INTRODUCTION
Social life is increasingly ruled by
algorithms. What is an algorithm? It is a digital tool to help to find
solutions to problems. IT companies have created powerful algorithms
that allow
personalized searches creating individual and social profiles that are
a basis
not only for the digital economy but also for political and social
processes,
locally and globally. This social dimension of algorithms is not
obvious. There
is the classical technical definition
by Donald E. Knuth in The Art of Computer
Programming:
The
modern
meaning for algorithm is quite similar to that of recipe,
process, technique, procedure, routine, except that the
word "algorithm" connotes something just a little different. Besides
merely being a finite set of rules which gives a sequence of operations
for
solving a specific type of problem, an algorithm has five important
features: finiteness, definiteness, input, output,
effectiveness. (Knuth 1968/69 apud
Ziegenbalg 1996, 23).
What happens when algorithms with such
"important features" are at the core of all kinds of social
processes, industrial techniques, and everyday routines? After the
invention of
the internet, the cultural dimension of algorithms has become apparent:
On
the most
fundamental level, they are what one can call anthropologically
entrenched in us, their creators and users. In
other words, there is a "constitutive entanglement" where "it is
not only us that make them, they also make us" (Introna and Hayes 2011,
108). Indeed, the problem with such mutual imbrication is that
algorithms
cannot be fully 'revealed,' but only unpacked to a certain extent. What
is
more, they always find themselves temporally
entrenched, so to speak. They come to life with their own rhythm,
or, to
use Shitaro Miyasaki's description in this volume, "they need
unfolding,
and thus they embody time" (p. 129). (Seyfert & Roberge 2016, 2)
Algorithms are implicitly or explicitly
designed within the framework of social customs. They are embedded in
cultures
from scratch. According to the phenomenologist Lucas Introna, creators
and
users are "impressed" by
algorithms (Introna 2016). The "impressionable subject," however, is
not the modern subject detached from the so-called outside world, but a
plurality of selves sharing a common world that is algorithmically
intertwined.
What is ethically at stake when dealing with algorithms becomes part of
human mores? What is the nature of this
entanglement between human mores and
algorithms? To what extent can it be said that algorithms are, in fact,
cultural? Who is responsible for the decisions taken by algorithms? To
what
extent is this anthropomorphic view on algorithms legitimate in order
to
understand what algorithms are? These are some foundational questions
when
dealing with the ethics of algorithms that is in an incipient state
(Mittelstadt et al. 2016). This paper deals with the difference between
who and
what we are in order to take an ethical perspective on algorithms and
their
regulation. The present casting of ourselves as homo
digitalis (Capurro 2017) opens the possibility of reifying
ourselves algorithmically. The main ethical challenge for the inrolling
digital
age consists in unveiling the ethical difference, particularly when
addressing
the nature of algorithms and their ethical and legal regulation.
1.
UNVEILING
AND CONCEALING THE ETHICAL DIFFERENCE
In The
Human Condition Hannah Arendt writes:
In
acting and
speaking, men show who they are, reveal actively their unique personal
identities and thus make their appearance in the human world, while
their
physical identities appear without any activity of their own in the
unique
shape of the body and sound of the voice. This disclosure of "who" in
contradistinction to "what" somebody is―his qualities, gifts,
talents, and shortcomings, which he may display or hide―is implicit in
everything somebody says and does. It can be hidden only in complete
silence
and perfect passivity, but its disclosure can almost never be achieved
as a
wilful purpose, as though one possessed and could dispose of this
"who" in the same manner he has and can dispose of his qualities. On
the contrary, it is more than likely that the "who," which appears so
clearly and unmistakably to others, remains hidden from the person
himself,
like the daimōn in Greek religion
which accompanies each man throughout his life, always looking over his
shoulder from behind and thus visible only to those he encounters.
