Joseph Weizenbaum 2021 Award in Information and Computer Ethics

Artificial smart systems "behaving as though guided by intelligence" interact with natural human and animal smart intelligence. What makes the difference? Firstly, natural smart intelligence arises from the being itself and concerns its own goals. Artificial smart systems get their goals from the outside even if they can further develop it by giving the impression "as though" they were their own. Secondly, their intelligence is based on stochastic processes. Such processes are random as opposed to deterministic ones.

The Greek word stochastikós is derived from stocházomai meaning aim at a target, from Greek stóchos aim. Artificial smart systems — or, better to say, their human designers let — calculate the best way to attain a goal given to them based on stochastic models that they can change as if they were learning not only by themselves but also for themselves as in the case of natural smart systems. They can do this quickly and shrewd as if they were making a conjecture about the best way to attain a goal as if it were their own goal. Hubert Dreyfus did foundational work on the difference between expert systems, the smart systems at that time, and human experts (Dreyfus 1972). His phenomenological and hermeneutic arguments are as fresh as they were fifty years ago.

Ethics in the age of smart systems means to ask the question of the relation between cunning intelligence and moral intelligence called prudence (phronesis) by Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics (Aristotle 1962; Capurro 2020). Although Aristotle does not use the term metis he uses other similar terms such as skill (deinotes) and cunning (panourgia). Skill is praised in case the goals are good, otherwise it is just cunning. Prudence (phronesis) implies cunning but not vice versa. Wickedness (mochtheria) and falsehood (diapseudesthai) distort the judgement of reason (Aristotle, NE 1143 b 23-36). Phronesis mediates between the knowledge of what is permanent (sophia) and the realm of human action (ta anthrophina) particularly regarding the means to attain happiness (eudaimonia) (Aristotle, NE 1143 b 20).

The reason why metis is not mentioned by Aristotle in his analysis of the relation between phronesis and cunning intelligence might be his taking a critical distance of mythical metis as well as its use in human and non-human contexts blurring the differences. Aristotle acknowledges that some animals have the capacity of previewing (dynamin pronoetiken) but he does not agree with "some people" who believe that "animals have prudence (phronima)." (Aristotle, NE 1141 a 27). Detienne and Vernant remark that the link between human logos and living beings without logos (aloga zoia) might become problematic if human phronesis interferes with animal intelligence although he gives conjectural knowledge a positive value in contrast to Plato who devalues knowledge based on probability as contrary to the ethical value of temperance (sophrosyne). For Aristotle, sagacity (anchinoia) implies a certain flexibility of the soul in contrast to the quietness (hesuchia) of temperance (Detienne and Vernant 1974, 304-306).

The Aristotelian analysis of the relation between phronesis and cunning intelligence provides a framework for dealing with today's ethical issues of smart systems that can be compared, for instance, with the famous Chinese "Thirty-six stratagems" as analyzed by Swiss sinologist Harro von Senger (Senger 1993). 

Where, for whom, to what extent, and at what price do smart systems make sense? What are the limits of their use in private and political life? What is good as a possibility for the community as a whole and what is good for me or for us? What should we promote or forbid by law and what should we not? How can we initiate a lasting (academic and daily) critical reflection on good living with smart systems?

Immanuel Kant wondered: «Do we live in an enlightened age?» (Kant, 1975, 59). Even if the answer was no, he did think it was an age of enlightenment. Kant expected that when the «the urge for and the vocation of free thought» had developed, it would gradually impact not only the population, making citizens more capable of «acting in freedom», but also on «the fundamentals of government», which would treat humans, «who is now more than a machine, in accord with his dignity» (Kant, 1975, p. 61). What better guidance for thinking and acting in digital futures than these words by Kant published in Königsberg on 30 September 1784? The dignity of the human person that wonders «who am I?» is different to its digitalisation, which can change and answers the question «what am I?» (Capurro, 2017b; Capurro, Eldred, & Nagel, 2013). Smart systems behave "as though guided by intelligence", that is to say, as if they were guided by a 'who' while in fact it is just a reified one, or a 'what'.

The difference between who and what is the basis of ethical thinking particularly in the age of smart systems. We must learn the vocation of free thinking  outside the greenhorn field of algorithms guiding smart systems (Seyfert & Roberge, 2016), and to this end we must expand  the concept of digital enlightenment or digital  literacy (Limberg, Sundin, & Talja, 2012). This is because this concept is generally understood as education in the use of digital technologies in general and smart systems in particular and not as the task of reflecting upon individual and collective life and considering sustainable digital futures.

Do we live in a smart age? No, we live in the age of smart systems that looks sometimes as they behaved as  guided by intelligence while being, in fact, stupid. The ethical challenge is to envisage smart living within and beyond the stochastic horizon of smart systems. To put it shortly: Take your time! Be smart in the age of smart systems.

REFERENCES
 

Aristotle (1962). Ethica Nicomachea. I. Bywater  (Ed.). Oxford: Clarendon Press. 

Capurro, R., Eldred, M., & Nagel, D. (2013). Digital whoness. Identity, privacy and freedom in the cyberworld. Berlin: De Gruyter.

Capurro, Rafael (2020). Pseudangelia - Pseudangelos. On  false messages and messengers in Ancient Greece. In: Informatio 25(1), 2020, 106-131.
Retrieved from https://informatio.fic.edu.uy/index.php/informatio/article/view/246

Detienne, Marcel, Vernant, Jean-Pierre (1991). Cunning intelligence in Greek culture and society. University of Chicago Press (Engl. Transl. Janet Lloyd. Orig. Les ruses de l'intelligence. La mètis des Grecs, Paris 1974).

