Angeletics


Work in Progress

Rafael Capurro






CONTENTS

I. RESOURCES

II. EXCERPTS & INTERPRETATIONS

Part I
1. Greek, Egyptian, and  Hebrew traditions

Part II
2. Arabic, Assyrian  and Persian  traditions
3. Latin, Spanish and Latin American traditions
4. Australia, New Zealand and Polynesia traditions

Part III

5. Far East tradition
6. African tradition
7. German tradition

Part IV

8. English tradition
9. French tradition

III. VARIA 1 / VARIA 2

IV. DRAFTS


V. IMPACT


VI. BIBLIOGRAPHY







II. EXCERPTS & INTERPRETATIONS


PART III


5. FAR EAST TRADITION

Wikipedia: Geschichte der Post
Rafael Capurro: The Dao of the Information Society in China
Rafael Capurro: In Search of Ariadne's Thread in Digital Labyrinths

JAPAN
Wikipedia: Kami
Wikipedia: Amabié
Martin Heidegger: Aus einem Gespräch von der Sprache
Tadashi Takenouchi: Capurro’s hermeneutic approach to Information Ethics
Rafael Capurro - Makoto Nakada: A Dialogue on Intercultural Angeletics
Rafael Capurro:  Die Lehre Japans: Theorie und Praxis der Botschaft bei Franz-Xaver



In Buddhism, Bodhisattva (/ˌboʊdɪˈsʌtvə/ BOH-dih-SUT-və) is the Sanskrit term for anyone who, motivated by great compassion, has generated Bodhicitta, which is a spontaneous wish and a compassionate mind to attain Buddhahood for the benefit of all sentient beingsBodhisattvas are a popular subject in Buddhist art.

Origins and outlines

In early Buddhism, the term bodhisattva was primarily used to refer specifically to Gautama Buddha in his former life. The Jataka tales, which are the stories of the Buddha's past lives, depict the various attempts of the bodhisattva to embrace qualities like self-sacrifice and morality.

According to the Jataka tales, the term "bodhisattva" originally referred to the pre-enlightened practitioner of austerities that surpassed Śrāvakayana and Pratyekabuddhayana by far and completed Bodhisattvayana. Mount Potalaka, for example, is one of Bodhisattvayana. The term for practitioners who have not yet reached Bodhisattvayana was not fixed, but the terms Śrāvaka-Bodhisattva (聲聞菩薩) and Pratyekabuddha-Bodhisattva (縁覚菩薩) had already appeared in the Āgama scriptures of early Indian Buddhism.

Mahayana Buddhism did not place much emphasis in honoring Śrāvakayana and Pratyekabuddhayana since they were classified as part of the Hinayana, but praise of the general Bodhisattvayana was commonplace. Because Hinayana was disliked and the terms Śrāvaka-Bodhisattva or Pratyekabuddha-Bodhisattva were not widely used, while usage of the general term "bodhisattva" had grown in popularity. Nevertheless, "bodhisattva" retained an implied reference to someone on the path to become an arhat or pratyekabuddha. In contrast, the goal of Mahayana's bodhisattva path is to achieve Samyaksambodhiṃ.


LOTOS-SUTRA

Harro von Senger: 36 Strategeme. Lebens- und Überlebenslisten aus drei Jahrtausenden.

Frankfurt am Main 2011, 339-342

 
 

24.15 Buddhas Gleichnis vom brennenden Haus

"Also habe ich gehört. Einst wohnte der Buddha in der Stadt Rajagrha [Hauptstadt des Landes Magadha in Indien] auf dem Geierberg [...] Scharen übersinnlicher Wesen und zahllose Jünger umgaben ihn [...] Zu jener Zeit erhob sich der Welterhabene und sprach [...]

So beginnt das Lotos-Sutra, auch die "Bibel Ostasiens" genannt. Es ist die bedeutendste Schrift des über den ganzen Fernen Ostens verbreiteten Mahajana-Buddhismus. In der Zeit zwischen 200 v. und 200 n. Chr. in Indien entstanden, verdankt es seine herausragende Stellung der unvergleichlichen Anziehungskraft, die es jahrhundertelang auf buddhistische Fromme ausgeübt hat. Ich stütze mich im folgenden auf die vollständige deutsche Übersetzung des unter dem Titel Miao Fa Lianhua Jing überlieferten chinesischen Textes von Margareta von Borsig (Sutra von der Lotosblüte des wunderbaren Gesetzes. Darmstadt 1993).

Die Reden des Lotos-Sutra sind dem zur höchsten Erleuchtung gelangten Buddha in den Mund gelegt. Vor dem Hintergrund einer mythischen Szenerie entfalten sich in den 28 Kapiteln des Sutra grandiose Bilder. Parabeln veranschaulichen den Lehrgehalt, darunter das im dritten Kapitel wiedergegebene Gleichnis vom brennenden Haus. In diesem Gleichnis erzählt Buddha, wie an jeder Seite eines riesigen Gebäudes gleichzeitig Feuer ausbricht und auf das ganze Bauwerk übergreift. Darin befinden sich die noch kleinen, unverständigen Söhne des unermeßlich reichen Hauseigentümers. Sie sind vergnügt in ihr Spiel vertieft, begreifen und merken nichts, erschrecken und fürchten sich nicht. Sie streben nicht danach zu entkommen. Der Vater warnt die Kinder und ruft ihnen zu: "Kommt schnell heraus!" Aber die Kinder nehmen die Worte des Vaters nicht auf. Sie sind nicht erschrocken und fürchten sich nicht, und sie denken nicht daran herauszukommen. Auch wissen sie nicht, was mit "Feuer" gemeint ist oder was mit "Haus" und wovon er meint, sie würden es verlieren. Sie laufen weiter im Spiel hin und her, und das ist alles.

Da überlegt sich der Vater: "Wenn ich und die Söhne das in Flammen stehende Haus nicht sofort verlassen, ist unser Tod unausweichlich." Er weiß, welche kostbaren und seltenen Dinge seine Söhne gern haben, und so ruft er ihnen zu: "Verschiedene Wagen mit Ziegen, mit Hirschen und Ochsen stehen außerhalb des Tors. Ihr könnt mit ihnen spielen. Ihr sollt nun schnell aus diesem brennenden Haus herauskommen. Ich will jedem das, was er will, geben." Als die Kinder von den kostbaren Dingen hören, von denen der Vater spricht und die ihren Wünschen entsprechen, kommen sie eifrig und beherzt, indem sie sich gegenseitig stoßen und einer dem anderen zuvorkommen will, balgend aus dem brennenden Haus.

Als der Vater es erreicht hat, daß alle Kinder unversehrt herauskommen, und er nun sieht, daß sie sich in dem Viereckhof auf die Erde setzen, da ist sein Herz ruhig und von Freude übervoll. Nun sagt jeder der Söhne zum Vater: "Vater, bitte gib uns nun diese schönen Dinge, die Wagen mit Zigen, Hirschen und Ochsen, die du uns vorhin versprochen hast!" Nun gibt der Vater jeder Sohn einen völlig gleichen Wagen. Dieser Wagen ist groß und breit und mit vielen Juwelen ausgeschmückt. [...] Nun steigt jeder Sohn auf einen großen Wagen. Sie haben etwas erhalten, was sie noch nie zuvor besaßen und auch im stillsten nicht erhofft hatten.

 
Dieses Gleichnis erläutert Buddha an einer anderen Stelle des Lotos-Sutra:

"Um der Lebewesen willen, die im Leid verblendet

und verwirrt,

Predige ich das Nirwana.

Dieses geschickte Mittel wende ich an

Und veranlasse sie, in des Buddhas Geisteskraft

einzugehen.

Früher predigte ich noch nicht zu ihnen:

Ihr müßt es erlangen, den Buddha-Weg zu vollenden.

Daß ich es noch nicht predigte, war,

Weil die Zeit der Predigt noch nicht gekommen war;

Nun ist gerade diese Zeit gekommen,

Und unverbrüchlich predige ich das Große-Fahrzeug.

Zunächst verspricht Buddha, dem in der Parabel der Vater entspricht, den Menschen, die mit ihrem irdischen Sinnen und Streben den Kindern im brennenden Haus gleichen, "Wagen mit Ziegen, Hirschen und Ochsen". Das ist ein Bild für das in Aussicht gestellte Nirwana. Mit der Verheißung der völligen Auflösung des Ichs verlockt Buddha die, oder zumindest einige, Menschen, sich von ihren Illusionen und irdischen Wahrvorstellungen (s. 19.4) zu befreien, also gleichsam das brennende Haus zu verlassen und jenen Zustand der Weltentrücktheit zu erlangen, der ihnen an sich erlaubt, ins Nirwana einzugehen. Aber in diesem Augenblick erhalten die so herangereiften Menschen nicht, wie versprochen, "Wagen mit Ziehen, Hirschen und Ochsen", also das sofortige Nirwana, sondern jeder einen gleich großen, breiten, juwelen-geschmückten Wagen. Damit ist die sogenannte Bodhisattvaschaft gemeint. Ein Bodhisattva steht in der letzten Stufe zur Erleuchtung, verzichtet aber darauf, ins Nirwana einzugehen, um sich wieder der Welt widmen zu können und andere Wesen, die nicht die Fähigkeit haben, sich mit eigener Kraft aus dem irdischen "brennenden Haus" zu retten, von seinem hohen geistigen Stand aus zu helfen. Während Jahrtausenden oder Jahrmillionen verzichtet also ein Bodhisattva auf das ursprünglich angestrebte persönliche Zielt – den Eintritt ins Nirwana –, um von seinen fortwährend neu aufgeäuften Verdiensten, die er für sich selbst nicht mehr benötigt, schwachen Wesen auf dem Weg zum Nirwana hin beizustehen.

Das Gleichnis vom brennenden Haus zeigt einen Buddha, der anfänglich nur die halbe Wahrheit sagt. Er setzt dem Menschen zunächst nur das eine Ziel, ins Nirwana einzugehen. Dies ist ein echtes, kein vorgegaukeltes Ziel. Erst nachdem er die Menschen unmittelbar vor dieses Ziel hingeführt hat, eröffnet er ihnen sein bislang geheimgehaltenes Ziel, nämlich sie dazu zu bewegen, als Bodhisattvas den Wesen und Menschen zu dienen. Bis zu einem gewissen Grade verhällt lsich Buddha wie in der Bezugsgeschichte 24.1 der König von Jin gegenüber dem Fürsten von Yu. Nur in bezug auf eines seiner beiden Ziele läßt er die Katze aus dem Sack. Wie der Fürst von Yu erfahren auch die von Buddhas "geschicktem Mittel" (fangbian) Betroffenen erst später, daß das Gegenüber noch ein zweites Ziel verfolgt. Im Unterschied zum König von Jin, fügt aber Buddha niemandem irgendeinen Schaden zu. Buddhas Anwendung des Doppelziel-Strategems kann daher als reines Dienststrategem qualifiziert werden. Der Zeck heiligt hier die Mittel. Dies geht aus folgendem Zwiegespräch Buddhas mit seinem Jünger Sariputra hervor, in dem der im Gleichnis geschilderte Vorgang allerdings nicht unter dem Aspekt einer Listanwendung, sondern unter dem engen Gesichtspunkt der Lüge analysiert wird:

"Sariputra! Was ist nun deine Meinung? Ist dieser Vater deshalb, weil er seinen Söhnen in ganz gleicher Weise einen großen Wagen von kostbaren Juwelen gab, nun irgendwie falsch und lügnerisch oder nicht?" Sariputra sagte: "Nein, von aller Welt Verehrter! Dieser Vater bewirkte, daß seine Söhne der Feuergefahr entkamen, und bewahrte ihren Körper und ihr Leben ganz heil. Dies ist keine Falschheit und Lüge. Was ist der Grund dafür? Schon weil er ihnen Leib und Leben ganz bewahrte, erlangten sie ein schönes, kostbares Ding. Er rettete sie mit einem geschickten Mittel aus dem brennenden Haus. Von aller Welt Verehrter! Selbst wenn dieser Vater ihnen nicht einmal den kleinsten Wagen gegeben hätte, wäre er nicht falsch und lügnerisch. Warum ist es so? Dieser Vater hatte ja diesen Gedanken: 'Ich will mit dem geschickten Mittel erreichen, daß diese Kinder herauskommen.' Dieser Beweggrund ist nicht falsch und lügnerisch; um so weniger, da der Vater, im Bewußtsein, daß sein Reichtum unermeßlich ist, seine Söhne reichlich zu beschenken wünschte und also jedem gleichermaßen einen großen Wagen schenkte."




CHINA


36 Strategeme

Harro von Senger: 36 Strategeme.
Lebens- und Überlebenslisten aus drei Jahrtausenden

Frankfurt am Main 2011, 15-17

 

Prolog

Das Strategem der offenen Stadttore

Reichskanzler Kong Ming, auch Zhuge Liang genannt, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zhuge_Liang war mit 5000 Soldaten nach Xicheng gezogen, um den dort lagernden Proviant nach Hanzhong zu überführen. Da trafen auf fliegenden Pferden Boten ein, mehr als zehn an der Zahl, einer nach dem anderen. Sie berichteten, der feindliche General Sima Yi aus dem Reiche Wei rücke mit einem Heer von 150 000 Mann, einem Hornissenschwarm gleich, gegen Xicheng vor. Zu diesem Zeitpunkt stand dem Reichskanzler Kong Ming kein einziger General mehr zur Seite. Nur noch ein Stab ziviler Beamter befand sich bei ihm. Von den mitgeführten 5000 Soldaten hatte die eine Hälfte Xicheng bereits mit Proviant verlassen. In der Stadt waren nicht mehr als 2500 Soldaten zurückgeblieben. Als die Beamten diese Nachricht vernahmen, wurden ihre Gesichter fahl vor Schrecken. Reichskanzler Kong Ming begab sich auf die Stadtmauer und hielt Ausschau. Tatsächlich, da stiegen am Horizont Staubwolken zum Himmel auf. Das Heer des feindlichen Generals Sima Yi näherte sich mit einem großen Aufgebot an Soldaten. Reichskanzler Kong Ming befahl: "Flaggen und Banner von der Stadtmauer herunternehmen und verbergen! Jeder Soldat auf seinen Posten! Wer diesen eigenmächtig verläßt und seine Stimme laut erhebt, der wird enthauptet. Die vier Stadttore sind weit zu öffnen. Bei jedem Stadttor haben 20 Soldaten, als einfache Leute verkleidet, die Straße zu kehren. Wenn das Heer des Sima Yi herankommt, handle niemand selbstherrlich. Ich habe mein besonderes Strategem [ji]."

Darauf warf sich Kong Ming einen Umhang aus Kranichfedern über, setzte sich einen nach oben gewölbten seidenen Hut auf und begab sich in Begleitung von zwei Knappen und mit einer Wölbbrettzither auf die Stadtmauer, um sich auf einem Beobachtungsturm unmittelbar vorne bei der Brüstung hinzusetzen. Er entzündete Duftkräuter und begann auf der Wölbbrettzither zu spielen. https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gayageum

Unterdessen gelangten Späer der Vorhut des Generals Sima Yi zur Stadtmauer und erblickten all dies. Keiner der Späher wagte sich weiter vor. Eilends kehrten sie zu Sima Yi zurück und erstatteten Bericht. Sima Yi lachte ungläubig. Dann hieß er seine Truppen halten. Er selbst ritt auf fliegendem Pferd weiter, um von fern auf die Stadt zu schauen. Wahrhaftig! Dort erblickte er den Reichskanzler Kong Ming, wie er auf dem Spähturm der Stadtmauer saß, mit heiter lächelnden Gesicht, die Wölbbrettzither spielend, dazu die Schwaden de brennenden Duftkräuter. Zu seiner Linken ein Knappe, der mit beiden Händen ein kostbares Schwert umfaßte, zu seiner Rechten ein Knappe mit einem Haarwedel.

Im Stadttoreingang und davor etwa 20 gewöhnliche Leute, die mit gesenkten Köpfen gleichmütig die Straße kehrten. Als Sima Yi dies alles erblickte, stiegen große Zweifel in ihm auf. Er kehrte zu seinem Heer zurück, befahl Vor- und Nachhut, die Stellungen auszuwechseln und zog in Richtung auf die nördlich gelegenen Berge von dannen. Sein zweiter Sohn Sima Zhao meinte unterwegs: "Bestimmt hat Zhuge Liang keine Soldaten und daher diese Szene vorbereitet. Vater, warum zieht Ihr da die Truppen zurück?"

Sima Yi entgegnete : "Zhuge Liang pflegt vorsichtig und bedachtsam zu sein. Noch nie hat er ein Wagnis auf sich genommen. Weit geöffnet waren heute die Tore de Stadt. Das ließ mit Sicherheit auf einen Hinterhalt schließen. Wären meine Truppen in die Stadt eingedrungen, so wären sie bestimmt dem Strategem [ji] zum Opfer gefallen. Was weißt du chon! Ein schneller Rückzug war angezeigt."

Und so zog das gesamte Heer des Sima Yi davon. Kong Ming sah die feindlichen Truppen in der Ferne verschwinden. Er lachte und klatschte dabei in die Hände. Keiner aus der Reihe der Beamten, der nicht verblüfft gewesen wäre. Sie fragten Kong Ming: "Sima Yi ist doch ein berühmter General des Staates Wei. Heute führte er 150 000 ausgesuchte Soldaten hierher, erblickte Euch, den Reichskanzler von Shu-Han, und zog sich dann eilends zurück. Weshalb?"

Kong Ming erwiderte: "Dieser Mann ging davon aus, daß ich vorsichtig und bedachtsam zu sein pflege und mich auf keine Wagnisse einlasse. Als er eine solche Szene sah, vermutete er, Soldaten lauerten in einem Hinterhalt. Daher trat er den Rückzug an. An sich scheue ich waghalsige Unternehmungen, heute aber suchte ich bei einem solchen Zuflucht, weil ich keine andere Wahl hatte."

All die Beamten beugten voller Staunen ihr Haupt und riefen aus: "Die Strategeme des Reichskanzlers vermögen selbst die Geister der Verstorbenen nicht zu ergründen. Wäre es nach uns gegangen, so hätten wir einfach die Stadt aufgegeben und wegeilen sollen."

Kong Ming sagte: "Ich hatte nicht mehr als 2500 Soldaten. Hätten wir die Stadt aufgegeben und die Flucht ergriffen, dann wären wir bestimmt nicht weit gekommen. Sima Yi hätte uns gefangengenommen.".

In späterer Zeit entstand ein Gedicht, das diese Tat preist:

"Eine mit Jadesteinen geschmückte Wölbbrettzither, drei Fuß lang, bezwang die auserlesenen Truppen, damals, als Zhuge Liang in Xicheng den Feind zur Umkehr bewegte. Bis auf den heutigen Tag zeigen die Einheimischen auf die Stelle. Hier haben 150 000 Mann ihre Pferde gewendet."

See also:

Cunning Intelligence
On Greek metis see Detienne/Vernant here as well as my paper Pseudangelia / Pseudangelos.

 

Wikipedia: Zhuge Liang

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zhuge_Liang

 

Some books popularly attributed to Zhuge Liang can be found today. For example, the Thirty-Six Stratagems, and Mastering the Art of War (not to be confused with Sun Tzu's The Art of War) are two commonly available works attributed to Zhuge Liang. Supposedly, his mastery of infantry and cavalry formation tactics, based on the Taoist classic I Ching, were unrivalled. His memorial, the Chu Shi Biao, written prior to the Northern Expeditions, provided a salutary reflection of his unwavering loyalty to the state of Shu. The memorial moved some readers to tears. In addition, he wrote Admonition to His Son (諸葛亮誡子書) in which he reflected on his humbleness and frugality in pursuit of a meaningful life.

 

Wikipedia: Thirty-Six Stratagems

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thirty-Six_Stratagems

 

The Thirty-Six Stratagems is a Chinese essay used to illustrate a series of stratagems used in politics, war, and civil interaction.

Its focus on the use of cunning and deception both on the battlefield and in court have drawn comparisons to Sun Tzu's The Art of War. Zhang Yingyu's The Book of Swindles, a late-Ming-dynasty work focused on the realms of commerce and civil society, shares some thematic similarities.

 

Wikipedia: Trickster

https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trickster

Trickster (engl. Gauner, Betrüger und Schwindler[1]) werden Figuren in der Mythologie oder Literatur genannt, die mit Hilfe von Tricks die Ordnung im (göttlichen) Universum durcheinanderbringen.
Die Figur des Tricksters handelt in der Mythologie meist aus moralischen Gründen – er fungiert oft als Kulturheros,[2] also jemand, der eine große Tat mit fundamentalen gesellschaftlichen Auswirkungen vollbringt, etwa indem er den Menschen den Ackerbau erklärt oder das Feuer bringt.
Die typischen Trickster sind an ihrem zwiespältigen Charakter zu erkennen. Auf der einen Seite brechen sie die Regeln, um den Menschen Gutes zu tun, auf der anderen Seite jedoch auch, um Konflikte (meist zwischen den Göttern) zu provozieren.[3]
Je nach Ursprungsmythologie werden sie als Tiergestalt, (Halb-)Götter oder Geister beschrieben.




WIKIPEDIA: GESCHICHTE DER POST

In China wurden Briefe bereits in sehr weit zurückliegender, vorchristlicher Zeit durch staatlich bestallte Kuriere befördert, die, je nach der zurückzulegenden Strecke, zu Fuß oder beritten die Zustellung vornahmen. Der Grundstein hierzu wurde während der Tschou-Dynastie (1122–256 v. Chr.) gelegt. Zu dieser Zeit unterstanden der Direktion 80 Boten sowie 8 Hauptkuriere, für die im Abstand von etwa 5 km Verpflegungsquartiere und in größeren Abständen Übernachtungsquartiere eingerichtet wurden. Dieses System wurde während der Zeit der Qin-Dynastie (221–207 v. Chr.) und vor allem während der Han-Dynastie entscheidend ausgebaut. Die Relaisstationen gewährten den Kurieren Unterkunft und Verpflegung auf Staatskosten und sorgten für Pflege oder Ersatz der Pferde. Die Leiter dieser Stationen erhielten vom Staat volle Steuerfreiheit als Gegenleistung für ihre Bemühungen.


RAFAEL CAPURO: THE DAO OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY IN CHINA


中国信息社会之
""与互文化信息

Keynote address at The International Conference on China’s Information Ethics, Renmin University of China, Beijing, October  28-29, 2010 (PowerPoint). See my Chinese homepage. Chinese translation by Junlan Liang (Chinese Academy of Social Science) 2011 Social Sciences Abroad (pdf-version here). See also: Towards an Ontological Foundation of Information Ethics   Ethics & Information Technology, 8, 4, 2006, 175-186. Chinese translation Shanghai Shifan Daxue Xuebao 2006, 05, 24-35.


CONTENTS

Introduction
Direct and indirect speech in the "Far West"
Direct and indirect speech in the "Far East"
Prospects

Acknowledgement

BibliographyAbstract: This paper deals with the distinction between direct and indirect speech in the “Far East” and the “Far West” following key insights of the French sinologist François Jullien The distinction is not primarily a grammatical or rhetorical but an existential one. It concerns the relation between man and world. It aims at providing a basis for thinking inter-culturally about ethical questions of the information society. My argument is that information moralities and their ethical reflection in the “Far West” stress the principle of direct speech while in the “Far East” the principle of indirect speech builds the basis of human communication. After explaining this distinction in the “Far West” in the first part, I show its relevance and difference in the “Far East” in the second part. Finally I draw some conclusions about the relevance of this distinction for the information society in China and the intercultural dialogue.

本文以法国汉学家弗朗索瓦.于连的洞见为基楚来讨论直接与间接话语在
"远东"和"远西"的区别。
这个区别主要不是一个语法上或修辞上的区别,而是一个关于存在性的区别。
它涉及到人与世界的关系,
并旨在为思考信息社会的伦理道德问题提供一个互文化的基础。
我认为"远西"的信息道德观及其伦理思索强调直接话语的原则,
而间接话语的原则则构成"远东"人际交往的基础。
在本文的第一部分,我將会解释"远西"对直接与间接话语这个区别的理解,
然后在第二部分说明这个区别在"远东"的相关性和差异,
並在最后提出这个区别对中国信息社会及互文化对话的重要性。
(Transl. by Pak-Hang Wong, Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics)

INTRODUCTION

Information ethics deals with the descriptive analysis and critical evaluation of moral norms and values within as well as between information societies. Although such issues arise today mainly with regard to the digital medium, information ethics can and should be concerned with other media and epochs building the scope of what is being called intercultural information ethics (Capurro 2007).

This paper deals with the distinction between direct and indirect speech in the “Far East” and the “Far West” following key insights by French sinologist François Jullien (Jullien 1995, 2003, 2005). The distinction is not primarily a grammatical or rhetorical but an existential or moral one. It concerns the relation between man and world. It aims at providing a basis for thinking inter-culturally about ethical questions of the information society. My argument is that information moralities and their ethical reflection in the “Far West” stress the principle of direct speech while in the “Far East” the principle of indirect speech builds the basis of human communication. This distinction should not be understood as an opposition. Furthermore, there is a complex tradition of ethical reflection about this distinction. After explaining this distinction in the “Far West” in the first part, I show its relevance and difference in some classic texts of the “Far East,” particularly in the Chinese tradition, in the second part. Finally, I draw some conclusions about the relevance of this distinction for the information society in China.

DIRECT AND INDIRECT SPEECH IN THE "FAR WEST"

One source of the idea of freedom of speech in the Western tradition is the Greek concept of ‘parrhesia’ that has been analysed by French philosopher Michel Foucault (Foucault 1983). This political principle built the basis of Greek ‘polis’together with two other ones, namely equality (‘isegoría’) and participation of all citizens in political decisions (‘isonomía’). What does ‘parrhesía’ exactly mean? According to Foucault, the ‘parrhesiastes’ is the one who says (‘rhema’) the truth to everybody (‘pan’). He – and the use of masculine is important in this context of ancient Greece – wants to speak and communicate his thoughts as clear and engaged as possible within a context that can be risky or even dangerous for him. To tell the truth is not just a mental event, as Descartes believed, but a verbal activity where the speaker is completely sure to own the truth. His courage is a sign of honesty. But how can we be sure that the speaker is a ‘truth speaker’? And how can he be sure that what he believes to be the truth is, in fact, the truth? The first question was important for the ancient Greeks and was answered, according to Foucault, by Plutarch and Galen. The second question is a modern one.

The parrhesiastic speaker risks his life when speaking the truth. This concerns particularly political risky situations. He is not interested in giving some proof but in criticizing his addressee. He is in an inferior position for instance with regard to a tyrant but also in a democratic discussion opposing to the majority. The risk was the exile. In other words, to tell the truth was considered a political duty with the goal of helping others or oneself. It is the opposite of the art of convincing that the Western tradition often conceives as belonging to indirect speech, together with silence and falsity. The Athenian ‘agora’ is the place where this kind of free speech appears for the first time in the “Far West.” There is a difference between this kind of political freedom of speech and the Socratic one that takes place in a face-to-face dialogue and deals with the life (‘bios’) of the person involved. Along epicurean and stoic traditions we find the concept of ‘parrhesia’ in the New Testament in the context of accusations against Jesus because of breaking the mosaic law: 

“Then some of the residents of Jerusalem  began to say, ‘Isn’t this the man they are trying  to kill? Yet here he is, speaking openly (‘parrhesía lalei’),and they are saying nothing to him. Do the rulers really know that this man is the Christ?’” (John 7, 25-26). 

Christian ‘parrhesía’ belongs to the spiritual technologies together with confession and spiritual exercises as developed in Modernity for instance by Ignatius of Loyola, the founder of the Jesuits (Capurro 1995, 29ff). The secular version of such exercises are, for instance, Cartesian meditations – Descartes having being educated by the Jesuits – where it is basic that nothing should be accepted as true that is not before object of doubt by the cogito.

The tradition of direct speech in the “Far West” is important but not exclusive. The philosopher Leo Strauss has analyzed the distinction between esoteric and exoteric writing (Strauss 1988). This distinction was common in Ancient Greece. But, according to Strauss, there is a difference between pre-modern and modern philosophers. While pre-modern philosophers struggle for the freedom to communicate their thoughts the philosophers of the Enlightenment were interested in a universal right to communicate as a political ideal. They conceived such ideal as the freedom of public discussion as well as the possibility of public education (Strauss 1988, 33). Modern philosophers such as Thomas More were critics of the “indirect approach” (“obliquo ducto”) (More 1964, 50). Nevertheless, Strauss defends pre-modern philosophers whose exoteric writings had not only a general educational purpose but also a more important philosophical one concerning that “which is indicated only between the lines” (Strauss 1988, 36). This was an esoteric message for young philosophers in order to be driven towards pure theory beyond practical and political interests.

In the transition from the Middle Ages to Modernity a new structure of European society based on nobility is developed and with it also a new standards of communication based on other moral norms and values. Traditional rhetoric is substituted by the art of conversation which looks for a balance between speech and silence particularly with regard to what could be offensive to other persons. The ‘art du lien’ – a term coined by the French communication scientists Olivier Arifon and Philippe Ricaud (Arifon and Ricaud 2005) – or ‘connecting art’ deals less with opposition or separation than with connection. This is called the style français  which is the language of diplomacy that gives its shape to European nations since the 17th until the 20th centuries.

Although communication morality in the “Far West” is based mainly on the principle of direct speech we should not oversee different kinds of refractions and mutations of this principle along history in order also to avoid a simplistic unilinear cultural evolution. One example of such a mutation is the criticism of censorship with regard to the spread of printed works at the Enlightenment no less than the development of investigative journalism in the 19th and 20thcenturies and today’s ideas and ideals concerning freedom of communication in the Internet.

DIRECT AND INDIRECT SPEECH IN THE "FAR EAST"

The art of indirect speech pervades China’s politics, economy as well as literary and philosophic traditions. Relations and not individuals build the core of communication where the goal is attaining harmony through negotiation. The art of negotiation in the "Far East" is not based on the idea of mastering the opponent by being basically against him or her preponderant although not exclusive in the "Far West," but of convincing the other. Individuals are then not masters but mediators or negotiators that can be, for a time, at the centre and be the expert or "the king" in order to make harmony possible and not in order to impose his or her will upon the others. Direct speech becomes less important when the goal is to avoid conflicts similar to the style français of French diplomacy and negotiation already mentioned  (Arifon and Ricaud 2005, 120-121).

But although the Western tradition acknowledges the role of indirect speech as opposed to the ideology of direct speech, it remains something morally problematic and related to lying, discretion, and hint through disguising and concealing. This tradition goes back to Greek ‘metis’ or ‘cunning’ (Jullien 2000, 44 ff). In poetry, the original place of indirect speech, Chinese culture discovers that the meaning encoded there is of moral and political nature. This is very much the opposite to what happens in Ancient Greece where the meaning is related to the soul and the divine. Jullien writes:

 “Only at Delphos, in connection with Pythia’s tripod one can observe that the indirect style of poetic formulations is related to political interests.” (Jullien 2000, 68, my translation) 

But the oscillation, called mantic, of the oracle between caution and truth remains a borderline case in the Greek tradition while in the Chinese culture it is the soul of everyday life. According to Jullien one key difference between Chinaand Greece consists in the fact that monarchy and its surrogates have been the only political system in China (Jullien 2000, 122-123). But China has developed a kind of political practice giving intellectuals a certain kind of legitimacy in order to provide the well functioning of monarchic power, namely the admonition of the sovereign in the name of morality. The different forms of admonition are closely related to indirect speech as well as to ethics of confidentiality. Under the guise of picture puzzle it is possible to express an opinion that can be tolerated by the sovereign similar to the court jester in the Western tradition. What is not good about this compromise between the intellectuals and power is the fact that language distortion is not also regarded as something normal but is even considered a higher value (Jullien 2000, 132). This apparently changes since the beginning of the 20th century.

But, on the other hand, it must be acknowledged that indirect speech plays a positive role in Confucius “Analects” (Confucius 2004). The master addresses the pupil by pointing to what is at stake (Jullien 2000, 195). The goal of teaching, like in most ethics, is not learning but doing. This is the reason why speaking remains on the background:

“The Master said, ‘Fine words and an insinuating appearance are seldom associated with true virtue’." (Confucius, 2004, I, 3)

The master’s teaching is open to everybody but indirect speech can only develop itself if the other opens himself or herself to it. The goal is neither the development of a conceptual system nor, as Hegel believed, just a moral sermon (Hegel 1986, 142). Confucius does not develop a moral theory but follows the “logic of the path” that works more by way of hints about possible detours and way outs (Jullien 2000, 211).

It is still an open question whether the renaissance of Confucianism in Chinatoday will lead to an information society shaped by this kind of ethics and morality. Since some ten years or so the ideal of a “harmonious society” has been officially announced in contrast to the concept of class struggle (Siemons 2006). The model of a Confucian information society and the predominance of indirect speech serving the power seem to be opposed to the Western model that gives individual freedom the highest value. While libertarian information society tends towards atomization and eventually to chaos, the Confucian model might grow stiff and end suffocated. Confucius wants to regulate social communication with the help of morality the most useful instrument being censorship. In the “Far West” the opposite form of blockage seems to endanger societal development, namely information overload for individuals and corporations as well as some forms of general and open struggle.