(Arendt
1998, 179-180)
Human whoness is nothing permanent and
substantial. It is not the immortal soul, not the Cartesian res
cogitans, and not noumenal Kantian personhood. It
happens
as an encounter. We conceal and reveal who we are through mutually
acknowledging or disacknowledging on the basis of shared customs,
rules, values
and practices, i.e., culturally. This concept of whoness
(Capurro et al. 2013) echoes the Latin concept of persona,
the mask or role of theatre
players. It also echoes the non-substantial view of the self in Eastern
traditions (Elberfeld 2017, 274-327) and, on a different account, David
Hume's
concept of "personal identity." He writes:
For
my part,
when I enter most intimately into what I call myself,
I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of
heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred. I never can catch myself at anytime without a perception,
and never can observe anything but the perception. [...] The mind is a
kind of
theatre, where several perceptions successively make their appearance
[...]
(Hume 1962, 259)
The reification of our "qualities,
gifts, talents and shortcomings" in digital media is deeply ambiguous.
It
suggests it is the truth about who we are, while in fact it
(re-)presents
digital profiles of ourselves. An adequate medium to unveil this
ambiguity is,
precisely, theatre.
Shakespeare's Hamlet, Prince of Denmark
is a paramount example of a plot that does not intend to offer a
solution for
the problem of life but to unveil it through questioning human
identity.
Bernardo, an officer, starts the play by asking: "Who's there?" The
question being repeated by Horatio, a friend to Hamlet. The Ghost
enters.
Bernardo says: "In the same figure, like the king that's dead."
Horatio, desperately, says: "Stay! speak, speak! I charge thee,
speak!" The Ghost exits. Marcellus, another officer, states
laconically:
"'Tis gone, and will not answer." (Shakespeare 2010, Hamlet I, 1,
2233-2235). "[M]en’s minds are wild" states Horatio at the end of the
play. "Music and the rites of war" should "speak loudly"
for the dead Hamlet who is brought to stage "like a soldier."
(Shakespeare 2010, Hamlet, V, 2, 2332) Who is Hamlet? "What is behind a name?" asks Thomas
Ostermeier in whose staging of Hamlet
he, Hamlet, is not present (Ostermeier 2017, 96). "The whole world
plays
the player" ("Die ganze Welt spielt den Schauspieler") is
Ostermeier's German translation of "All the world's a stage" in
Shakespeare's As you Like it
(Shakespeare 2010,
II, 7, 626) (Ostermeier 2017, 98). "To act means to play"
("Handeln heißt spielen") writes Ostermeier (ibid.). Hesitation
or
delay in answering, is proper to good
human interplay being exposed to "the whole world," i.e., to
situations that she cannot foresee or even master in its entirety,
requiring
the possibility of taking her time for hesitation before
decision-making. According
to Ostermeier, many of the catastrophes of the last century "were due
to a
lack of time for hesitation that would have given place for thinking
over and
for reflection" (Ostermeier 2017, 99, transl. RC).
Algorithms know nothing about hesitation.
In fact, they know nothing at all and they do not learn. They are
heteronomous.
They are not played by the world, but by human designers and users. The
question about who we are is about the being of the who. Asking this question
means avoiding the confusion about as who we play with
the belief that this
possibility is, in fact, the only and true one, making a fixation out
of an
interpretation. When it comes to human beings, their being
is a matter of interpretation who one is as a player
with other players in the drama of life. The Australian
phenomenologist Michael Eldred writes:
Who
one is is always a matter of having adopted
certain masks of identity reflected
from the world as offers of who one could be in the world. Each human
being is
an origin of his or her own
self-movement and has an effect on
the surroundings, changing them this way or that, intentionally or
unintentionally. [...] The core mask of identity borne by a who (Gr.