Dreyfus, Hubert L. (1972). What Computers Can't Do: the Limits of Artificial Intelligence. New York: MIT Press.

Guzzoni, Ute (1999). Das Philosophieren und die List. In: Harro von Senger (ed.): Die List. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 386-423.

Kant, I. (1975). Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung? In: Schriften zur Anthropologie, Geschichtsphilosophie, Politik und Pädagogik, 53–61. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft. 

Leibniz, G.W. (1996). Dialogus (1677). In: Schriften zur Logik und zur philosophischen Grundlegung von Mathematik und Naturwissenschaft. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 23-37.

Limberg, L., Sundin, O., & Talja, S. (2012). Three theoretical perspectives on information literacy. Human IT, 11(2), 93–130. 
Retrieved from https://humanit.hb.se/article/view/69/51

Marx, K. (1969). Thesen über Feuerbach. Marx-Engels Werke, 3. Berlin: Dietz. 
Retrieved from http://www.mlwerke.de/me/me03/me03_005.htm

Morozov, E. (2013). To save everything, click here: The folly of technological solutionism. New York: Public Affairs.

Oxford Learner's Dictionaries
Retrieved from https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/definition/american_english/smart_1

Oxford Etymology Dictionary
Retrieved from https://www.etymonline.com/word/smart

Seyfert, R., & Roberge, J. (Eds.). (2016). Algorithmic cultures: Essays on meaning, performance and new technologies. London/New York: Routledge.

Senger, Harro von (1993). The Book of Stratagems: Tactics for Triumph and Survival. London: Penguin Books.

Senger, Harro von (Ed.) (1999a). Die List. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

Zuboff, S. (2019). The age of surveillance capitalism: The fight for a human future at the new frontier of power. New York: Public Affairs.

• German Scientific Information Policy 1974-1986 (Deutsche Fachinformationspolitik 1974-1986)
  
• Information Economy (Informationsökonomie)
• Structure of Scientific Information in Germany (Struktur der Fachinformation in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland)
• Origin and Development of Information Science (Zur Entstehung und Entwicklung der Informationswissenschaft)
  
• Research and Education in Information Science in the Federal Republic of Germany (Forschung und Ausbildung auf dem Gebiet der Informationswissenschaft in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland).
  

• Beijing
  
• CAE
  
• Beijing University (founded in 1898)
  
• Department of Philosophy (Prof. Liu Xiaogan)
• University Library
• Department of Library and Information Science
  
• Xi'an: University of Technology
• University Library
• Library and Information Science Division (founded in 1983)
  
• Chongqin
• University Library
  
• Guilin
• Guangzhou
  
• Hong Kong

HOST GIFT





MIRROR

The signs at the back of the mirror say:

five sons achieve office/rank, which is a sign of virtue of the family

Top: Five
Bottom: Son(s)
Right: Reach/Achieve
Left: Government Office/Exam

VASE

 for painter's brushes






BOWLS






TAO TE CHING

中国信息社会之"道"与互文化信息伦理

本文以法国汉学家弗朗索瓦．于连的洞见为基楚来讨论直接与间接话语在＂远东＂和＂远西＂的区别。
这个区别主要不是一个语法上或修辞上的区别，
而是一个关于存在性的区别。
它涉及到人与世界的关系，
并旨在为思考信息社会的伦理道德问题提供一个互文化的基础。
我认为＂远西＂的信息道德观及其伦理思索强调直接话语的原则，
而间接话语的原则则构成＂远东＂人际交往的基础。
在本文的第一部分，我將会解释＂远西＂对直接与间接话语这个区别的理解，
然后在第二部分说明这个区别在＂远东＂的相关性和差异，
並在最后提出这个区别对中国信息社会及互文化对话的重要性。
(Transl. Pak-Hang Wong)

Review of the Conference

See also Wong Pak-Hang

CHINESE MEDIA REPORTS ABOUT THE CONFERENCE
(broken links)

http://www.wenming.cn/gzyd/2010-10/29/content_21264656.htm
http://news1.ruc.edu.cn/102392/71456.html
http://info.ruc.edu.cn/news/newsdetails/966
http://www.sinoss.net/2010/1029/27469.html

Interpreting the Digital Human (2008). Chinese translation Alien blog, 2013

Intercultural Information Ethics. Chinese translation by Junlan Liang (Chinese Academy of Social Sciences) 2011

The Dao of the Information Society in China and the Task of Intercultural Information Ethics  2010.
Chinese translation of the whole paper by Junlan Liang, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.



Towards an Ontological Foundation of Information Ethics  in: Ethics & Information Technology, 8, 4, 2006, 175-186. Chinese translation in: Shanghai Shifan Daxue Xuebao 2006, 05, 24-35.

"Following the path of thought about considering the Dao as information, I sent an email to Xueshan Yan from the Department of Information Management, Peking University,
— who could not take part of the ISIS conference but who is a member of FIS — asking him
about the Chinese sign for information and its relation with breathing and information. He
answered me as follows:
"The expression of Information in Chinese is 信息（pronunciation: xin xi). 信 in ancient
Chinese has the meaning of "say something by mouth", "letter"; in modern Chinese it
means message (informal or small information); only 息 has the meaning of breathing
both in ancient and modern Chinese. If separated 信 or 息 do not have any relationship
with Dao. Only when they are combined together the meaning of Dao can emerge."
(Xueshan Yan, e-mail from September 8, 2015)
(Quote from p.8)

JOURNALS