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Contribution to the AI, Ethics and Society Conference, University of Alberta, Edmonton (Canada), May 8-10, 2019. In: International Review of Information Ethics (IRIE) July, 2020.
Technical University (TU) Berlin: Ringvorlesung (PowerPoint), Marchstr. 23, Raum MAR 1.001, 16:00, Febr 4, 2020.
Institute of Philosophy and Technology: IPT Talk Series 2022-2023. Athens, October 17, 2022.
Video
| Abstract The paper aims at presenting some
issues that arose when dealing with societal and ethical implications
of AI
since the seventies in which the author was involved. It is a narrative
on how
the understanding of AI dealt firstly with the question whether
machines can think. With the rise of
the
internet in the nineties the perception of AI turned, secondly,
into an
issue of what AI as distributed intelligence means with an impact at
all levels
of social life no less that at basic ethical issues of daily life. In a
breath-taking
use of AI for all kinds of societal goals and contexts, the awareness
grew, thirdly,
that all natural and artificial things might be digitally connected
with each
other and to human agents. In the conclusion some challenges
relating to
the development and use of artificial intelligences are mentioned as
well as
results of recent research done in academia, scientific associations
and
political bodies concerning the possibilities for good life with and
without
artificial intelligences. Introduction What does
Artificial Intelligence (AI) mean in a broad historical perspective?
This is a
question that has not only sociological implications but addresses the
basic
understanding of technology as not being purely instrumental but
shaping the
relation between man and world. AI is the spirit of our time that
conditions but
does not determine knowledge and action. The answer to this question is
a long
and complex analysis going back to the roots not only of Western
philosophy but
also to other philosophical traditions. My aim in this paper is to
recall some
facts and discuss some arguments related to societal and ethical
implications
of AI particularly since the seventies in which I was involved. My narrative
about AI deals firstly with the question originated from
cybernetics ―whether
a machine can think― and I do this with reference to authors such as
Alan
Turing, Norbert Wiener, Joseph Weizenbaum, and Hubert Dreyfus. With the
rise of
the Internet in the nineties the perception of AI turned, secondly,
into
an issue of what AI as distributed intelligence means with an impact at
all
levels of social life. This broad societal challenge was called
cyberspace; it
was commonly perceived as a kind of separate sphere from the real
world. This
dualism soon became untenable. In a breath-taking development of
digital
technology for all kinds of societal goals and contexts, the awareness
grew, thirdly,
that all natural and artificial things might be digitally connected
with each
other as well as to human agents into what is being called the Internet
of
Things. The interpretation of AI changed from the original question
whether
machines can think into the one of what natural and artificial things
are when
they become intelligent. I. Can machines
think?
At every stage of technique since Daedalus or
Hero of Alexandria, the
ability of the artificer to produce a working simulacrum of a living
organism
has always intrigued people. This desire to produce and to
study
automata has always been expressed in terms of the living technique of
the age.
In the days of magic, we have the bizarre and sinister concept of
the
Golem, that figure of clay into which the Rabbi of Prague breathed life
with the
blasphemy of the Ineffable Name of God. In the time of Newton, the
automaton
becomes the clockwork music box, with the little effigies pirouetting
stiffly
on top. In the nineteenth century, the automaton is a glorified
heat
engine, burning some combustible fuel instead of the glycogen of the
human
muscles. Finally, the present
automaton opens doors by means of photocells, or points guns to the
place at
which a radar beam picks up an airplane, or computes the solution of a
differential equation. (Wiener 1965, 39-40) We can
enlarge this history with regard to literature (Karol Capek: R.U.R.
Rossum's
Universal Robots 1921, Stanislaw Lem: Golem XIV, 1981; Isaac Asimov's
Three
Laws of robotics became famous through the collection I, Robot, 1950)
and
particularly to film (Fritz Lang: Metropolis 1927; Stanley Kubrick:
2001: A
Space Odyssey, 1968; Aaron Liptsadt:
Android, 1982; Ridley Scott: Blade Runner 1982; Gene Roddenberry: Star
Trek
1987-1994, Albert Pyn: Cyborg, 1989;
Steven Spielberg: A.I. Artificial Intelligence 2001; Alex Proyas: I.
Robot
2004). The term artificial intelligence was first used in a scientific
context
in a workshop at The word cybernetics
is of Greek origin. A cybernetes is the pilot of a ship facing
the
insecurity of starting or not a travel in view of the weather, the sea,
the robustness
of the ship, the support of the crew. The Greeks called metis
savvy intelligence
useful for any kind of risky endeavours. Metis has to do with
skills, prudence,
wisdom, cunning, and trickery (Detienne
and Vernant 1974). In a foundational text of Western thought, Aristotle
writes
in his Politics that in order to live well (eu zen)
lifeless (apsycha)
and living (empsycha) instruments (organon) are needed
for the
administration of the household (oikia). The rudder is such a
lifeless
instrument for the pilot of a ship, while a look-out man is a living
one.