τίς, L.
quis) is one's own proper name, around
which other masks cluster. (Eldred 2013, 22-23)
An ethics of algorithms deals with making
this difference theoretically and practically between who and what we
are by
resisting the tendency to confuse or even to identify ourselves (our
selves)
with masks that we give to ourselves or others give to us. This
confusion comes
to a head when we believe we can attribute moral responsibility to
algorithms
that are supposed to be a kind of who whatsoever. Hamlet,
Prince of Denmark represents on stage this interplay of
masking and unmasking ourselves. It is a key theatre play when it comes
to
unmasking the ethos of a society
driven by algorithms. Algorithms implement digital reifications of who
we are
and what roles we play in the drama of life. Ethics of algorithms faces
the
challenge of the extent to which and under what rules we (who?) want
algorithms
to play a role in the human interplay on the stage that is the world.
2. ENCULTURATING ALGORITHMS
We build our individual and social ways of
being (ethos) through what Hannah
Arendt calls "the ‘web’ of human relationships" (Arendt 1998, 183).
Human interplay is risky because human agents face the contingencies of
their
past, present and future actions and interpretations and the risks of
ongoing
power play with others. This makes a difference between the human
interplay and
the interaction between non-human actors. Michael Eldred puts the
difference interplay and interaction
in dialogue with Hannah Arendt as follows:
The
realm or
dimension she is addressing, of ‘people... acting and speaking
together’
(27:198) through which they show to each other who they are and perhaps
come to
‘full appearance [in] the shining
brightness we once called glory’ (24: 180), is not that of action and
reaction,
no matter (to employ Arendt's own words) how surprising, unexpected,
unpredictable, boundless social interaction may be, but of interplay.
It is the play that has to be understood, not the
action, and it is no accident that play is also that which takes place
on a
stage, for she understands the dimension of ‘acting and speaking’
(27:199),
revealing and disclosing their selves as who
they are. On the other hand, interplay takes place also in private: in
the
interplay of love as a groundlessly grounding way to be who with
another, where
speaking easily becomes hollow. (Eldred 2013, 83)
The implicit and explicit moral and legal
norms and values of human interplay can today be reified in the digital
medium
through algorithms that shine back onto the players when personal
digital data
of whatever kind are at stake. This shining-back on the social players
can be a
means of promotion or destruction not only of what people produce
within and
outside the digital network but also of their own interpretation of who
they
are or want to be. In-between these two poles, namely promotion or
destruction,
there is a lot of possibilities that should be carefully analyzed and
evaluated
due to the ambiguities inherent in this intertwining between the
interplay of
freedoms and its digital reification with various kinds of masking and
unmasking options and procedures. An example of this ambiguity is the
use of
algorithms for pre-crime analysis aiming at unmasking potential
criminals. From
the perspective of algorithmic search we are nothing but a bunch of
data.
Algorithms can map and track our digital identities. But nobody can
guarantee
that such a public persona matches me and not someone else. Everyone is
under
general suspicion and everything we do on the internet on any kind of
devices
connected with the internet leaves our digital footprint that might be
used or
misused for or against us and others in both the digital and the
material
world. The result is a tension between two moods of being-in-the-world,
namely
trust and anxiety (Capurro 2005).
Algorithms might strengthen or weaken our
"symbolic immune systems" such as moral and legal norms and values
(Sloterdijk 2009). As in the case of biological immune systems, we must
pay
attention to the changing environment not only by using but by
observing
algorithms, using them, paradoxically, for such a purpose (Algorithm
Watch
2017). To be digitally observed, or not to be, that is the question. Or
as John
Lanchester puts it: "You Are the Product" (Lanchester 2017).
Protecting us from algorithms means to
resist
becoming identified by algorithmic observation everywhere, all the
time, using
and being (ab-)used, for instance, through mobile phones. To resist
means
learning to reveal and conceal
ourselves through a kind of guerrilla tactics
that Brunton and Nissenbum
call "obfuscation" (Brunton & Nissenbaum 2015).