A possible way out of both models can be found in the taoist view of indirect speech. At the beginning of Laozi’s “Daodejing” it is said:

“A dao that can be defined.

Is not the eternal dao,

Concepts that can be conceived,

Are not eternal concepts” (Laozi, 2002 , Ch. 1, 1-4)

The Chinese thinker does not separate reality in two different levels as the Greeks did. The “dao” refers indirectly to the beginning of a process of becoming and growing. In contrast to the Aristotelian model, the goal (‘telos’) of this process is not the realization or fulfilment of potentiality (‘dynamis’) but the passing on itself that is in permanent danger of solidifying.

Laozi’s style is based on the principle of giving hints or pointing to something, avoiding one sidedness or partiality in order to keep himself in a kind of “global indifference” (Jullien 2000, 286) since the “greatest forms are without shape” (Laozi 2002, Ch. 41, 17). Instead of a global information morality ruling (digital) communication from a fixed perspective, the Taoist sage would probably prefer to look at it as within the “dao” in order to keep it in movement within a never-ending creative process. This implies not only a criticism of Luhmann’s hypostatization of communication processes but also of the present digital casting of Being that I call digital ontology. If such interpretation of Being turns into a fixed and the only true one, it mutates into metaphysics and, in terms of politics, into ideology (Capurro 2006). Otherwise it can become part of different kinds of assemblages with other media and remain flexible with regard to existential, ecological and social needs and constraints.

While we in the “Far West” use different linguistic tools such as myths and allegories in order to deal with the unspeakable, for Chinese master Chuang Tzu (2001-2009) words are fishing stakes. He says:

“Fishing-stakes are employed to catch fish; but when the fish are got, the men forget the stakes. Snares are employed to catch hares, but when the hares are got, men forget the snares. Words are employed to convey ideas; but when the ideas are apprehended, men forget the words. Fain would I talk with such a man who has forgot[en] the words!” (Chuang Tzu 26, 11)

The difference between the Western metaphor of the veil and the Taoist fishing stakes is, according to Jullien, that the last one is purely instrumental avoiding a metaphysical separation between appearance and reality. Chuang Tzu’s critique of language does not lead to silence but to a strategy seeking to avoid partiality. It does not only question bias and fixed perspectives but allows also the coexistence of apparently contradictory things. Such kind of relational thinking is different from the dialectic of concepts aiming at bridging the gap between the sensory and the supra-sensory or transcendent. Both are different strategies for relating the biosphere and the digital infosphere into an ecosphere. Otherwise they tend to become separate realities and even degenerate into ideologies.

This problem is similar to the issue concerning the separation of morality from the flow of life as addressed by Lao Tse in his coming together with Confucius (Chuang Tzu 14, 6). A fixed morality is endangered of becoming separate from the “dao”. Lao Tzu brings fresh air into the symbolic sphere. His ethics is a symptom that morality is becoming fixed and autonomous. This issue was newly addressed in the “Far West” by Niklas Luhmann with regard to fixed moral distinctions in different spheres of society (Möller 2002, 316-317). There is a way “beyond happiness” consisting in “vital nourishing” (“yang sheng”) (Chuang Tzu, Chapters 3 and 19; Jullien 2005). Nourishing is the basic verb and norm of life. According to Chinese thinking, life should be long and healthy. By contrast, in the “Far West” eternal life is seen as a goal at the end of a linear process. “Vital nourishing” means learning to give up the will to live as a fixed idea or not to hang on it. Death is not a mistake as Heiner Müller believes (Mayer and Müller 2005). The one who only wants to live (“sheng sheng”) does not live.

Taoist thinking does not teach to look for a fixed centre like Confucius and Aristotle did but to oscillate following a logic of concentration and scattering, by opening ourselves to natural processes and particularly to “heaven” (Jullien 2005, 39 ff). “Heaven” is not a metaphysical dimension no less than a spiritual view of it but a life process (Jullien 2005, 62). It does not mean, like in case of the Aristotelian and Platonic ‘in-formation’ process to materialize a super-sensory form but a process of perennial becoming (Capurro 1978). The perception of this process is the “dao”-centred moral consciousness according to Chuang Tzu consisting in learning to breathe as a medium or communication process between the world, the “dao” and the self (Jullien 2005, 71-75). The leitmotif – not the imperative! – guiding our actions can be formulated as follows: ‘circulate – instead of blocking!’ which is a possible translation of the famous Taoist concept “wuwei” (Wohlfart 2002, 101).

From this perspective we should avoid blocking the digital infosphere, for instance through information overload or censorship, letting information circulate and feed our life. Information management does not mean in this case applying an external strategy but learning to adapting ourselves to different kinds of information flows depending on the context where ‘in-formation’ processes take place. It means also not fixing ourselves on a specific medium, including the digital one, becoming dependent or even addicted to it. In order to become good information managers we must first learn to manage our life nourishing it calmly and cool. Taoism is an anti-stress life technology. It is a permanent exercise in a good mood consisting in getting rid of the imperative to give life meaning. By contrast, the “Far West” is based on direct speech, temporality and meaning.

PROSPECTS

What is the goal of this kind of analysis for intercultural debates on information ethics? First of all, to learn from each other. Western information societies can learn from Taoism and the spirit of the “Far East” not only on how to deal with blocking processes based on fixed moralities, exacerbating the primacy of direct speech.  Information societies in the “Far East” might learn from direct speech, individual freedom and autonomy as correctives of an idealized harmony that might block social changes. In both cases we should be careful not to oversee the complexity and richness of our traditions including the difference itself between “Far East” and “Far West” that is nothing but a starting point for intercultural information ethics that should be both theoretical and empirical. Makoto Nakada has done and is doing pioneer work in this area (Nakada and Tamura 2005; Nakada and Capurro 2009).

Secondly, the Internet is not, as conceived in its early stages, a kind of hyper-sphere where all cultural and contingent differences disappear and we are all equal (Han 2005). This is a simplistic and outdated perception of a medium that in the meantime pervades the real physical and cultural world in which we live instead of building a separate world. We are in the world with all our linguistic, historical and geographical contingency. The internet as well as all devices connected through this medium are part of such contingency. This is why any cyberethics related to the internet as a whole makes only sense if it is mediated with the specific situations and traditions in which this technology is being used. Consequently, intercultural information ethics should not be identified with a universal code of morality for the global information society as developed by UNESCO (2010), but as a global space of reflection where we can put into question what is morally and ethically given for granted within different cultural backgrounds.

The World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) proclaimed an inclusive information society and the overcoming of the digital divide within and between nations (WSIS 2003). This can be considered, on the one hand, as a Kantian “regulative idea” or a universal ideal for the digital era. But, on the other hand, the history of media and literature provides examples of information and communication ideals both as utopias and dystopias that should be critically analized both in the “Far West” and the “Far East” (Grimm and Capurro 2008).


ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The author thanks Fernando Elichirigoity (University of Illinois at Urbana Champaign) for his criticisms and assistance in polishing this text.

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RAFAEL CAPURRO: IN SEARCH OF ARIADNE'S THREAD IN DIGITAL LABYRINTHS
 

In:: M. Bottis & T. Alexandropoulou (eds.): Broadening the Horizons of Information Law and Ethics - A Time for Inclusion University of Macedonia Press, 2017, 1-19  (pdf)


2.  An Email Exchange After the Conference

After the conference an email exchange took place among a number of colleagues and myself in which we evaluated some of the philosophical and societal issues at hand and the stakes involved and whether or not we were able to trace to any length the myth of Ariadne's thread in digital labyrinths. For those who may not be familiar with this myth, I can first say briefly that it is a myth about a guide to freedom, which is not a myth at all but something we all have a need for.

As for the concept of labyrinth itself, its design and initiatory function, I note that it is part of many cultural heritages throughout the world (Kern 1999). I use the concept of labyrinth in order to address issues of knowledge and power that might allow us — but who constitutes 'us' and who are we in the digital age? — to become agents of change and not just digital 'sub-jects', i.e., objects of private monopolies and state powers and unable to develop new shapes of freedom (Capurro 2014). In order to do this, we must be aware that our being-in-the-world with others is not identical with the reification of ourselves on the Internet. I call this the ethical difference.

Following the path of thought about considering the Dao as information, I sent an email to Xueshan Yan from the Department of Information Management, Peking University, — who could not take part of the ISISconference but who is a member of FIS — asking him about the Chinese sign for information and its relation with breathing and information. He answered me as follows:

"The expression of Information in Chinese is 信息pronunciation: xin xi).  in ancient Chinese has the meaning of "say something by mouth", "letter"; in modern Chinese it means message (informal or small information); only  has the meaning of breathing both in ancient and modern Chinese. If separated  or  do not have any relationship with Dao. Only when they are combined together the meaning of Dao can emerge." (Xueshan Yan, e-mail from September 8, 2015)

Joseph Brenner found this issue being closely related to his research on "Logic in Reality" (Brenner 2008). We started a conversation about the book of the French philosopher and sinologist François Jullien: "La grande image n'a pas de forme" (Jullien 2005). The title is a quote from Chapter 41 of the Tao Te Ching: "The great form has no shape" (Laozi 2011). Jullien analyses the way or Dao of the indeterminate that is expressed in classical Chinese with words such as air, wind (feng) or atmosphere. Wind circulates or 'impregnates' what is and what is not: "The grass must bend, when the wind (feng) blows across it." (Confucius, 9 2005, xii,19). This differs from the Platonic and Aristotelian views that matter is 'in-formed' by forms. It goes, in fact, in the opposite direction to the Western method — hodos means 'way' in Greek — that starts with the indifferentiated, the mythical chaos, Aristotle's hyle (matter) or Plato's chora (receptacle or material substratum) being 'in-formed' by the demiurge, a kind of "artisan god" (Margel 1995). According to Jullien, the Chinese painter starts with form (xing ) and goes through a dynamism or vitality (shi) or through wind or air (qi-xiang 氣象) in such a way that what is eventually depicted is informis or without form. This makes possible that the forms which are at the bottom and not at the top open themselves to the indeterminate. The pictorial result is the "great image that has no form." (Jullien 2005/2009) Joseph Brenner sent me the following quote in the English translation from François Jullien's La grande image. He found that the translator uses the form breath-energy, breath-image, breath-phenomenon, breath-resonance and breath-spirit for the words in French starting with souffle: "The Chinese also conceived of atmosphere by means of another binomial linked to wind and explicitly associating the visible and invisible.[ …] The energy of the undifferentiated foundation (of the world) actualizing itself and taking form, this image (phenomenon) spreads out as a ‘breath-atmosphere’. Wang Wei indicates this as a principle:

“When one contemplates the painting, one must look first at the breath-image; then the tonality – clear or confused, limpid or opaque; then the relation structuring (the structural relation of) the principal and secondary mountains.” (Jullien 2009, Transl. Jane Marie Todd)

This understanding of information as no-form is the opposite to the results of my early research on the etymology and history of ideas of the Latin term informatio as a translation of the heavy Greek metaphysical terms eidos, idea, morphe and typos (Capurro 1978). I followed the track of informatio as documented in the "Thesaurus Linguae Latinae" (ThLL) where it is stated that informatio is composed of the particle 'in' meaning a reinforcing and not a negation of the forming process (formatio). Although the particle 'in' means also 'no' — like the alpha privativum in Greek for instance in a-letheia (un-concealment, truth) — no use of this sense with regard to informatio is given, excepting related concepts such as informabilis, informia, informitas, and informiter.

In my dissertation I mentioned this but did not follow the track further. This has been done now by Vinícios Souza de Menezes, a PhD student in Information Science at the Brazilian Research Center for Information (IBICT), and an expert in contemporary philosophy in his paper "Information, a critical-philological excursus" in which he critically analyzes my interpretation (Menezes 2015). What remained forgotten in my analysis leads him to informatio as aletheia and to Aristotelian and Platonic metaphysics with the predominance of beings and not of being as a process of giving. This path of thinking makes possible a translation between informatio as no-form and the Chinese thinking of the Dao — as well as with the Japanese tradition Musi or 'denial of self' (Nakada and Tamura 2005; Capurro 2005) — through the mediation of Western thought on the abyss of existence by some philosophers quoted by Menezes such as Wittgenstein, Heidegger and Agamben.

In my paper for the first Chinese conference on Information Ethics that took place at the Renmin University in Beijing in 2010 (Capurro 2010a), I quoted Chuang Tzu:

“Fishing-stakes are employed to catch fish; but when the fish are got, the men forget the stakes. Snares are employed to catch hares, but when the hares are got, men forget the snares. Words are employed to convey ideas; but when the ideas are apprehended, men forget the words. Fain would I talk with such a man who has forgot[en] the words!” (Chuang Tzu 26, 11)

A main issue in my presentation at the ICPI conference in Vienna dealt with the relation between language and information as analyzed by Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker (Weizsäcker 1973) and Martin Heidegger (Heidegger 1959). This hermeneutic relation is also an angeletic one — from Greek angelos = messenger) — , dealing with the transmission and mutual exchange of messages and not only with their interpretation, Hermes being both, the messenger of the gods and their interpreter (Capurro and Holgate 2011, Capurro 1978, 263- 266). Michael Eldred writes: 

"Above all, the mutual exchange (metabole) of messages, the interplay of messaging in which an attentive listening to each other on the part of the interlocutors is essential. All exchange presupposes a mutuality of some kind, no matter how defective (Even subjugation to the other is a kind of exchange.). Mutual exchange is a kind of (at least) double or (complex multiple) movement resulting from the intertwining of the exercise of the powers of the exchangers." (Michael Eldred, e-mail from September 9, 2015)

Following the discussions on social and ethical issues during the Vienna conference, a group of colleagues — among them Rainer E. Zimmermann, professor of Philosophy at the University of Applied Sciences in Munich, and José María Díaz Nafría, engineer and philosopher, professor at the University of León (Spain) and creator of BITrum, a glossary of concepts, metaphors and theories dealing with information (BITrum 2015) — , came to the idea of creating a research group called SE 104. The acronym corresponded to the room where a session of the Vienna Summit on ethical issues of the information society took place that had the particularity of being difficult for the participants to find! This was also a general issue for most participants searching for their session rooms in the labyrinthine building of the Technical University of Vienna. The title of this group was given with a good sense of humour but addressed also a serious issue, namely whether the theories proposed and discussed during the Summit were Ariadne's thread(s) in the digital labyrinths and/or labyrinth(s) in themselves.

I suggest using also the plural form, since there are several possibilities for shaping freedom when facing digital labyrinths and threads and also because, as José María Díaz Nafría suggested in one of his mails, digital labyrinths seem to have no center with one Minotaur, one Ariadne, and one Theseus. According to the myth, Crete's King Minos was in opposition to the kings of Athens for whom his palace was a labyrinth, i.e., a centre of power and domination. The labyrinth was built by Daedalus, a famous craftsman, for King Minos to imprison the Minotaur. The Minotaur, half-man, half-bull is a symbol of evil since his only role in existence was to eat maidens sacrificed by Minos to his gods. Minos' daughter, Ariadne, was willing to help Theseus, the son of King Aegeus of Athens, in whom she fell in love, in his task to kill the Minotaur by giving him a sword and a ball of thread to find his way out of the labyrinth. Today, we are inside digital labyrinths guided by threads that look like Ariadne's but often make us unable to be aware of the labyrinth as a labyrinth, i.e. as a place of negative power and domination. They are threads of business, not of love.

In his "History of Philosophy" Hegel writes that to know that "a human being is free" makes an "incredible difference" ("ein ungeheurer Unterschied") in human history although such knowledge does not mean its realization (Hegel 1971, 40). It is not a question of looking for an outside to the digital labyrinth(s) in the sense of avoiding the historical challenges of the digital age. It is, instead, a question of how far we are able, again, to see the labyrinth as a labyrinth, i.e., to unveil knowledge and power in digital age as done, for instance, by Edward Snowden. I agree with Peter Fleissner, professor emeritus of Design and Assessment of New Technologies at the Vienna University of Technology, that any restriction by social, political and economic structures hindering the emancipatory development of people is an essential indicator for the transformation of the present information societies. Freedom is not a property of a worldless and isolated subjectivity, but a relation between human beings in a shared world that is concerned with their mutual respect and fairness also in their relation to the natural world to which we belong.

Both relations, to ourselves and to the world, are today mediated by digital technologies. They give rise to the belief that to be means to be digital and, particularly, that I am a human being only as far as I am in the digital world reifying or 'in-forming' my self as digital data and believing that I am eventually a digital being. I call this belief digital metaphysics that I distinguish from digital ontology, in which the digital understanding of being is acknowledged as a possible today predominating way of understanding ourselves and the world.

The difference between 'is' and 'as' is not only an ontological but an ethical one (Capurro 2012a). The ethical difference between who and what we are, or between our selves and our data, is one of Ariadne's threads (Capurro, Eldred, Nagel 2013). The task of translating information in the sense I proposed at the Vienna Summit can be understood as one of Ariadne's threads of emancipation from the knowledge and power structures of the digital labyrinth. Looking for a language of "mutuality" (Peter Fleissner), i.e., of mutual estimation and care for each other, in the digital age means looking for mediations that depend on our capacity to translate our concepts and values into other languages and vice versa, to be open to the messages coming from the other(s) particularly when they look uncanny, i.e., unusual or unfamiliar from a normal perspective, an issue that led Thomas Kuhn to his theory on the structure of scientific revolutions (Kuhn 1962; Capurro and Holgate 2011). This is not only a theoretical but also a practical task about different kinds of exercises of resistance and resilience at the macro- and micro-levels in order to transform ourselves and our societies into more free and fair ones in the digital age (Capurro 1995).




JAPAN



WIKIPEDIA: KAMI

Kami (Japanese: , [kaꜜmi]) are the spirits or phenomena that are worshipped in the religion of Shinto. They can be elements of the landscape, forces of nature, as well as beings and the qualities that these beings express; they can also be the spirits of venerated dead persons. Many kami are considered the ancient ancestors of entire clans (some ancestors became kami upon their death if they were able to embody the values and virtues of kami in life). Traditionally, great or sensational leaders like the Emperor could be or became kami.

In Shinto, kami are not separate from nature, but are of nature, possessing positive and negative, and good and evil characteristics. They are manifestations of musubi (結び), the interconnecting energy of the universe, and are considered exemplary of what humanity should strive towards. Kami are believed to be "hidden" from this world, and inhabit a complementary existence that mirrors our own: shinkai (神界, "the world of the kami"). To be in harmony with the awe-inspiring aspects of nature is to be conscious of kannagara no michi (随神の道 or 惟神の道, "the way of the kami").

Though the word kami is translated multiple ways into English, no one English word expresses its full meaning. The ambiguity of the meaning of kami is necessary, as it conveys the ambiguous nature of kami themselves.



MARTIN HEIDEGGER: AUS EINEM GESPRÄCH VON DER SPRACHE
ZWISCHEN EINEM JAPANER UND EINEM FRAGENDEN

In: ders.: Unterwegs zur Sprache. Pfullingen 1975, 142 ff




F    Wie heißt das japanische Wort für "Sprache"?
J   (nach weiterem Zögern) Es heißt "Koto ba"
F   Und was sagt dies?
J   ba nennt die Blätter, auch und zumal die Blütenblätter. Denken Sie an die Kirschblüte und an die Pflaumenblüte.
F   Und was sagt Koto?
J   Diese Frage ist am schwersten zu beantworten. Indessen wird ein Versuch dadurch erleichtert, daß wir das Iki zuerläutern wagten: das reine Entzücken der rufenden Stille. Das Wehen der Stille, die dies rufende Entzücken ereignet, ist das Waltende, das jene Entzücken kommen läßt. Koto nennt aber immer zugleich das jeweils entzückende selbst, das einzig je im unwiederholbaren Augenblick mit der Fülle seines Anmutens zum Scheinen kommt.
F Koto wäre dann das das Ereignis der lichtenden Botschaft der Anmut.
J Herrlich gesagt; nur führt das Wort "Anmut" das heutige Vorstellen zu leicht in die Irre...
F nämlich weg in den Bezirk der Impressionen...
J denen die Expression zugeordnet bleibt als die Art der Befreiung. Hilfreicher scheint mir die Zuwendung zum griechischen Wort 
χάρις, das ich in dem schönen Spruch fand, den Sie in Ihrem Vortrag "...dichterisch wohnet der Mensch..." aus Sophokles anführten, und das Sie mit "Huld" übersetzten. Darin spricht eher das wehende Ankommen der Stille des Entzückens.
F Zugleich noch anderes, was dort gesagt sein möchte, aber im Rahmen des Vortrages nicht dargetan werden konnte. Die χάρις heißt dort τίκτουσα - die her-vor-bringende. Unser deutsches Wort dichten, tihton, sagt das Selbe. So kündigt sich im Spruch des Sophokles für uns an, daß die Huld selbst dichterisch, das eigentlich Dichtende ist, das Quellen der Botschaft des Entbergens der Zwiefalt.
J Ich bräuchte mehr Zeit, als das Gespräch verstattet, um den neuen Ausblicken nachzudenken, die sich mit Ihrem Hinweis öffnen. Aber eines sehe ich sogleich, daß er mir hilft, Ihnen noch deutlicher zu sagen, was Koto ist.
F Das scheint mir unumgänglich zu sein, um Ihr japanisches Wort für "Sprache" Koto ba auch nur einigermaßen mitdenken zu können.
J Sie erinnern wohl die Stelle unseres Gespräch, wo ich Ihnen die vermeintlich entsprechenden japanischen Worte zu der Unterscheidung des aistheton  und noeton nannte: Iro und meint mehr als Farbe und das sinnlich Wahrnehmbare jeder Art. Ku, das Offene, die Leere des Himmel, meint mehr als das Übersinnliche.
F Worin das "mehr" beruht, konnten Sie nicht sagen.
J Doch jetzt kann ich einen Wink folgen, den beide Worte bergen.
F Wohin winken sie?
J In das, von woher das Widerspiel beider zueinander sich ereignet.
F Und das ist?
J Koto, das Ereignis der lichtenden Bortschaft der hervorbringenden Huld.
F Koto wäre das waltende Ereignen...
J und zwar dessen, was die Hut des Gedeihenden und Erblühenden braucht.
F Was sagt dann Koto ba als Name für die Sprache?
J Aus diesem Wort gehört, ist die Sprache: Blütenblätter, die aus Koto stammen.
F Das ist ein wundersames und darum unausdenkbares Wort. Es nennt anderes als das, was uns die metaphysisch verstandenen Namen: Sparche, glossa, lingua, langue und language vorstellen. Ich gebrauche seit langem nur ungern das Wort "Sprache", wenn ich ihrem Wesen nachdenke.
J Aber finden Sie ein gemäßeres?
F Ich meine, es gefunden zu haben; möchte es jedoch davor bewahren, daß es als geläufiger Titel verwendet und zur Bezeichnung für einen Begriff umgefälscht wird.
J Welches Wort gebrauchen Sie?
F Das Wort "die Sage". Es meint: das Sagen und sein Gesagtes und das zu-Sagende.
J Was heißt sagen?
F Vermutlich das Selbe wie zeigen im Sinne von: erscheinen- und scheinenlassen, dies jedoch in der Weise des Winkens.
J Die Sage ist darnach nicht der Name für das menschliche Sprechen...
F sondern für jenes Wesende, das Ihr japanisches Wort Koto ba erwinkt: Das Sagenhafate...
J in dessen Winken ich jetzt erst durch unser Gespräch heimisch geworden bin, so daß ich auch klarer sehe, wie gut geleitet Graf Kuki war, als er unter Ihrer Anleitung dem Hermeneutischen nachzusinnen versuchte.
F Sie erkennen aber auch, wie dürftig es um meine Anleitung bestellt sein mußte; den mit dem Blick in das Wesen der Sage beginnt das Denken erst jenen Weg, der uns aus dem nur metaphysischen Vorstellen zurücknimmt in das Achten auf die Winke jener Botschaft, deren Botengänger wir eigens werden möchten.
J Der Weg dahin ist weit.
F Weniger, weil er in die erne, als weil er durch das Nahe führt.
J Das so nah ist, lang schon so nah gewesen ist, wie uns Japanern das bislang unbedachte Wort für das Wesen der Sprache: Koto ba.
F Blüttenblätter, die aus Koto stammen. Die Einbildungskraft möchte ausschweifen in unerfahrene Bereiche, wenn dieses Wort sein Sagen beginnt.
J Schweifen könnte sie nur, wenn sie in das bloße Vorstellen losgelassen würde. Wo sie jedoch als Quell des Denkens springt, scheint sie mir eher zu versammeln als zu schweifen. Dergleichen ahnte schon Kant, wie Sie selber zeigen.
F Aber ist unser Denken schon an diesem Quell?
J Wenn nicht, dann doch unterwegs dorthin, sobald es den Pfad sucht, auf den, wie ich jetzt deutlicher Sehe, unser japanisches Wort für "Sprache" winken möchte.
F Um diesem Wink uns fügen zu können, müßten wir erfahrener sein im Wesen der Sprache.
J Mir scheint, Bemühungen darun begleiten seit Jahrzehnten Ihren Denkweg und dies so vielfältig, daß Sie vorbereitet genug sind, etwas vom Wesen der Sprache als Sage zu sagen.
F Aber Sie wissen auch ebensogut, daß eigene Bemühung allein nie zureicht.
J Das bleibt wahr. Doch wir können, was sterbliche Kraft für sich nie vermag, eher erlangen, wenn wir von der Bereitschaft erfüllt sind, auch das wegzuschenken, was wir von uns aus nur immer versuchen, ohne daß es die Vollendung erreicht hat.
F Vorläufiges habe ich in dem Vortrag gewagt, den ich in den letzten Jahren einige Male hielt unter dem Titel "Die Sprache".
J Von diesem Vortrag über die Sprache habe ich Berichte und sogar eine Nachschrift gelesen.
F Solche Nachschriften, auch die sorgfältigen, bleiben, wie ich schon sagte, zweifelhafte Quellen, und jede Nachschrift des genannten Vortrages ist ohnehin eine Verunstaltung seines Sagens.
J Wie meinen Sie dieses harte Urteil?
F Es ist kein Urteil über die Nachschriften, sondern über eine unklare Kennzeichnung des Vortrages.
J Inwiefern?
F Der Vortrag ist kein Sprechen über die Sprache...
J Sondern?
F Wenn ich Ihnen jetzt antworten könnte, wäre das Dunkel um den Weg gelichtet. Aber ich kann nicht antworten. Der Grund dafür ist derselbe, der mich bisher davor zurückgehalten hat, den Vortrag als Schrift erscheinen zu lassen.
J Es wäre aufdringlich, wollte ich diesen Grund wissen. Nach der Art, wie Sie vorhin unser japanisches Wort für "Sprache" in Ihr Gehör aufnahmen, und aus dem, was Sie von der Botschaft der Entbergung der Zwiefalt und vom Botengang des Menschen andeuteten, kann ich nur unbestimmt vermuten, was es heißt, die Frage nach der Sprache in eine Besinnung auf das Wesen der Sage zu verwandeln.
F Sie verzeihen, wenn ich mit den Hinweisen sparsam bleibe, die vielleicht dahin führen könnten, das Wesen der Sage zu erörtern.
J Hierfür bedarf es einer Wanderung in die Ortschaft des Wesens der Sage.
F Dies vor allem. Aber ich meine jetzt zuvor etwas anderes. Was mich zur Zurückhaltung bestimmt, ist die wachsende Einsicht in das Unantastbare, was uns das Geheimnis der Sage verhüllt. Mit der bloßen Aufhellung des Unterschiedes zwischen Sagen und Sprechen ist wenig gewonnen.
J Wir Japaner haben für Ihre Art der Zurückhaltung - ich darf wohl sagen- ein angeborenes Verständnis. Ein Geheimnis ist erst recht dann ein Geheimnis, wenn nicht einmal dies zum Vorschein kommt, daß es ein Geheimnis waltet.
F Für die oberflächlich Eiligen nicht minder als für die sinnend Bedächtigen muß es so aussehen, als gäbe es nirgends ein Geheimnis.
J Wir stehen jedoch mitten in der Gefahr nicht nur zu laut vom Geheimnis zu reden, sondern sein Walten zu verfehlen.
F Dessen reinen Quell zu hüten, dünkt mich das Schwerste.
J Aber dürfen wir deshalb kurzerhand der Mühe und dem Wagnis ausweichen, über die Sprache zu sprechen?
F Keineswegs. Wir müssen uns unablässig um ein solches Sprechen bemühen. Sein Gesprochenes kann freilich nie in die Form einer wissenschaftlichen Abhandlung eingehen...
J weil dadurch die Bewegung des hier verlangten Fragens zu leicht erstarrt.
F Dies wäre der geringste Verlust. Schwerer wiegt ein anderes: ob es nämlich je ein Sprechen über die Sprache gibt.
J Daß es dies gibt, bezeugt doch unser eigenes Tun.
F Ich fürchte, nur allzusehr.
J Dann verstehe ich Ihr Bedenken nicht.
F Ein Sprechen über die Sprache macht sie fast unausweichlich zu einem Gegenstand.
J Dann entschwindet ihr Wesen.
F Wir haben uns über die Sprache gestellt, statt von ihr zu hören.
J Dann gäge es nur ein Sprechen von der Sprache...
F in der Weise, daß es von ihrem Wesen her gerufen un dahin geleitet wäre.
J Wie vermögen wir solches?
F Ein Sprechen von der Sprache könnte nur ein Gespräch sein.
J Darin bewegen wir uns ohne Zweifel.
F ABer ist es ein Gespräch vom Wesen der Sprache her?
J Mir scheint, wir bewegen uns jetzt im Kreis. Ein Gespräch von der Sprache muß von ihrem Wesen gerufen sein. Wie vermag es dergleichen, ohne selber erst auf ein Hören sich einzulassen, das sogleich ins Wesen reicht?
F Dieses seltsame Verhältnis nennte ich einmal den hermeneutischen Zirkel.
J Er besteht überall im Hermeneutischen, also dort, wo nach Ihrer heutigen Erläuterung das Verhältnis von Botschaft und Botengang waltet.
F Der Botengänger muß schon von der Botschaft herkommen. Er muß aber auch schon auf sie zugegangen sein.
J Sagten Sie früher nicht, dieser Zirkel sei unausweichlich; statt zu versuchen, ihnals einen vermeintlich logischen Widerspruch zu vermeiden, müsse man ihn gehen?
F Gewiß. Aber diese notwendige Anerkennung des hermeneutischen Zirkels bedeutet noch nicht, daß mit der Vorstellung des anerkannten Kreisens der hermeneutische Bezug ursprünglich erfahren ist.
J Sie würden also Ihre frühere Auffassung preisgeben.
F Allerdings - und zwar insofern, als die Rede von einem Zirkel stets vordergründig bleibt.
J Wie würden Sie jetzt den hermeneutischen Bezug darstellen?
F Ich möchte eine Darstellung ebenso entschieden vermeiden wie ein Sprechen über die Sprache.
J So läge alles daran, in ein entsprechendes Sagen von der Sprache zu gelangen.
F Ein solches sagendes Entsprechen könnte nur ein Gespräch sein.
J Aber offenkundig ein Gespräch ganz eigener Art.
F Ein solches, das dem Wesen der Sage ursprünglich vereignet bliebe.
J Dann dürten wir aber nicht mehr jedes Miteinanderreden ein Gespräch nennen...
F falls wir diesen Namen fortan so hörten, daß er uns die Versammlung auf das Wesen der Sprache nennt.
J In diesem Sinne wären dann auch Platons Dialoge keine Gespräche?
F Ich möchte die Frage offenlassen und nur darauf weisen, daß sich die Art eines Gesprächs aus dem bestimmt, von woher die dem Anschein nach allein die Sprechenden, die Menschen, angesprochen sind.
J Wo das Wesen der Sprache als die Sage die Mehen anspräche (ansagte), ergäbe sie das eigentliche Gespräch...
F das nicht "über" die Sprache, sondern von ihr, als von ihrem Wesen gebraucht, sagte.
J Wobei es sogleich von untergeordneter Bedeutung bliebe, ob das Gespräch als ein geschriebenes vorliegt oder als ein irgendwann gesprochenes verklungen ist.
F Gewiß - weil alles daran liegt, ob dieses eigentliche Gepräch, mag es geschrieben oder gesprochen sein oder nicht, fortwährend im Kommen bleibt.
J Der Gang eines solchen Gespräches müßte einen eigenen Charakter haben, demgemäß mehr geschwiegen als geredet würde.
F Geschwiegen vor allem über das Schweigen...
J weil das Reden und Schreiben über das Schweigen das verderblichste Gerede veranlaßt...
F Wer vermöchte es, einfach vom Schweigen zu schweigen?
J Dies müßte das eigentliche Sagen sein...
F und das stete Vorspiel zum eigentlichen Gespräch von der Sprache bleiben.
J Ob wir so nicht das Unmögliche versuchen?
F Allerdings - solange dem Menschen nicht jener Botengang rein gewährt ist, den die Botschaft braucht, die dem Menschen die Entbergung der Zwiefalt zuspricht.
J Diesen Botengang hervorzurufen, gar nocht, ihn zu gehen, dünkt mich noch unvergleichlich schwerer als das Wesen des Iki zu erörtern.
F Gewiß. Denn es müßte sich etwas ereignen, wodurch sich dem Botengang jene Weite öffnete und zuleuchtete, inder das Wesen der Sage zum Scheinen kommt.
J Ein Stillendes müßte sich ereignen, was das Wehen der Weite in das Gefüge der rufenden Sage beruhigte.
F Überall spielt das verhüllte Verhältnis von Botschaft und Botengang.
J In unserer alten japanischen Dichtung singt ein unbekannter Dichter vom Ineinanderduften der Kirschblüte und Pflaumenblüte am selben Zweig.
F So denke ich mir das Zueinanderwesen von Weite und Stille im selben Ereignis der Botschaft der Entbergung der Zwiefalt.
J Doch wer von den Heutigen könnte darin einen Anklang des Wesens der Sprache hören, das unser Wort Koto ba nennt, Blütenblätter, die aus der lichtenden Botschaft der hervorbringenden Huld gedeihen?
F Wer möchte in all dem eine brauchbare Aufhellung des Wesens der Sprache finden?
J Man wird es nie finden, solange man Auskünfte in Gestalt von Leitzsätzen und Merkworten fordert.
F Doch manch einer könnte in das Vorspiel eines Botenganges einbezogen werden, sobald er sich für ein Gespräch von der Sprache bereithält.
J Mir will scheinen, als hätten wir jetzt selber, statt über die Sprache zu sprechen, einige Schritte auf einem Gang versucht, der sich dem Wesen der Sage anvertraut.
F Sich ihm zusagt. Freuen wir uns, wenn es nicht nur so scheint, sondern so ist.
J Was ist dann, wenn es so ist?
F Dann ereignet sich der Abschied von allem "Es ist".
J Den Abschied denken Sie aber doch nicht als Ver und Verneinung?
F Keineswegs.
J Sondern?
F Als die Ankunft des Gewesen.
J Aber das Vergangene geht doch, ist gegangen, wie soll es kommen?
F Das Vergehen ist anderes als das Gewesen.
J Wie sollen wir dieses denken?
F Als die Versammlung des Währenden...
J das, wie Sie neulich sagten, währt als das Gewährende...
F und das Selbe bleibt wie die Botschaft...
J die uns als Botengänger braucht.