Similarly, a slave (doulos) is a living possession which takes
the place
of all other instruments. He writes: If every instrument could accomplish its
own work, following a
command or anticipating it, like the statues of Daedalus, or the
tripods of
Hephaestus, which, says the poet, of their own accord (automatous)
entered the assembly of the Gods; if, in like manner, the shuttle
would
weave and the plectrum touch the lyre without a hand to guide
them, the
master builder (architektosin) would not need servants (hypereton), nor
masters (despotais) slaves (doulon). (Aristotle,
Politics,
1253 b
25-39, revised English translation, RC). Aristotle
addresses ironically a mythical society as a utopia where work is not
based on
the use of slaves but on lifeless
intelligent automata. Karl Marx quotes this text in Das Kapital
by
saying that neither Aristotle, "the greatest thinker of antiquity," nor
other thinkers could comprehend [t]he economic paradox, that the most powerful
instrument for shortening
labour-time, becomes the most unfailing means for placing every moment
of the
labourer’s time and that of his family, at the disposal of the
capitalist for
the purpose of expanding the value of his capital. (Marx 1867, 335;
Engl. transl. 2015, 278) The use of
machines based on steam-power, electricity or digital technology
creates new
forms of the division of labour under, according to Marx but also to
Norbert
Wiener, new slave-like conditions. Wiener wrote in 1950: Let us remember that the automatic machine,
whatever we think of any
feelings it may have or may not have, is the precise economic
equivalent of
slave labor. Any labor which competes with slave labor must
accept
the economic conditions of slave labor. It
is completely clear that this will produce an unemployment situation,
in comparison with which the present recession and even the depression
of the
thirties will seem a pleasant joke. (Wiener 1989, 162) It was Joseph
Weizenbaum who in his book Computer Power and Human Reason
(Weizenbaum
1976) also raised fundamental ethical issues of computer technology.
The book
was published ten years after his famous ELIZA — A Computer
Program for
the Study of Natural Language Communication between Man and Machine
(Weizenbaum 1966). Weizenbaum opus magnum was a result of
self-critical
thinking. Herbert Simon published his The
Sciences of the Artificial in 1969. In 1972 Hubert L. Dreyfus
published the
influential book What Computers Can't Do. The Limits of Artificial
Intelligence (Dreyfus 1972). Other studies dealing with AI
followed, such
as Margaret Boden Artificial Intelligence and Natural Man
(1977), Aaron
Sloman The Computer Revolution in Philosophy (1978), Daniel C.
Dennett Brainstorms
(1978); Pamela McCorduck: Machines Who
Think (1979); Don Ihde Technics and
Praxis. A Philosophy of Technology (1979; John R. Searle Minds,
Brains, and Programs
(1980); Deborah
G. Johnson Computer Ethics (1985); Terry Winograd &
Fernando Flores Understanding
Computers and Cognition (1986); P.
S. Churchland Neurophilosophy (1986); Margaret
Boden (ed.): The Philosophy of
Artificial Intelligence (1990) A number of
these scholars were deeply influenced, as I was, by the traditions of
hermeneutics and phenomenology. Those who stand out include Hubert
Dreyfus ― I
had the privilege to meet him in 1992 (Capurro 2018a) ― and Terry
Winograd and
Fernando Flores. Winograd and Flores attracted my attention on AI in
the
eighties and early nineties after I published my post-doctoral thesis Hermeneutics
of Specialized Information
(Capurro 1986). The work analyzed the
relationships between human understanding and
interaction with
computer-based information storage and retrieval. In 1987 I
was invited by German philosophers Hans Lenk and Günter Ropohl to
write a
contribution on the emerging field of computer ethics for a reader on Technology
and Ethics published by Reclam well known for their little yellow
paperback
books. The book included contributions by Theodor W. Adorno, Hans
Jonas,
Kenneth D. Alpern and Alois Huning dealing particularly with ethical
issues of
engineering (Lenk & Ropohl 1987). Later on, I wrote two papers on
Joseph
Weizenbaum whom I had the privilege to meet several times (Capurro
1987, 1998). In 1987 I
made a short presentation on AI at the 14th German Congress of
Philosophy.
