ABSTRACT
The purpose of this paper
is to
address some of the questions on the notion of
agent in
relation to property and personhood. I argue that following the Kantian
criticism
of Aristotelian metaphysics, contemporary biotechnology and information
and communication technology bring about
a new
challenge -- this time with regard to the Kantian moral subject
understood in the subject's
unique metaphysical qualities of dignity and autonomy. The concept of
human
dignity underlies the foundation of many democratic systems,
particularly
in Europe
as well as of international treaties, including the Universal
Declaration of
Human Rights.
Digital agents,
artificial organisms as well as
new
capabilities
of the human agents related to their embeddedness in digital and
biotechnological environments bring about an important transformation
of
the
human self appraisal. A critical comparative reflection of this
transformation
is an important because of its ethical implications.
I deal first with the concept of
agent within the framework of Aristotelian philosophy,
which is the
basis for
further theories in accordance with and/or opposition to it,
particularly since
Modernity. In the second part of this paper, I deal with the concept of
personhood in
Kantian
philosophy, which supersedes the Aristotelian metaphysics of substance
and builds
the basis of a metaphysics of the moral human subject. In the third
part, I discuss
the question of artificial agents arising from modern biology and ICT.
Blurring
the difference between the human and the natural and/or artificial
opens a "new
space" for philosophical reflection as well as for debate in law and
practical
policy.