TADASHI TAKENOUCHI: CAPURRO'S HERMENEUTIC APPROACH TO  INFORMATION ETHICS

ETHOS IN THE INFORMATION SOCIETY AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF "ANGELETICS"


Published in International Review of Information Ethics 1, 06/2004

Finally, I would like to briefly discuss the relationship between Capurro’s hermeneutic approach and the Japanese perspective. Capurro is interested in (ontological) distinctions between mono and koto, or between “reality (Realität)” and “actuality (Wirklichkeit)” as proposed by Bin Kimura (1931- ), a noted Japanese psychoanalyst and a thinker. Mono and koto are concepts of Japanese language which mean “things” and “events”, respectively. Kimura relates the word “reality” to the “essence” of something and “actuality” to what is “happening”. He mentions that in Japanese they use mono and koto, where mono refers to things in there being while koto refers to what is happening. The world is the whole of what is happening, not of the things. Also the existences or activities of “I” and “you” are not mono but koto, that is, they are not “substances” in Japanese. Capurro thinks this is important for our thinking about the question of what he calls “information metaphysics” vs. “information ontology,” the conflict between information-as-thing (Michael Buckland’s term) and information-as-event (Capurro’s concept to denote the “eventuality” in Heideggerian terms of the phenomenon), or between information as mono and as koto. Capurro says that Heidegger's criticism of the “Ges ell” and what he calls the “Information Gestell” would look only to information as mono (things), but this is exactly what the book culture was. Libraries are full of mono. What the Internet brings is information as koto (events) and this is the main thought concerning “message”, because a message is basically koto. It makes no sense to think of messages as “things” with some “characteristics.” I agree with Capurro when he says that messages are basically koto. The concept of information is particularly problematic, and this is why he thinks that we must switch to the concept of “message” which is more dynamic. t It is natural that Kimura has a similar viewpoint of the hermeneutic approach because his work is based on Heidegger. On the other hand, Kimura also depends on the philosophy of Kitaro Nishida (1870-1945), who is called the first “philosopher” in Japan. Nishida himself practiced Zen and tried to systematize the eastern thought in terms of the western philosophy to overcome the separation between subjectivity and objectivity. Capurro himself has deepened his interest in Zen Buddhism and Japanese thought (e.g. Capurro 1999b, c) and promoted friendships with Japanese thinkers.

The future relationship between Capurro’s hermeneutic approach and Japanese thought will be interesting. The interaction between them is expected to bear fruitful outcomes in the development of information ethics.





In: Rafael Capurro & John Holgate (eds.): Messages and Messengers Angeletics as an Approach to the Phenomenology of Communication. 
Munich 2011, pp. 67-84.

CONTENT

On the Phatic Function
On Phatic Overload, Being-in-the-World, and BA
On Western Angeletic Conceptions
On Messengers and Messages
On Learning From Each Other
Acknowledgements
Bibliography


ON THE PHATIC FUNCTION


RC
 Some Japanese schools are thinking about prohibiting the use of mobile phones because they are being misused for bullying but also for prostitution, particularly of young girls, as well as for other kinds of wrongdoings.

MN This is a very important and serious problem for us. I don’t know about prostitution, but it is true that young Japanese girls as well as young boys in high school, in junior-high school or even in elementary school, are under great influence from mobile phones and the internet in various ways. It is easy to talk about the ‘bad influence’ of this new sort of CMC or communication, but what is important in these cases is to see why younger generations (and also older generations) are so much interested in communication using these new tools. I think that one of the attractive characteristics of mobile phones for boys and girls is that they provide them with means with which they can communicate among themselves without being disturbed by their parents or family members. Another aspect of the attractiveness of mobile phones seems to be the “phatic function” (Jakobson 1960).

According to Kiyokazu Nishimura, a Japanese scholar dealing with media, aesthetics and dramatic expression such as Kabuki (classical Japanese dance-drama), mobile phones give to young and old generations a sense of connection with friends, peer groups, etc. The participants want to get connected all the time or they want to feel the potential connection with others by sending e-mails or by just keeping their mobile phones on (Nishimura 1999). In my view, we need to create some sort of shared field among the participants in which various aspects of communication such as persuasion, transmission of information, greeting and so on can take place. In direct or face-to-face communication, we use various sorts of facial expressions such as eye contact or gestures while on the phone we use verbal expressions such as  ‘can you hear me?,’ ‘isn’t it?,’ ‘right?,’ and so on. These utterances and facial expressions have nothing to do with the content or essence of the communication, but at the same time they are indispensable when communication itself occurs.

In my view, in order for communication to take place, we need a shared field or Ba (= place). In order to keep or create this Ba, we need such utterances and facial expressions that can be seen as meta-communication. They determine or characterize the nature of communication taking place in accordance with or under the influence of this ‘meta-communication.’ In my view, using mobile phones or being engaged in communication via SMS provides the participants with a certain sort of phatic function or meta-communication. We need a certain sort of meta-communication when we talk with each other or are engaged in interactive actions. We always say such things, ‘this is just a joke,’ ‘honestly speaking,’ ‘are you teasing me?’ These utterances are something that determines the situations within which a variety of deeds, interactive actions, or talks can occur.

The concept of Ba as used by Kitaro Nishida or Bin Kimura means a place where the subject and the object or mono (things, objects) and koto (events, human interpretation of objects and experiences) encounter. Take for instance the following poem (haiku) by Matsuo Basho (1644-1694):

Furu ike ya / kawazu tobikomu / mizu no oto

An ancient pond / a frog jumps in / the splash of water

With this poetic expression, we experience some sort of oneness (Ichinyo) of the poet, frog, old pond, sound of jumping frog, Basho’s ears, our own ears. In this case, Ba is the place where these mono, koto, kotoba (words, expressions) come together. In the case of communication by mobile phone or the internet, Bamight be considered as the place where meta-communication and communication come together (Nakamura 1998; Kimura 1994).

According to Ervin Goffman, otters’ play is dependent upon some kind of phatic function or meta-communication: ‘this is just playing, so never bite me seriously’ (Goffman 1974). Of course, the phatic function is not dependent on speech in this case. According to Nishimura, and I think so too, we are now facing serious confusions at the level of meta-communication. For example, we can't live alone, but we have to live by sacrificing others to live a better life, or as Fromm pointed out, we need freedom and on the other hand we fear freedom and escape from freedom (Fromm 1941). In the case of younger generations inJapan, we are half Westerners but remain dwellers in the ‘Far East.’ This is perhaps the case with older generations too. We dislike too close friendships. We like individualism imported from Western cultures, on the one hand, but we always feel that we are hurt by loneliness, on the other. We are facing a kind of confusion or collapse of meta-communication. Japanese youth often hurt each other or sometimes even ‘kill’ others by teasing (death as the result of bullying) and excuse this by saying: ‘hey, this is just a game!’

It is true that we need a sense of connection or of sharing the situations in a various ways, so that people don’t have much difficulty in understanding a kind of phatic function, and in some cases they seem to seek new sorts of phatic function or meta-communication to keep their communication active all the time. In my own view, Japanese web-sites are full of information or utterances that remind us of the younger generations’ need for a simple form of meta-communication. Japanese web-sites are full of blogs whose titles are: ‘You see, I’m here’ (Boku ha koko ni iruyo). Mobile phones are a token of a need for easy meta-communication. In this sense, we Japanese face the situation which might be called phatic overload. In the cases of the prostitution of young girls, some people prefer to use terms such as enjyo-kousai, which means ‘aid-receiving friendship.’ But who gives aid for what and who receives what? This might be referred to as distorted phatic overload which is motivated by simple greed, in one way, and by a sense of poverty of communication or human relations, in another.

Lovely puppets attached to mobile phones of school girls symbolize this complicated situation in Japan. They mean ‘we are not bad girls, we are just girls worthy of someone’s aid.’


ON PHATIC OVERLOAD, BEING-IN-THE-WORLD and BA


RC 
Phatic overload can be ontically understood as arising from individual loneliness. But if we interpret moods not just as subjective states of mind but, following Heidegger, as ways of experiencing our being-in-the-world or Ba, loneliness reveals what is stated by the utterance: ‘You see, I’m here,’ that is to say, the very fact of the ‘here’ of Being or the Ba of existence.

The intention of sending a message to a receiver is mostly represented as being the sender and the receiver originally separated from each other and connected by a medium. This is clearly portrayed in Claude Shannon’s communication scheme (Shannon 1948). It is interesting to remark that Shannon does not define the concept of message used in this scheme. His concept of information as possible selections from a repertoire of physical symbols is the opposite to the ordinary meaning of information as communication of something new. Warren Weaver remarked:

The word information, in this theory, is used in a special sense that must not be confused with its ordinary usage. In particular, information must not be confused with meaning. In fact, two messages, one of which is heavily loaded with meaning and the other of which is pure nonsense, can be exactly equivalent, from the present viewpoint, as regards information. It is this, undoubtedly, that Shannon means when he says, “the semantic aspects of communication are irrelevant to the engineering aspects.” But this does not mean that the engineering aspects are necessarily irrelevant to the semantic aspects. (Shannon and Weaver 1949, p. 8)

Shannon’s mechanism of communication – dealing with the engineering problem of getting a message of encoded symbols from a sender to a receiver through an electromagnetic medium so that it can be reliably reconstructed at the receiver’s end – can only work because there is something common to the sender and the receiver beyond or underlying their physical separation. In the case of humans, senders and receivers share a common world or Ba. Shannon’s scheme is a world-less or Ba-less representation of human communication. On the basis of this abstraction – ‘abstrahere’ means to ‘draw off’ – there is no structural difference between this technical model of communication of two technical systems, the metaphysical model of a divine sender communicating messages through angels to human receivers or the Cartesian model of an isolated mind seeking to communicate with the external world or with other separated and encapsulated minds. What is excluded is not only the shared world but also the moods in which human senders and receivers experience their common being-in-the-world itself. As Heidegger taught us, this emotional tonality is a pre-theoretical experience of embeddedness that precedes the separation between subject and object. This is the reason why I think it is important to develop an intercultural philosophical angeletics in order to be aware of this Western bias as well as to describe different ontic angeletic situations and forms of sharing the world.

MN Phatic overload is just what I wanted to stress. Nothing is being said, no clear content or reference, at least on the surface level, exchanging utterances such as ‘can you hear me,’ but just the fact of being in communication with another person. They always want to know whether they are in communication or not and they always feel constant anxiety about not keeping in contact with the outer world. The phatic function is closely related with the use of mobile phones, blogs or SMS that provide them (us) with moods (or illusions) enabling them (us) to have a feeling as if we were always in contact with the outer world. In the case of Boku ha koko ni iruyo, ha and yo mean ‘isn’t it?`’ Therefore, Boku ha koko ni iru-yo  means ‘I'm here, you see’ or ‘isn't it?’  ‘Here’ seems to be their position(s) immersed in some sort of ‘moods’ in the dimension of their being-in-the-world with others.

In my view, this ‘here’ = Ba = place reflects several aspects of Japanese cultural and existential situations:

(1) strong orientation toward a life in which meanings can be shared with others;

(2) emptiness of human existence sometimes leading to suicide or metal illness;

(3) explicitly and implicitly shared contexts in which various types of phatic function as well as communication can be realized;

(4) Ba interpreted as ‘in-between’ (Aida) combined with Mu (nothingness).

I want to add an explanation to Ba as the fourth aspect. As I explained above, Baas discussed by Kitaro Nishida or Bin Kimura means the place where the ‘subject’ and the ‘object’ or mono (things, objects) and koto (events, human interpretation of experiences) encounter each other. In my view, these remarks show typical cases of Japanese ways of understanding the world pre-ontologically and existentially. 

The following views reflect these ways of understanding the world, i.e., Ba. According to Toshihiko Izutsu, Dougen, a famous Zen-Buddhist priest (1200-1253) of the Kamakura period, tried to bring Being – which is dried up by the process of articulation of beings or by grasping the essence based on the process of articulation of beings – into a state of ‘articulating beings without grasping the essence.’ He, Dougen, also tried to bring Being into its original fluency (Izutsu 1991). Izutsu interprets Basho’s haiku from the same perspective. Words, frog, pond, the sounds, the poet, and the readers of Basho’s haiku, are gathered in the situation of a changing process of articulation and inarticulation. Words, people, events, things and experiences are related to one another as a fluid or active process of interchange of articulation and non-articulation of things. Yujiro Nakamura, a Japanese philosopher who attempts to combine traditional Japanese thoughts with modern Western thought, suggests that Kitaro Nishida tried to regain the meanings of beings based on Mu (nothingness) or ‘predicative substrata’ (‘substratum’) which contrasts with subjective substrata. In this sense, Mu is understood not as mere emptiness but as the source of beings (Yu) on which articulations of beings are founded. According to Nakamura, the oneness of Mu and Yu, or the oneness of subjects and objects, the oneness of events (Koto) and words (Gen) needs Ba (or Bamen = place, field) where a ‘coming together’ of subjects and objects, events (Koto) and words (Gen) is possible. This Ba or Bamen includes, as Nakamura stresses, citing the work of Motoki Tokieda, a Japanese linguist (Tokieda 2008), things, scenes, subject’s attitudes, subject’s feelings, and subject’s emotions (Nakamura 2001).

The traditional Japanese self-understanding is based on a place of secret inner minds which seem to be sustained by traditional emotional sensitivity (mono-no-ahare). People can share the meanings of this traditional emotional sensitivity, but the sadness coming from it is confined to each person. This is a kind of fragile relationship between persons with fragile minds that underlies the desire to share the same meanings of existence in this world whilst at the same time keeping apart from each other. Most of my graduate students from China say that they don’t have the expression Iba-sho-ga-nai which means ‘I don’t have a place for myself.’ This seems to show a difference between Japanese and Chinese culture with regard to understanding Ba, although the Chinese don’t use this term. This is an interesting topic for intercultural angeletics.

Japanese Ba seems to reflect the plurality of the Japanese life-world, culture and society. To put this another way, we might say that Japanese people live in mental situations leading them to constant pursuit of the meaning of life and human relations as well as to meta-communication or shared cultural, existential contexts determining their life, human relations and ways of communication. Tsuji’s research provides us with interesting data on these problems (Tsuji 1999). This research, done in 1999, is based on samples of Japanese university students. His interpretation of these data can lead to misunderstandings in some ways. I try to interpret the data as follows:

1. Students with an orientation toward strong and constant friendship and with an orientation toward moderate, not strong but also not weak, i.e. constant, friendship in good balance are characterized by less use of certain sorts of phatic expressions such as te-yuka. (= what I would say). For example: ‘Are you ill? Do you have a cold? ‘Well, what I would rather say (te-yuka), is that I’m a bit tired’ (toka-iu-kanji). Or: ‘Did you enjoy that movie?’ ‘Well, I’d say, that movie is kind of (toka-iu-kanji) not so good or not so bad.’

2. Students who seem to want to know ‘what is a good friendship’ or who want to keep a sense of a related situation via mobile phones or face-to face contact tend to use more frequently such phatic expressions, te-yuka and toka-iu-kanji.

3. Students who have contradictory attitudes toward communication by mobile phone, that is to say, students with views such as ‘phones can make the distance of human relations or friendship shorter compared to face-to-face communication’ have at the same time these views: ‘When I use phones, I feel it easier to talk with friends about a lot of things with which I have difficulty in face-to-face situations.’ and ‘I feel talking with friends over the phone a comfort because I can cut the communication whenever I don’t want to continue it.’

In my view, these findings about phatic communication in Japan suggest the fact that we should take into account the Japanese Ba or Japan’s cultural and existential situation when we move on to the interpretation of concrete problems related with intercultural angeletics.

In order to understand some problems related with Japanese phatic communication and with intercultural angeletics, we should take into consideration, using this as an example, the Japanese orientation toward or the pursuit of the meaning of good communication, good human relations and good human living. The expression Boku ha koko ni iru yo which we see in Japanese society today as a theme of private blogs, words of popular songs and so on, seems to reflect this orientation toward or pursuit of meaning. It seems that mobile phone use symbolizes people’s wondering, ‘what are good human relations and good communication for?’ Under such circumstances, Japanese people are likely to be motivated to use mobile phones or communication via blogs which are characterized by ambiguous meanings, that is to say, indirect and mediated communication on the one hand, and communication rendering human relations direct and lacking in distance on the other. The devices which make human communication meaningless and at the same time meaningful through a variety of occasions for phatic communication without concrete message-exchange – for example, te-yuka and toka-iu-kanji – mean a lot of  things and also nothing at all. I discussed the meanings of Japanese blogs, Japanese popular songs, the Japanese sense of privacy (as subject matter for communication via SMS or blogs) in my papers (Nakada 2009, 2008; Nakada and Capurro 2009).

I think that our thinking in the ‘Far East’ throws light on Western views about angeletics itself. What is exactly meant, from the point of view of angeletics, by the original connection between a sender and a receiver? Merleau-Ponty suggested that we human beings have ‘the original connection’ among ourselves in the dimension of our bodily existence. And as you know, his studies on aphasia and agnosia are strongly associated with Jakobson's studies on language and aphasia (Merleau-Ponty 1945). The phatic function might be considered to be the only function that birds have in common with human beings. This is very interesting too. Then we human beings and other creatures would have 'the original connection' in the dimension of the phatic function! But each function, understood as a basic mood, makes the world openness or ontological dimension, manifest in different ways, at least in the case of Dasein. In your contributions to angeletics you refer several times to Niklas Luhmann’s distinction between message (Mitteilung) or meaning-offer (Sinnangebot), information (Information) or the process of meaning selection, and finally understanding (Verstehen) or integrating the selected meaning into the system (Luhmann 1987). According to Luhmann, these three dimensions constitute the concept of communication. In this model there is an original and recursive relation between sender and receiver. This means, if I understand you correctly, that the phatic function is an essential element of communication because it enables a distinction to be made within the process of communication itself each time when a selection of a meaning takes place. This implies also that ‘to communicate is to communicate is to communicate’ or that communication is a self-referential process that is at best expressed by the phatic function. Or at least we might be able to see the phatic function from Luhmann’s viewpoint. Is my understanding correct?


ON WESTERN ANGELETIC CONCEPTIONS


RC
 As you know, Jakobson’s “communication model” distinguishes between the phatic function, the message, the context and the code. These distinctions go back to Karl Bühler’s “organon model” in which the triadic relation between sender, reference and receiver can be of a different nature depending upon whether the signs represent something (“Darstellung”), or express something about the sender (“Ausdruck”) or make an impact on the receiver (“Apell”) (Bühler 1978/1934). Since Niklas Luhmann we know that the message (“Mitteilung”) is a meaning-offer and has no definite content until the receiver makes his/her choices. Cybernetics has taught us that every receiver can turn into a sender. Lacanian psychoanalysis underlines the indefinite and indefinable nature of “the object” addressed in the long run by human desire. No less important is the role of the psychoanalyst as “the other” that enables the analysand to take a detour to himself/herself. This relationship, called the transference phenomenon, takes place from both sides. In other words, I am suggesting that the psychoanalytic experience is not only centred on the indefinite object of desire, as Lacan stressed, but also on the angeletic experience of the analyst as a messenger who passes on the message coming from the analysand or, more precisely, from his/her already understood (i.e. pre-conceived) being-in-the-world that Freud called ‘the unconscious.’ The original messenger or medium is not something (!) in-between a sender and a receiver, but it is Ba or being-in-the-world itself, although seen or experienced differently in Japan and the West, if I may simplify this complex intercultural issue. We can distinguish roughly the following conceptions:

1) metaphysical (theocentric) angeletics: God as sender - angels/poets as messengers - humans as receivers;

2) anthropocentric and technocentric angeletics: humans as senders - technical media as messengers - humans as receivers technical (artificial) and/or human senders - technical (digital) media as messengers - technical (artificial) and/or human receivers;

3) ontological angeletics: Being as sender - ‘here’ of Being as ontic-ontological messenger, sender and/or receiver - Being as receiver.

The ontological conception is the only one that thinks the original relation or encounter (“Ereignis”) between Being and “being here” or Ba. To speak about Being as ‘sender’ and ‘receiver’ could be misunderstood as a kind of ontic phenomenon separated from the “here” or Ba. I shall try to explain this issue later.

As you know, in Being and Time (Heidegger 1976), Heidegger called the original relation between understanding and pre-understanding of the “here” of Being the “hermeneutic circle” (Heidegger 1976). But given the fact that existential understanding is not primarily a theoretical, but a practical activity concerning all kinds of relations happening in the shared world-openness, it would be better to speak of an ‘angeletic circle’ or a relation between message and messenger, as Heidegger proposed in one of his late writings (Heidegger 1975). Each interpretation is based on a process of message transmission. Which means that hermeneutics presupposes angeletics. Hermes is first and foremost a messenger, no less than an interpreter and translator. Of course, a philosophical angeletics is no less ambitious than twentieth century hermeneutic philosophy. We should also make a distinction between an ontic or empirical science of messages and messengers, and a philosophical angeletics. As an empirical science, angeletics is not necessarily reduced to the phenomenon of human communication but can include also all kinds of messages and messengers in the natural sciences.

Let me further explain what I understand by angeletic philosophy and, correspondingly, by a philosophical angeletics, using other Heideggerian themes, without going into a detailed textual analysis or exegesis of Heidegger. But perhaps I should use the term ‘angeletic thinking’ instead of ‘angeletic philosophy’ insofar as thinking is a possible historical response to the call of Being (Heidegger 1971), whereas philosophy in the Greek tradition is a doctrine or teaching about the forms (idea, eidos) of beings qua beings. From this perspective, thinking is originally angeletic, whereas philosophy is ‘in-formational’ (Capurro 1978). Heidegger explains this inversion and transformation of the relationship between subject and object into Being and Dasein by saying that, while modern subjectivity has a “representation” (“Vorstellung”, ‘idea’, ‘image’) of a tree, thinking exposes itself to the “call” (“Ruf”) of a tree itself that, so to speak, “introduces itself” (“der Baum stellt sich uns vor”) (Heidegger 1971, 16-17). This second experience is possible because we and the tree have a common ground, namely the earth (“die Erde”) which is not in our heads but in the world (ibid.). As Jean-Luc Nancy, following Heidegger, remarks, philosophy and particularly hermeneutics can be understood as the presentation of a message. The task of thinking is of the kind of being a messenger (Nancy 2001, 94-95; Capurro 2002).

As you know, Heidegger’s so-called ‘turn’ (“Kehre”) has to do with the view that (human) existence (Dasein) is addressed by Being instead of conceiving Dasein as ‘projecting’ or casting his/her being. Of course, both perspectives are closely related and already addressed in Being and Time (Heidegger 1976). But for Heidegger, human existence or, to put it in more neutral terms, the structure he calls Dasein or the Here of “Being” that seems to be characteristic only of a particular kind of beings, namely ourselves, is derivative not only with regard to knowledge but also in its very possibility of being. This can be expressed in simple terms by saying that we human beings are finite beings and are aware of our givenness as well. We know that we were born and that we will die, as well as of the “in-between” (“Zwischen”) of our lives (Heidegger 1976, 374).

Heidegger uses the term “Es gibt” (‘there is,’ ‘it gives’) in order to express what we can call the ontological angeletic phenomenon (Heidegger 1976a). Being is the original sender and receiver whose encounter (Ereignis) with Da-sein or ‘Ba’as messenger enables a world, that is to say, an ethos or cast of living to emerge. But the expression ‘there is’ or ‘it gives’ makes it clear that Being is not any kind of subject, especially not a divine one, sending and receiving messages. (Sheehan 2001) It is in original unity and difference with its Here. And vice versa: the messenger that receives the message of/from Being is in itself – or as him/herself in the case of human Dasein, the only one we know about – a ‘disclosure’ (aletheia = truth) or messenger of Being. The message is the world.

Dasein announces its facticity with the phatic dialogical (!) function: ‘You see, I’m here’ (Boku ha koko ni iruyo). In his late writings, on several occasions Heidegger uses a tautological style such as “language speaks” (“die Sprache spricht”) to underscore the self-referential phenomenon of Being that cuts off, so to speak, the monologue of the (human) subject, especially when such monologue is conceived entirely as an inter-subjective dialogue, leaving aside its ontological dimension. In the ‘Dialogue with a Japanese’ he makes a distinction between “speaking about” (“Sprechen über”) and “speaking from” (“Sprechen von”), that is to say, between language as a tool for conversation vs. language as the messenger of Being. In the last sentence of the Tractatus Wittgenstein uses this distinction but he seems not to be aware of it: “What we cannot speak about, we must pass over in silence” (“7 Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muß man schweigen.”) (Wittgenstein 1975, 85). Wittgenstein is phatically speaking “from” Being – the standard English translation says “about” instead of ‘from’ – by saying that it is not possible to speak “about” – literally “over” it – because Being is not an object (and of course it is not a subject), or it is an ‘object’ or “la Chose” (or “l’a-chose”) in the Lacanian sense (Lacan 1986). It ‘is’ or ‘it sends itself’ as the in-between of Da-sein letting messages pass through. In contrast to language as a tool, poetic language allows us to speak “from” Being in a kind of relation where the messenger hears what language ‘dictates’ (Latin dictare, German dichten) or sends to him/her. Humans as the Here of Being are messengers of Being, letting beings be what they are. Heidegger calls humans “messengers” (“Botengänger”) (Heidegger 1975, 155). He writes:

The messenger must already come from the message. But he must also already have gone toward it. (“Der Botengänger muß schon von der Botschaft herkommen. Er muß aber auch schon auf sie zugegangen sein.”). (Heidegger 1975, 150, my translation RC)

The usual German term for messenger being Bote, “Botengänger” seems to underline the pure dynamic fact of bringing the message. It is the opposite of the kind of messengers we call ambassadors (Botschafter). There is an original unity and difference between Being and Dasein beyond or prior to any ontic separation of sender, message, messenger and receiver. Unity and difference between Being and Dasein mean nothing more and nothing less than that we cannot not interpret or ‘cast’ the meaning of Being by casting or projecting – Heidegger calls it “Entwurf” – not only what beings are, but primordially and practically our own existence. I think that today this double-bind casting of Being is done from a perspective of the digital. I call it therefore digital ontology (Capurro 2010) following basic insights of the Australian philosopher, Michael Eldred (Eldred 2009/2011).

Humans as messengers are then not primarily, as we believe especially since modernity, senders and/or (digital) receivers of messages, but are originally messengers of Being, the message itself being the world as a casting of Being arising from the encounter between Being and Dasein. This inverted relationship with regard to anthropocentric modernity allows us a heteronomous relation to Being, becoming who we are, that is to say, in Lacanian terms, a divided or “crossed-out” (“barré”) subject (Lacan 1971, II, 168) or a subject characterized by the finitude of its being addressed by the Other (Lacan 1971, 108) that can annihilate him/her. Loneliness and anxiety are moods through which, as Heidegger taught us, we discover the truth, that is to say, the finitude of being-in-the-world-with-others. We receive and pass on – and sometimes try to bypass – the message of Being because we are originally the Here of its disclosure.

Although we mostly live immersed in the given openness of everyday existence, exchanging messages and maintaining communication through the phatic function, we have the potentiality to grasp a given (historical) disclosure of Being as a possible one, that is to say, to change its truth. For this it is necessary that the message of Being is perceived as such — as a gift of the ‘it gives’. An example of this at the level of an ontic region is the so-called paradigm change in science where the pre-ontological messages (facts) that are supposed to prove or falsify a theory are re-interpreted when the theory, with all its biases, pre-conceptions and pre-suppositions, its instruments, institutions, traditions, etc., is put into question (Kuhn 1970). The radical questioning of a given world-openness by a messenger of Being that makes explicit this ontological or structural relation between Being and messenger, can lead to strong opposition from the defenders of the status quo and – to condemnation of the messenger, as in the case of Socrates. This opens the debate as to which are the ethical criteria for making a distinction between a messenger of Being and its opposite (a charlatan), with all degrees in between. One important criterion for this difficult ethical task that is always endangered by manipulation and self-deception is whether the messenger maintains critically the openness of Being or proclaims an absolute truth. Another criterion is whether other messengers also remain critical with regard to the alternative casting of Being as passed on to them, or whether they develop from there, say, a political ideology, a mere worldview or a theoretical dogma (I thank Michael Eldred for an enlightening e-mail exchange on this issue).


ON MESSENGERS AND MESSAGES


MN 
If my understanding is correct, I think that your angeletics is something I've been thinking about for a long time since my years as a university student. I've struggled with the problem why a lot of people are influenced by fiction or the imaginative representation of the mass media, even though they know the difference between the reality (facts) and the fictions (copies of reality). This problem can't be solved if we think that facts (or messages of some facts) are the first (original) and the mediated portrayal (news, dramas) are the copies of the first-hand realities. This kind of ontic thinking, which is typical for most scientific authors and scholars, seems to cause difficulties for them if they try to understand the deep background of the bad/good influences of media as well as other forms of artistic expression such as poems, dramas, games and so on (these are all copies of reality in a way). At first, I tried to solve this problem by getting hints from Kant’s “Urteilskraft” (power of judgement) or “Einbildungskraft” (power of imagination), or from distinctions between reality and actuality in Bin Kimura, or the discussions of optical illusions and so on, but after some years' struggle, I understand that the presupposition that fact is first and expression is second, is the main problem itself. And now I know that we have to think about the presupposition that the message of Being is first and the (human) messenger is second.

Your remark about the inverted relationship between message and messenger is very interesting in this sense, but some Japanese poets such as Basho seem not to invert the relations message and messenger, facts and expressions, mono (the objects or beings) and koto (language, expressions, objects expressed by words). They rather try to see the not-divided situations that consist of ambiguous beings of objects and words, mono and koto, person (artist or audience) and objects. In this sense, they don’t ask where the separated things and phenomena come from, but how is the unity of objects and persons, mono to koto and so on? This is my personal understanding.

Now, I feel that we are close to the core questions of mediated and aesthetic expressions as well as of communication itself. Don’t you think so? There are no scholars around me who are interested in this kind of ontological/hermeneutical discussion/thinking but luckily some of my students seem to be fond of my talks related to phatic function or ontological explanation of CMC or computer mediated communication. The theme of the thesis of one of my undergraduate students is “ontological views on the use of the mobile phone.”

I wonder how we as messengers can send this kind of discussion to a broader range of possible receivers. I wonder also how we can relate this kind of discussion to the problems of information ethics and robo-ethics in an academic or theoretical as well as in a practical way in order to address difficult matters such as youth's wrong-doings as an expression of the loss of identity, or the loss of sense of fundamental relations between human beings, the poverty of meaning in our minds and so on.

I am also thinking about comparing the phatic function in different cultures. Some of my graduate students come from various countries. For example, I think it will be very interesting to ask the students from China: ‘Explain the role of Confucius as a messenger.’ According to Hideo Kobayashi (Kobayashi 1961), what we can learn from the Confucian tradition is the importance of active wisdom. I think that active wisdom is important because the meanings of some messages, as we discussed, are not determined merely by messages themselves or the literal contents of messages/utterances separated from the relations between messages and messengers or the phatic function (keeping-in-touch) of communication.