The ethical and legal challenge is about explicitly
enculturating algorithms,
paying attention to the contexts in
which, for what, by whom, and for whom they are created and used. Helen
Nissenbaum writes:
Contexts
are
structured social settings characterized by canonical activities,
roles,
relationships, power structures, norms (or rules), and internal values
(goals,
ends, purposes). Contexts are ‘essentially rooted in specific times and
places’
that reflect the norms and values of a given society. (Nissenbaum 2010,
132-133)
Algorithms with their "five important
features: finiteness, definiteness,
input, output, effectiveness" (Donald Knuth) are embedded from
scratch
in contexts, i.e., in social norms and values. Norms and values arise
in the
three-dimensional temporal in-between as which the human interplay of
interests
and traditions takes place. Unveiling the temporality shaped by
algorithms is a
key task for a future phenomenology of algorithms. Understanding
algorithms as cultural
practices means to critically reflect on the assemblages
of institutions, values, and norms in which they are
explicitly or implicitly embedded (Stalder 2016). Algorithms are
reified
social
practices whose norms and regulations must be hermeneutically
questioned and
reconsidered in view of the operations and intentions of their users
and
producers (Dobusch 2013). Algorithmic decision-making (ADM) is not
neutral just
because it is logical and executed by a machine. The cultural framework
within
which algorithms are ethically and legally embedded is not a permanent
and
unquestionable basis, at least in democratic systems. The weakness of
such
systems becomes problematic when considering, for instance, the
presumable
Russian influence on the U.S.
presidential elections via Facebook, Google and Twitter. In a
centralized
one-party system like China
in search of a Confucius-based harmonious
society, algorithms are a powerful instrument for political
surveillance.
The Confucian tradition aiming at ruling
society can be weakened when considering the Taoist tradition according
to
which societal processes are embedded in a larger natural framework.
Taoist
thinking looks for regulation in the
sense of, for instance, regulating the current of a river. Such a kind
of flow
regulation is based on the maxim: ‘Don't block!' which is a translation
of the
Taoist concept of wu wei or
non-action (Jullien 2005). Wu wei
means not acting against the laws of nature as well as paying attention
to the changes in social settings. Blockages of
different kinds, such as information overload, can arise due to a lack
of legal
rules but also to ways of ruling and regulating information flows
(Capurro
2010). These questions are particularly relevant in the present debate
over
autonomous cars.
3.
ENCULTURATING AUTONOMOUS CARS
On
December 8, 1926 The Milwaukee Sentinel announced:
"'Phantom Auto' will tour
city":
A
‘phantom motor
car’ will haunt the streets of Milwaukee today.
Driverless, it will start its own motor, throw in its clutch, twist its
steering wheel, toots its horn, and it may even ‘sass’ the policeman at
the
corner. The ‘master mind’ that will guide the machine as it prowls in
and out
of the busy traffic will be a radio set in a car behind. Commanding
waves sent
from the second machine will be caught by a receiving set in the ‘ghost
car’.
The tour, conducted by the Achen Motor company, will start at 11.30
a.m. from
the company's rooms at Oneida and
Jackson streets [...] (Quote apud
Capurro 2017, 115)
Thirty years later, the US The Central
Power and Light Company
foresaw the future of driverless cars this way:
ELECTRICITY
MAY BE THE DRIVER. One day a car may speed
along an
electric super-highway, its speed and steering automatically controlled
by
electronic devices embedded in the road. Highways will be made safe –
by
electricity! No traffic jams ... no collisions ... no driver fatigue.
(The
Victoria Advocate 1957, quote apud
Capurro 2017, 116)
Today it seems, on the one hand, as if in
the near future, say, in a decade or so, driverless cars controlled by
algorithms will become an obvious option or even, as some experts think
(AD
2025), the most successful paradigm for global and local mobility.