The argument was, following Dreyfus, that while AI is based on explicit
formalized rules, human understanding is incarnate in a body, sharing
with
others a common world and related to a situation that it transcends
(Capurro
1987a). Winograd and Flores addressed this difference with regard to
the design
of computer systems that I analyzed in a paper published in the Informatik-Spektrum,
the German journal of Computer Science (Capurro 1987b, 1992; see also:
Capurro
1988, 1988a, 1989, 1990). In 1988 I
participated at the 18th World Congress of Philosophy held in It was the
Jesuit theologian Karl Rahner (1904-1984) who in his book Geist in
Welt
(Spirit in the World) (Rahner 1957) opened my eyes about the relevance
of
angelology when dealing with the nature of human knowledge. According
to
Rahner, who develops his argument based on a detailed analysis of
Thomas
Aquinas quaestio 89 of the Summa Theologiae, human
knowing cannot
be compared with God's knowledge as it is completely different
to ours.
A comparison as thought experiment, with angel's knowing lets the differentia
specifica of human knowledge shine forth. Being both creatures,
humans and
angels have knowledge in common as tertium comparationis. But
humans are
incarnated spirits that need to go back to sensory experience (conversio
ad
phantasmata) after the process of abstraction (abstractio)
of the
forms, which is not the case with angels. The view of divine perennial
substances
(aidiai ousiai) separated from the finite material
natural processes
of becoming and decay ―the Latin terminus technicus being intelligentiae
separatae― goes back to Aristotle's Metaphysics Book Lamda
(Aristotle
1973). Aquinas' epistemological reflection on angels and humans is
based on
Latin translations of Islamic philosophers such as Avicena, who
themselves
translated and commented Greek classics. In this context of
Greek-Persian-Arabic-Latin
tradition, I first discovered the Greek origin (eidos, idea, typos,
morphe)
and the Latin roots of the term information (informatio) as well as its relation to the concepts of
messenger and message (angelos/angelia) (Capurro 1978, 2018;
Capurro
& Holgate 2011). Aquinas' angelology has its source in the Bible,
according
to which angels are immortal but not eternal creatures. In many
cases
they are God's messengers and not just, as in the case of Aristotle,
perennial star
movers (Capurro 1993, 2017). Living in a
secular and technological age, the idea of creating artificial
intelligences
that would even supersede the human one can be considered in some way
in parallel
to ancient and medieval thinking about divine and human intelligence,
the relata
being now human (natural) and artificial (digital). Artificial
intelligences would
not only enhance but eventually supersede human intelligence as the
debate on
transhumanism and singularity shows (Eden et al. 2012) I developed in
the early
nineties a critique of authors like Hans Moravec (1988) and Raymond
Kurzweil
(1999) on what I called cybergnosis (Capurro & Pingel 2002)
an issue
that raised my attention in the early nineties as related to the
analogy between
angels and computers (Capurro 1993; 1995, 78-96). According to Blaise Pascal: "L'homme n'est ni
ange ni bête, et le malheur veut que qui veut faire
l'ange fait la
bête." (Pascal
1977, 572) The English translation "Man is neither angel
nor beast, and whoever wants to act as an angel, acts the beast"
does
not reflect the double meaning of the verb "faire" ― to act but also
to make ―, although this second meaning is not the one addressed by
Pascal. Many
years later, in 2010, I was invited to participate at an international
conference on Information Ethics: Future of Humanities,
organized
by the Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical
Ethics, the Uehiro
Foundation on Ethics and Education, and the Carnegie Council for
Ethics in
International Affairs, that was held at St Cross College,
Oxford. I
presented a paper with the title Beyond Humanisms. My argument
was that
Western humanisms rest on a fixation of the humanum. They are
metaphysical, although they might radically differ from each other. I
addressed
the debate on trans- and posthumanism as follows: The question about the humanness of the human
and its "beyond"
is not any more concerned with the relationship between the human and
the
divine as was the case with the classical humanisms in Antiquity,
Renaissance
and Reformation, nor with the self-introspection of the subject as in
Modernity, but with the hybridization of the human, particularly
through the
digital medium as well as through the possibilities to change the
biological
substrate of the human species. A common buzz-word for these issues is
"human enhancement." (Capurro 2012b, 49-50). The
difference between strong and weak AI was one of the main issues
discussed in
the nineties (Capurro 1993). It dealt with the question how far
intelligence
can be separated from its biological substrate being (or
becoming) a
product of programming in the digital medium. The strong dualistic
thesis became
more and more problematic considering that matter matters, that is to
say, that
natural intelligence is intrinsically related to its embodiment and
that a
bottom-up procedure must take the issue of the medium seriously or
otherwise
consider that what is crucial with the concept of artificial
intelligence is
not the asymptotic and unachievable approach to human intelligence but
the
difference created when working with another medium. When dealing with
artificial intelligence(s) a key issue is to clarify the concept of
artificiality. It was the Italian sociologist Massimo Negrotti who
opened my
eyes on this matter (Negrotti 1999, 2002, 2012; Capurro 1995a). The
dualism
between hard- und software, underlying the strong AI thesis finds its
counterpart in the metaphysical dualism between human and angelic
intelligences. This dualism is portrayed by Lewis Carroll in the
dialogue
between II. Distributed
Intelligence
Social,
ethical and legal issues of AI that were mainly object of academic
discussions
exploded in a global context that made manifest different research
agendas, cultural
backgrounds and every-day lifeworlds of different societies. As the
Internet
took root so did concerns for an ever-growing schism between those with
and
those without access to its benefits. This was soon to be known as the digital
divide. At the same time, it became evident that this was not only
a
technical issue. Basic questions related to privacy and
democracy
were at stake. The World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS)
organized by
the United Nations that took place 2003 in Ethical
issues of AI were discussed at the beginning of the new century in two
EU
projects in which I participated, namely ETHICBOTS (2005-2008) and
ETICA
(2009-2011). The ETHICBOTS (Emerging Technoethics of Human
Interaction with
Communication, Bionic and Robotic Systems) project took place under
the
leadership of the Italian philosopher Guglielmo Tamburrini, University
"Federico II", 1. The triaging categories of imminence,
novelty, and social
pervasiveness to assess the urgency of and the need for addressing
techno-ethical issues. 2. A variety of ethical approaches and
perspectives to
represent the ethical richness of the European culture and tradition.