Hideo Kobayashi says that if we try to make good use of active wisdom, we have to get rid of selfishness. This means that the interpretation of some poems or novels can't be separated from the (imaginative) relations between authors and readers. In this sense, we can learn how to use active wisdom through active and/or imaginative human relations such as the relations between Confucius and his disciples. As some scholars suggest, even ‘fake’ interaction with robots might have some real influence upon human beings as their partners. According to an interesting experimental survey done by Mariko Narumi and Michita Imai, the artificial voices of robots with a friendly and sympathetic tone are found to influence subjects’ behaviour. The subjects influenced by the utterance of robots such as ‘Why don’t you have a piece of this cake?” tend to eat a piece of cake offered by robots. Narumi and Imai explain the results of this research thus: “We human beings tend to attribute the friendly voice of a machine to the imagined inner minds or emotions of the robot.” (Narumi and Imai 2003)

I remember having heard a story about nodding robots. Even nodding robots enable people to communicate more easily, for example, when speaking on the telephone, even if the nodding robots are just showing fake agreement. It is strange that some autistic patients can communicate with robots more easily than with human beings in some cases, according to studies on human-robot-interaction (Feil-Seifer and Mataric 2008). In my view, we can explain these phenomena in such a way. Human communication consists of different levels and in many cases patients with, for example, agnosia, autism or schizophrenia,have difficulty dealing with or understanding information or meanings at the meta-level of communication. I gained this insight from Bin Kimura (Kimura 1994) and Masakazu Yamazaki (Yamazaki 1988); fake communication with robots might enable patients to deal with the meanings at the meta-level more easily because this sort of communication has a simple structure. So in this sense, the distinction between fake and real is not so important. Hideo Kobayashi did not study Heidegger or Gadamer but he knew that these questions regarding the relations between texts and readers are important. If we don't forget this ‘truth,’ classical literatures or classic works will remain alive in our minds, said Kobayashi. I think that he learned this through his own dialogue with the classics of Japan and China.


ON LEARNING FROM EACH OTHER


RC 
I think that we in the West can and should learn a lot from your angeletic experiences with robots and particularly from the underlying ontological Japanese perspective that does not give to the human being such a predominance as in the West, separating from the world as an autonomous subject. A de-centred human subject that, strictly speaking is no longer (an underlying) subject, but understands him/herself as being-out-there-in-the-world as messenger for Being’s sendings in the sense I tried to explain, might be more flexible in his/her interchange with other non-human agents such as robots, being able to translate, if I may say so, the world-less phatic utterances of robots as something that mimic ontically the ontological experience of loneliness and finitude. By the way, in Plato's dialogues, Socrates’ interlocutors often answer with phatic utterances such as: ‘I see,’ ‘I follow you,’ ‘certainly,’ ‘of course’, etc. that allow the dialogue to continue or, better, that allow Socrates to pass on ‘his’ ideas that are supposed to lead to an existential self-questioning on the part of the partner and not to an indoctrination by Socrates’ message. From this perspective, Socrates is not a sender but a messenger of ideas that come to him from beyond. As soon as such ideas are considered as one’s own they turn into an opinion (doxa) and become the object of endless discussions. The Socratic dialogue is a place or Ba where language (logos) passes through (dia) the participants’ shared being-in-the-world. This is also Lacan’s interpretation of Plato’s Symposium in his seminar on transference, where he compares the psychoanalyst’s task with the Socratic erotic method of letting love messages to pass on (Lacan 1991).

Let us take an example from your tradition such as The Tale of Genji or Genji monogatari (Murasaki Shikibu 2010). In the middle of the tale we read about Princess Asagao, daughter of Prince Momozono, brother of the Emperor, who has been courted in vain by Prince Genji, her cousin, from his seventeenth year onward. Genji is now thirty-three years old. Lady Fujitsubo, the Emperor’s consort, loved by Genji, and Asagao’s father have both died. In Chapter 20 Murasaki Shikibu tells the story of the problematic relationship between Genji and Asagao. At the beginning of Chapter 21 she writes:

From Genji came a note in which he said: “Does it not give you a strange feeling to witness a Day of Cleansing in which you take no part?” And remembering that she was still in mourning for her father, he added the poem: “Little thought I that, like a wave in the swirl of the flood, you would come back so soon, a dark-robed mourner swept along time’s hurrying stream.” It was written on purple paper in a bold script, and a spray of wisteria was attached to it. Moved by all that was going on around her she replied: “It seems but yesterday that I first wore my somber dress; but now the pool of days has grown into a flood wherein I soon shall wash my grief away.” The poem was sent without explanation or comment and constituted, indeed, a meager reply; but, as usual, he found himself constantly holding it in front of him [self] and gazing at it as though it had been much more than a few poor lines of verse. When the end of the mourning actually came, the lady who acted as messenger and intermediary in general was overwhelmed by the number of packages from the Nijo-in [Genji’s palace] which now began to arrive. Lady Asagao expressed great displeasure at this lavishness and, if the presents had been accompanied by letters or poems of at all a familiar or impertinent kind, she would at once have put a stop to these attentions. But for a year past there had been nothing in his conduct to complain of. From time to time he came to the house and enquired after her, but always quite openly. His letters were frequent and affectionate, but he took no liberties, and what nowadays troubled her chiefly was the difficulty of inventing anything to say in reply. (Murasaki Shikibu 2010, 398-399)

Genji’s letter is written in prose and a direct style while the poem that usually accompanies a letter is full of indirect messages including the purple paper on which it is written, the bold script, a spray of wisteria and, of course, the poem itself. Cultures in the “Far East” as well as in the “Far West” – using the terminology of the French sinologist François Jullien (Jullien 2003) – differ on the issue of direct and indirect style (Capurro 2011).

Princess Asagao is in trouble. Should she answer or not? Should she continue a formal and, at least for her, meaningless phatic communication? She writes a “meager reply” that is brought to Genji by a messenger, a lady, without “any explanation or comment”. Genji “as usual” does not know what to think about it and holds  the message “constantly ... in front of him [self] and gazing at it as though it had been more than a few poor lines of verse.” Later on, Genji sends a lot of gifts including letters and poems but he must be careful of “taking no liberties”, otherwise she would stop the communication. Both Asagao and Genji express through messages and messengers different kinds of loneliness and other forms of emotional perception of the Ba of their time. But, of course, it is Murasaki Shikibu herself who gives such an answer by writing this story.

Of course, an in-depth interpretation of this and many other examples in this wonderful tale presuppose an analysis of the structure or Ba of Japanese society during the Heian period (794-1192), particularly of the mores and values governing communication with regard to gender roles, possibilities of transgressing such mores and roles, the role of messengers, the different kinds of messages, including their materiality and calligraphy. Some of the moral dilemmas arising from such mores and values are made explicit by Murasaki Shikibu, such as Asagao’s doubts about continuing the communication and Genji’s concern about not transgressing certain limits when sending her gifts and messages. The historian of the Heian period, George Sansom, calls such mores “rules of taste” (Sansom 1958).

This connection between ethics and aesthetics seems to be characteristic of Japanese culture to the present day. With regard to the The Tale of Genji Sansom writes:

The irresistible amorist is a pessimist at heart, weighed down by a sense of misfortune, by the weight of an unhappy karma. At the age of thirty we find him haunted by the impermanence of worldly things, and on the point of embracing a monastic life. […]. Throughout the story, even in its saddest episodes, there runs a thread of delight in beauty. All the love talk is interspersed with enjoyment of colour, shape, and perfume, and a continual exchange of poetic messages. Calligraphy plays almost as great a part as the tones of a lover’s voice in arousing tender emotion. […] In this world of the senses, the words for good and beautiful are almost interchangeable. (Sansom 1958, 186-191)

In other words, The Tale of Genji is an example of how messages coming from both humans and nature were passed on through messengers. And, more radically, how Japanese Ba during the Heian period was experienced as such a place where messages pass through. In this sense, we can say that the Here of Being or the structure of a culture is at best understood if it is conceived and lived as a place where messages pass through instead of being blocked. This is one of the lessons of Chinese Taoism. (Jullien 2005) As you know, Japanese society during the Heian period was profoundly influenced by China.

MN According to the anthropologist, Masao Yamaguchi, Genji lives on two levels in this world. One is the level of fixed moral rules and the other one is chaos, where such rules are invisible and can be violated (Yamaguchi 1983). In my view, as son of the emperor, Genji belongs to Ikai (i.e., a different world, a different form Seken) or the level of chaos, where he, perhaps unconsciously, goes beyond fixed mores or Seken, that is to say, the traditional Japanese life-world (Nakada 2008, 2009). In his pursuit of love affairs, he violates, on the one hand, fixed mores and, on the other, through the connection between ethics and aesthetics, his life reproduces the cultural norms. I believe that this dualism between chaos (Ikai) and mores (Seken) reflects another dualism in Japanese cultural identity, namely, between an aspect influenced by ancient China, in particular, by Confucianism, and another aspect of the genuinely Japanese mind symbolized by The Tale of Genji. One important thing is that Murasaki Shikibu bears witness to this cultural Ba in reflecting on this dualism.

One of the difficult questions is, indeed, how to analyse this story from an angeletic perspective and how to relate this Ba or phatic communication to an angeletic perspective. We are very close to the core of problems from which our mutual understanding and some misunderstanding arose. I think that our dialogue itself is a realization of an angeletic relationship and shows the importance of intercultural angeletics.


ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

We thank Michael Eldred (Cologne) and John Holgate (Sydney) for their criticisms as well as for polishing our English.


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RAFAEL CAPURRO: DIE LEHRE JAPANS

THEORIE UND PRAXIS DER BOTSCHAFT BEI FRANZ-XAVER



Dieser Beitrag wurde in: R. Haub, J. Oswald (Hrsg.): Franz Xaver - Patron der Missionen. Festschrift zum 450 Todestag, Regensburg: Schnell & Steiner (2002) S. 103-121 veröffentlicht (alle Bilder im folgenden Beitrag erschienen in diesem Band). Eine kürzere Fassung erschien in: Geist und Leben, Juli/August 2002 (4), S. 252-264. Der Online-Version sind Bilder und im Anhang Auszüge aus verschiedenen Quellen hinzugefügt.

Über die Reise von Yamaguchi zu Ôtomo Yoshishige nach Bungo, die etwa fünf bis sieben Tage in Anspruch nahm, berichtet Schurhammer:  

"Xaver reist fast Mitte September mit 2 christlichen Fidalgos, sowie Bernardo und Matheus von Yamaguchi ab, seinem Brauch gemäß zu Fuß, ein Bündel mit dem Altarstein, Meßkelch und den Ornamenten auf dem Rücken, die er als heilige Dinge nie einen anderen tragen ließ, um sich in einem Hafen der Provinz Suwô nach Bungo einzuschiffen. Er war bereits 2 Tage unterwegs und seine Füße waren angeschwollen, da er ein Jahr lang nicht mehr gewandert war, als er einige Portugiesen traf, die ihm entgegengeritten waren. Duarte da Gama hatte sie mit einem Fahrzeug übers Meer zur Gegenküste von Suwô geschickt, den Pater abzuholen, und sie waren von dem Hafen eine halbe Meile landeinwärts geritten, bis sie ihn trafen. Da er das angeborene Reittier ablehnte, begleiteten sie ihn zu Fuß bis zum Hafen, wo er ihr Fahrzeug bestieg und mit ihnen nach Bungo zum Hafen von Figi fuhr, wo er das Portugiesenschiff Duarte da Gamas traf und sich von den beiden japanischen Fidalgos verabschiedete, die ihn im Namen aller Christen Yamaguchis bis dahin begleitet hatten." /28/
Hervorheben möchte ich dabei Xavers "angeschwollene Füße", die zu jenen körperlichen Strapazen gehören, die er bei der Verbreitung seiner Botschaft teilweise freiwillig auf sich nahm: Sein Leib war Teil seiner Botschaft. Der Lohn dafür war die Genugtuung ("placer"), die er empfand, als er die "Heiden" in Disputationen überzeugen und bekehren konnte (Doc. 96, S. 4419).  

Er bewundert das asketische Leben der Japaner, ihr sparsames Essen, "wenngleich nicht so ganz beim Trinken, und sie trinken Reiswein, denn es gibt kein Weinbau in diesen Gegenden" (Doc. 90, S. 370). "Sie töten und essen nicht das, was sie züchten, manchmal essen sie Fisch und Reis und Getreide, wenngleich wenig" (Doc 90, s. 381). Die Leute sind gesund und werden alt: "Wir leben in diesem Land körperlich sehr gesund. Möge Gott, dass es unseren Seelen auch so geht!" (Doc. 90, S. 381-382) Japan ist ein kaltes Land und es gibt keine Betten (Doc. 110, S. 467). "Diejenigen, die in diesen Ländern leben, sind diskret und scharfsinnig. Aber es gibt nur Reis zu essen. Auch etwas Getreide und Gemüse und andere Dinge von wenig Substanz. Sie machen Reiswein und es gibt keinen anderen, und dieser ist teuer und wenig. Und die größte  Herausforderung sind die ständigen und offensichtlichen Todesgefahren." (Doc. 97. S. 423). Xaver hält vor allem Flamen und Deutsche als besonders geeignet für die Japan-Mission, sofern sie nämlich wegen mangelnder Sprachkenntnisse in Spanien oder Italien nicht predigen können und – mit einem kalten Klima besser auskommen (Doc. 97, S. 423). Nach zweieinhalb Jahren hatte Japan sein Haar gebleicht /29/.  Über die Begegnung mit Ôtomo Yoshishige schreibt Schurhammer: 

"Yoshishige wünschte ein Freundschaftsbündnis mit dem König Portugals zu schließen. Er hörte den Pater mit Interesse an, als er ihm vom christlichen Glauben sprach. Er gab ihm gern die Erlaubnis, in seinem Lande zu predigen, und ließ ihm eine Wohnung in Okinohama anweisen, wo das Schiff Duarte da Gamas vor Anker lag und die Portugiesen ihre Waren verkauften, und ließ es an Aufmerksamkeiten aller Art nicht fehlen und ihn aufs beste mit allem versorgen. Zur sofortigen Annahme des christlichen Glaubens und dessen strengen Sittenvorschriften konnte er sich freilich noch nicht entschließen. Mußte er ja auch fürchten, dadurch seinen immer noch recht unsicheren Thron zu gefährden, da manche seiner mächtigen Vasallen einen solchen Schritt zum Anlaß nehmen konnten, sich gegen ihn zu erheben." /30/ 
Fast dreißig Jahre später, als er im Jahre 1578 zum Christentum konvertierte, erzählte Yoshishige wie er 1545 von einem portugiesischen Kaufmann namens Diego Vaz beeindruckt war:  
"Da fragte ich ihn, ob er zu den Kamis und Hotokes (= den shintoistischen und buddhistischen Göttern) bete. Er aber lachte und sagte, er bete nur den Schöpfer des Himmels und der Erde an, den Erlöser der Welt. Diese Worte habe ich nie vergessen, und es schien mir, wenn er als Kaufmann und Laie trotz aller Geschäfte sich täglich die Zeit zum Gebet nehme, dann müsse es etwas Wichtiges sein um die Verehrung seines Gottes." /31/
Von Paul wußte Xaver, dass die Japaner ihr "Gesetz" von Indien über China bekommen hatten, worüber er Ignatius einen langen Bericht ("muy larga información") schreiben will (Doc. 70, S. 282). Am 5. November 1549 erzählt er von einer Begegnung in Kagoshima mit einem Weisen /32/ namens "Ninxit" (Ninshitsu), der im Gespräch unschlüssig war, ob die Seele unsterblich ist oder nicht: "einmal sagt er mir ja, andere Male wiederum nein". Dazu bemerkt Aoyama:  
"Der Begriff "Seele" ist in den Zen-Sekten nämlich von dem des Christentums sehr verschieden. Das absolute Wesen, das der Welt und der Seele innewohnt, wurde bei den japanischen Zen-Mönchen verschieden benannt: "Kokoro" (das Herz), "Ware" (das Ich) usw. Man machte aber dabei einen klaren Unterschied zwischen diesem Absoluten und dem Ich im gewöhnlichen Sinne, welches man oft auch "Shôga" (das kleine Ich) nannte und von dessen egoistischen Neigungen man sich zu befreien suchte. Im religiösen Gespräch der Zen-Mönche konnte darum häufig dasselbe Wort zwei voneinander verschiedene Wesen bezeichnen, wie das Wort des hl. Paulus "Ich lebe - nein nicht mehr ich, sondern Christus in mir"." /33/
Xavers Übersetzer Paul, war bei einer solchen gelehrten Diskussion offensichtlich überfordert. Xaver fürchtete, dass die anderen Gelehrten nicht so sind wie dieser "sein Freund, der wunderbar ist". Alle, Priester und Laien, wundern sich aber, so Xaver, dass sie von so weit her kommen ("que son más de seis mil leguas"), "bloß um über diese Dinge über Gott zu sprechen, und wie die Leute ihre Seelen retten können, indem sie an Jesus Christus glauben, und indem wir sagen, dass wir in diese Länder kommen, weil es Gottes Wille ist" (Doc. 90, S. 372). Ein Grund für die Echtheit dieser Freundschaft findet Aoyama in der folgenden von Br. Almeida tradierten wunderbaren Anekdote, die er in Kagoshima von Ninshitsus Schülern erfuhr und welche auch nicht nur die Identität und die Differenz, sondern auch das gegenseitige Nicht-Verstehen zwischen Christen und Zen-Buddhisten versinnbildlicht: 
"Jene Bonzen (in Fukushô-ji) haben den Brauch, daß sie sich in einem Jahre 100 Tage lang für eine oder zwei bestimmte Stunden in Betrachtung versenken, was sie Zazen nennen... In ihrer Körperhaltung zeigen sie eine solche Bescheidenheit, Sammlung und Ruhe, als wären sie in göttlicher Beschauung verzückt. Als P. Magister Francisco einmal mit diesem alten Bonzen, dem Oberen des Klosters, durch den gemeinsamen Raum schritt, wo alle Bonzen (gerade) damit beschäftigt waren, ihre Betrachtung zu halten, fragte der Pater Ninjit: 'Was tun diese Ordensleute hier?' Da lächelte jener und antwortete ihm: 'Die einen berechnen, wieviel sie die vergangenen Monate von ihren Gläubigen eingenommen haben; andere überlegen, wo sie bessere Kleider und Behandlung für ihre Person bekommen können; andere denken an ihre Erholungen und ihren Zeitvertreib; kurz, keiner an etwas, das irgendwelche Bedeutung hätte." /34/
Das Interesse der Gebildeten an den Missionaren mag auch darin begründet gewesen sein, wie Aoyama bemerkt (S. 76), dass diese nicht aus Europa, sondern aus Tenjiku (Indien), der Heimat Buddhas, kamen. "Die Leute bewunderten Paul", so Aoyama, "weil er als erster Japaner Indien gesehen hatte." (S. 48) Das Interesse der Herrschenden lag sicherlich auch an den von den Portugiesen mitgebrachten Waren und Waffen sowie an der Möglichkeit, durch den neuen Glauben, sich Machtverhältnisse zu sichern. Am 5. November 1549 berichtet Xaver aus Kagoshima von seinem Vorhaben, die "Grundsätze des Glaubens" durch Paul ins Japanische übersetzen und drucken zu lassen, denn "die wichtigsten Leute können lesen und schreiben" und "wir können nicht überall hinfahren" (Doc. 90, S. 387). Sie verfertigten eine lateinische Transkription, die des Japanischen nicht kundigen Missionare auf Straßen laut vorlesen konnten (Doc. 96, S. 405-406). Schurhammer schreibt:  
"Eine gewisse Methode war bereits festgelegt. Der Katechismus, das in Kagoshima verfaßte Buch, von dem die Neubekehrten in Yamaguchi bereits Abschriften in sino-japanischer Schrift hergestellt hatten, diente als Grundlage für den Unterricht. An dessen Lesung schlossen sich Ansprachen und an diese Disputationen an, bei denen der sprachgewandte Bruder Fernández als Dolmetscher diente. Mit Hilfe von Auszügen, welche die Neubekehrten aus den buddhistischen heiligen Büchern machten, hatte man die Hauptlehren der einzelnen Sekten und ihre Überlieferungen über das Leben ihrer Hauptgötter Shaka und Amida kennengelernt und bestimmte Fragen für jede Sekte zusammengestellt, die man deren Anhängern bei deren Besuch vorlegte, sowie die Argumente, die ihre Irrtümer widerlegten. Für den Gottesnamen war der Ausdruck Dainichi durch das lateinische Deus ersetzt worden, um Mißverständnisse bei den Buddhisten zu vermeiden. Was aber die von den abendländischen so verschiedenen Sitten und Gebräuche Japans betraf, war Xaver für weitgehende Anpassung. 'Wenn etwas', so legte er Torres ans Herz, 'keine Beleidigung Gottes ist, dann scheint es das Vorteilhafteste zu sein, nichts zu ändern, falls eine Änderung nicht mehr zum Dienste Gottes gereicht.' Und das wollte er verstanden wissen von der Kleidung, dem Essen und ähnlichen Dingen, die in sich indifferent waren, deren Änderung aber Ärgernis geben konnte." /35/
Die Nutzung des lateinischen Ausdrucks Deus sollte also zur Unterscheidung zwischen dem wahren Gott der Missionare und dem falschen Gott der Shingon-Sekte, dem als Erzeuger der Welt angebetenen "Dainichi", dienen. In Wahrheit aber, so berichtet Xaver am 29. Januar 1552 aus Cochin, klang der lateinische Ausdruck wie "Dayuzo", was soviel wie "große Lüge" bedeutet. Ein gutes Argument, um sich dem neuen Gott nicht anzuschließen und um darüber zu spotten (Doc. 96, S. 413-414) und ein Beispiel auch dafür, wie eine angebliche Lösung des angeletischen Dilemmas, des Übersetzers-Dilemmas also, auch und gerade in prinzipellen Fragen, sich ins Gegenteil verkehren kann: Anstelle einer Unterscheidung findet eine Äquivokation statt. Für einen nicht nur im christlichen Glauben, sondern auch in der abendländischen Prinzipien-Metaphysik wurzelnden Missionar war dies der Weg der Dialektik. Nach jeder Predigt gab es, wie Xaver mehrmals betont, "sehr lange Disputationen" (Doc. 96, S. 407). Der Weg des Herzens führte zwar, wie im Falle der Freundschaft mit Ninshitsu, zu einer gemeinsamen menschlichen Ebene, ohne aber von hier aus die Perspektive des Anderen annehmen zu können. 

Auf Xavers Wunsch verfertigte Fernández die spanische Übersetzung des Protokolls einer solchen Disputation, die er im Auftrag von P. Torres in japanischer Sprache aufgeschrieben hatte. Hier ein kleiner Auszug, der teilweise auch in einem Brief Xavers zu finden ist (Doc. 96, S. 408-409): 

"Zuerst kamen viele Zen-shû, Patres und Laien. Wir fragten sie, was sie täten, um Heilige zu werden. Sie antworteten lachend: es gebe keine Heiligen; es sei also gar nicht notwendig, sich seinen Weg zu suchen. Denn nachdem jenes große Nichts ins  Dasein getreten sei, könne es nichts anderes tun, als sich wieder ins Nichts zu verwandeln.  
Wir fragten sie viele Dinge, um ihnen klarzumachen, daß es ein Prinzip gebe, das allen anderen Dingen ihren Anfang gibt.  
Sie gaben zu, daß dem so sei, indem sie sagten: 'Dies ist ein Prinzip, aus dem alle Dinge hervorgehen: Menschen, Tiere, Pflanzen. Jedes geschaffene Ding hat in sich dieses Prinzip und wenn der Mensch oder das Tier sterben, dann verwandeln sie sich in die vier Elemente, in das, was sie waren, und dies Prinzip kehrt zurück in das, was es ist.' Dieses Prinzip, sagen sie, ist weder gut noch böse, hat weder Seligkeit noch Schmerz, stirbt nicht und lebt nicht, so daß es ein Nichts ist. [...]  
Andere kamen und fragten: 'Was ist Gott?'  
Wir antworteten ihnen: 'Von allen Dingen, die es gibt, wissen wir, daß sie einen Anfang hatten. Wir wissen aber wohl, daß sie nicht aus sich selber ihren Anfang nahmen. Darum gibt es ein Prinzip, das ihnen allen ihren Anfang gab. Dies hatte keinen Anfang und wird kein Ende haben, und dies nennen wir in unserer Sprache Gott.'  
Sie fragten, ob er einen Körper habe, und ob man ihn sehen könne?  
Wir antworteten ihnen [...]" /36/
Eine solche Disputation setzt gegenseitige Kenntnisse etwa der griechischen Metaphysik und ihrer scholastischen Umdeutung, der christlichen Schöpfungslehre, der Buddhistischen Auffassung des Nichts, des Ignatianischen "Principio y Fundamento" usw. voraus, will sie mehr als eine sophistische Übung sein. Die "Bonzen", so Xaver, widmen sich der Meditation und manche kommen dabei sogar auf den Gedanken eines "Prinzips". Da sie aber keine Bücher und folglich auch "keine Autoritäten" darüber haben, teilen sie dies den anderen nicht mit (Doc. 96, S. 416). Diese Bemerkung ist nicht nur interessant bezüglich der dem Buch beigemessenen Bedeutung als Medium und Legitimationsinstanz, sondern auch bezüglich des Hinweises auf die eigene Suche eines Denkweges, der unter Umständen dorthin führt, wo der Andere sich befindet. Allerdings wird dies hier von Xaver nur einseitig wahrgenommen.

Aoyama berichtet, dass im 16. Jahrhundert, die Japaner nicht so sehr die Kraft und die Intelligenz des Menschen hochschätzten, "sondern das zartsinnige Gefühl der Liebe und das Leiden um der Liebe willen. Die duldenden Shintô-Gottheiten [...] wurden vom Volk hoch verehrt. Nach dem Glauben des damaligen Volkes verdienten diese Gottheiten durch ihr Leiden bzw. durch ihren leidvollen Tod das Glück ihres Sohnes und wurden durch diesen Sohn wieder vom Leiden befreit oder ins Leben zurückgebracht. In den zeitgenösischen Gemälden ist das Leiden bzw. der leidvolle Tod dieser Gottheiten aus tiefer Verehrung ihres Leidens sehr ausdrucksvoll und schmerzvoll dargestellt." /37/  Kein Wunder also, dass die einfachen Leute während einer Straßenpredigt anfingen zu weinen, als es beim Leben Christi um seine Passion ging, wie Xaver berichtet (Doc. 96, S. 406). 

Über Xavers bottom-up-Methode schreibt Aoyama: "Xaver predigte häufig auch dem gewöhnlichen Volk vor dem Haupteingang des Fukushôji-Klosters. Vermutlich las er dabei bloß aus seinem Katechismus vor, den er im Winter 1549 bis 1550 mit seinem Dolmetscher Paul auf japanisch verfaßt hatte, und ließ Paul dem Volk das Gelesene erklären." /38/
 
 

AUSBLICK

Jenseits seines missionarischen Selbstverständnisses und auch dessen seiner Zeit lag aber wohl der Gedanke, nicht bloß mit Buddhisten zu disputieren, um sie zu bekehren, sondern etwa mit ihnen zu meditieren und sich einer anderen kategorialen Erfahrung des Göttlichen zu öffnen, ein Weg, den Spätere in unterschiedlicher Weise gegangen sind. Ich denke dabei zum Beispiel an Enomiya Lasalle, Teilhard de Chardin, David Steindl-Rast, Karl Rahner, Hans Küng oder – Pedro Arrupe /39/.  Xaver selbst hat von Japan nicht nur viel gelernt, sondern er hat Freunde gewonnen. Er schreibt den europäischen Mitstreitern aus Cochin am 29. Januar 1552:  
"Über Japan gibt es so viel zu schreiben, dass es kein Ende nehmen würde. Ich fürchte, dass das, was ich geschrieben habe, Viele ärgern wird, weil es viel Lesen bedeutet. Ich tröste mich aber damit, dass diejenigen, die sich wegen des Lesens ärgern, sich diesen Ärger entledigen können, indem sie nicht mehr lesen. Womit ich Schluß mache, ohne abschließen zu können, indem ich meinen geliebten Patres und Brüdern über so große Freunde schreibe, wie dies die Christen in Japan sind." (Doc. 96, S. 420) 
Eine von Br. Almeida überlieferte Episode zwischen Xaver und Ninshitsu besagt, dass Xaver ihn gefragt hätte, welche Zeit ihm als die bessere erscheine, die Jugend oder das Alter, in dem er bereits stehe: 
"Nachdem er ein wenig nachgedacht hatte, gab er zu Antwort: die Jugend. Nach dem Grund befragt, sagte er, dann sei der Körper noch frei von Krankheiten und Beschwerden, und man habe noch die Freiheit, ungehindert zu tun, was man begehre. Darauf erwiderte ihm der Pater: 'Wenn Ihr ein Schiff sähet, das vom Hafen ausgefahren ist und das notwendigerweise zu einem anderen gelangen muß, wann könnten sich dann die Passagiere mehr freuen, wenn sie noch mitten im offenen Meer sind, den Winden, Wellen und Stürmen ausgesetzt, oder wenn sie sich schon dem Hafen nahe sehen und anfangen, durch die Barre einzulaufen, um darin von den früheren Schiffbrüchen und Stürmen auszuruhen?' Darauf antwortete Ninjit: 'Pater, ich verstehe Euch sehr gut, ich weiß wohl, daß natürlicherweise der Anblick des Hafens angenehmer und freudiger ist für jene, die in ihn einzulaufen haben. Da ich aber bis jetzt noch nicht im klaren bin und mich noch nicht entschlossen habe, welcher Hafen der bessere ist, so weiß ich nicht, wie und wo ich landen muß." /40/
Der öfter in Seenot geratene Xaver wirft eine metaphysische Frage auf, die ein ebenfalls mit dem Meer und den Häfen vertrauter Japaner lebensweltlich beantwortet. Es wäre nämlich fatal, so scheint Ninshitsu anzudeuten, man würde einen fahrenden Kaufmann, die Vorstellung von einem idealen und absolut sicheren Hafen näher bringen wollen, während er in Wahrheit die Erfahrung macht, dass das Loslassen von dieser Idee, seine Existenz als erfahrener weil fahrender und heute wohl auch surfender Kaufmann erst möglich macht. Mit anderen Worten, er möchte die Güter und ihre Sicherheit nicht gegen das Leben, gegen Nichts also, umtauschen – auch im Alter nicht. 

Welchen Nutzen haben diese Erfahrungen und Überlegungen im Hinblick auf die Herausforderungen des gegenwärtigen interkulturellen Dialogs vor allem auf der Basis der digitalen Weltvernetzung? Diese ist weder ein böser Dämon noch ein bloßes Werkzeug marktwirtschaftlicher Zweckrationalität. Sie öffnet die Möglichkeit einer Abschwächung der massenmedialen Herrschaftsstrukturen des 20. Jahrhunderts. Die Frage ist nur: Was haben wir uns zu sagen?  

Eine Theorie der Botschaft kann einen Beitrag zur Kritik heutiger techno-missionarischer Ambitionen leisten. Sie versteht sich dabei auch als Teil einer affirmativen Medienphilosophie, die ein vielfältiges Gelingen des Menschseins in einer weltumspannenden message-Kultur anvisiert. Eine Kernfrage dieser Kultur wird sicherlich sein, inwiefern wir uns dem Wort des Anderen öffnen auch und gerade, wenn wir meinen, eine universale und/oder sogar heilige Botschaft zu besitzen.  


28. Georg Schurhammer: Franz Xaver, S. 265. 
29. Georg Schurhammer: Franz Xaver, S. 317. 
30. Georg Schurhammer: Franz Xaver, S. 274. 
31. Zitat nach Paul Aoyama: Die Missionstätigkeit, S. 157-158. 
32. Die Führer einer Dorfgemeinde wurden "Bôzu" (Herr der kleinen Ortschaft) genannt. Gemeint waren aber nicht die gebildeten und beim Volk angesehenen Mönche. Xaver verwendet das Wort undifferenziert. Vgl. Paul Aoyama: Die Missionstätigkeit, S. 61. In bezug auf Ninshitsu spricht er von einem "Bischof" ("obispo"). Ninshitsu war, so Aoyama (S. 72), Rektor des Sôtô-Klosters Fukushô-ji. 
33. Paul Aoyama: Die Missionstätigkeit, S. 72-73. 
34. Zitat nach Paul Aoyama: Die Missionstätigkeit, S. 74 
35. Georg Schurhammer: Franz Xaver, S. 253. 
36. Zitat nach Georg Schurhammer: Franz Xaver, S. 299-302. 
37. Paul Aoyama: Die Missionstätigkeit, S. 21. 
38. Paul Aoyama: Die Missionstätigkeit, S. 77. 
39. Vgl. Arrupes Einsatz für die "Inkulturation" in Pedro Arrupe: Mein Weg und mein Glaube. Ostfildern: Schwabenverlag 1982. Hier S. 71-79. Zum interreligiösen Dialog vgl. Josef Sudbrack: Mystik im Dialog. Würzburg: Echter Verlag 1992. 
40. Zitat nach Paul Aoyama: Die Missionstätigkeit, S. 75.