Anxiety when
it comes to trusting algorithms or not as car drivers might diminish or
even
disappear according to the "familiarity principle." (Leonhardt 2017,
Capurro 2005) But, on the other hand,
nobody can guarantee that algorithms can deal with the complexity and
unforeseeability of mobility in situations in which pedestrians, young
and
old, cars driven by humans, bikes, dogs etc. come into play, following
(or not)
implicit or explicit rules and laws that vary according to cultural
traditions,
individual preferences, and ad hoc
decisions. What is supposed to reduce complexity and diminish the
lethal
consequences of today's mobility systems by relying on algorithms,
sensors of
all kinds, in cars as well in the roads, GPS control, etc. might become
a
nightmare if, for instance, hackers misuse the system for terrorist
attacks
(Capurro 2017b).
That said, we must consider that the
present ethical and legal debate over autonomous cars should be
addressed as
part of the broader issue about the digitalization of society in
general and
mobility in particular. The ethics of algorithms with regard to
autonomous cars
deals so far mainly with questions of accountability, responsibility
and
so-called distributed morality, where moral responsibility might be
applied
analogically to artificial agents (Mittelstadt
et al. 2016, 10-12, Floridi and Sanders
2004). Autonomy as
a technical concept concerns different levels at which cars might be
more or
less autonomous with regard to the intervention of a driver inside or
outside
the car or of a whole surveillance and digital track system. In this
case,
mobility could be designed exclusively for autonomous cars in order
to avoid
so-called ethical dilemmas that arise when moral and legal rules
embedded in
algorithms become a matter of autonomous interpretation in
unforeseeable
situations. This concept of autonomy contrasts with the philosophical
concept
qualifying human beings whose actions have their origin in themselves.
In their
critique of computer systems as moral agents Deborah Johnson and Keith
Miller
write:
Obviously,
there
are levels of abstraction in which computer behaviour appears
autonomous, but
the appropriate use of the term ‘autonomous’ at one level of
abstraction does
not mean that computer systems are, therefore, ‘autonomous’ in some
broad and
general sense. We should not allow the existence of a particular level
of
abstraction to determine the outcome of the broader debate about the
moral
agency of computer systems. (Johnson and Miller 2008,
132)
A comparative theory of agents must
address, historically and systematically, different concepts of agents
and
autonomy in order to avoid misleading analogies and equivocal uses of
this and
other concepts that originate when the ethical difference between who
and what
is no longer being perceived as a
difference (Capurro 2015). What kind of mobility makes sense for a
society?
What are the options among different kinds of assemblages of means of
mobility?
What is the trade-off of such assemblages with regard to the
environment? How
can automated and autonomous driving be embedded in different societal
customs
and needs, geographic environments, etc.? In other words, enculturating
algorithms is a key issue with regard to autonomous driving. With the
invention
of the car, we defined ourselves as car drivers following the long
tradition of
reflection on the tasks and qualities of steering ships (kybernetes)
or the six-thousand-year tradition of learning how to
handle horses (Raulff 2015). Different kinds of practices on how to
move or
being moved in the world shine back on ourselves. This is also the case
with
autonomous driving when we trust algorithms to steer the movement of a
car in
view of goals given by ourselves. What is a car in the 21st century?
What kind
of recasting of the relation between man and world takes place with the
invention of autonomous cars? How will this invention be adopted and
adapted by
different cultures? What kind of new forms of social inclusion and
exclusion
will this new form of mobility bring to humans in different societies
and
environments?
PROSPECTS
Enculturating algorithms is a broad
interdisciplinary and intercultural field. In the introduction to their
book Understanding Computers and Cognition. A New
Foundation for Design published in 1986, Terry Winograd and
Fernando Flores
write: "[...] in designing tools we are designing ways of being."