(Capurro,
Tamburrini, Weber 2008, 14) The results
of the project included a paper on Ethical Regulations on Robotics
in Europe
(Nagenborg, Capurro, Weber, Pingel 2008) as well a book on Ethics
and
Robotics (Capurro & Nagenborg 2009). In a contribution to
the workshop L'uomo e la macchina. Passato e presente (Pisa
1967-2007)
organized by the Philosophy Department of the
The ETICA (Ethical
Issues of Emerging ICT Applications) project (2009-2011), under the
leadership
of the German philosopher Bernd Carsten Stahl, dealt with the following
technologies: affective computing, ambient intelligence, artificial
intelligence, bioelectronics, cloud computing, future internet,
human-machine
symbiosis, neuroelectronics, quantum computing, robotics,
virtual/augmented
reality. In the Ethical Evaluation by Michael Nagenborg and
myself we summarized
the ethical issues of AI as follows: 1.
Human
Dignity: The
visions of ―artificial persons or ―artificial (moral) agents with
corresponding
rights are to be seen as being in contrast to the emphasis given to
human
rights in the European Union. This might be even stronger the case with
anthropomorphic robots. 2.
Autonomy
and
responsibility: The question of 'machine autonomy‘ does give rise to
questions
about human autonomy and responsibility. 3.
Privacy:
AI is one of
the major building blocks of surveillance society. 4.
Cultural
Diversity: Artificial
moral agents with a strong bias towards a certain cultural identity
might be in
contrast to a pluralistic society. 5.
Inclusion:
AI might
contribute in making ICT more accessible to many people, but it might
also
foster the digital divide. 6.
Access
to the labour
market: AI systems are likely to replace humans in certain contexts 7.
Precautionary
Principle: The precautionary principle might be invoked with regard to
military
applications of AI. 8.
Principle
of Transparency:
The potential (bi-directional) dual use of AI systems calls for paying
attention to the funding and future use of R&D in the field. 9.
Likelihood
of Ethical
Issues: High. (Nagenborg & Capurro 2012, 20-21) In the
recommendations we stated [t]he current research on Computer and
Information Ethics is very much
human-centred, which means that there is little to none research on
animals or
environmental issues. Therefore, we would like to encourage our
colleagues to
take some inspirations from the Ethics of the European Institutions and
to
overcome the bias towards humans. (Nagenborg & Capurro 2012, 75) In the Annex
to this deliverable Lisa Stengel and Michael Nagenborg analyzed the
question on
how does a technology become an ethical issue at the level of the EU,
as in the
case of the work done by the European Group on Ethics in Science
and New
Technologies (EGE) to the European Commission as well as by the
National
Ethics Committees. They remarked: "Since the European Community moved
from
a mere economic community to a political According to The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union
such
"community of values" consist of human dignity, freedom, democracy,
equality, the rule of law and the respect for human rights (Nagenborg
&
Stengel 2012, 1-2). The EGE issued an Opinion in 2005 on Ethical
Aspects of
ICT Implants in the Human Body (EGE 2005) of which Stefano
Rodotà and myself
were the rapporteurs that raised questions related to AI from the
perspective
of the European "community of values." We summarized the issues as
follows: “We shall not lay hand upon thee”. This was the
promise made in the
Magna Charta – to respect the body in its entirety: Habeas Corpus.