6. AFRICAN TRADITION





WIKIPEDIA: UBUNTU PHILOSOPHY

Ubuntu (Zulu pronunciation: [ùɓúntʼù]) is a Nguni Bantu term meaning "humanity". It is often also translated as "humanity towards others", but is often used in a more philosophical sense to mean "the belief in a universal bond of sharing that connects all humanity".

In Southern Africa, it has come to be used as a term for a kind of humanist philosophy, ethic, or ideology, also known as Ubuntuism propagated in the Africanisation (transition to majority rule) process of these countries during the 1980s and 1990s.

Since the transition to democracy in South Africa with the Nelson Mandela presidency in 1994, the term has become more widely known outside of Southern Africa, notably popularised to English-language readers through the ubuntu theology of Desmond Tutu. Tutu was the chairman of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), and many have argued that ubuntu was a formative influence on the TRC. However, this view is challenged and contextualized by Christian B. N. Gade in A Discourse on African Philosophy: A New Perspective on Ubuntu and Transitional Justice in South Africa. One of Gade's key findings is that former TRC commissioners and committee members question the importance of ubuntu in the TRC process. Another is that there are several differing and historically developing interpretations of ubuntu, some of which have evident political implications and reflect non-factual and creative uses of history.


WIKIPEDIA: EKPE

Ekpe, also known as Egbo (Ibibio: Leopard), is a secret society flourishing chiefly among the Efiks of the Cross River State, the Oron, of Akwa Ibom StateNigeriaArochukwu and some parts of Abia State, as well as in the diaspora, such as in Cuba and Brazil. The society is still active at the beginning of the 21st century, however, now it plays only a ceremonial role. There are two distinct but related societies, the primary one in the Cross RiverArochukwuAkwa Ibom areas, and the secondary one among the Southern and Eastern Igbo groups. It is general belief amongst the Efik native tribe, although hardly ever substantiated, that the members of the Ekpe society invented the Nsibidi.

Ekpe is a mysterious spirit who is supposed to live in the jungle and to preside at the ceremonies of the society. Members of the Ekpe society are said to act as messengers of the ancestors (ikan). The economics of the society is based on paying tribute to the village ancestors. Only males can join, boys being initiated about the age of puberty. Members are bound by oath of secrecy, and fees on entrance are payable. The Ekpe-men are ranked in seven or nine grades, for promotion to each of which fresh initiation ceremonies, fees and oaths are necessary. The society combines a kind of freemasonry with political and lawenforcing aims. For instance any member wronged in an Ekpe district, that is one dominated by the society, has only to address an Ekpe-man or beat the Ekpe drum in the Ekpe-house, or blow Ekpe as it is called, i.e., sound the Ekpe horn, before the hut of the wrong-doer, and the whole machinery of the society is put in force to see justice done. Ekpe members always wear masks when performing their police duties, and although individuals may nonetheless be recognized, fear of retribution from the ikan stops people from accusing those members who may overstep their limits. Formerly the society earned a bad reputation due to what the British viewed as the barbarous customs that were intermingled with its rites.

Amama

Social importance is attached to the highest ranks of Ekpe-men, called Amama. At least in the past, very large sums, sometimes more than a thousand pounds, were paid to attain these upper levels. The trade-off is that the Amama often control the majority of the community wealth. The Amama often appropriate hundreds of acres of palm trees for their own use and, with the profits they earn, ensure that their sons achieve comparable rank, which has the effect of limiting access to economic gain for other members of the community. The Ekpe society requires that its initiates sponsor feasts for the town, which foster the appearance of the redistribution of wealth by providing the poor with food and drink.

Art and ceremonies

The Ekpe-house, an oblong building like the nave of a church, usually stands in the middle of the villages. The walls are of clay elaborately painted inside and ornamented with clay figures in relief. Inside are wooden images to which reverence is paid.

At Ekpe festivals masked dancers perform. Some of the older masks show horns and filed teeth. Non initiates and women are not allowed to come in contact with the masked dancers.

Ekpe in the diaspora

Abakuá
Main article: Abakuá

Abakuá is an Afro-Cuban men's initiatory fraternity, or secret society, which originated from the Ekpe society in the Cross River region of southeastern Nigeria and southwestern Cameroon.

See also
Abakuá

References
"Art and Life in Africa: Eket Information" University of Iowa


WIKIPEDIA: ESHU

Eshu (Yoruba: Èṣù, also known as Echú, Exu or Exú) is an Orisha in the Yoruba religion of the Yoruba people (originating from Yorubaland, an area in and around present-day Nigeria). As the religion has spread around the world, the name of this Orisha has varied in different locations, but the beliefs remain similar.

Name and role

Eshu partially serves as an alternate name for Eleggua, the messenger for all Orishas, and that there are 256 paths to Eleggua—each one of which is an Eshu. It is believed that Eshu is an Orisha similar to Elugga, but there are only 101 paths to Eshu according to ocha, rather than the 256 paths to Eleggua according to Ifá. Eshu is known as the "Father who gave birth to Ogboni", and is also thought to be agile and always willing to rise to a challenge.

Both ocha and Ifá share some paths, however. Eshu Ayé is said to work closely with Orisha Olokun and is thought to walk on the shore of the beach. Eshu Bi is a stern and forceful avatar, appearing as both an old man and young boy, who walked with Shangó and Oyá (the initial two Ibeyi), and Eshu Bi protects both of these, as well as all other small children. Eshu Laroye is an avatar believed to be the companion of Oshún and believed to be one of the most important Eshus, and the avatar of Eshu Laroye is thought to be talkative and small.

Other names

The name of Eshu varies around the world: in Yorùbáland, Eshu is Èṣù-Elegba; Exu de Candomblé in Candomblé; Echú in Santería and Latin America; Legba in Haitian Vodou; Leba in Winti; Exu de Quimbanda in Quimbanda; Lubaniba in Palo Mayombe; and Exu in Latin America.

Brazil

Exu is known by various forms and names in Afro-Brazilian religions. They include Akessan; Alafiá; Alaketo; Bará, or Ibará; Elegbá, or Elegbará, Inan; Lalu, or Jelu; Laroiê; Lon Bií; Lonã; Odara; Olodé; Tamentau, or Etamitá; Tlriri; and Vira, a feminine manifestation of Exu. The most common forms or praise-names of Exu are Exu-Agbo, the protector and guardian of houses and terreiros; Exu-Elepô, the god of palm oil; Exu lnã, the god of fire; Exu Ojixé, a messenger god.

Candomblé

A shrine dedicated to Exu is located outside of the main terreiro of a Candomblé temple, usually near the entrance gate. It is, in general, made of rough clay or a simple mound of red clay. They are similar to those found in Nigeria.

Ritual foods offered to Exu include palm oil; beans; corn, either in the form of cornmeal or popcorn; farofa, a manioc flour. Four-legged male birds and other animals are offered as sacrifice to Exu. In each offering made to an orixá, a part of the food is separated and dedicated to Exu.

In culture

Eshu is described as a "black devil-god" in the character list of Aimé Césaire's Une Tempête, and is mentioned briefly by the Master of Ceremonies in the Introduction. He appears as a bawdy trickster to foil the colonialist Prospero in Act 3, Scene 3. 

In Jamaican-Canadian Nalo Hopkinson's 2000 science fiction novel Midnight Robber, eshu is a name for the individual AI that runs each household in the far-future Cockpit County on the Carib-colonized planet of Toussaint.


References

Names and worship of Esu. Roots and Rooted. Retrieved 1 August 2015.
Ócha'ni Lele (24 June 2010). Teachings of the Santería Gods: The Spirit of the Odu. Inner Traditions / Bear & Co. p. 251
Robert D. Pelton (1989). The Trickster in West Africa: A Study of Mythic Irony and Sacred Delight. University of California Press. p. 161.
Lopes, Nei (2004). 
Enciclopédia brasileira da diáspora africana. São Paulo, SP: Selo Negro Edições. pp. 266–267
Aimé Césaire. 
Une Tempête [A Tempest]. Translated by Richard Miller.



WIKIPEDIA: ELESGUA

Elegua (Yoruba: Èṣù-Ẹlẹ́gbára, also spelled Eleggua; known as Eleguá in Latin America) is an Orisha, a deity of roads in the religions of SanteriaCandomblé and in Palo Mayombe. He is syncretized with either Saint MichaelSaint Anthony of Padua, or the Holy Child of Atocha.

In Africa

Elegua is known as Èṣù-Ẹlẹ́gbára in the Yoruba religion and is closely associated with Eshu. Ẹlẹ́gbára means the "master of force" in the Yoruba language.

Santeria

Eleguá is also known as the Regla de Ocha in Cuba, where is the orisha and "owner" of caminos, or roads and paths. All ceremonies and rituals in Santeria must first have the approval by Eleguá before progressing. He is the messenger of Olofi. He differs somewhat from Exu, who in this case is seen as his brother, by having dangerous and less aggressive characteristics. Eluguá moves silently; in contrast, Exu "breaks through". Manifestations or associated orishas of Eleguá includes Akefun, Aleshujade, Arabobo, Awanjonu, Lalafán, Obasín, Oparicocha, and Osokere.[2]

There is a pataki (story) in Santeria in which Olodumare gives Eleguá the keys to the past, present, and future; for this reason, Eleguá is often depicted holding a set of keys. A figure of Eleguá may be placed in the house behind the entrance door.[2]

In BraziL

In Afro-Brazilian religion Elegbara is one of the titles of Exu.

References

Adeoye, C.L. (1989). Ìgbàgbọ́ àti ẹ̀sìn Yorùba (in Yoruba). Ibadan: Evans Bros. Nigeria Publishers. p. 123. 
Lopes, Nei (2004). 
Enciclopédia brasileira da diáspora africana. São Paulo, SP: Selo Negro Edições. p. 252.



Keynote address at the African Information Ethics Conference Pretoria (South Africa), 5th to 7th February 2007. Published in the International Review of Information Ethics (IRIE) (2007). Reprinted in: Journal of the American Society for Information Science and Technology (59 (7): 1-9, 2008.


INFORMATION ETHICS FROM AFRICA


Information Ethics in Africa is a young academic field. Not much has been published on the role that African philosophy can play in thinking about the challenges arising from the impact of ICT on African societies and cultures. Most research on ICT from an ethical perspective takes its departure from Western philosophy. Let us review very briefly some recent works on African philosophy that are relevant in a negative or positive sense to the subject of this conference. 

African oral and written traditions of philosophy have a long and rich past, going back as far as 3000 BC with the Egyptian Maat-Philosophy of ancient Egypt, the Afro-Hellenic tradition of Greek and Roman Antiquity and the early Middle Ages (Amasis, Plotinus, Philon, Euclid, Apuleius, Tertullian, Augustine), the Afro-Islamic tradition (Al-Farabi, Averroes, Ibn Battuta), the colonial break with contributions in the amharic language (Zara  Yoqob, WaldaHawat, Amo, Hannibal), the anti-colonial philosophy (DuBois, Garvey, Césaire, Senghor), the ethno-philosophy of the 70s (Kagame, Mbiti), Afrosocialism (Nkruma, Nyerere), universalistic theories (Houtondji, Wiredu, Towa), and contemporary representatives of different schools such as hermeneutics (Okere, Ntumba, Okonda, Serequeberhan, Kinyongo), Sage-philosophy (Oruka, Kaphagawani, Sogolo, Masolo) (Oruka/Masolo 1983), and feminism (Eboh, Oluwole, Boni, Ngoyi), to mention just a few names and schools. These traditions have been recently analysed by Jacob Mabe in his book on oral and written forms of philosophical thinking in Africa (Mabe 2005, 276-278; Ruch/Anyanwu 1981; Neugebauer 1989; Serequeberhan 1996). He has also edited the first comprehensive lexicon on Africa in German (Mabe 2004), with more than 1000 keywords including entries on "media" and the "Internet" (Tambwe 2004).

The Department of Philosophy at the University of South Africa has published a comprehensive reader Philosophy from Africa, edited by Pieter Coetzee and Abraham Roux (Coetzee/Roux 2002). Of the 37 contributors 33 are Africans speaking for themselves on the topical issues of decolonization, Afrocentrism in conflict with Eurocentrism, the struggle for cultural freedoms in Africa, the historic role of black consciousness in the struggle for liberation, the restitution and reconciliation in the context of Africa’s post-colonial situation (Eze 1997), justice for Africa in the context of globalization, the pressures on the tradition of philosophy in Africa engendered by the challenges of modernity, the reconstitution of the African self in its relation to changing community, the African epistemological paradigm in conflict with the Western, and the continuity of religion and metaphysics in African thought. The second edition contains themes on gender, race and Africa’s place in the global context. Although the book addresses a broad variety of themes there is no contribution dealing specifically with information and communication technologies from an ethical or even philosophical perspective, although Paulin Houtondji addresses the problem of “Producing Knowledge in Africa Today” (Houtondji 2002). The terms '"information" and "communication" are absent, not even listed in the index.

Is there a specific African philosophic and ethical perspective with roots in African languages, social experiences and values as analyzed for instance by John Mbiti, (1969), Chyme Gyekye (1996), Mutombo Nkulu (1997), Luke Mlilo and Nathanael Soédé (2003) and Jean-Godefroy Bidima (2004)? Yes there is, if we follow Mogobe Ramose’s contribution to this reader (Coetzee/Roux 2002) that bears the title “Globalization and ubuntu” (Ramose 2002), but also, for instance, Kwasi Wiredu’s contribution on the “conceptual decolonization in African culture” through an analysis of African languages and terminology (Wiredu 1995; Weidtmann 1998). I am not making a plea for ethnophilosophy as criticized for instance by Houtondji (1983), but for a dialogue between both cultures and languages, and the global and the local as envisaged in the 2004 symposium of the International Center for Information Ethics (Capurro, Frühbauer, Hausmanninger 2007). My position is related to Wiredu’s and Oladipo’s interpretation as a “third way in African philosophy” (Oladipo 2002) as well as to Oruka’s “sage philosophy” (Oruka 1990). My view aims at a critical analysis of the oral and/or written African traditions, as analyzed for instance by Anthony Appiah in his article for the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Appiah 1998). I explicitly acknowledge modern reason without assuming that its manifestations are inviolable, particularly when they serve the purposes of colonialization. I locate ethical discourse between the particular and the universal. My aim, following the Kantian tradition, is universality, but I am aware, with Aristotle, that moral and political utterances are contingent, subject to different interpretations and applications based on economic interests and power structures. They are also objects of a critical analysis that envisages the good and seeks a humane world free from the dogmatic fixations of norms that merely reflect, implicitly or explicitly, particular points of view. In other words, ethics reflects on the permanent flow of human life and its modes of empirical regulation that make possible, on the basis of mutual respect, manifestations of humanity in unique and multiple forms. We are all equal, and we are all different.

According to Ramose, ubuntu is “the central concept of social and political organization in African philosophy, particularly among the Bantu-speaking peoples. It consists of the principles of sharing and caring for one another.” (Ramose 2002, 643). Ramose discuses two aphorisms “to be found in almost all indigenous African languages,” namely: “Motho ke motho ka batho” and “Feta kgomo tschware motho.” The first aphorism means that “to be human is to affirm one’s humanity by recognizing the humanity of others and, on that basis, establish humane respectful relations with them. Accordingly, it is ubuntu which constitutes the core meaning of the aphorism.” The second aphorism means “that if and when one is faced with a decisive choice between wealth and the preservation of life of another human being, then one should opt for the preservation of life.” (Ramose 2002, 644). Following this analysis we can ask: what is the role of ubuntu in African information ethics? How is the intertwining of information and communication technology with the principles of communalism and humanity expressed in aphorisms such as “Motho ke motho ka batho” which can be translated as “people are other people through other people”? What is the relation between community and privacy in African information society? What kind of questions do African people ask about the effects of information and communication technology in their everyday lives?  

One of the few detailed analysis of the relationship between ubuntu and information ethics, or more precisely, between ubuntu and privacy was presented by H. N. Olinger, Johannes Britz and M.S. Olivier at the Sixth International Conference of Computer Ethics: Philosophical Enquiry (CEPE 2005). They write:

“The African worldview driving much of African values and social thinking is “Ubuntu” (Broodryk, 2004). The Ubuntu worldview has been recognized as the primary reason that South Africa has managed to successfully transfer power from a white minority government to a majority-rule government without bloodshed (Murithi, 2000). The South African government will attempt to draft a Data Privacy Bill and strike an appropriate balance within the context of African values and an African worldview.” (Olinger/Britz/Olivier 2005, 292)

According to the authors, Ubuntu ethical principles have been applied in South Africa in the following areas: 
- Politics (the African Renaissance
)
- Business (through collective learning, teamwork, sustainability, a focus on local community, and an alternative to extractive capitalism
 ) 
- Corporate governance (though the attitudes of fairness, collectiveness, humility
)
- Restorative justice (through the use of dialogue, collective restitution and healing)

- Conflict resolution and reconciliation (through the Ubunto ethos of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, TRC) (Olinger/Britz/Olivier 2005, 295).

The authors emphasise the specificity of the Ubuntu worldview as a community-based mindset, opposed to Western libertarianism and individualism but close to communitarianism. The Nigerian philosopher Simeon Onyewueke Eboh has written a profound study on “African Communalism” (2004). Olinger, Britz and Olivier remark critically that the population of southern Africa has to rediscover Ubuntu because many have not experienced it, and also because many live in two different cultures, practicing Ubuntu in the rural environments and Western values in the urban environments. If this is the case, not only in South Africa but in other African countries then there is a lot of theoretical and practical work to be done! 

The authors translate the aphorism “Umunto ungumuntu ngabanye abantu” (Nguni languages of Zulu and Xhosa) as “A person is a person through other persons” (Olinger/Britz/Olivier 2005, 293). According to Broodryk (2002), Ubuntu is an African worldview “based on values of intense humanness, caring, respect, compassion, and associated values ensuring a happy and qualitative human community life in a spirit of family.” This means that personal privacy  being a key ethical value in Western countries  might be considered as less important from an Ubuntu-based perspective, even if we accept that there are several conceptions of privacy in both the West and the East (Ess 2005, Capurro 2005). In a comparative study of ethical theories in different cultures, Michael Brannigan addresses African Ethics with the utterance “To Be is to Belong” (Brannigan 2005). An analysis of this thesis could lead to a foundation of African information ethics based not upon the abstract or metaphysical concept of Being of  some classical Western ethical theories, but upon the experience of Being as communal existence. The task of such an analysis would be to recognize the uniqueness of African perspectives as well as commonalities with other cultures and their theoretical expressions. This analysis could lead to an interpretation of ICT within an African horizon and correspondingly to possible vistas for information policy makers, responsible community leaders and, of course, for African institutions.
 

Johannes Britz chaired a session on ICT in Africa at the Ethics and Electronic Information in the Twenty-First Century (EE21) symposium at the University of Memphis (Mendina/Britz 2004). He said that an important condition of Africa's finding a place in the twenty-first century is a well-developed and maintained ICT infrastructure. Both Britz and Peter John Lor, former Chief executive of the National Library of South Africa, think that the present north-south flow of information should be complemented by a south-north flow in order to enhance mutual understanding. They plea for a shift toward the recognition of the “local” within the “global,” following the idea of “thinking locally and acting globally.” In ethical terms, this means respect for different local cultures and strengthening their active participation in intercultural dialogue (Lor/Britz 2004, 18). Although Africa is still far from a true knowledge society, there is hope of success on certain fronts, such as investment in human capital, stemming the flight of intellectual expertise, and the effective development and maintenance of IT infrastructure (Britz et al. 2006). Dick Kawooya (Uganda Library Association) stresses the ethical dilemma confronting librarians and information professionals in much of sub-Saharan Africa, namely concerns about general literacy, information literacy, and access to the Internet on the one hand, and “dwindling budgets” for educational institutions, particularly libraries, on the other (Kawooya 2004, 34). Michael Anyiam-Osigwe, chief executive of the Africa Institute for Leadership, Research and Development, stresses the importance of ICT towards attaining sustainable democracy in Africa (Anyiam-Osigwe 2004). According to Coetzee Bester, a former member of parliament in South Africaand co-founder of the Africa Institute for Leadership, Research and Development, the problem of ICT in Africa includes all stakeholders. 
He writes:

 “A program to reconstruct communities as holistic entities is necessary. This should include leadership, followers, agree-upon principles and values as well as effective interaction among all these elements.” (Coetzee Bester 2004, 12)

A value-based reorientation implies personal awareness, an understanding of information, effective interactions between leaders and their communities without limitations of time and space, and mutual confidence in representative leadership.

In the already mentioned study on “Ethics and the Internet in West Africa” (Brunet/Tiemtoré/Vettraino-Soulard 2004) the authors identify six types of ethical issues related to the development of the Internet in Africa but also relevant for other countries, namely: 

- Exclusion and inequity 
- Culture (Internet Content)
 
- Internet costs and financing
 
- Sociotechnical aspects of Internet integration (resistance, uses)
 
- Political power
 
- Economic organization

There is no such thing as a morally neutral technology. This is not to say just that technologies can be used and misused, but to express the deeper insight that all technologies create new ways of being. They influence our relation with one another, they shape, in a more or less radical way, our institutions, our economies, and our moral values. This is why we should focus on information technology primarily from an ethical perspective. It is up to the African people and their leaders to question how to transform their lives by these technologies. African educational and research institutions should also reflect critically on these issues. In their analysis of the impact of “new technologies” on “ancient Africa” Willy Jackson and Issiaka Mandé point to the problem that the development of the information society in Africa “comes up against a lack of financing and the unsuitability of the legal and statutory frameworks” (Jackson/Mandé 2007, 175).

As Bob Jolliffe, senior lecturer in computer science at the University of South Africa, has pointed out there is an implicit connection between free software, free culture, free science, open access, and the South African Freedom Charter (Jolliffe 2006). A major task of information ethics in South Africa as well as in other African countries, is to align such ideals with concrete social, political, economic and technical processes. ICT in Africa should become a major contribution for opening “the doors of learning and culture” to use the wording of the Freedom Charter. The space of knowledge as a space of freedom is not, as Jollife rightly remarks, an abstract ideal. It has a history that limits its possibilities. It is a space of rules and traditions of specific societies, in dialogue with their foundational myths and utopian aspirations. We are morally responsible not only for our deeds but for our dreams. Information ethics offers an open space to retrieve and debate these information and communication myths and utopias. 

The main moral responsibility of African academics is to enrich African identities by retrieving and re-creating African information and communication traditions. From this perspective, cultural memory is an ethical task if we want to create a humane community based  not just on the number of people but on the relations between them, as the German Egyptologist Jan Assmann remarks following Friedrich Nietzsche in his Genealogy of Morals (Assmann 2000, Nietzsche 1999, vol. 5, 294-300). Cultural memory must be re-shaped again and again to build the core of a humane society. This means no more and no less than basing morality on memory and communication, thereby establishing information ethics at its core. The function of cultural memory is not just to express what belongs to the collective memory of a community, but to engage the will of its members to connect themselves through the task of creating it. Cultural memory is connective. It is related to our myths and to our dreams. We remember Nietzsche’s ambiguous warning: “You want to be responsible for everything! But not for your dreams!” (Nietzsche 1999, vol. 3, 117). I call this warning ‘ambiguous’ because Nietzsche, no less than Sigmund Freud, was well aware of the limits of human will and our tendency to repress or forget what we consider painful. The Egyptian god Thot is a symbol of cultural memory as a social task. He is the god of wisdom and writing as well as messenger of the gods, particularly of the sun god Re, and is associated with the goddess Maat, the personification of justice. Thot, the Greek Hermes, was represented as an ibis- (or a baboon) headed man with a reed pen and a palette, known in the Western tradition through Plato’s criticism of writing in his Phaedrus. 

I think that retrieving the African cultural memory with regard to information and communication norms and traditions is the main information challenge for African information ethics. It should recognize the different strategies of social inclusion and exclusion in the history of African societies, including traumatic experiences such as slavery and apartheid. Since the emergence of the Internet, this challenge is discussed under the heading of the digital divide. But African information ethics implies much more than just the access and use of this medium. The problem is not a technical one, but one of social exclusion, manipulation, exploitation and annihilation of human beings. It is vital that thought about African information ethics be conducted from this broader perspective.


NELSON MANDELA: LONG WALK TO FREEDOM

London: Little, Brown and Co. 1994

[my emphasis throughout the text, RC]


As readers will discover, this book has a long history. I began writing it clandestinely in 1974 during my imprisonment on Robben Island. Without the tireless labor of my old comrades Walter Sisulu and Ahmed Kathrada for reviving my memories, it is doubtful the manuscript would have been completed. The copy of the manuscript which I kept with me was discovered by the authorities and confiscated. However, in addition to their unique calligraphic skills, my co-prisoners Mac Maharaj and Isu Chiba had ensured that the original manuscript safely reached its destination. I resumed work on it after my release from prison in 1990.
Since my release, my schedule has been crowded with numerous duties and responsibilities, which have left me little free time for writing.
Fortunately, I have had the assistance of dedicated colleagues, friends, and professionals who have helped me complete my work at last, and to whom I would like to express my appreciation.
I am deeply grateful to Richard Stengel who collaborated with me in the creation of this book, providing invaluable assistance in editing and revising the first parts and in the writing of the latter parts. I recall with fondness our early morning walks in the Transkei and the many hours of interviews at Shell House in Johannesburg and my home in Houghton. A special tribute is owed to Mary Pfaff who assisted Richard in his work. I have also benefited from the advice and support of Fatima Meer, Peter Magubane, Nadine Gordimer, and Ezekiel Mphahlele.
I want to thank especially my comrade Ahmed Kathrada for the long hours spent revising, correcting, and giving accuracy to the story. Many thanks to my ANC office staff, who patiently dealt with the logistics of the making of this book, but in particular to Barbara Masekela for her efficient coordination. Likewise, Iqbal Meer has devoted many hours to watching over the business aspects of the book. I am grateful to my editor, William Phillips of Little, Brown, who has guided this project from early 1990 on, and edited the text, and to his colleagues Jordan Pavlin, Steve Schneider, Mike Mattil, and Donna Peterson. I would also like to thank Professor Gail Gerhart for her factual review of the manuscript.

p. 9

See:
- Writing and Smuggling the Manuscript
- Mac Maharaj on Mandela, Zuma and South Africa (Alec Russell 2015)
https://www.ft.com/content/061882b4-338b-11e5-bdbb-35e55cbae175#axzz3h6zjRcP4


PART ONE
 

A COUNTRY CHILDHOOD


2

The only rivalry between different clans or tribes in our small world at Qunu was that between the Xhosas and the amaMfengu, a small number of whom lived in our village. AmaMfengu arrived on the eastern Cape after fleeing from Shaka Zulu’s armies in a period known as the iMfecane, the great wave of battles and migrations between 1820 and 1840 set in motion by the rise of Shaka and the Zulu state, during which the Zulu warrior sought to conquer and then unite all the tribes under military rule. AmaMfengu, who were not originally Xhosa-speakers, were refugees from the iMfecane and were forced to do jobs that no other African would do. They worked on white farms and in white businesses, something that was looked down upon by the more established Xhosa tribes. But amaMfengu were an industrious people, and because of their contact with Europeans, they were often more educated and “Western” than other Africans.

When I was a boy, amaMfengu were the most advanced section of the community and furnished our clergymen, policemen, teachers, clerks, and interpreters. They were also amongst the first to become Christians, to build better houses, and to use scientific methods of agriculture, and they were wealthier than their Xhosa compatriots. They confirmed the missionaries’ axiom, that to be Christian was to be civilized, and to be civilized was to be Christian. There still existed some hostility toward amaMfengu, but in retrospect, I would attribute this more to jealousy than tribal animosity. This local form of tribalism that I observed as a boy was relatively harmless. At that stage, I did not witness nor even suspect the violent tribal rivalries that would subsequently be promoted by the white rulers of South Africa.

My father did not subscribe to local prejudice toward amaMfengu and befriended two amaMfengu brothers, George and Ben Mbekela. The brothers were an exception in Qunu: they were educated and Christian. George, the older of the two, was a retired teacher and Ben was a police sergeant. Despite the proselytizing of the Mbekela brothers, my father remained aloof from Christianity and instead reserved his own faith for the great spirit of the Xhosas, Qamata, the God of his fathers. My father was an unofficial priest and presided over ritual slaughtering of goats and calves and officiated at local traditional rites concerning planting, harvest, birth, marriage, initiation ceremonies, and funerals. He did not need to be ordained, for the traditional religion of the Xhosas is characterized by a cosmic wholeness, so that there is little distinction between the sacred and the secular, between the natural and the supernatural.

While the faith of the Mbekela brothers did not rub off on my father, it did inspire my mother, who became a Christian. In fact, Fanny was literally her Christian name, for she had been given it in church. It was due to the influence of the Mbekela brothers that I myself was baptized into the Methodist, or Wesleyan Church as it was then known, and sent to school. The brothers would often see me playing or minding sheep and come over to talk to me. One day, George Mbekela paid a visit to my mother. “Your son is a clever young fellow,” he said. “He should go to school.” My mother remained silent. No one in my family had ever attended school and my mother was unprepared for Mbekela’s suggestion. But she did relay it to my father, who despite — or perhaps because of — his own lack of education immediately decided that his youngest son should go to school.

The schoolhouse consisted of a single room, with a Western-style roof, on the other side of the hill from Qunu. I was seven years old, and on the day before I was to begin, my father took me aside and told me that I must be dressed properly for school. Until that time, I, like all the other boys in Qunu, had worn only a blanket, which was wrapped around one shoulder and pinned at the waist. My father took a pair of his trousers and cut them at the knee. He told me to put them on, which I did, and they were roughly the correct length, although the waist was far too large. My father then took a piece of string and cinched the trousers at the waist. I must have been a comical sight, but I have never owned a suit I was prouder to wear than my father’s cut-off pants.

On the first day of school, my teacher, Miss Mdingane, gave each of us an English name and said that from thenceforth that was the name we would answer to in school. This was the custom among Africans in those days and was undoubtedly due to the British bias of our education. The education I received was a British education, in which British ideas, British culture, British institutions, were automatically assumed to be superior. There was no such thing as African culture.

Africans of my generation — and even today — generally have both an English and an African name. Whites were either unable or unwilling to pronounce an African name, and considered it uncivilized to have one. That day, Miss Mdingane told me that my new name was Nelson. Why she bestowed this particular name upon me I have no idea. Perhaps it had something to do with the great British sea captain Lord Nelson, but that would be only a guess.

pp. 14-16

 

  3

My later notions of leadership were profoundly influenced by observing the regent and his court. I watched and learned from the tribal meetings that were regularly held at the Great Place. These were not scheduled, but were called as needed, and were held to discuss national matters such as a drought, the culling of cattle, policies ordered by the magistrate, or new laws decreed by the government. All Thembus were free to come — and a great many did, on horseback or by foot.

On these occasions, the regent was surrounded by his amaphakathi, a group of councilors of high rank who functioned as the regent’s parliament and judiciary. They were wise men who retained the knowledge of tribal history and custom in their heads and whose opinions carried great weight.

Letters advising these chiefs and headmen of a meeting were dispatched from the regent, and soon the Great Place became alive with important visitors and travelers from all over Thembuland. The guests would gather in the courtyard in front of the regent’s house and he would open the meeting by thanking everyone for coming and explaining why he had summoned them. From that point on, he would not utter another word until the meeting was nearing its end.

Everyone who wanted to speak did so. It was democracy in its purest form. There may have been a hierarchy of importance among the speakers, but everyone was heard, chief and subject, warrior and medicine man, shopkeeper and farmer, landowner and laborer. People spoke without interruption and the meetings lasted for many hours. The foundation of self-government was that all men were free to voice their opinions and equal in their value as citizens. (Women, I am afraid, were deemed second-class citizens.) A great banquet was served during the day, and I often gave myself a bellyache by eating too much while listening to speaker after speaker. I noticed how some speakers rambled and never seemed to get to the point. I grasped how others came to the matter at hand directly, and who made a set of arguments succinctly and cogently. I observed how some speakers used emotion and dramatic language, and tried to move the audience with such techniques, while other speakers were sober and even, and shunned emotion.

At first, I was astonished by the vehemence — and candor — with which people criticized the regent. He was not above criticism — in fact, he was often the principal target of it. But no matter how flagrant the charge, the regent simply listened, not defending himself, showing no emotion at all.

The meetings would continue until some kind of consensus was reached. They ended in unanimity or not at all. Unanimity, however, might be an agreement to disagree, to wait for a more propitious time to propose a solution. Democracy meant all men were to be heard, and a decision was taken together as a people. Majority rule was a foreign notion. A minority was not to be crushed by a majority.

Only at the end of the meeting, as the sun was setting, would the regent speak. His purpose was to sum up what had been said and form some consensus among the diverse opinions. But no conclusion was forced on people who disagreed. If no agreement could be reached, another meeting would be held. At the very end of the council, a praise-singer or poet would deliver a panegyric to the ancient kings, and a mixture of compliments to and satire on the present chiefs, and the audience, led by the regent, would roar with laughter.