(Winograd and Flores 1986, xi). Interpreting algorithms as
ways of being means taking a critical stance with regard not
only to calculating thinking in general and algorithms in particular,
but to
our belief in them that becomes
exacerbated in the 21st century. When such belief becomes predominant,
the
ethical difference might be perceived either as an anthropocentric
ideology or
simply as a myth arising from pre-scientific or anti-technological
thinking. In The Science of Logic Hegel writes:
Since
calculation is so much of an external and therefore mechanical
business, it has
been possible to manufacture machines
that perform arithmetical
operations with
complete accuracy. It is
enough to know this fact alone about the nature of calculation to
decide on the
merit of the idea
of making it the main instrument of the education of spirit, of
stretching
spirit on the rack in order to perfect it as a machine. (Hegel 2010,
181-182)
Modified
translation of the second sentence by the author added Febr. 23,
2020: If one only knew this fact about the nature
of calculation,
the meaning of the decision could be found there about the idea of
making it
the main instrument to forming the spirit, stretching it on the rack to
perfect
it as a machine.
Weil das Rechnen ein so sehr äußerliches,
somit mechanisches Geschäft ist, haben sich Maschinen verfertigen lassen,
welche die arithmetischen Operationen aufs vollkommenste
vollführen. Wenn man über die Natur des Rechnens nur diesen
Umstand allein kennte, so läge darin die Entscheidung, was es mit
dem Einfalle für eine Bewandtnis hatte, das Rechnen zum
Hauptbildungsmittel des Geistes zu machen und ihn auf die Folter, sich
zur Maschine zu vervollkommnen, zu legen. (Hegel 1976, 249)
In the last two hundred
years the concept of spirit/mind (Geist) has been object of
theoretical
and practical critique in such a way that it lost its meaning as dynamis or capacity for changing the
relationship between ourselves and world. The Marxian demand to change
the
world instead of just interpreting it (Marx 1969) begs the question,
since no
change of the relationship between ourselves and world is possible if
not based
on a previous recasting of it. Geist,
our historical mind, is our original and originating capacity for such
recasting. Only if we acknowledge this capacity can we cope with the
challenges
of an age in which human mental creativity is to be ostensibly
perfected as an
algorithm. In doing so, we give up what enables us to originate
different
castings of ourselves and the world, including the present digital one.
The
power of calculation might become a source of liberation by
enculturating
algorithms instead of stretching human mental creativity on the rack of
algorithmically controlled computers.
REFERENCES
AD 2025. The automated driving
community.
Algorithm Watch (2017)
Arendt,
Hannah
(1998). The Human
Condition. Chicago
and London: The University of Chicago
Press, 2nd Ed.
Beuth, Patrick (2017).
Feinbild Algorithmus. In: DIE
ZEIT, October 14.
Brunton, Finn,
Nissenbaum, Helen (2015). Obfuscation. A
user’s guide
for privacy and protest. Cambridge,
Mass.: The MIT Press.
Capurro, Rafael
(2017).
Homo
Digitalis. Beiträge zur Ontologie, Anthropologie und Ethik
der digitalen
Technik. Heidelberg:
Springer.
Capurro, Rafael
(2017a). Ethical Issues
of
Humanoid-Human Interaction. In: Prahlad Vadakkepat, Ambarish
Goswami,
Jong-Hwan
Kim (eds.): Handbook of Humanoids. Springer 2017.
Capurro, Rafael
(2017b). Autonomous Zombies
are not an option. In: 2015
AD. The Automated Driving Community, June 28.
Capurro, Rafael
(2015). Toward a
Comparative Theory of Agents. In: Mathias
Gutmann, Michael Decker, Julia Knifka (Eds.):
Evolutionary
Robotics, Organic Computing and Adaptive Ambience. Vienna: LIT, 2015, 81-96.
Capurro, Rafael
(2010). The
Dao of the
Information Society in China
and the Task of Intercultural Information Ethics.
Capurro, Rafael
(2005). Between Trust and
Anxiety. On the Moods of Information Society. In: Richard Keeble
(ed.):
Communication Ethics Today. Leicester:
Troubadour Publishing Ltd., 2005, 187-196.
Capurro, Rafael,
Eldred, Michael and Nagel,
Daniel (2013). Digital
Whoness. Identity, Privacy and Freedom in the
Cyberworld. Berlin:
de Gruyter.