This
promise has survived technological developments. Each intervention on
the body,
each processing operation concerning individual data is to be regarded
as
related to the body as a whole, to an individual that has to be
respected in
its physical and mental integrity. This is a new all-round concept of
individual, and its translation into the real world entails the right
to full
respect for a body that is nowadays both physical and electronic. In
this new
world, data protection fulfils the task of ensuring the “habeas data”
required by the changed circumstances – and thereby becomes an
inalienable
component of civilisation, as has been the history for habeas corpus.
At the same time, this is a permanently
unfinished body. It can be
manipulated to restore functions that either were lost or were never
known –
only think of maiming, blindness, deafness; or, it can be stretched
beyond its
anthropological normality by enhancing its functions and/or adding new
functions – again, for the sake of the person’s welfare and/or social
competitiveness, as in the case of enhanced sports skills or
intelligence
prostheses. We have to contend with both repairing and capacity
enhancing
technologies, the multiplication of body-friendly technologies that can
expand
and modify the concept of body care and herald the coming of 'cyborgs'
– of the
posthuman body. “In our societies, the body tends to become a raw
material
that can be modelled according to environmental circumstances”.
The
possibilities of customised configuration undoubtedly increase, and so
do the
opportunities for political measures aimed at controlling the body by
means of
technology. The downright reduction of our body to a device
does not only enhance
the trend ―already pointed out― towards turning it increasingly into a
tool to
allow continuous surveillance of 29 individuals. Indeed, individuals
are
dispossessed of their own bodies and thereby of their own autonomy. The
body
ends up being under others’ control. What can a person expect after
being
dispossessed of his or her own body? (EGE 2005, 39-30) Stefano
Rodotà (1933-2017), a famous Italian jurist and politician,
published the opus
magnum Treatise of Biolaw (Trattato di Biodiritto)
edited
together with Paolo Zatti, the first volume being Field and Sources
of
Biolaw (Ambito e Fonti del Biodiritto) edited by
Mariachiaria
Tallacchini and himself. In a comprehensive contribution on "the new habeas
corpus" Rodotà who, as far as I know, first coined the
concept of
"habeas data" used in the 2005 EGE Opinion, analyzes key ethical and
legal issues of the digitization of the human body (Rodotà 2010,
169-230). According
to Rodotà, the basic right to informational
self-determination,
overcomes the dualism between habeas corpus, dealing with the
protection
of the physical body, and habeas data, dealing with the
protection of
the electronic one. There are not different subjects to be protected
but a
common object, namely "the person in its different configurations,
conditioned little by little in its relation with the technologies that
are not
only the electronic ones." (Rodotà 2010, 229, my translation).
The EGE
issued two Opinions dealing
with Ethics of Information and Communication Technologies (EGE
2012) and
with Ethics of Security and Surveillance Technologies (EGE
2014). The
development and use of AI devices, particularly robots, became
accelerated and
diversified due to the impact of the Internet in all areas of social
life. Turing's
question in 1950 "can machines can think?" turn more and more on the
intrinsic relation of the practical issue concerning their "intelligent
behavior," Turing's formulation from 1948. Building robots and the
reflection upon them becomes a social or moral issue, that is
to say, it
concerns contexts of application with specific
values, customs and rules of behavior (Latin mores) and a
critical
reflection thereupon. In 2009 the Center for Cybernetics Research
(Cybernics) at
the The real intercultural ethical challenge in
Japan is, I think, to ponder
how robots become part of Japanese interplay between Japanese minds,
which
differs from the interplay in the "Far West," ― particularly as it is
based on the Buddhist tradition of 'self-lessness' or Mu ―
sharing a
common Ba [place]" (Nakada & Capurro 2013, 14; see also
Nakada,
Capurro, Sato 2017; Capurro 2017a; Tzafestas 2016, 155-175). The nature
of the self is indeed a key issue when dealing with the question about
the
interaction between artificial intelligences and human beings, being
the case
that artificial intelligences might mimic a self but, in fact, they are
not (so
far) a who but a what. In an interdisciplinary project organized by
ACATECH (German
Academy for Science and Engineering), on the question of privacy and
trust on
the internet, the ethics group, composed of the Australian philosopher
Michael
Eldred, the German lawyer Daniel Nagel and myself, developed a view of
privacy
and trust based on this difference. In the introduction to the ethics
chapter
of the final report we stated: The concept of privacy cannot be adequately
determined without its
counterpart, publicness. Privacy and publicness are not properties of
things,
data or persons, but rather ascriptions dependent upon the specific
social and
cultural context. These ascriptions relate to what a person or a self
(it may
also be several selves) divulges about him- or herself. A self, in
turn, is not
a worldless, isolated subject, but a human being who is and understands
herself
always already connected with others in a shared world. The possibility
of
hiding, of displaying or showing oneself off as who one is, no matter
in what
way and context and to what purpose, is in this sense, as far as we
know,
peculiar to human beings, but precisely not as the property of a
subject, but
rather as a form of the interplay of a human being's life as shared
with
others. (Capurro, Eldred, Nagel 2012, 64) In a special
section of this chapter I analyzed intercultural aspects of digitally
mediated
whoness, privacy and freedom in the Far East, Latin America and III. Natural
and Artificial
Intelligences
Since then,
robots have become increasingly socially relevant beyond industry
applications
and an entirely new conception, the Internet of Things, has in
conjunction with
RFID technology become a window into future possibilities. The term,
Internet
of Things, was coined by Kevin Ashton in
1999. Asthon wrote in 2009: We're physical, and so is our environment. Our
economy, society
and survival aren't based on ideas or information—they're based on
things. You
can't eat bits, burn them to stay warm or put them in your gas tank. Ideas and information are important,
but things matter much more. [...] We need to empower computers with
their own
means of gathering information, so they can see, hear and smell the
world for
themselves, in all its random glory. RFID and sensor
technology
enable computers to observe, identify and understand the world—without
the
limitations of human-entered data. Ten years on, we've made a lot
of
progress, but we in the RFID community need to understand
what's so
important about what our technology does, and keep advocating for it.