As a leader, I have always followed the principles I first saw demonstrated by the regent at the Great Place. I have always endeavored to listen to what each and every person in a discussion had to say before venturing my own opinion. Oftentimes, my own opinion will simply represent a consensus of what I heard in the discussion. I always remember the regent’s axiom: a leader, he said, is like a shepherd. He stays behind the flock, letting the most nimble go out ahead, whereupon the others follow, not realizing that all along they are being directed from behind.

 It was at Mqhekezweni that I developed my interest in African history. Until then I had heard only of Xhosa heroes, but at the Great Place I learned of other African heroes like Sekhukhune, king of the Bapedi, and the Basotho king, Moshoeshoe, and Dingane, king of the Zulus, and others such as Bambatha, Hintsa and Makana, Montshiwa and Kgama. I learned of these men from the chiefs and headmen who came to the Great Place to settle disputes and try cases. Though not lawyers, these men presented cases and then adjudicated them. Some days, they would finish early and sit around telling stories. I hovered silently and listened. They spoke in an idiom that I’d never heard before. Their speech was formal and lofty, their manner slow and unhurried, and the traditional clicks of our language were long and dramatic.

At first, they shooed me away and told me I was too young to listen. Later they would beckon me to fetch fire or water for them, or to tell the women they wanted tea, and in those early months I was too busy running errands to follow their conversation. But, eventually, they permitted me to stay, and I discovered the great African patriots who fought against Western domination. My imagination was fired by the glory of these African warriors.

The most ancient of the chiefs who regaled the gathered elders with ancient tales was Zwelibhangile Joyi, a son from the Great House of King Ngubengcuka. Chief Joyi was so old that his wrinkled skin hung on him like a loose-fitting coat. His stories unfolded slowly and were often punctuated by a great wheezing cough, which would force him to stop for minutes at a time. Chief Joyi was the great authority on the history of the Thembus in large part because he had lived through so much of it.

But as grizzled as Chief Joyi often seemed, the decades fell off him when he spoke of the young impis, or warriors, in the army of King Ngangelizwe fighting the British. In pantomime, Chief Joyi would fling his spear and creep along the veld as he narrated the victories and defeats.

He spoke of Ngangelizwe’s heroism, generosity, and humility. Not all of Chief Joyi’s stories revolved around the Thembus. When he first spoke of non-Xhosa warriors, I wondered why. I was like a boy who worships a local soccer hero and is not interested in a national soccer star with whom he has no connection. Only later was I moved by the broad sweep of African history, and the deeds of all African heroes regardless of tribe.

Chief Joyi railed against the white man, who he believed had deliberately sundered the Xhosa tribe, dividing brother from brother. The white man had told the Thembus that their true chief was the great white queen across the ocean and that they were her subjects. But the white queen brought nothing but misery and perfidy to the black people, and if she was a chief she was an evil chief. Chief Joyi’s war stories and his indictment of the British made me feel angry and cheated, as though I had already been robbed of my own birthright.

Chief Joyi said that the African people lived in relative peace until the coming of the abelungu, the white people, who arrived from across the sea with fire-breathing weapons. Once, he said, the Thembu, the Mpondo, the Xhosa, and the Zulu were all children of one father, and lived as brothers.

The white man shattered the abantu, the fellowship, of the various tribes. The white man was hungry and greedy for land, and the black man shared the land with him as they shared the air and water; land was not for man to possess. But the white man took the land as you might seize another man’s horse.

I did not yet know that the real history of our country was not to be found in standard British textbooks, which claimed South Africa began with the landing of Jan Van Riebeeck at the Cape of Good Hope in 1652. It was from Chief Joyi that I began to discover that the history of the Bantuspeaking peoples began far to the north, in a country of lakes and green plains and valleys, and that slowly over the millennia we made our way down to the very tip of this great continent. However, I later discovered that Chief Joyi’s account of African history, particularly after 1652, was not always so accurate.

pp. 24-27

PART TWO

JOHANNESBURG

 

10



At the beginning of 1942, in order to save money and be closer to downtown Johannesburg, I moved from the room at the back of the Xhomas’ to the WNLA compound. I was assisted by Mr. Festile, the induna at the Chamber of Mines, who was once again playing a fateful role in my life. On his own initiative he had decided to offer me free accommodation in the mining compound.

The WNLA compound was a multiethnic, polyglot community of modern, urban South Africa. There were Sothos, Tswanas, Vendas, Zulus, Pedis, Shangaans, Namibians, Mozambicans, Swazis, and Xhosas. Few spoke English, and the lingua franca was an amalgam of many tongues known as Fanagalo. There, I saw not only flare-ups of ethnic animosity, but the comity that was also possible among men of different backgrounds. Yet I was a fish out of water there. Instead of spending my days underground, I was studying or working in a law office where the only physical activity was running errands or putting files in a cabinet.

Because the WNLA was a way station for visiting chiefs, I had the privilege of meeting tribal leaders from all over southern Africa. I recall on one occasion meeting the queen regent of Basutoland, or what is now Lesotho, Mantsebo Moshweshwe. She was accompanied by two chiefs, both of whom knew Sabata’s father, Jongilizwe. I asked them about Jongilizwe, and for an hour I seemed to be back in Thembuland as they told colorful tales about his early years.

The queen took special notice of me and at one point addressed me directly, but she spoke in Sesotho, a language in which I knew few words. Sesotho is the language of the Sotho people as well as the Tswana, a large number of whom live in the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. She looked at me with incredulity, and then said in English, “What kind of lawyer and leader will you be who cannot speak the language of your own people?” I had no response. The question embarrassed and sobered me; it made me realize my parochialism and just how unprepared I was for the task of serving my people. I had unconsciously succumbed to the ethnic divisions fostered by the white government and I did not know how to speak to my own kith and kin. Without language, one cannot talk to people and understand them; one cannot share their hopes and aspirations, grasp their history, appreciate their poetry, or savor their songs. I again realized that we were not different people with separate languages; we were one people, with different tongues.

pp. 96-97

PART FOUR

THE STRUGGLE IS MY LIFE


20

 

Education is the great engine of personal development. It is through education that the daughter of a peasant can become a doctor, that the son of a mineworker can become the head of the mine, that a child of farmworkers can become the president of a great nation. It is what we make out of what we have, not what we are given, that separates one person from another.

Since the turn of the century, Africans owed their educational opportunites primarily to the foreign churches and missions that created and sponsored schools. Under the United Party, the syllabus for African secondary schools and white secondary schools was essentially the same. The mission schools provided Africans with Western-style English-language education, which I myself received. We were limited by lesser facilities but not by what we could read or think or dream.

Yet, even before the Nationalists came to power, the disparities in funding tell a story of racist education. The government spent about six times as much per white student as per African student. Education was not compulsory for Africans and was free only in the primary grades. Less than half of all African children of school age attended any school at all, and only a tiny number of Africans were graduated from high school. Even this amount of education proved distasteful to the Nationalists. The Afrikaner has always been unenthusiastic about education for Africans. To him it was simply a waste, for the African was inherently ignorant and lazy and no amount of education could remedy that. The Afrikaner was traditionally hostile to Africans learning English, for English was a foreign tongue to the Afrikaner and the language of emancipation to us.

pp. 194-196 

 

PART EIGHT

ROBBEN ISLAND: THE DARK YEARS

62

 

One morning, several days after my meeting with Bram and Joel, we were taken to the head office. The head office was only about a quarter of a mile away and was a simple stone structure that resembled our own section. Once there, we were lined up to have our fingerprints taken, which was routine prison service business. But while waiting, I noticed a warder with a camera. After our fingerprints had been taken, the chief warder ordered us to line up for photographs. I motioned to my colleagues not to move, and I addressed the warder: “I would like you to produce the document from the commissioner of prisons authorizing our pictures to be taken.” Photographs of prisoners required such authorization.

It was always valuable to be familiar with regulations, because the warders themselves were often ignorant of them and could be intimidated by one’s superior knowledge. The warder was taken aback by my request and was unable to offer any explanation or produce anything in writing from the commissioner of prisons. He threatened to charge us if we did not consent to have our photographs taken, but I said that if there was no authorization, there would be no pictures, and that is where the matter remained.

As a rule, we objected to having our pictures taken in prison on the grounds that it is generally demeaning to be seen as a prisoner. But there was one photograph I did consent to, the only one I ever agreed to while on Robben Island.

One morning, a few weeks later, the chief warder, instead of handing us hammers for our work in the courtyard, gave us each needles and thread and a pile of worn prison jerseys. We were instructed to repair the garments, but we discovered that most of these jerseys were frayed beyond repair. This struck us as a curious task, and we wondered what had provoked the change. Later that morning, at about eleven o’clock, the front gate swung open, revealing the commanding officer with two men in suits. The commanding officer announced that the two visitors were a reporter and photographer from the Daily Telegraph in London. He related this as if visiting members of the international press were a regular diversion for us.

Although these men were our first official visitors, we regarded them skeptically. Firstly, they were brought in under the auspices of the government, and second, we were aware that the Telegraph was a conservative newspaper unlikely to be sympathetic to our cause. We well knew that there was great concern in the outside world about our situation and that it was in the government’s interest to show that we were not being mistreated.

The two journalists walked slowly around the courtyard, surveying us. We kept our heads down concentrating on our work. After they had made one circuit, one of the guards plucked me by the shoulder and said, “Mandela, come, you will talk now.” In those early days, I often spoke on behalf of my fellow prisoners. The prison service regulations were explicit that each prisoner was permitted to speak only for himself. This was done to negate the power of organization and to neutralize our collective strength. We objected to this role, but made little headway. We were not even permitted to use the word we when we made complaints. But during the first few years, when the authorities needed one prisoner to speak on behalf of others, that individual would be me.

I talked to the reporter, whose name was Mr. Newman, for about twenty minutes, and was candid about both prison and the Rivonia Trial. He was an agreeable fellow, and at the end of our talk, he said he would like the photographer to take my picture. I was reluctant, but in this case relented because I knew the photograph would only be published overseas, and might serve to help our cause if the article was even the least bit friendly. I told him I would agree provided Mr. Sisulu could join me. The image shows the two of us talking in the courtyard about some matter that I can no longer remember. I never saw the article or heard anything about it. The reporters were barely out of sight when the warders removed the jerseys and gave us back our hammers.

The men from the Telegraph were the first of a small stream of visitors during those early months. While the Rivonia Trial still resonated in people’s minds, the government was eager to show the international community that we were being treated properly. There were stories in the press about the inhuman conditions on the island, about how we were being assaulted and tortured. These allegations embarrassed the government, and to combat them they brought in a string of outsiders meant to rebut these critical stories.

We were briefly visited by a British lawyer who had argued for Namibian independence before the World Court, after which we were informed that a Mr. Hynning, a representative of the American Bar Association, would be coming to see us. Americans were then a novelty in South Africa, and I was curious to meet a representative of so august a legal organization.

On the day of Mr. Hynning’s visit we were called into the courtyard. The American arrived in the company of General Steyn, the commissioner of prisons, who rarely made appearances on the island. General Steyn was that unusual thing in the prison service, a polished and sophisticated man.

His suits were always of a fine quality and a fashionable cut. He was courtly, and referred to us as “gentlemen,” even doffing his hat to us, something no one else in the prison service ever did. Yet General Steyn oppressed us by omission rather than commission. He basically turned a blind eye to what was happening on the island. His habitual absence emboldened the more brutal prison officials and gave them carte blanche to do whatever they wanted. In his most gracious manner, the general introduced our guest and said, “Gentlemen, please select your spokesman.” A number of the prisoners called out my name. General Steyn nodded in my direction, and I stood up. In contrast to General Steyn, Mr. Hynning was a heavyset, unkempt man. I thanked him for visiting us and said we were honored by his presence. I then summarized our complaints, beginning with the central and most important one, that we were political prisoners, not criminals, and that we should be treated as such. I enumerated our grievances about the food, our living conditions, and the work detail. But as I was speaking, Mr. Hynning kept interrupting me. When I made a point about the long hours doing mindless work, he declared that as prisoners we had to work and were probably lazy to boot.

When I started to detail the problems with our cells, he interjected that the conditions in backward American prisons were far worse than Robben Island, which was a paradise by comparison. He added that we had been justly convicted and were lucky not to have received the death penalty, which we probably deserved.

Mr. Hynning perspired a great deal and there were those among us who thought he was not altogether sober. He spoke in what I assumed was a southern American accent, and had a curious habit of spitting when he talked, something none of us had ever seen before.

Finally, I had heard enough, and I interrupted him, “No, sir, you misunderstand the points that I am making.” Hynning took offense that I was now contradicting him, while General Steyn watched and listened without comment. Under the circumstances, it was difficult to keep tempers down. The men were angered by Mr. Hynning’s remarks and annoyed that he had been permitted to see us at all. Normally, a visit of any kind lifted our spirits but the visit of Mr. Hynning was demoralizing. Perhaps that is what the authorities wanted. To meet someone with so impressive an affiliation and so little understanding was depressing. Hynning finally just turned and walked away without so much as a good-bye. We were not sorry to see him go. We discussed Mr. Hynning for years afterward and many of the men imitated the way he spoke to comic effect. We never heard about him again, and he certainly did not win any friends on Robben Island for the American Bar Association.

pp. 469-472


63

 

In jail, all prisoners are classified by the authorities as one of four categories: A, B, C, or D. A is the highest classification and confers the most privileges; D is the lowest and confers the least. All political prisoners, or what the authorities called “security prisoners,” were automatically classified as D on admission. The privileges affected by these classifications included visits and letters, studies, and the opportunity to buy groceries and incidentals — all of which are the lifeblood of any prisoner. It normally took years for a political prisoner to raise his status from D to C.

We disdained the classification system. It was corrupt and demeaning, another way of repressing prisoners in general and political prisoners in particular. We demanded that all political prisoners be in one category. Although we criticized it, we could not ignore it: the classification system was an inflexible feature of prison life. If you protested that, as a D Group prisoner, you could receive only one letter every six months, the authorities would say, Improve your behavior, become a C Group prisoner, and you will be able to receive two letters every six months. If you complained that you did not receive enough food, the authorities would remind you that if you were in A Group, you would be able to receive money orders from the outside and purchase extra food at the prison canteen. Even a freedom fighter benefits from the ability to buy groceries and books.

The classifications generally ran parallel to the length of one’s sentence. If you were sentenced to eight years, you would generally be classified as D for the first two years, C for the next two, B for the following two, and A for the last two. But the prison authorities wielded the classification system as a weapon against political prisoners, threatening to lower our hard-won classifications in order to control our behavior.

Though I had been in prison for nearly two years before I was taken to Robben Island, I was still in D Group when I arrived. While I desired the privileges that came with higher classifications, I refused to compromise my conduct. The fastest way to raise one’s classification was to be docile and not complain. “Ag, Mandela, you are a troublemaker,” the warders would say. “You will be in D Group for the rest of your life.”

Every six months, prisoners were called before the prison board to have their classifications evaluated. The board was meant to assess our behavior in terms of prison regulations, but we found that it preferred to act as a political tribunal rather than a mere evaluator of behavior. During my first meeting with the board, the officials asked me questions about the ANC and my beliefs. Although this had nothing to do with the classification system, I was vain enough to answer and think that I might convert them to my beliefs. It was one of the few times we were treated as human beings, and I for one responded. Later I realized that this was simply a technique on the part of the authorities to glean information from us, and I had fallen for it. Shortly afterward, we agreed among ourselves not to discuss politics with the prison board.

As a D Group prisoner, I was entitled to have only one visitor, and to write and receive only one letter, every six months. I found this one of the most inhumane restrictions of the prison system. Communication with one’s family is a human right; it should not be restricted by the artificial gradations of a prison system. But it was one of the facts of prison life.

Visits and letters were restricted to “first degree” relatives. This was a restriction we not only found irksome but racist. The African sense of immediate family is far different from that of the European or Westerner. Our family structures are larger and more inclusive; anyone who claims descent from a common ancestor is deemed part of the same family.

In prison, the only thing worse than bad news about one’s family is no news at all. It is always harder to cope with the disasters and tragedies one imagines than with the reality, however grim or disagreeable. A letter with ill tidings was always preferable to no letter at all.

But even this miserable restriction was abused by the authorities. The anticipation of mail was overwhelming. Mail call took place once a month, and sometimes six months would go by without a letter. To be allowed one letter in six months and then not to receive it is a great blow. One wonders: What has happened to my wife and children, to my mother and my sisters? When I did not receive a letter I felt as dry and barren as the Great Karroo desert. Often the authorities would withhold mail out of spite. I can remember warders saying, “Mandela, we have received a letter for you, but we cannot give it to you.” No explanation of why, or whom the letter was from. It required all my self-discipline not to explode at such times.

Afterward, I would protest through the proper channels, and sometimes get it. When letters did arrive, they were cherished. A letter was like the summer rain that could make even the desert bloom. When I was handed a letter by the authorities, I would not rush forward and grab it as I felt like doing, but take it in a leisurely manner. Though I yearned to tear it open and read it on the spot, I would not give the authorities the satisfaction of seeing my eagerness, and I would return slowly to my cell as though I had many things to occupy me before opening a letter from my family.

During the first few months, I received one letter from Winnie, but it was so heavily censored that not much more than the salutation was left. The island’s censors would black out the offending passages in ink, but they later changed this when they realized we could wash away the ink and see what was underneath. They began to use razors to slice out whole paragraphs. Since most letters were written on both sides of a single piece of paper, the material on the other side would also be excised. They seemed to relish delivering letters in tatters. The censorship delayed the delivery of mail because warders, some of whom were not proficient in English, might take as long as a month to censor a letter. The letters we wrote were censored as well; they were often as cut up as the letters we received.

At the end of August, after I had been on the island less than three months, I was informed by the authorities that I would have a visitor the following day. They would not tell me who it was. Walter was informed that he, too, would have a visitor, and I suspected, I hoped, I wished — I believed — that it would be a visit from Winnie and Albertina.

From the moment Winnie learned we had been brought to the island, she had been trying to arrange a visit. As a banned person, Winnie had to receive a special dispensation from the minister of justice, for she was technically not permitted to communicate with me. Even with the help of the authorities, visiting Robben Island was not an easy proposition. Visits were a maximum of thirty minutes long, and political prisoners were not permitted contact visits, in which the visitor and prisoner were in the same room.

Visits did not seem to be planned in advance by the authorities. One day, they would contact your wife and say, “You have permission to visit your husband tomorrow.” This was enormously inconvenient, and often had the effect of making visits impossible. If a family member was able to plan a visit in advance, the authorities would sometimes deliberately delay issuing a permit until after the plane had departed. Since most of the men’s families lived far from the Cape and had very little money, visits by family members were often far beyond their means. Some men who came from poor families did not see their wives for many years at a time, if at all. I knew of men who spent a decade or more on Robben Island without a single visit.

The visiting room for noncontact visits was cramped and windowless. On the prisoner’s side, there was a row of five cubicles with small square pieces of glass that looked out on identical cubicles on the other side. One sat in a chair and looked through the thick, smudged glass that had a few small holes drilled into it to permit conversation. One had to talk very loudly to be heard. Later the authorities installed microphones and speakers in front of the glass, a marginal improvement.

Walter and I were called to the visitors’ office in the late morning and took seats at the far end of the room. I waited with some anxiety, and suddenly, filling out the glass on the other side of the window was Winnie’s lovely face. Winnie always dressed up for prison visits, and tried to wear something new and elegant. It was tremendously frustrating not to be able to touch my wife, to speak tenderly to her, to have a private moment together. We had to conduct our relationship at a distance under the eyes of people we despised.

I could see immediately that Winnie was under tremendous strain. Seeing me in such circumstances must have been trying. Just getting to the island itself was difficult, and added to that were the harsh rituals of the prison, the undoubted indignities of the warders, and the impersonality of the contact.

Winnie, I later discovered, had recently received a second banning order and had been terminated from her job at the Child Welfare Office as a result. Her office was searched by the police shortly before she was fired. The authorities were convinced that Winnie was in secret communication with me. Winnie loved her job as a social worker. It was the hands-on end of the struggle: placing babies with adoptive parents, finding work for the unemployed and medical help for the uninsured. The banning and harassment of my wife greatly troubled me: I could not look after her and the children, and the state was making it difficult for her to look after herself. My powerlessness gnawed at me.

Our conversation was awkward at first, and was not made easier by the presence of two warders standing directly behind her and three behind me. Their role was not only to monitor but to intimidate. Regulations dictated that conversation had to be in either English or Afrikaans — African languages were forbidden — and could involve family matters only. Any line of talk that departed from the family and verged on the political might mean the abrupt termination of the visit. If one mentioned a name unfamiliar to the warders, they would interrupt the conversation, and ask who the person was and the nature of the relationship. This happened often, as the warders were generally unfamiliar with the variety and nature of African names. It was frustrating to spend precious minutes of one’s visit explaining to a warder the different branches of one’s family tree. But their ignorance also worked in our favor: it allowed us to invent code names for people we wanted to talk about and pretend that we were referring to family members.

That first visit was important, for I knew that Winnie was anxious about my health: she had heard stories that we were being physically abused. I quickly informed her that I was fine and she could see that I was fit, though a bit thinner than before. She, too, was thinner, something I always attributed to stress. After a visit in which Winnie’s face looked drawn or tense, I would urge her to put on a bit of weight. She was always dieting, and I was always telling her not to. I inquired one by one about all the children, about my mother and sisters, and Winnie’s own family.

Suddenly, I heard the warder behind me say, “Time up! Time up!” I turned and looked at him with incredulity. It was impossible that half an hour had passed. But, in fact, he was right; visits always seemed to go by in the blink of an eye. For all the years that I was in prison, I never failed to be surprised when the warder called, “Time up!” Winnie and I were both hustled from our chairs and we waved a quick farewell. I always felt like lingering after Winnie left, just to retain the sense of her presence, but I would not let the warders see such emotion. As I walked back to the cell, I reviewed in my head what we had talked about. Over the next days, weeks, and months, I would return to that one visit again and again. I knew I would not be able to see my wife again for at least six months. As it turned out, Winnie was not able to visit me for another two years

pp. 473-478


65


At weekends, during our first year on the island, we were kept inside our cells all day except for a half hour of exercise. One Saturday, after returning from exercise in the courtyard, I noticed that a warder had left a newspaper on the bench at the end of the corridor. He had become rather friendly to us, and I assumed that he had not left the newspaper there by accident.

Newspapers were more valuable to political prisoners than gold or diamonds, more hungered for than food or tobacco; they were the most precious contraband on Robben Island. News was the intellectual raw material of the struggle. We were not allowed any news at all, and we craved it. Walter, even more than myself, seemed bereft without news. The authorities attempted to impose a complete blackout; they did not want us to learn anything that might raise our morale or reassure us that people on the outside were still thinking about us.

We regarded it as our duty to keep ourselves current on the politics of the country, and we fought long and hard for the right to have newspapers. Over the years, we devised many ways of obtaining  them, but back then we were not so adept. One of the advantages of going to the quarry was that warders’ sandwiches were wrapped in newspaper and they would often discard these newsprint wrappers in the trash, where we secretly retrieved them. We would distract the warders’ attention, pluck the papers out of the garbage, and slide them into our shirts.

One of the most reliable ways to acquire papers was through bribery, and this was the only area where I tolerated what were often unethical means of obtaining information. The warders always seemed to be short of money, and their poverty was our opportunity.

When we did get hold of a paper, it was far too risky to pass around. Possession of a newspaper was a serious charge. Instead, one person would read the paper, usually Kathy or, later, Mac Maharaj. Kathy was in charge of communications, and he had thought of ingenious ways for us to pass information. Kathy would go through the paper and make cuttings of relevant stories, which were then secretly distributed to the rest of us. Each of us would write out a summary of the story we were given; these summaries were then passed among us, and later smuggled to the general section. When the authorities were particularly vigilant, Kathy or Mac would write out his summary of the news and then destroy the paper, usually by tearing it into small pieces and placing it in his ballie, which the warders never inspected.

When I noticed the newspaper lying on the bench, I quickly left my cell, walked to the end of the corridor, looked in both directions, and then plucked the newspaper off the bench and slipped it into my shirt. Normally, I would have hidden the newspaper somewhere in my cell and taken it out only after bedtime. But like a child who eats his sweet before his main course, I was so eager for news that I opened the paper in my cell immediately. I don’t know how long I was reading; I was so engrossed in the paper that I did not hear any footsteps. Suddenly, an officer and two other warders appeared and I did not even have time to slide the paper under my bed. I was caught black-and-white-handed, so to speak. “Mandela,” the officer said, “we are charging you for possession of contraband, and you will pay for this.” The two warders then began a thorough search of my cell to see if they could turn up anything else.

Within a day or two a magistrate was brought in from Cape Town and I was taken to the room at headquarters that was used as the island’s court. In this instance, the authorities were willing to call in an outside magistrate because they knew they had an open-and-shut case. I offered no defense, and was sentenced to three days in isolation and deprivation of meals. I do not think that I was set up by the warder who left the newspaper on the bench, though some assumed I had been. At the hearing, the authorities grilled me as to how I got the newspaper, and I refused to answer. If I had been railroaded, the authorities would have known how I’d gotten it.

The isolation cells were in our same complex, but in another wing. Although just across the courtyard, they felt enormously distant. In isolation, one was deprived of company, exercise, and even food: one received only rice water three times a day for three days. (Rice water is simply water in which rice has been boiled.) By comparison, our normal ration of pap seemed like a feast.

The first day in isolation was always the most painful. One grows accustomed to eating regularly and the body is not used to being deprived. I found that by the second day I had more or less adjusted to the absence of food, and the third passed without much craving at all. Such deprivation was not uncommon among Africans in everyday life. I myself had gone without food for days at a time in my early years in Johannesburg.

As I have already mentioned, I found solitary confinement the most forbidding aspect of prison life. There is no end and no beginning; there is only one’s own mind, which can begin to play tricks. Was that a dream or did it really happen? One begins to question everything. Did I make the right decision, was my sacrifice worth it? In solitary, there is no distraction from these haunting questions.

But the human body has an enormous capacity for adjusting to trying circumstances. I have found that one can bear the unbearable if one can keep one’s spirits strong even when one’s body is being tested. Strong convictions are the secret of surviving deprivation; your spirit can be full even when your stomach is empty. In those early years, isolation became a habit. We were routinely charged for the smallest infractions and sentenced to isolation. A man might lose his meals for a sidelong glance or be sentenced for failing to stand when a warder entered the room. Some PAC prisoners, who often flouted the rules simply for the sake of doing so, spent a great deal of time in isolation. The authorities believed that isolation was the cure for our defiance and rebelliousness.

The second time I was charged and spent time in isolation occurred shortly after the first. As I have mentioned, we were having great difficulty making our complaints heard. The remoteness of the prison made the authorities feel they could ignore us with impunity. They believed that if they turned a deaf ear to us, we would give up in frustration and the people on the outside would forget about us.

One day we were working at the lime quarry when the commanding officer came to observe us, accompanied by a gentleman whom we at first did not recognize. One of my colleagues whispered to me that it was Brigadier Aucamp from the Head Office, our commanding officer’ commanding officer. (He is not to be confused with the Aucamp of Pretoria Local, who looked after us during the Rivonia Trial.) The two men stood at a distance, watching us.

Aucamp was a short, heavyset fellow in a suit rather than a military uniform. He normally came to the island on biannual inspections. On those occasions, we were ordered to stand at attention at the grille of our cells and hold up our prison cards as he walked by.

I decided that Aucamp’s unexpected appearance was a singular opportunity to present our grievances to the man who had the power to remedy them. I put down my pick and began to walk over to them. The warders immediately became alarmed and moved toward me. I knew that I was violating regulations, but I hoped the warders would be so surprised by the novelty of my action that they would do nothing to stop me. That proved to be the case.

When I reached the two men, the commanding officer said bluntly, “Mandela, go back to your place. No one called you.” I disregarded him and addressed Aucamp, saying I had taken this extraordinary action because our complaints were being ignored. The C.O. interrupted me: “Mandela, I order you back to your place.” I turned to him and said in a measured tone, “I am here already, I will not go back.” I was hoping that Aucamp would agree to hear me out, but he studied me coldly and then turned to the warders and said calmly, “Charge him.”

I continued to speak as the guards led me away. “Take him back to the cells,” the C.O. said. I was charged and, once again, I had no defense. The punishment this time was four days in isolation. There was a lesson in what I had done, a lesson I already knew but had disobeyed out of desperation. No one, least of all prison officials, ever likes to have his authority publicly challenged. In order to respond to me, Aucamp would have had to humiliate his subordinate. Prison officials responded much better to private overtures. The best way to effect change on Robben Island was to attempt to influence officials privately rather than publicly. I was sometimes condemned for appearing to be too accommodating to prison officials, but I was willing to accept the criticism in exchange for the improvement

pp. 492-496

66
 


The most important person any prisoner’s life is not the minister of justice, not the commissioner of prisons, not even the head of prison, but the warder in one’s section. If you are cold and want an extra blanket, you might petition the minister of justice, but you will get no response. If you go to the commissioner of prisons, he will say, “Sorry, it is against regulations.” The head of prison will say, “If I give you an extra blanket, I must give one to everyone.” But if you approach the warder in your corridor, and you are on good terms with him, he will simply go to the stockroom and fetch a blanket.

I always tried to be decent to the warders in my section; hostility was self-defeating. There was no point in having a permanent enemy among the warders. It was ANC policy to try to educate all people, even our enemies: we believed that all men, even prison service warders, were capable of change, and we did our utmost to try to sway them.

In general we treated the warders as they treated us. If a man was considerate, we were considerate in return. Not all of our warders were ogres.

We noticed right from the start that there were some among them who believed in fairness. Yet, being friendly with warders was not an easy proposition, for they generally found the idea of being courteous to a black man abhorrent. Because it was useful to have warders who were well disposed toward us, I often asked certain men to make overtures to selected warders. No one liked to take on such a job.

We had one warder at the quarry who seemed particularly hostile to us. This was troublesome, for at the quarry we would hold discussions among ourselves, and a warder who did not permit us to talk was a great hindrance. I asked a certain comrade to befriend this fellow so that he would not interrupt our talks. The warder was quite crude, but he soon began to relax a bit around this one prisoner. One day, the warder asked this comrade for his jacket so that he could lay it on the grass and sit on it. Even though I knew it went against the comrade’s grain, I nodded to him to do it.

A few days later, we were having our lunch under the shed when this warder wandered over. The warder had an extra sandwich, and he threw it on the grass near us and said, “Here.” That was his way of showing friendship. This presented us with a dilemma. On the one hand, he was treating us as animals to whom he could toss a bit of slop, and I felt it would undermine our dignity to take the sandwich. On the other hand, we were hungry, and to reject the gesture altogether would humiliate the warder we were trying to befriend. I could see that the comrade who had befriended the warder wanted the sandwich, and I nodded for him to take it.

The strategy worked, for this warder became less wary around us. He even began to ask questions about the ANC. By definition, if a man worked for the prison service he was probably brainwashed by the government’s propaganda. He would have believed that we were terrorists and Communists who wanted to drive the white man into the sea. But as we quietly explained to him our nonracialism, our desire for equal rights, and our plans for the redistribution of wealth, he scratched his head and said, “It makes more bloody sense than the Nats.”

Having sympathetic warders facilitated one of our most vital tasks on Robben Island: communication. We regarded it as our duty to stay in touch with our men in F and G, which was where the general prisoners were kept. As politicians, we were just as intent on fortifying our organization in prison as we had been outside. Communication was essential if we were to coordinate our protests and complaints. Because of the greater numbers of prisoners coming and going in the general section, the men in F and G tended to have more recent information about not only what was happening in the movement, but about our friends and families.

Communication between sections was a serious violation of regulations. We found many effective ways around the ban. The men who delivered our drums of food were from the general section, and in the early months we managed to have whispered conversations with them in which we conveyed brief messages. We formed a clandestine communications committee, composed of Kathy, Mac Maharaj, Laloo Chiba, and several others, and their job was to organize all such practices.

One of the first techniques was engineered by Kathy and Mac, who had noticed that on our walks to the quarry, the warders often tossed away empty matchboxes. They began secretly collecting them, and Mac had the idea of constructing a false bottom to the box and placing in it a tiny written message. Laloo Chiba, who once trained as a tailor, wrote out minuscule coded messages that would be placed in the converted matchbox.

Joe Gqabi, another MK soldier who was with us, would carry the matchboxes on our walks to the quarry and drop them at a strategic crossing where we knew the general prisoners would pass. Through whispered conversations at food deliveries, we explained the plan.

Designated prisoners from F and G would pick up the matchboxes on their walks, and we retrieved messages in the same fashion. It was far from perfect, and we could easily be foiled by something as simple as the rain. We soon evolved more efficient methods.

We looked for moments when the warders were inattentive. One such time was during and after meals. We helped ourselves to our food, and we worked out a scheme whereby comrades from the general section who worked in the kitchen began placing letters and notes wrapped in plastic at the bottom of the food drums. We sent return communication in a similar way, wrapping notes in the same plastic and placing them at the bottom of the mounds of dirty dishes that were routed back to the kitchen. We would do our best to create a mess, scattering food all over the plates. The warders even complained about the disarray, but never bothered to investigate.