Dobusch, Leonhard
(2013). Tag
Archive:
Algorithm Regulation #4: Algorithm as a Practice. January 14. In:
Leonhard
Dobusch, Philip Mader and Sigrid Quack: governance across borders.
transnational
fields and transversal themes. a blogbook.
Elberfeld, Rolf
(2017).
Philosophieren in einer globalisierten Welt. Wege zu einer
transformativen
Phänomenologie. Freiburg/München: Alber.
Eldred, Michael
(2013). Phenomenology of whoness: identity,
privacy, trust and
freedom. In
Rafael Capurro, Michael Eldred & Daniel Nagel, Daniel: Digital Whoness: Identity, Privacy and
Freedom in the Cyberworld. Berlin: de
Gruyter 2013, 19-59.
Floridi, Luciano
and
Sanders, Jeff W.
(2004). On
the Morality of Artificial Agents. Minds and Machines 2004, 14 (3),
349-379.
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich
(2010). The
Science of Logic, transl. and ed. G. di Giovanni, Cambridge University
Press. (German: G.W.F. Hegel: Wissenschaft der Logik, Werke 5,
Frankfurt a.M. 1976)
Hume, David
(1962). A
Treatise of Human
Nature. In: On Human Nature And the Understanding, ed. A. Flew. New York:
Collier.
Introna, Lucas
(2016).
The algorithmic
choreography of the impressionable subject In: Robert
Seyfert & Jonathan Roberge (eds.):
Algorithmic Cultures: Essays on Meaning, Performance and New
Technologies. London and New York:
Routledge, 26-51.
Johnson, Deborah
G. and
Miller, Keith W.
(2008). Un-making artificial moral agents. Ethics and Information
Technology 10, 123-133.
Jullien,
François
(2005). Nourrir sa vie. À l'écart du bonheur. Paris: Seuil.
Knuth, Donald
(1968/69). The Art of
Computer Programming. Reading,
Mass.:
Addison-Wesley.
Lanchester, John
(2017). You
Are the
Product. In: London
Review of Books, Vol. 39 No. 16, 3-10.
Leonhardt, David
(2017). Driverless
Cars
Made me Nervous. Then I Tried One. In:
The New York Times International Weekly, October 22.
Marx, Karl (1969). Thesen
über Feuerbach: In: Marx-Engels Werke, 3, Berlin: Dietz Verlag.
Mittelstadt, Brent
Daniel, Allo, Patrick, Taddeo, Mariarosaria, Wachter, Sandra, and
Floridi,
Luciano (2016). The
ethics of algorithms: Mapping the
debate. Big Data & Society, July–December 1–21.
Nissenbaum, Helen
(2010). Privacy in
Context. Technology, Policy, and the Integrity of Social Life. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Ostermeier, Thomas
(2017). Hamlet in der Mausefalle. In: Lettre International 118, 96-101.
Raulff, Ulrich (2015).
Das letzte Jahrhundert der Pferde. Geschichte einer Trennung.
München: Beck.
Seyfert, Robert
and
Roberge, Jonathan
(eds.) (2016). Algorithmic Cultures: Essays on Meaning, Performance and
New
Technologies. London and New York:
Routledge.
Shakespeare,
William
(2010). Hamlet, Prince
of Denmark.
In: Sämtliche Werke 2. Frankfurt am
Main: Zweitausendeins, 2233-2332.
Sloterdijk, Peter
(2009):
Du musst dein Leben ändern. Über Anthropotechnik. Frankfurt
am Main: Suhrkamp.
Stalder, Felix (2016).
Kultur der Digitalität. Berlin: Suhrkamp Verlag.
Winograd, Terry,
Flores,
Fernando (1986). Understanding Computers and
Cognition.
A New Foundation for Design. Norwood,
NJ: Ablex.
Ziegenbalg, Jochen
(1996). Algorithmen: von Hammurapi bis Gödel. Heidelberg, Berlin, Oxford:
Spektrum
Akademischer Verlag.
Last update: March 16, 2021