It's not
just a "bar code on steroids" or a way to speed up toll roads,
and we must never allow our vision to shrink to that scale. The
Internet
of Things has the potential to change the world, just as the Internet
did. Maybe even more so. (Ashton 2009) The Internet
was once an idea and is now a thing. The Internet of Things is an idea
in the
process of becoming a thing. It goes beyond the traditional view of
artificial
intelligent things called robots, envisaging the transformation of all
kinds of
natural and artificial things becoming digitally networked, although
this might
not be necessary the case. It is, I believe, the powerful IT industry
with its insatiable
hunger for digital data from users viewed as customers which is
strongly
behind the idea and the reality of the Internet of Things. Intelligent
things
might be also designed and used as stand-alone but this is bad news for
IT
giants. This is also true of humans as far as they might design their
lives as
being always online, what is being called onlife.
Things and
humans would eventually turn just into a bunch of digital data.
A
"who" might be confused with a "what" and a "what"
might look like a "who." The difference between living online and
offline
does
not mean a kind of Platonic dualism of separate worlds, but concerns the freedom of choice, life design
and
the protection of privacy. George Orwell's Animal Farm (Orwell
1989) might
turn into a digital farm. Without ideas nothing would change in
the
human world and, what is even more relevant, ideas make possible for
us,
humans, to reflect on the foreseen and unforeseen changes that things
bring
about for as well as for non-human living and non-living, natural and
artificial beings with whom we share a common world. What are
things such as the Internet or the Internet of Things? They are, prima
facie,
just tools. What is a tool? In Heidegger's famous tool analysis in Being
and
Time he coined the terms "readiness-to-hand" and
"presence-at-hand."
When tools break down, that is to say, when they lose there
readiness-to-hand,
the worldly context or structure of references to which they implicitly
belong,
becomes manifest (Heidegger 1987, 102ff; Capurro 1992). In the
introduction to Understanding
Computers and Cognition written sixty years after Heidegger's work,
Winograd and Flores write how: "[...] in designing tools we are
designing
ways of being" (Winograd & Flores 1986, xi). It is not due to the
Internet that things are embedded in semantic and pragmatic networks
but the
other way round. It is because they, that is to say, we are from
scratch
embedded in such networks that we are able to design a digital network
and interact
with them and between ourselves. This means a paradigm change with
regard to
the way modernity conceived things as objects in the so-called "outside
world" to be the correlate to an encapsulated subject. Not only humans
and
natural things but also artificial things become autonomous and
networked
agents in the digital age. But what does autonomy and action mean in
each case?
In a contribution to the panel on Autonomic Computing, Human
Identity and
Legal Subjectivity hosted by Mireille Hildebrandt and Antoinette
Rouvroy
at the International Conference: Computers, Privacy & Data
Protection: Data
Protection in a Profiled World that took place in Brussels in 2009 I
wrote: At today’s early stage of these breath-taking
developments, it is
difficult to give a typology of the new kinds of digital and living
agents and
the theoretical and practical challenges arising from them. From a
broad
perspective, these challenges are related, on the one hand, to all
kinds of
robots, starting with the so-called softbots (digital robots) as well
as to all
kinds of physical robots – including the (still speculative) nanobots
based on
nanotechnology – with different degree of complexity, including all
forms of
imitation of human and non-human living beings (bionics). On the other
hand, there
are the possibilities arising from the hybridization between ICT with
non-human
as well as with human agents, for instance. ICT, or other technologies,
can
become part of living organisms, for instance as implants (EGE 2005),
or vice
versa. In this case, humans become (or have already become) "cyborgs"
(Hayles 1999). Finally, synthetic biology allows the artificial
construction of
new as well as the genetic modification of living beings (EGE 2009;
Karafyllis
2003). (Capurro 2012a, 484) The
pervasive use of AI raises the question of the very basic understanding
of
technology as not being purely instrumental but shaping the
relation
between man and world. It belongs to what I call digital ontology,
that
is to say, the interpretation of the being of beings as well as of
being itself
from a digital perspective as a possible one. This ontological
perspective
might turn into a metaphysical world view or, politically speaking,
into an ideology
in case it becomes dogmatic, immunizing itself from critique (Capurro
2006,
2008, 2017c). The Finish
information security researcher Kimmo Halunen recently wrote a
contribution
with the title "Even artificial intelligences can be vulnerable, and
there
are no perfect artificial intelligence applications" (Halunen 2018). I
asked
him if he was the first one to use the plural noun "artificial
intelligences" but he could not clarify the issue. In any case, the use
of
the plural noun might help to demystify the big noun AI by paying
attention to
a diversity of "artificial intelligence applications" making a
difference with regard to other kinds of natural or artificial ones.