Our toilets and showers were adjacent to the isolation section. Prisoners from the general section were often sentenced to isolation there and would use the same set of toilets we did, though at different times. Mac devised a method of wrapping notes in plastic and then taping them inside the rim of the toilet bowl. We encouraged our political comrades in the general section to be charged and placed in isolation so that they could retrieve these notes and send replies. The warders never bothered to search there.

In order not to have our notes read or understood by the authorities if they were found, we devised ways of writing that could not easily be seen or deciphered. One way was to write messages with milk. The milk would dry almost immediately, and the paper would look blank. But the disinfectant we were given to clean our cells, when sprayed on the dried milk, made the writing reappear. Unfortunately, we did not regularly receive milk. After one of us was diagnosed with an ulcer, we used his.

Another technique was to write in tiny, coded script on toilet paper. The paper was so small and easily hidden that this became a popular way of smuggling out messages. When the authorities discovered a number of these communications, they took the extraordinary measure of rationing toilet paper. Govan was then ailing and not going to the quarry, and he was given the task of counting out eight squares of toilet paper for each prisoner per day.

But even with all these ingenious methods, one of the best ways was also the easiest: getting sent to the prison hospital. The island had one hospital, and it was difficult to segregate us from the general prisoners while we were there. Sometimes prisoners from the different sections even shared the same wards, and men from Section B and prisoners from F and G mingled and exchanged information about political organizations, strikes, go-slows, whatever the current prison issues were.

Communication with the outside world was accomplished in two ways: through prisoners whose sentences were completed and who were leaving the island, and through contact with visitors. Prisoners who were leaving would smuggle out letters in their clothes or baggage. With outside visitors, the situation was even more dangerous, because the risks were also borne by the visitor. When lawyers visited us, warders were not permitted in the room and we would sometimes pass a letter to the lawyer to be taken out. Lawyers were not searched. In these meetings, we could also communicate by writing as we had during the Rivonia Trial. Because the room was bugged, we might say, “Please tell . . .” and then pause and write “O.T.,” meaning Oliver Tambo, on a piece of paper, “that we approve of his plan to cut down the size of the . . .” and then write, “National Executive.”

Through a plastic-wrapped note hidden in our food drums, we learned in July of 1966 that the men in the general section had embarked on a hunger strike to protest poor conditions. The note was imprecise, and we did not know exactly when the strike had started or exactly what it was about. But we would support any strike of prisoners for whatever reason they were striking. Word was passed among us, and we resolved to initiate a sympathetic strike beginning with our next meal. A hunger strike consists of one thing: not eating.

Because of the time lag in communications, the general prisoners probably did not learn of our participation for a day or so. But we knew that the news would hearten them. The authorities would be telling them that we were not participating in the strike, that we were gorging ourselves on gourmet meals. This was standard operating procedure; in a crisis, the authorities inevitably started a disinformation campaign to play one section against the other. In this case, while the ANC unanimously supported the strike, some PAC men in the general section did not.

During the first day of our strike, we were served our normal rations and refused to take them. On the second day, we noticed that our portions were larger and a few more vegetables accompanied our pap. On the third day, juicy pieces of meat were served with supper. By the fourth day, the porridge was glistening with fat, and great hunks of meat and colorful vegetables were steaming on top. The food was positively mouthwatering.

The warders smiled when we passed up the food. The temptation was great, but we resisted, even though we were being driven especially hard at the quarry. We heard that in the main section, prisoners were collapsing and being taken away in wheelbarrows.

I was called to the Head Office for an interview with Colonel Wessels. Such sessions were delicate, as my fellow prisoners knew that the authorities would attempt to influence me to call off the strike. Wessels was a direct man and demanded to know why we were on a hunger strike. I explained that as political prisoners we saw protest to alter prison conditions as an extension of the anti-apartheid struggle. “But you don’t even know why they are striking in F and G,” he said. I said that did not matter, that the men in F and G were our brothers and that our struggle was indivisible. He snorted, and dismissed me.

The following day we learned of an extraordinary course of events: the warders had gone on their own food boycott, refusing to go to their own cafeteria. They were not striking in support of us, but had decided that if we could do such a thing, why couldn’t they? They were demanding better food and improved living conditions. The combination of the two strikes was too much for the authorities. They settled with the warders and then, a day or two later, we learned the authorities had gone to the general section and asked for three representatives to negotiate changes. The general prisoners declared victory and called off the hunger strike. We followed suit a day later.

* * *

That was the first and most successful of the hunger strikes on the island. As a form of protest, they did not have a high success rate and the rationale behind them always struck me as quixotic. In order for a hunger strike to succeed, the outside world must learn of it. Otherwise, prisoners will simply starve themselves to death and no one will know. Smuggled-out information that we were on a hunger strike would elicit newspaper stories, which in turn would generate pressure from advocacy groups. The problem, particularly in the early years, was that it was next to impossible to alert people on the outside that we were waging a hunger strike inside.

For me, hunger strikes were altogether too passive. We who were already suffering were threatening our health, even courting death. I have always favored a more active, militant style of protest such as work strikes, go-slow strikes, or refusing to clean up; actions that punished the authorities, not ourselves. They wanted gravel and we produced no gravel.

They wanted the prison yard clean and it was untidy. This kind of behavior distressed and exasperated them, whereas I think they secretly enjoyed watching us go hungry. But when it came to a decision, I was often outvoted. My colleagues even jokingly accused me of not wanting to miss a meal. The proponents of hunger strikes argued that it was a traditionally accepted form of protest that had been waged all over the world by such prominent leaders as Mahatma Gandhi. Once the decision was taken, however, I would support it as wholeheartedly as any of its advocates. In fact, during the strikes I was often in the position of remonstrating with some of my more wayward colleagues who did not want to abide by our agreement. “Madiba, I want my food,” I remember one man saying. “I don’t see why I should go without. I have served the struggle for many years.”

Comrades would sometimes eat on the sly. We knew this for a simple reason: by the second day of a hunger strike, no one needs to use the toilet. Yet one morning you might see a fellow going to the toilet. We had our own internal intelligence service because we knew that certain men were weak in this regard.

pp. 497-503


67

 

In the midst of the July 1966 hunger strike I had my second visit from my wife. It was almost exactly two years after the first visit, and it nearly did not happen at all. Winnie had been under constant harassment since her first visit in 1964. Her sisters and brother were persecuted by the police, and the authorities attempted to forbid anyone in her family from living with her. Some of this I learned at the time, much of it I found out later. Some of the nastiest items were known to me because when I would return from the quarry, I often would find neatly cut clippings about Winnie that had been anonymously placed on my bed by the warders. In small and spiteful ways, the authorities did their best to make Winnie’s journeys as unpleasant as possible. For the previous two years, her visits had been stymied by local magistrates and by the repeated bannings that prevented her from traveling. I had recently heard through counsel that Winnie had been informed by the police that she could visit me only if she carried a pass. Winnie, who had been protesting the government’s policy regarding women’s passes since the 1950s, rightly refused to carry the hated document. The authorities were clearly attempting to humiliate her and me. But I thought it was more important that we see each other than to resist the petty machinations of the authorities, and Winnie consented to carry a pass. I missed her enormously and needed the reassurance of seeing her, and we also had vital family matters to discuss.

The regulations governing each of Winnie’s visits were long and complicated. She was barred from taking a train or car and had to fly, making the trip much more expensive. She was required to take the shortest route from the airport to Caledon Square, the Cape Town police station, where she was required to sign various documents. She had to report to the same station on the way back and sign more documents.

I had also learned from a newspaper clipping that a Special Branch officer broke into our Orlando house while Winnie was dressing and she reacted angrily, pushing the officer out of the bedroom. The lieutenant laid a charge of assault against her, and I asked my friend and colleague George Bizos to defend her, which he ably did. We had seen stories about this in the newspapers, and some of the men even joked with me about Winnie’s bellicosity. “You are not the only boxer in the family, Madiba,” they said.

This second visit was for only half an hour, and we had much to discuss. Winnie was a bit agitated from the rough treatment in Cape Town and the fact that, as always, she had to ride in the hold of the ferry where the fumes from the engine made her ill. She had taken pains to dress up for me, but she looked thin and drawn.

We reviewed the education of the children, the health of my mother, which was not very good, and our finances. A critical issue was the education of Zeni and Zindzi. Winnie had placed the girls in a school designated as Indian, and the authorities were harassing the principal on the grounds that it was a violation of the law for the school to accept African pupils. We made the difficult decision to send Zeni and Zindzi to boarding school in Swaziland. This was hard on Winnie, who found her greatest sustenance in the two girls. I was consoled by the fact that their education would probably be superior there, but I worried about Winnie. She would be lonely and prey for people who sought to undermine her under the guise of being her friends. If anything, Winnie was too trusting of people’s motives.

To get around the restrictions on discussing nonfamily matters, we used names whose meaning was clear to us, but not to the warders. If I wanted to know how Winnie was really doing, I might say, “Have you heard about Ngutyana recently; is she all right?” Ngutyana is one of Winnie’s clan names, but the authorities were unaware of that. Then Winnie could talk about how and what Ngutyana was doing. If the warder asked who Ngutyana was, we would say she was a cousin. If I wanted to know about how the external mission of the ANC was faring, I would ask, “How is the church?” Winnie would discuss “the church” in appropriate terms, and I might then ask, “How are the priests? Are there any new sermons?” We improvised and managed to exhange a great deal of information that way.

As always, when the warder yelled, “Time up!,” I thought only a few minutes had passed. I wanted to kiss the glass good-bye, but restrained myself. I always preferred for Winnie to leave first so she would not have to see me led away by the warders, and I watched as she whispered a good-bye, hiding her pain from the warders.

After the visit, I replayed all the details in my mind, what Winnie wore, what she said, what I said. I then wrote her a letter going over some of what we had discussed, and reminding her of how much I cared for her, how unshakable our bond was, how courageous she was. I saw my letters to her both as love letters and as the only way I could give her the emotional support she needed.

Soon after the visit, I learned that Winnie had been charged for failing to report to the police on her arrival in Cape Town as well as refusing to furnish the police with her address when she left. Having already given her address at the ferry, she was asked again when she returned, and refused, saying she had done so earlier. Winnie was arrested and released on bail. She was tried and sentenced to a year’s imprisonment, which was suspended except for four days. Winnie was subsequently dismissed from her second job as a social worker because of the incident, and lost her main source of income.

The state did its utmost to harass me in ways they thought I would be powerless to resist. Toward the end of 1966, the Transvaal Law Society, at the instigation of the minister of justice, made a motion to strike me off the roll of practicing attorneys as a result of my conviction in the Rivonia Trial. Apparently they were not discouraged by the earlier unsuccessful attempt to remove my name from the roll because of my conviction in the Defiance Campaign.

I found out about the Law Society’s action only after it had been initiated. The Transvaal Law Society was an extremely conservative organization, and they were seeking to punish me at a time when they assumed I would be unable to defend myself. It is not easy for a prisoner on Robben Island to defend himself in court, but that is precisely what I intended to do.

I informed the authorities that I planned to contest the action and would prepare my own defense. I told prison officials that in order to prepare adequately, I would need to be exempt from going to the quarry and would also require a proper table, chair, and reading light to work on my brief. I said I needed access to a law library and demanded to be taken to Pretoria.

My strategy was to overwhelm the prison authorities and the courts with legitimate requests, which I knew they would have a difficult time satisfying. The authorities always found it distressing when I wanted to defend myself in court because the accompanying publicity would show that I was still fighting for the same values I always had.

Their first response was, “Mandela, why don’t you retain a lawyer to defend you? He will be able to handle the case properly. Why put yourself out?” I went ahead and applied to the registrar of the Supreme Court for the records, documents, and books that I would need. I also requested a list of the state’s witnesses and summaries of their prospective testimony.

I received a letter stating that before the court would grant my requests they would need to know the nature of my defense. This was extraordinary. To ask the nature of a lawyer’s defense before the trial? No defendant can be compelled to reveal his defense before he is actually in court. I wrote back to tell them that the nature of my defense would become clear to them when I filed my papers — and not until then.

This was the beginning of a flurry of correspondence between me and the registrar as well as the state attorney, who was representing the Law Society. I would not back down on any of my requests. The authorities were equally intransigent: I could not be taken off quarry detail, I could not have a table and chair, and under no circumstances would I be able to go to Pretoria to use the law library.

I continued to bedevil the Law Society and registrar with demands, which they continued to deflect. Finally, several months and many letters later, without any fanfare and with just a cursory notification to me, they dropped the entire matter. The case was becoming more than they had bargained for. They had reckoned I would not have the initiative or wherewithal to defend myself; they were mistaken.

I was able to read in detail about the official reactions to my opposition to the Law Society’s actions because we were receiving a daily newspaper just as if it were delivered to our door. In effect, it was. The warder who supervised us at night was a quiet, elderly Jehovah’s Witness whom Mac Maharaj had befriended. One night, he wandered over to Mac’s cell and told him that he wanted to enter a newspaper contest that required an essay. Would Mac, he wondered, be willing to assist him in writing it? The old warder hinted that if Mac helped him, there would be a reward. Mac agreed, and duly wrote the essay. A fortnight later, the old man came to Mac very excited. He was now a finalist in the competition; would Mac write him another essay? The warder promised Mac a cooked chicken in return. Mac told the old warder that he would think about it.

The next day, Mac came to Walter and me and explained the situation. While Walter encouraged Mac to accept the food, I appreciated his reluctance to do so, because it would appear that he was getting special treatment. That night, he told the warder he would write the essay in exchange for a pack of cigarettes. The old warder agreed, and the following evening presented Mac with a newly bought pack of cigarettes.

The next day, Mac told us that he now had the leverage he wanted over the old warder. How? we asked. “Because I have his fingerprints on the cigarette pack,” Mac said, “and I can blackmail him.” Walter exclaimed that that was immoral. I did not criticize Mac, but asked what he would blackmail him for. Mac raised his eyebrow: “Newspapers,” he said. Walter and I looked at each other. I think Walter was the only man on Robben Island who relished newspapers as much as I did. Mac had already discussed his plan with the communications committee, and although we both had reservations about Mac’s technique, we did not stop him.

That night Mac told the warder that he had his fingerprints on the pack of cigarettes and that if the old man did not cooperate, he would expose him to the commanding officer. Terrified of being fired and losing his pension, the warder agreed to do whatever Mac wanted. For the next six months, until the warder was transferred, the old man would smuggle that day’s newspaper to Mac. Mac would then summarize the news and reduce it to a single small piece of paper, which would circulate among us. The unfortunate warder did not win the contest, either.

It would be hard to say what we did more of at the quarry: mine lime or talk. By 1966, the warders had adopted a laissez-faire attitude: we could talk as much as we wanted as long as we worked. We would cluster in small groups, four or five men in a rough circle, and talk all day long, about every subject under the sun. We were in a perpetual conversation with each other on topics both solemn and trifling.

There is no prospect about prison which pleases — with the possible exception of one. One has time to think. In the vortex of the struggle, when one is constantly reacting to changing circumstances, one rarely has the chance to carefully consider all the ramifications of one’s decisions or policies. Prison provided the time — much more than enough time — to reflect on what one had done and not done.

We were constantly engaged in political debates. Some were dispatched in a day, others were disputed for years. I have always enjoyed the cutand-thrust of debating, and was a ready participant. One of our earliest and longest debates concerned the relationship between the ANC and the Communist Party. Some of the men, especially those MK soldiers who had been trained in socialist countries, believed that the ANC and the party were one and the same. Even some very senior ANC colleagues, such as Govan Mbeki and Harry Gwala, subscribed to this theory.

The party did not exist as a separate entity on Robben Island. In prison, there was no point in making the distinction between the ANC and the party that existed on the outside. My own views on the subject had not altered in many years. The ANC was a mass liberation movement that welcomed all those with the same objectives.

Over time, the debate concerning the ANC and the party grew progressively acrimonious. A number of us proposed one way to resolve it: we would write to the ANC in exile in Lusaka. We prepared a secret twenty-two-page document on the subject with a covering letter from myself to be sent to Lusaka. It was a risky maneuver to prepare and smuggle out such a document. In the end, Lusaka confirmed the separation of the ANC and the party and the argument eventually withered away.

Another recurrent political discussion was whether or not the ANC leadership should come exclusively from the working class. Some argued that because the ANC was a mass organization made up mainly of ordinary workers, the leadership should come from those same ranks. My argument was that it was as undemocratic to specify that the leaders had to be from the working class as to declare that they should be bourgeois intellectuals. If the movement had insisted on such a rule, most of its leaders, men such as Chief Luthuli, Moses Kotane, Dr. Dadoo, would have been ineligible. Revolutionaries are drawn from every class.

Not all debates were political. One issue that provoked much discussion was circumcision. Some among us maintained that circumcision as practiced by the Xhosa and other tribes was not only an unnecessary mutilation of the body, but a reversion to the type of tribalism that the ANC was seeking to overthrow. It was not an unreasonable argument, but the prevailing view, with which I agreed, was that circumcision was a cultural ritual that had not only a salutary health benefit but an important psychological effect. It was a rite that strengthened group identification and inculcated positive values.

The debate continued for years, and a number of men voted in favor of circumcision in a very direct way. A prisoner working in the hospital who had formerly practiced as an ingcibi set up a secret circumcision school, and a number of the younger prisoners from our section were circumcised there. Afterward, we would organize a small party of tea and biscuits for the men, and they would spend a day or two walking around in blankets, as was the custom.

One subject we hearkened back to again and again was the question of whether there were tigers in Africa. Some argued that although it was popularly assumed that tigers lived in Africa, this was a myth and they were native to Asia and the Indian subcontinent. Africa had leopards in abundance, but no tigers. The other side argued that tigers were native to Africa and some still lived there. Some claimed to have seen with their own eyes this most powerful and beautiful of cats in the jungles of Africa.

I maintained that while there were no tigers to be found in contemporary Africa, there was a Xhosa word for tiger, a word different from the one for leopard, and that if the word existed in our language, the creature must have once existed in Africa. Otherwise, why would there be a name for it? This argument went round and round, and I remember Mac retorting that hundreds of years ago there was a Hindi word for a craft that flew in the air, long before the airplane was invented, but that did not mean that airplanes existed in ancient India

pp. 504-511

68


“Zithulele," the Quiet One, was what we called the tolerant, soft-spoken warder in charge of us at the quarry. He routinely stood a great distance from us while we worked and did not appear to care what we did as long as we were orderly. He never berated us when he found us leaning on our spades and talking. We responded in kind. One day, in 1966, he came to us and said, “Gentlemen, the rains have washed away the lines on the roads, we need twenty kilos of lime today. Can you help?” Although we were working very little at the time, he had approached us as human beings, and we agreed to assist him.

That spring, we had felt a certain thawing on the part of the authorities, a relaxation of the iron-fisted discipline that had prevailed on the island. The tension between prisoners and warders had lessened somewhat. But this lull proved to be short-lived and came to an abrupt end one morning in September. We had just put down our picks and shovels on the quarry face and were walking to the shed for lunch. As one of the general prisoners wheeled a drum of food toward us, he whispered, “Verwoerd is dead.” That was all. The news quickly passed among us. We looked at each other in disbelief and glanced over at the warders, who seemed unaware that anything momentous had occurred.

We did not know how the prime minister had died. Later, we heard about the obscure white parliamentary messenger who stabbed Verwoerd to death, and we wondered at his motives. Although Verwoerd thought Africans were beneath animals, his death did not yield us any pleasure.

Political assassination is not something I or the ANC has ever supported. It is a primitive way of contending with an opponent. Verwoerd had proved to be both the chief theorist and master builder of grand apartheid. He had championed the creation of the bantustans and Bantu Education. Shortly before his death he had led the Nationalists in the general election of 1966, in which the party of apartheid had increased its majority, winning 126 seats to the 39 achieved by the United Party, and the single seat won by the Progressive Party.

As often happened on the island, we had learned significant political news before our own guards. But by the following day, it was obvious the warders knew, for they took out their anger on us. The tension that had taken months to abate was suddenly at full force. The authorities began a crackdown against political prisoners as though we had held the knife that stabbed Verwoerd.

The authorities always imagined that we were secretly linked with all kinds of powerful forces on the outside. The spate of successful guerrilla attacks against the South African police forces in Namibia by the South-West African People’s Organization (SWAPO) — an ally of the ANC — had also unnerved them. I suppose we should have been flattered that the government thought our nascent military ability was sophisticated enough to successfully eliminate their head of state. But their suspicions merely reflected the insecurities of narrow, shortsighted men who blamed their problems not on their own misguided policies but on an opponent by the name of the ANC.

The punishment against us was never enunciated as an official policy, but it was a renewal of the harsh atmosphere that prevailed upon our arrival on the island. The Quiet One was replaced with a man who was a vicious martinet. His name was Van Rensburg and he had been flown to the island on twenty-four hours’ notice after the assassination. His reputation preceded him, for his name was a byword among prisoners for brutality.

Van Rensburg was a big, clumsy, brutish fellow who did not speak but shouted. During his first day on the job we noticed he had a small swastika tattooed on his wrist. But he did not need this offensive symbol to prove his cruelty. His job was to make our lives as wretched as possible, and he pursued that goal with great enthusiasm.

Each day over the next few months, Van Rensburg would charge one of us for insubordination or malingering. Each morning, he and the other warders would discuss who would be charged that afternoon. It was a policy of selective intimidation, and the decision on who would be charged was taken regardless of how hard that prisoner had worked that day. When we were trudging back to our cells, Van Rensburg would read from a list, “Mandela [or Sisulu or Kathrada], I want to see you immediately in front of the head of prison.” The island’s administrative court began working overtime. In response, we formed our own legal committee made up of myself, Fikile Bam, and Mac Maharaj. Mac had studied law and was adept at putting the authorities on the defensive. Fiks, who was working toward a law degree, was a bright, resourceful fellow who had become the head of the prisoners’ committee in our section. The job of our legal committee was to advise our comrades on how to conduct themselves in the island’s administrative court.

Van Rensburg was not a clever fellow, and while he would lord it over us at the quarry, we could outwit him in court. Our strategy was not to argue with him in the field, but to contest the charges in court where we would have a chance to make our case before slightly more enlightened officers. In administrative court, the charge would be read by the presiding magistrate. “Malingering at the quarry,” he might say, at which Van Rensburg would look smug. After the charge had been read in full, I always advised my colleagues to do one thing and one thing only: ask the court for “further particulars.” This was one’s right as a defendant, and though the request became a regular occurrence, Van Rensburg would almost always be stumped. Court would then have to be adjourned while Van Rensburg went out to gather “further particulars.”

Van Rensburg was vindictive in large ways and small. When our lunch arrived at the quarry and we would sit down to eat — we now had a simple wooden table — Van Rensburg would inevitably choose that moment to urinate next to our food. I suppose we should have been grateful that he did not urinate directly on our food, but we lodged a protest against the practice anyway. One of the few ways prisoners can take revenge on warders is through humor, and Van Rensburg became the butt of many of our jokes. Among ourselves we called him “Suitcase.” Warders’ lunch boxes were known as “suitcases” and normally a warder would designate a prisoner, usually his favorite, to carry his “suitcase,” and then reward him with half a sandwich. But we always refused to carry Van Rensburg’s “suitcase,” hence the nickname. It was humiliating for a warder to carry his own lunch pail.

One day, Wilton Mkwayi inadvertently referred to “Suitcase” within Van Rensburg’s hearing. “Who is Suitcase?” Van Rensburg bellowed. Wilton paused for a moment and then blurted out, “It’s you!” “Why do you call me Suitcase?” Van Rensburg asked. Wilton paused. “Come, man,” Van Rensburg said. “Because you carry your own ‘suitcase,’ ” Wilton replied tentatively. “The general prisoners carry the ‘suitcases’ of their warders, but we won’t carry yours — so we call you Suitcase.” Van Rensburg considered this for a moment, and instead of getting angry, announced, “My name is not Suitcase, it’s Dik Nek.” There was silence for a moment, and then all of us burst into laughter. In Afrikaans, Dik Nek literally means “Thick Neck”; it suggests someone who is stubborn and unyielding. Suitcase, I suspect, was too thick to know that he had been insulted.

One day at the quarry, we resumed our discussion of whether or not the tiger was native to Africa. We were not able to talk as freely during Van Rensburg’s tenure as we had been before, but we were able to talk nonetheless while we worked. The principal advocate of those who argued that the tiger was not native to Africa was Andrew Masondo, an ANC leader from the Cape who had also been a lecturer at Fort Hare. Masondo could be a volatile fellow, and he was vehement in his assertions that no tigers had ever been found in Africa. The argument was going back and forth and the men had put down their picks and shovels in the heat of the argument. This attracted the attention of the warders, and they shouted at us to get back to work. But we were so absorbed in the argument that we ignored the warders. A few of the lower-ranking warders ordered us to go back to work, but we paid them no attention. Finally, Suitcase marched over and bellowed at us in English, a language in which he was not expert: “You talk too much, but you work too few!” The men now did not pick up their tools because they were bent over in laughter. Suitcase’s grammatical mistake struck everyone as extremely comical. But Suitcase was not at all amused. He immediately sent for Major Kellerman, the commanding officer.

Kellerman arrived on the scene a few minutes later to find us in much the same state as we had been before. Kellerman was relatively new to the island, and was determined to set the right tone. One of the warders then reported to Kellerman that Andrew Masondo and I had not been working, and we were to be charged with malingering and insubordination. Under Kellerman’s authority, we were then handcuffed and taken to isolation. From that point on, Suitcase seemed to hold a special grudge against me. One day, while he was supervising us at the quarry, I was working next to Fikile Bam. We were off by ourselves, on the far side of the quarry. We worked diligently, but since we were both studying law at the time, we were discussing what we had read the night before. At the end of the day, Van Rensburg stood in front of us and said, “Fikile Bam and Nelson Mandela, I want to see you in front of the head of prison.”

We were brought before the lieutenant, who was the head of prison, and Van Rensburg announced, “These men did not work the whole day. I’m charging them for defying orders.” The lieutenant asked if we had anything to say. “Lieutenant,” I responded, “we dispute the charge. We have been working and, in fact, we have evidence that we have been working, and it is essential to our defense.” The lieutenant scoffed at this. “All you men work in the same area,” he said. “How is it possible to have evidence?” I explained that Fiks and I had been working apart from the others and that we could show exactly how much work we had done. Suitcase naively confirmed that we had been off by ourselves, and the lieutenant agreed to have a look. We drove back to the quarry.

Once there, Fiks and I walked to the area where we had been working. I pointed to the considerable pile of rocks and lime that we had built up and said, “There, that is what we have done today.” Suitcase had never even bothered to examine our work and was rattled by the quantity of it. “No,” he said to the lieutenant, “that is the result of a week’s work.” The lieutenant was skeptical. “All right, then,” he said to Suitcase, “show me the small pile that Mandela and Bam put together today.” Suitcase had no reply, and the lieutenant did something I have rarely seen a superior officer do: he chastised his subordinate in the presence of prisoners. “You are telling lies,” he said, and dismissed the charges on the spot.

One morning in early 1967, during Suitcase’s tenure, we were preparing to walk to the quarry when Suitcase informed us that an order had come down from Major Kellerman forbidding us to talk. Not only was conversation banned on our walks; henceforth, there would be no conversation permitted at the quarry. “From now on, silence!” he yelled. This command was greeted by profound dismay and outrage. Talking and discussing issues were the only things that made the work at the quarry tolerable. Of course, we could not discuss it on the way to the quarry because we were ordered not to talk, but during our lunch break the ANC leadership and the heads of the other political groups managed secretly to hash out a plan.

While we were surreptitiously hatching our plan, Major Kellerman himself appeared and walked into our lunch shed. This was highly unusual; we had never had such a high-ranking visitor in our lowly shed. With a cough of embarrassment, he announced that his order had been a mistake and that we could resume talking at the quarry, just as long as we did it quietly. He then told us to carry on and spun on his heel and was gone. We were glad the order was rescinded, but suspicious as to why. For the remainder of the day, we were not forced to work very hard. Suitcase did his best to be friendly, and said that as a gesture of goodwill he had decided to withdraw all pending charges against us.

That afternoon, I discovered that my cell had been moved from number 4, near the entrance of the passageway, to number 18, at the back. All of my belongings had been dumped into the new cell. As always, there was no explanation. We guessed that we were to have a visitor and I had been moved because the authorities did not want me to be the first among the prisoners to talk to whoever was coming. If each prisoner in turn voiced his complaints, the authorities could yell “Time up!” before a visitor reached cell 18. We resolved that in the interest of unity, each individual along the passageway would inform any visitor that while everyone had individual complaints, the prisoner in number 18 would speak for all.

The following morning, after breakfast, we were informed by Suitcase that we would not be going to the quarry. Then Major Kellerman appeared to say that Mrs. Helen Suzman, the lone member of the liberal Progressive Party in Parliament and the only voice of true opposition to the Nationalists in Parliament, would be arriving shortly. In less than fifteen minutes, Mrs. Suzman — all five feet two inches of her — came through the door of our passageway, accompanied by General Steyn, the commissioner of prisons. As she was introduced to each prisoner, she asked him whether or not he had any complaints. Each man replied the same way: “I have many complaints, but our spokesman is Mr. Nelson Mandela at the end of the corridor.” To General Steyn’s dismay, Mrs. Suzman was soon at my cell. She firmly shook my hand and cordially introduced herself.

Unlike judges and magistrates, who were automatically permitted access to prisons, members of Parliament had to request permission to visit a prison. Mrs. Suzman was one of the few, if not the only, members of Parliament who took an interest in the plight of political prisoners. Many stories were circulating about Robben Island, and Mrs. Suzman had come to investigate for herself.

As this was Mrs. Suzman’s first visit to Robben Island, I attempted to put her at ease. But she was remarkably confident and utterly unfazed by her surroundings, and proposed that we get down to business right away. General Steyn and the commanding officer stood by her, but I did not mince words. I told her of our desire to have the food improved and equalized and to have better clothing; the need for facilities for studying; our right to information such as newspapers; and many more things. I told her of the harshness of the warders, and mentioned Van Rensburg in particular. I pointed out that he had a swastika tattooed on his forearm. Helen reacted like a lawyer. “Well, Mr. Mandela,” she said, “we must not take that too far because we don’t know when it was made. Perhaps, for example, his parents had it tattooed on him?” I assured her that was not the case.

Normally, I would not complain about an individual warder. One learns in prison that it is better to fight for general principles than to battle each individual case. However callous a warder may be, he is usually just carrying out prison policy. But Van Rensburg was in a class by himself, and we believed that if he were gone, it would make a disproportionate difference for all of us. Mrs. Suzman listened attentively, jotting down what I said in a small notebook, and promised to take these matters up with the minister of justice.

She then made an inspection of our cells, and talked a bit with some of the other men. It was an odd and wonderful sight to see this courageous woman peering into our cells and strolling around our courtyard. She was the first and only woman ever to grace our cells. Van Rensburg was exceedingly nervous during Mrs. Suzman’s visit. According to Kathy, while Mrs. Suzman and I were talking, Van Rensburg apologized for all his past actions. But his contrition did not last long, for the next day he informed us he was reinstating all the charges against us.

We later learned that Mrs. Suzman had taken up our case in Parliament, and within a few weeks of her visit, Suitcase was transferred off the island

 pp. 512-520

 

69

 

I never imagined the struggle would be either short or easy. The first few years on the island were difficult times both for the organization outside and those of us in prison. After Rivonia, much of the movement’s underground machinery had been destroyed. Our structures had been discovered and uprooted; those who were not captured were scrambling to stay one step ahead of the enemy. Virtually every one of the ANC’s senior leaders was either in jail or in exile.

In the years after Rivonia, the ANC’s External Mission, formerly responsible for fund-raising, diplomacy, and establishing a military training program, took up the reins of the organization as a whole. The External Mission not only had to create an organization in exile, but had the even more formidable task of trying to revitalize the underground ANC inside South Africa. The state had grown stronger. The police had become more powerful, their methods more ruthless, their techniques more sophisticated. The South African Defense Force was expanding. The economy was stable, the white electorate untroubled. The South African government had powerful allies in Great Britain and the United States who were content to maintain the status quo.

But elsewhere the struggle against imperialism was on the march. In the middle to late 1960s, armed struggles were being fought throughout southern Africa. In Namibia (then South-West Africa), SWAPO was making its first incursions in the Caprivi Strip; in Mozambique and Angola, the guerrilla movement was growing and spreading. In Zimbabwe (then Rhodesia), the battle against white minority rule was advancing. Ian Smith’s white government was bolstered by the South African Defense Force, and the ANC regarded the battle in Zimbabwe as an extension of our struggle at home. In 1967, we learned that the ANC had forged an alliance with the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU), which had been formed by Joshua Nkomo.

That year, a group of MK soldiers who had been training in Tanzania and Zambia crossed the Zambezi River into Rhodesia with the intention of making their way home. This first group of MK soldiers was christened the Luthuli Detachment and they were the spearhead of the armed struggle.