Halunen
writes: Artificial intelligence has its own special
characteristics that also
make other kinds of attacks against these systems possible. Because
an
artificial intelligence usually attempts some kind of identification
and then
makes decisions based on it, the attacker may want to trick the
artificial
intelligence. This problem has been encountered in the fields of
pattern and
facial recognition in particular. Last
year, it was published that Google’s artificial intelligence
algorithm was tricked into classifying a turtle as a rifle. As for
facial
recognition, makeup and hairstyles that fool facial recognition
algorithms have been developed. Of course, people also make
mistakes in
identifying objects or faces, but the methods used for identification
by an
artificial intelligence are very different. This means that the
errors
made by an artificial intelligence seem bizarre to humans, because even
small
children can tell a turtle from a rifle, and these camouflage methods
do not
work against people. In an
automated environment, in which artificial intelligence makes the
decisions,
such deceptions can be successful and may help the attacker. (Halunen
2018) What moves
artificial intelligences? Energy and human needs, beliefs and desires
reified
in digital algorithms (Capurro 2019). It is not primarily a question
whether
machines can think or how far they can be like human
intelligence or
even better ― other machines and living beings supersede humans
in many
regards ― but on how we might be able to live with or without them in
different
contexts in the life-world. Artificial intelligences or, for that
matter,
computer programs can break down as Winograd and In my
contribution to the international conference: Artificial
Intelligence
& Regulation, organized by LUISS (Libera Università
Internazionale degli
Studi Sociali Guido Carli) held in Algorithms are implicitly or explicitly designed
within the framework of
social customs. They are embedded in cultures from scratch.
According to
the phenomenologist Lucas Introna, creators and users
are "impressed" by algorithms (Introna 2016). The
"impressionable subject," however, is not the modern subject detached
from the so-called outside world, but a plurality of selves sharing a
common
world that is algorithmically intertwined. What is ethically at stake
when
dealing with algorithms becomes part of human mores? What is the
nature of
this entanglement between human mores and algorithms? To what
extent
can it be said that algorithms are, in fact, cultural? Who is
responsible for
the decisions taken by algorithms? To what extent is this
anthropomorphic view
on algorithms legitimate in order to understand what algorithms are?
These are
some foundational questions when dealing with the ethics of algorithms
that is
in an incipient state (Mittelstadt et al. 2016). [...] The present casting of ourselves as homo
digitalis (Capurro 2017) opens the possibility of reifying
ourselves
algorithmically. The main ethical challenge for the inrolling digital
age
consists in unveiling the ethical difference, particularly when
addressing the
nature of algorithms and their ethical and legal regulation. (Capurro
2019,
forthcoming) The debate
on driverless cars sometimes obfuscates basic questions on mobility
that affect
societies and individuals in the 21st century. At least some parts of
industry
seem to be interested in these issues though. I received an invitation
from the Verband der Automobilindustrie (VDA) (German
Association of the
Automobile Industry) to a dialogue with the CEO of Continental AG,
Dr.
Elmar Degenhart. The meeting took place in Last but not
least, I would like to mention the current issue of the International
Review
of Information Ethics dealing with "Ethical Issues of Networked
Toys,"
the guest editors being Juliet Lodge and Daniel Nagel. In their
introductory
remarks they write: Networked toys - Artificial guardians for little
princesses or demonic
plastic princes? Networked toys dominate the shelves in toy stores at a
time
when neither their real benefits nor their potentially latent dangers
have been
fully explored. Do hyper-connected toys transform the relationship
between
adults, the child and its environment? Do they shape their minds and
predispose
them to seek convenience and speedy responses rather than rely on their
own
autonomous capacities for critical thought? Questions such as who really is in control
arise, both of the toys ―parents,
third parties or even the toddlers themselves― and of data (including
biometrics) that might be collected for unclear purposes and opaque
destinations. For what specific or linkable purpose and above all where
and to
whom is data transmitted? What ethical considerations should be
addressed? Is there an actual benefit for the children
themselves? Do hyper
connected devices and robo-toys teach them how to handle technology or
does it
erode their capacity for autonomous reflection as speed and convenience
are
prioritised in their on-line and off-line worlds? Do such toys presage
fundamental transformation of childhood and the imagined and physical
worlds?
(Lodge & Nagel 2018)
Conclusion:
Enlightening the
Digital
Enlightenment What is the
task of Information ethics in the era of artificial intelligences?
Answer: enlightening
the digital enlightenment which follows the path of thought of the
philosophers
Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno in their influential collection of
essays
published in revised edition in 1947 with the title Dialectics of
Enlightenment (Dialektik der Aufklärung) (Horkheimer
& Adorno
1975). A main insight of this book is the ambivalence of the project(s)
of enlightenment
coming from the social revolutions of the nineteenth century
but going back to the dialectics
between mythology and science that characterizes European Enlightenment
particularly in the eighteenth century. Enlightenment must take care of
this
ambivalence that might revert digital enlightenment into digital
mythology. This
narrative shows the changing meanings of the concept of artificial
intelligence(s) since the middle of the last century depends both on
the
state-of-the-art of digital technology as well as of the different
contexts in
which it has been used. Looking back to my personal experiences since
the early
seventies and the changing academic debates in the years that followed,
I dare
no forecast beyond what appears today as challenges in the near future.
The task of
taming the digital chaos through different kinds of national and
international
regulations is still very much in the early stages and is dependent on
how the
awareness of these issues take root across the globe. Enlightened
awareness
addresses several problems such as ecological issues, sustainability,
taxation,
state regulation, fake news, cyber wars, digital capitalism, digital
colonialism, social justice, surveillance society, digital addiction,
the
future of work, and who we are as cybercitizens in the digital age.
Toni Samek
and Lynette Schultz organized an Information Ethics Roundtable at the Who should
take care of the enlightenment of the digital enlightenment? Answer:
universities, research institutions, scientific associations,
governments and
the media. As a paramount example of a scientific association leading
in the
field of enlightening the digital enlightenment I would like to mention
the
Institution of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Standards
Association (IEEE).
It brought about the Global Initiative of Autonomous and Intelligent
Systems,
under the leadership of managing director Konstantinos Karachalios.
John Havens
took care as Executive Director of the Ethical Considerations in
Artificial
Intelligence and Autonomous Systems. Jared Bielby managed the Committee
for
Classical Ethics. The final report represents the collective input of
several
hundred participants from six continents who are thought to be leaders
from
academia, industry, civil society, policy and government (IEEE 2016). I
quote
the introduction in extenso: The task of the Committee for Classical Ethics
in Autonomous and
Intelligent Systems is to apply classical ethics methodologies to
considerations of algorithmic design in autonomous and intelligent
systems
(A/IS) where machine learning may or may not reflect ethical outcomes
that
mimic human decision-making. To meet this goal, the Committee has drawn
from
classical ethics theories as well as from the disciplines of machine
ethics,
information ethics, and technology ethics. As direct human control over
tools
becomes, on one hand, further removed, but on the other hand, more
influential
than ever through the precise and deliberate design of algorithms in
self-sustained
digital systems, creators of autonomous systems must ask themselves how
cultural and ethical presumptions bias artificially intelligent
creations, and
how these created systems will respond based on such design. By drawing
from
over two thousand years’ worth of classical ethics traditions, the
Classical
Ethics in Autonomous and Intelligent Systems Committee will explore
established
ethics systems, addressing both scientific and religious approaches,
including
secular philosophical traditions such as utilitarianism, virtue ethics,
deontological
ethics and religious and culture-based ethical systems arising from
Buddhism,
Confucianism, African Ubuntu traditions, and Japanese Shinto influences
toward
an address of human morality in the digital age. In doing so the
Committee will
critique assumptions around concepts such as good and evil, right and
wrong,
virtue and vice and attempt to carry these inquiries into artificial
systems
decision-making processes. Through reviewing the philosophical
foundations that
define autonomy and ontology, the Committee will address the potential
for
autonomous capacity of artificially intelligent systems, posing
questions of
morality in amoral systems, and asking whether decisions made by amoral
systems
can have moral consequences. Ultimately, it will address notions of
responsibility and accountability for the decisions made by autonomous
systems
and other artificially intelligent technologies. (IEEE 2016) At the
political level I highlight and support the recent activities of the
European
Union, particularly the Communication from the Commission to the
European
Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic
and Social
Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Artificial Intelligence for
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