In August, as the Luthuli Detachment, accompanied by ZAPU troops, moved southward, they were spotted by the Rhodesian army. Over the next few weeks, fierce battles were fought and both sides sustained casualties. Finally, our troops were overpowered by the superior numbers of the Rhodesian forces. Some were captured, and others retreated into Bechuanaland — which had become independent Botswana. By the beginning of 1968, another larger ANC detachment had entered Rhodesia and fought not only the Rhodesian army but South African policemen who had been posted to Rhodesia.

We heard of this months later by rumor, but did not learn the full story until some of the men who had fought there were imprisoned with us. Though our forces were not victorious, we quietly celebrated the fact that our MK cadres had engaged the enemy in combat on their own terms. It was a milestone in the struggle. “Justice” Panza, one of the commanders of the Luthuli Detachment, was later imprisoned with us. He briefed us on the detachment’s military training, political education, and valor in the field. As a former commander-in-chief of MK, I was terribly proud of our soldiers.


Before receiving the news of MK’s battles abroad, we also learned of Chief Luthuli’s death at home in July 1967. The circumstances were curious: he had been hit by a train in an area near his farm where he often walked. I was granted permission to write a letter to his widow. Luthuli’s death left a great vacuum in the organization; the chief was a Nobel Prize winner, a distinguished, internationally known figure, a man who commanded respect from both black and white. For these reasons, he was irreplaceable. Yet in Oliver Tambo, who was acting president-general of the ANC, the organization found a man who could fill the chief’s shoes. Like Luthuli, he was articulate yet not showy, confident but humble. He too epitomized Chief Luthuli’s precept: “Let your courage rise with danger.”

We organized a small memorial service for the chief in Section B and permitted everyone who wanted to speak to do so. It was a quiet, respectful service, with only one sour note. When Neville Alexander of the Unity Movement rose to speak, it was apparent that he had come not to praise the chief but to bury him. Without even perfunctory regrets at the man’s passing, he accused Luthuli of being a patsy of the white man, mainly on the grounds that the chief had accepted the Nobel Peace Prize.

Apart from its wrong-headedness, Neville’s speech was entirely contrary to the climate of cooperation between organizations we were trying to create on the island. From the moment I arrived on the island, I had made it my mission to seek some accommodation with our rivals in the struggle. I saw Robben Island as an opportunity to patch up the long and often bitter differences between the PAC and the ANC. If we could unite the two organizations on the island, that could set a precedent for uniting them in the liberation struggle as a whole.

Yet from the beginning, relations with the PAC had been more competitive than cooperative. Some of the PAC men had already been on the island, and saw our arrival as an encroachment on their territory. We heard from some of our men that the most senior PAC prisoners had expressed regret that we had not been hanged.

In 1962, when I had first been on the island, the PAC had greatly outnumbered the ANC. In 1967, the numbers were reversed. Yet this seemed to harden the PAC in their positions. They were unashamedly anti-Communist and anti-Indian. In the early years, I had talks with Zeph Mothopeng, who had been on the PAC’s National Executive Committee. Zeph argued that the PAC was more militant than the ANC, and that in prison, the ANC should follow the PAC’s lead. The PAC maintained that negotiations with the authorities were a betrayal, but that did not stop them from taking advantage of the benefits that resulted from negotiations. In 1967, I held talks with Selby Ngendane on the question of unity. Outside of prison, Ngendane had been violently opposed to the Freedom Charter, but in prison, particularly when sent to our section, Selby mellowed. We eventually wrote separate letters to our respective organizations in the general section advocating the idea of unity. The ANC also worked well with Clarence Makwetu, who later became president of the PAC. Makwetu, who had once been a member of the ANC Youth League, was in our section and was a balanced, sensible man. We had many fruitful discussions about the unity of our two organizations, but after Makwetu was released and was succeeded in the PAC leadership on Robben Island by John Pokela, the talks foundered.

The PAC’s insecurity occasionally had comical results. At one point, an order came from Pretoria that I was to be isolated from all other prisoners at the quarry. I would work separately, eat separately, and have my own guard. We noticed that this new ruling caused some agitation among the PAC. Several days later, the PAC decided that their leader, Zeph Mothopeng, would also be isolated, and on their own they had him work and eat separately from everyone else for as long as I did.

The PAC often refused to participate in meetings that had no overt party affiliation. When we called meetings to discuss our grievances and later had news sessions to discuss what we had learned from the paper, the PAC boycotted these gatherings. I found this greatly annoying. The PAC, we learned, were ignorant of changes in their own organization on the outside. At the time, the PAC members on the island refused to believe our claims that the exiled PAC had opened its doors to whites and Indians as members. That was heresy. Yet we had read in the paper that the white activist Patrick Duncan had become a member of the PAC executive. The PAC members derided this at the time as ANC propaganda.

 
The ANC formed its own internal organization on the island. Known as the High Command, or more officially, the High Organ, it consisted of the most senior ANC leaders on Robben Island, the men who had been members of the National Executive Committee: Walter Sisulu, Govan Mbeki, Raymond Mhlaba, and myself. I served as the head of the High Organ.

From its inception, we decided the High Organ would not try to influence external ANC policy. We had no reliable way of evaluating the situation in the country, and concluded it would neither be fair nor wise for us to offer guidance on matters about which we were uninformed. Instead, we made decisions about such matters as prisoners’ complaints, strikes, mail, food — all of the day-to-day concerns of prison life. We would, when possible, convene a general members’ meeting, which we regarded as vital to the health of our organization. But as these meetings were extremely dangerous and thus infrequent, the High Organ would often take decisions that were then communicated to all the other members. The High Organ also operated a cell system, with each cell consisting of three members.

In the first few years on the island, the High Organ also acted as a representative committee for all the political prisoners in our section. In 1967, we organized a petition demanding better treatment that was signed by virtually everyone, including members of the PAC, the Unity Movement, and the Liberal Party, represented by Eddie Daniels. This arrangement was acceptable to all until Neville Alexander complained that the High Organ was neither democratic nor truly representative, and that some other body ought to be created.

Neville’s original suggestion eventually turned into a prisoners’ committee composed of people from all political parties. There was fear among the other organizations that the ANC would attempt to dominate it, and the committee’s rules were crafted so that its powers were purely consultative and its decisions not binding. Even so, it was still difficult to agree on a common approach to problems. We suggested that Fikile Bam, a member of the Yu Chi Chan Club, preside over meetings. Later, the committee leadership would rotate. Eventually the committee became known as Ulundi, and acted as a disciplinary committee for all political prisoners.

The High Organ was the source of some controversy because of its ethnic composition: all four permanent members were from Xhosa backgrounds. This was a matter of coincidence rather than design; the senior ANC leadership on the island, the only four to have served on the National Executive Committee, happened to be Xhosa. It would not have been proper to take a less senior comrade and put him on the High Organ simply because he was not a Xhosa. But the fact that the High Organ was Xhosa-dominated disturbed me because it seemed to reinforce the mistaken perception that we were a Xhosa organization.

I have always found this criticism to be vexing and based on both ignorance of ANC history and maliciousness. I would refute it by noting that the presidents of the ANC have been Zulus, Basotho, Pedis, and Tswanas, and the executive has always been a mixture of tribal groups. I recall once working in our courtyard on a sunny afternoon, while some men from the general section were working on the roof above me. They shouted at me, “Mdala! [Old man!], why do you only talk to Xhosas?” The accusation stung me. I looked up and said, “How can you accuse me of discrimination? We are one people.” They seemed satisfied by that, but their perception stuck in my mind. From then on, whenever I knew I would be walking in front of men from the general section, I would try to converse with Kathy or Eddie Daniels, or someone who was not a Xhosa.

We subsequently decided that there should be a fifth, rotating member of the High Organ. This member was usually not a Xhosa; Kathy, for example, was the fifth member of the High Organ for more than five years. Laloo Chiba also served for a time, and in the end, the criticism died a slow and unremarkable death.

I did not by any means dominate the High Organ, and in fact, a number, of proposals that I felt strongly about were rejected. This is as it should be, but I sometimes found it frustrating. There were two issues regarding the authorities about which I could never persuade my colleagues. Prison regulations stated that prisoners must stand in the presence of a senior officer. I advocated that we should remain seated, as it was demeaning to have to recognize the enemy when he did not recognize us as political prisoners. My comrades believed this was a trivial matter and the negative consequences of resistance would outweigh any benefits.

The second issue was rejected by the High Organ on similar grounds. The warders called us by either our surnames or our Christian names. Each, I felt, was degrading, and I thought we should insist on the honorific “Mister.” I pressed for this for many years, without success. Later, it even became a source of humor as my colleagues would occasionally call me “Mr.” Mandela.

 pp. 521-527


PART NINE

ROBBEN ISLAND: BEGINNING TO HOPE

 

72


Some of the warders began to engage us in conversation. I never initiated conversations with warders, but if they addressed a question to me, I tried to answer. It is easier to educate a man when he wants to learn. Usually, these questions were posed with a kind of exasperation: “All right, Mandela, what is it you really want?” Or, “Look, you have a roof over your head and enough food, why are you causing so much trouble?” I would then calmly explain our policies to the warders. I wanted to demystify the ANC for them, to peel away their prejudices.

In 1969 a young warder arrived who seemed particularly eager to get to know me. I had heard rumors that our people on the outside were organizing an escape for me, and had infiltrated a warder onto the island who would assist me. Gradually, this fellow communicated to me that he was planning my escape. In bits and pieces he explained the plan: one night, he would drug the warders on duty at the lighthouse to allow for the landing of a boat on the beach. He would furnish me with a key to get out of our section so that I could meet the boat. On the boat I was to be equipped with underwater diving gear, which I would use to swim into the harbor at Cape Town. From Cape Town, I would be taken to a local airport and flown out of the country. I listened to the plan in its entirety and did not communicate to him how far-fetched and unreliable it sounded. I consulted with Walter, and we agreed that this fellow was not to be trusted. I never told him that I would not do it, but I never took any of the actions required to implement the plan.

He must have gotten the message, for he was soon transferred off the island. As it turned out, my mistrust was justified, for we later learned that the warder was an agent of the Bureau of State Security (BOSS), South Africa’s secret intelligence agency. The plot was that I was to be successfully taken off the island, but killed in a dramatic shootout with security forces at the airport as I tried to leave the country. The entire plan had been dreamed up by BOSS, even the rumors that reached me about the ANC’s planning an escape. It was not the last time they would try to eliminate me.

The term of a commanding officer was usually no more than three years, and we had been through several by 1970. That year, Robben Island’s commanding officer was Colonel Van Aarde, a rather amiable, harmless fellow who allowed us free rein. But at the end of the year, the authorities concluded that they wanted a different atmosphere on the island, and Colonel Piet Badenhorst was named the new C.O. of Robben Island. This was an ominous development. Badenhorst was reputed to be one of the most brutal and authoritarian officers in the entire prison service. His appointment indicated one thing: the government believed that discipline on the island was too lax, and that a strong hand was needed to keep us in line. Badenhorst would supposedly make us yearn for the days of Suitcase.

Whenever a new commanding officer was appointed, I requested a meeting with him. I did this in order to impress upon him the seriousness of our cause and also to evaluate his character. I requested a meeting with Colonel Badenhorst and was turned down. He was the first commanding officer to spurn such a meeting.

We felt the effects of his regime before we ever saw him. A number of the newer regulations regarding study and free time were immediately rescinded. It was obvious that he intended to roll back every privilege we had won over the years. Our old warders were transferred off the island and replaced by Badenhorst’s handpicked guards. They were younger, coarser men who enforced every niggling regulation, whose job was to harass and demoralize us. Within days of Badenhorst’s appointment, our cells were raided and searched; books and papers were confiscated; meals were suspended without warning; and men were jostled on the way to the quarry.

Badenhorst attempted to turn back the clock to the way the island was in the early 1960s. The answer to every question was always no. Prisoners who requested to see their lawyers were given solitary confinement instead. Complaints were completely ignored. Visits were canceled without explanation. The food deteriorated. Censorship increased. About a week after Badenhorst arrived, we were working at the quarry one morning when, without introduction or fanfare, Badenhorst and his driver pulled up in the commander’s car. He got out and surveyed us from a distance. We paused to look at our new commander. Badenhorst returned my glance and called out, “Mandela, Jy moet jou vinger uit jou gat trek” (You must pull your finger out of your arse). I did not care for this expression at all, and without thinking, I started advancing toward Badenhorst. He was still a distance away, and before I got close he had returned to his car and driven away.

From his car, Badenhorst radioed a command to his staff, and within minutes a truck had arrived to transport us back to Section B. We were commanded to be silent in the truck, and when we arrived at the courtyard, we were ordered to stand at attention. Badenhorst appeared in front of us, pacing back and forth. He seemed incapable of uttering a sentence without including an oath or swearword. “Jou ma se moer,” was his favorite expression. “Your mother is a moer” — moer being a vulgar term for an intimate part of a woman’s anatomy.

In his guttural voice, he told us he was disgusted to have observed our laziness at the quarry. As a result, he said, he was arbitrarily dropping all of our classifications by one notch. Though we despised the classification system, most of the men had by that time risen to at least C level, where they were permitted to study. D level prisoners were not allowed to study. The authorities rued the fact that they had allowed us study privileges, and Badenhorst was determined to rectify that mistake.

Later, after my anger abated, I realized that Badenhorst’s crude remark to me at the quarry was a calculated one. He had been brought to Robben Island to restore order, and he had singled out the individual he assumed was the source of the disorder. Like a teacher who takes over a rowdy class, he sought to discipline the student he regarded as the principal troublemaker.

pp. 542-545

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In late May of 1971, a number of men from SWAPO (the South-West African People’s Organization), an ally of the ANC fighting for independence in Namibia, were brought to the isolation section. They were led by Andimba Toivo ja Toivo, a founder of SWAPO and a formidable freedom fighter. We learned that they had embarked on a hunger strike to protest their isolation, and we immediately decided to join in. This angered Badenhorst and the authorities who regarded this as unacceptable insubordination.

Late on the night of May 28, we were awakened by shouts and fierce knocking on our cell doors. “Get up! Get up!” the warders yelled. We were ordered to strip and then line up against the wall of the courtyard. The warders were obviously drunk and were yelling and taunting us. They were led by a sadistic fellow named Fourie, whom we privately called Gangster.

It was a bitterly cold night, and for the next hour, while we stood at attention naked and shivering, our cells were searched one by one. Warders kept up their abuse for the entire time. Toward the end of the hour, Govan experienced severe chest pains and collapsed. This seemed to scare Fourie, and he ordered us to return to our cells.

The warders searched high and low, and found nothing. But the search seemed only an excuse for Fourie’s sadistic impulses. Only later did we learn that Fourie was reputed to have molested prisoners in the general section. The following day we discovered that the warders had brutally beaten some general prisoners before they came to us, and afterward, assaulted Toivo ja Toivo, who hit back and knocked down the warder who was beating him. Toivo was severely punished for this.

We filed a formal complaint about our treatment, but it was ignored. The incident stands out in my memory, but it was by no means unique; incidents like it were the rule rather than the exception during Badenhorst’s command. We were determined not to let conditions deteriorate entirely under Badenhorst. We smuggled messages to our people on the outside to agitate for his dismissal. At the same time, we resolved to create a delegation among ourselves to see Badenhorst. We discussed this for months and gradually decided on its composition; Walter and I represented the ANC, and each of the other parties had two representatives as well.

Badenhorst agreed to meet us, and at our parley we threatened work stoppages, go-slows, hunger strikes — every weapon at our disposal — unless he reformed his ways and restored many of the privileges that he had rescinded. He merely said he would take what we said under consideration. We regarded this confrontation as a victory, for he was wary of us and knew that we had alerted people on the outside of our  complaints. These efforts soon produced a response.

A few weeks later, we knew an important visit must be imminent because when it rained that day at the quarry we were allowed to take shelter instead of continuing to work. The following day we were informed that a troika of judges were coming to the island. The authorities asked us to nominate a spokesman to express our grievances, and I was chosen.

As I was preparing for my meeting with the judges, I was informed by a reliable source that a prisoner in the general section had recently been severely beaten by a guard. The three judges were Justices Jan Steyn, M. E. Theron, and Michael Corbett of the Cape provincial division of the Supreme Court. They were escorted by the commissioner of prisons, General Steyn, and accompanied by Colonel Badenhorst. I met them that day outside, where we were working.

General Steyn introduced me to the judges and explained that I had been selected to represent the other prisoners. The judges then indicated that as a matter of course they would talk with me privately. I replied that I had nothing to hide and that in fact I welcomed the presence of General Steyn and the colonel. I could see that they were taken aback by my statement, and I added that it would be only proper for them to have the opportunity to reply to my charges. The judges reluctantly acquiesced.

I began by recounting the recent assault in the general section. I told them the details that had been reported to me, the viciousness of the beating, and the cover-up of the crime. I had barely begun to speak when I noticed Badenhorst shifting uncomfortably. When I had finished describing the incident, Badenhorst interjected in a gruff, aggressive manner: “Did you actually witness this assault?” I replied calmly that I had not but that I trusted the people who had told me of it. He snorted and wagged his finger in my face. “Be careful, Mandela,” he said. “If you talk about things you haven’t seen, you will get yourself in trouble. You know what I mean.”

I ignored Badenhorst’s remarks and turned to the judges and said, “Gentlemen, you can see for yourselves the type of man we are dealing with as commanding officer. If he can threaten me here, in your presence, you can imagine what he does when you are not here.” Judge Corbett then turned to the others and said, “The prisoner is quite right.” I spent the remainder of the meeting enumerating complaints about our diet, work, and studying. Inwardly Badenhorst must have been fuming, but outwardly he seemed chastened. At the end of the session, the judges thanked me, and I bade them good-bye.

I have no idea what the judges said or did after the meeting, but over the next few months, Badenhorst seemed to have his hands tied. The harshness abated, and within three months of the judges’ visit, we received word that Badenhorst was to be transferred. A few days before Badenhorst’s departure, I was called to the main office. General Steyn was visiting the island and wanted to know if we had any complaints. Badenhorst was there as I went through a list of demands. When I had finished, Badenhorst spoke to me directly. He told me that he would be leaving the island, and added, “I just want to wish you people good luck.” I do not know if I looked dumbfounded, but I was amazed. He spoke these words like a human being, and showed a side of himself we had never seen before. I thanked him for his good wishes, and wished him luck in his endeavors.

I thought about this moment for a long time afterward. Badenhorst had perhaps been the most callous and barbaric commanding officer we had had on Robben Island. But that day in the office, he had revealed that there was another side to his nature, a side that had been obscured but that still existed. It was a useful reminder that all men, even the most seemingly cold-blooded, have a core of decency, and that if their heart is touched, they are capable of changing. Ultimately, Badenhorst was not evil; his inhumanity had been foisted upon him by an inhuman system. He behaved like a brute because he was rewarded for brutish behavior.

pp. 546-549


 

74

 

 
It was announced that Colonel Willemse would succeed Colonel Badenhorst as commanding officer. I requested a meeting with the colonel after his appointment and visited with him shortly after his arrival. While he was obviously not a progressive man, he was courteous and reasonable, in marked contrast to his predecessor. Badenhorst’s tenure, we hoped, would simply be a dip on the graph of the steady improvement of our conditions.

The aggressive young warders departed with Badenhorst as well, and we quickly resumed our customary behavior at the quarry and in our section. Willemse may have been a reasonable man, but when he saw that we spent more time at the quarry talking than working, he was shocked. He had been on the island for only a few weeks when I was summoned to his office for a meeting. “Mandela,” he said frankly, “you must help me.”

I asked him how. “Your men are not working. They don’t listen to orders. They only do what they want to do. This is a prison. There must be some discipline. It is not only good for us but good for you. We must have some order or they will bring back someone like the previous head of prison.”

What the colonel said made sense. I listened and told him that his request was a legitimate one, but before I could respond to him, I would need to meet with all my men. At that time, a meeting of all prisoners in the single cells was something that was expressly forbidden. By asking him to permit such a meeting, I was asking him for a significant extension of the rules. He knew this as well as I did, and he wanted some time to consider it.

Within days, I received a communication from Willemse saying he would allow it. All of us met one afternoon in the courtyard, without guards watching over us. I told the men what Willemse said, and noted that by compromising a bit now, we would be making our conditions better in the long run. We decided that we would at least appear to be working, but what work we did would be at a pace that suited us. From then on, that is what we did, and we heard no more complaints from the commanding officer.

During the early part of Willemse’s tenure, in 1971–2, there was a steady influx of captured MK soldiers. These men had seen combat, and were well informed about the state of the exile movement. While I was never happy to see ANC men imprisoned, I was keen to debrief them after they arrived. I was extremely eager to know about Oliver, about the training camps, about MK’s successes and failures. The men were extremely militant, and they did not take to prison life easily. One of the first of these men was Jimmy April, an MK officer who had trained under Joe Slovo and had fought against the enemy in Rhodesia. MK had been slowly infiltrating men back into the country with forged identity documents. Jimmy had been one of them and he was arrested in South Africa.

Jimmy regaled us with war stories, but I also took him aside and asked him about MK’s problems. As I was founder of MK and its first commander-in-chief, Jimmy and the others were more candid with me than they were with the others. He told me stories of discontent in the camps, and of abuses by MK officers. I asked him to keep the matter to himself, and I managed to smuggle a letter out to Oliver suggesting that some reforms must be made in the camps.

One day, I was at the Head Office meeting with Colonel Willemse when I saw Jimmy outside the office of another official. He turned to me and said in some agitation, “They are refusing to give me my letter.” “On what ground?” I replied. “They claim it contains matter which I am not allowed to see,” he said. I entered the office to discuss the matter, but before I could even open my mouth, Jimmy had barged in and loudly said to the official, “Give me my letter!” Jimmy began to push me aside to get to the officer’s desk and take the letter himself. At this point, the official took the letter and moved behind me as if for protection from Jimmy. It might have been a comical scene in a film, but at the time it was nerve-racking. I turned to Jimmy and said quietly but sternly, “Please don’t do this. Calm down. I’ll sort out this matter and see to it that you get your letter. Now, please leave.”

My speech had the intended effect, and Jimmy left the office. I then turned to the officer, who was extremely rattled. It was, for me, an odd position. I was not opposing the authorities but mediating between my own people and the men I had so long fought against. The militancy of those who were coming to the island put me in this position more and more frequently. While we were encouraged by their radicalism, these men sometimes made our day-to-day life more burdensome. Within a week, the officer handed me Jimmy’s letter
 

pp. 550-552

 

75

 

One morning instead of walking to the quarry, we were ordered into the back of a truck. It rumbled off in a new direction, and fifteen minutes later we were ordered to jump out. There in front of us, glinting in the morning light, we saw the ocean, the rocky shore, and in the distance, winking in the sunshine, the glass towers of Cape Town. Although it was surely an illusion, the city, with Table Mountain looming behind it, looked agonizingly close, as if one could almost reach out and grasp it.

The senior officer explained to us that we had been brought to the shore to collect seaweed. We were instructed to pick up the large pieces that had washed up on the beach, and wade out to collect seaweed attached to rocks or coral. The seaweed itself was long and slimy and brownishgreen in color. Sometimes the pieces were six to eight feet in length and thirty pounds in weight. After fishing out the seaweed from the shallows, we lined it up in rows on the beach. When it was dry, we loaded it into the back of the truck. We were told it was then shipped to Japan, where it was used as a fertilizer.

The work did not seem too taxing to us that day, but in the coming weeks and months, we found it could be quite strenuous. But that hardly mattered because we had the pleasures and distractions of such a panoramic tableau: we watched fishing ships trawling, stately oil tankers moving slowly across the horizon; we saw gulls spearing fish from the sea and seals cavorting on the waves; we laughed at the colony of penguins, which resembled a brigade of clumsy, flat-footed soldiers; and we marveled at the daily drama of the weather over Table Mountain, with its shifting canopy of clouds and sun.

In the summer, the water felt wonderful, but in winter, the icy Benguela currents made wading out into the waves a torture. The rocks on and around the shore were jagged, and we often cut and scraped our legs as we worked. But we preferred the sea to the quarry, although we never spent more than a few days there at a time.

The ocean proved to be a treasure chest. I found beautiful pieces of coral and elaborate shells, which I sometimes brought back to my cell. Once someone discovered a bottle of wine stuck in the sand that was still corked. I am told it tasted like vinegar. Jeff Masemola of the PAC was an extremely talented artist and sculptor, and the authorities allowed him to harvest pieces of driftwood, which he carved into fantastic figures, some of which the warders offered to buy. He constructed a bookcase for me, which I used for many years. The authorities told visitors that they had provided me with it.

The atmosphere at the shore was more relaxed than at the quarry. We also relished the seaside because we ate extremely well there. Each morning when we went to the shore, we would take a large drum of fresh water. Later, we would bring along a second drum, which we would use to make a kind of Robben Island seafood stew. For our stew we would pick up clams and mussels. We also caught crayfish, which hid themselves in the crevices of rocks. Capturing a crayfish was tricky; one had to grab it firmly between its head and tail or it would wiggle free.

Abalone, or what we call parlemoen, was my favorite dish. Abalones are mollusks that cling tenaciously to rocks, and one has to pry them loose. They are stubborn creatures, difficult to open, and if they are the slightest bit overcooked, they are too tough to eat. We would take our catch and pile it into the second drum. Wilton Mkwayi was the chef among us and he would concoct the stew. When it was ready, the warders would join us and we would all sit down on the beach and have a kind of picnic lunch. In 1973, in a smuggled newspaper, we read about the wedding of Princess Anne and Mark Phillips, and the story detailed the bridal luncheon of rare and delicate dishes. The menu included mussels, crayfish, and abalone, which made us laugh; we were dining on such delicacies every day.

One afternoon, we were sitting on the beach eating our stew when Lieutenant Terblanche, who was then head of prison, made a surprise visit. We quickly pretended to be working, but we had not fooled him. He soon discovered the second drum containing a mussel stew bubbling over the fire. The lieutenant opened the pot and looked inside. He then speared a mussel, ate it, and pronounced it “Smaaklik,” Afrikaans for “tasty."

pp. 553-555

 

76

 

In the struggle, Robben Island was known as the University. This is not only because of what we learned from books, or because prisoners studied English, Afrikaans, art, geography, and mathematics, or because so many of our men, such as Billy Nair, Ahmed Kathrada, Mike Dingake, and Eddie Daniels, earned multiple degrees. Robben Island was known as the University because of what we learned from each other. We became our own faculty, with our own professors, our own curriculum, our own courses. We made a distinction between academic studies, which were official, and political studies, which were not.

Our university grew up partly out of necessity. As young men came to the island, we realized that they knew very little about the history of the ANC. Walter, perhaps the greatest living historian of the ANC, began to tell them about the genesis of the organization and its early days. His teaching was wise and full of understanding. Gradually, this informal history grew into a course of study, constructed by the High Organ, which became known as Syllabus A, involving two years of lectures on the ANC and the liberation struggle. Syllabus A included a course taught by Kathy, “A History of the Indian Struggle.” Another comrade added a history of the Coloured people. Mac, who had studied in the German Democratic Republic, taught a course in Marxism.

Teaching conditions were not ideal. Study groups would work together on the quarry and station themselves in a circle around the leader of the seminar. The style of teaching was Socratic in nature; ideas and theories were elucidated through the leaders asking and answering questions.

It was Walter’s course that was at the heart of all the education on the island. Many of the young ANC members who came to the island had no idea that the organization had even been in existence in the 1920s and 1930s. Walter guided them from the founding of the ANC in 1912 through to the present day. For many of these young men, it was the only political education they had ever received.

As these courses became known in the general section, we began to get queries from our men on the other side. This started what became a kind of correspondence course with the prisoners in the general section. The teachers would smuggle lectures over to them and they would respond with questions and comments.

This was beneficial for us as well as for them. These men had little formal education, but a great knowledge of the hardships of the world. Their concerns tended to be practical rather than philosophical. If one of the lectures stated that a tenet of socialism is “From each according to his ability and to each according to his need,” we might receive a question back that said, “Yes, but what does that mean in practice? If I have land and no money, and my friend has money but no land, which of us has a greater need?” Such questions were immensely valuable and forced one to think hard about one’s views.

For a number of years, I taught a course in political economy. In it, I attempted to trace the evolution of economic man from the earliest times up to the present, sketching out the path from ancient communal societies to feudalism to capitalism and socialism. I am by no means a scholar and not much of a teacher, and I would generally prefer to answer questions than to lecture. My approach was not ideological, but it was biased in favor of socialism, which I saw as the most advanced stage of economic life then evolved by man.

In addition to my informal studies, my legal work continued. I sometimes considered hanging a shingle outside my cell, because I was spending many hours a week preparing judicial appeals for other prisoners, though this was forbidden under prison service regulations. Prisoners from all different political stripes sought my help. South African law does not guarantee a defendant the right to legal representation, and thousands upon thousands of indigent men and women went to prison every year for lack of such representation. Few Africans could afford a lawyer, and most had no choice but to accept whatever verdict the court handed down. Many men in the general section had been sentenced without benefit of counsel, and a number of them sought me out to make an appeal. For most of these men, it was the first time they had ever dealt with an attorney.

I would receive a smuggled note from a prisoner in F or G asking for help. I would then request the particulars of the case, the charge, the evidence, and the testimony. Because of the clandestine nature of these exchanges, information would come slowly in bits and pieces. A consultation that would last no more than half an hour in my old Mandela and Tambo office might take a year or more on the island. I advised my “clients” to write a letter to the registrar of the Supreme Court asking for a record of their case. I told the prisoner to inform the registrar that he had limited funds and would like the record at no charge. Sometimes the registrars were kind enough to supply that material gratis.

Once I had the record of the case, I could put together an appeal, usually based on some judicial irregularity such as bias, incorrect procedure, or insufficient evidence. I drafted a letter to the judge or magistrate in my own handwriting, and then sent it to the other side. Because it was a violation of regulations for me to prepare a man’s case, I would instruct the prisoner to copy the document in his own hand. If he could not write, and many prisoners could not, I told him to find someone who could.

I enjoyed keeping my legal skills sharp, and in a few cases verdicts were overturned and sentences reduced. These were gratifying victories; prison is contrived to make one feel powerless, and this was one of the few ways to move the system. Often I never met the men I worked for, and sometimes, out of the blue, a man who was serving us pap for lunch would whisper a thank-you to me for the work I had done on his behalf

 pp. 556-558

 

77

 

THE OPPRESSION of my wife did not let up. In 1972, security policemen kicked down the door of 8115 Orlando West. Bricks were hurled through the window. Gunshots were fired at the front door. In 1974, Winnie was charged with violating her banning orders, which restricted her from having any visitors apart from her children and her doctor. She was then working at a lawyer’s office, and a friend brought Zeni and Zindzi to see her during

her lunch hour. For this, Winnie was charged and then sentenced to six months’ imprisonment. She was put in Kroonstad Prison, in the Orange Free State, but her experience there was not as horrendous as her previous stay in Pretoria. Winnie wrote to me that she felt liberated in prison this time, and it served to reaffirm her commitment to the struggle. The authorities permitted Zindzi and Zeni to visit her on Sundays.When Winnie was released in 1975, we managed, through letters and communications with our lawyers, to work out a plan for me to see Zindzi. 
Prison regulations stated that no child between the ages of two and sixteen may visit a prisoner. When I went to Robben Island, all my children were in this legal limbo of age restrictions. The reasoning behind the rule is not pernicious: the lawmakers presumed that a prison visit would negatively affect the sensitive psyches of children. But the effect on prisoners was perhaps equally damaging. It is a source of deep sorrow not to be able to see one’s children.

In 1975, Zindzi turned fifteen. The plan was for her mother to alter Zindzi’s birth documents to show that the girl was turning sixteen, not fifteen, and therefore able to see me. Birth records are not kept in a very uniform or organized way for Africans, and Winnie found that it was not hard to modify her documents to show that Zindzi was born a year earlier. She applied for a permit, and it was approved. A few weeks before Zindzi’s scheduled visit in December, I had a previously arranged visit with Winnie’s mother. When I was seated across from her in the visiting area, I said to her, “Well, Ma, I’m very excited because I’m going to see Zindzi.” My mother-in-law, who was a former teacher, regarded me with some surprise and then said in a rather peevish way, “No, Zindzi cannot come and see you because she is not yet sixteen.” I realized immediately that no one had told her about our gambit. There was a warder behind each of us, and I decided I would simply gloss over what she had said, and mumbled, “Ah, well, Ma, it is nothing.”

But my mother-in-law is a stubborn woman and she did not let it pass. “Well, Mkonyanisi” — an affectionate term for son-in-law in Xhosa, which is what she always called me — “you have made a serious error because Zindzi is only fifteen.” I widened my eyes in a gesture of alarm and she must have gotten the message because she did not mention Zindzi again. I had not seen Zindzi since she was three years old. She was a daughter who knew her father from old photographs rather than memory. I put on a fresh shirt that morning, and took more trouble than usual with my appearance: it is my own vanity, but I did not want to look like an old man for my youngest daughter.

I had not seen Winnie for over a year, and I was gratified to find that she looked well. But I was delighted to behold what a beautiful woman my youngest daughter had become and how closely she resembled her equally beautiful mother. Zindzi was shy and hesitant at first. I am sure it was not easy for her finally to see a father she had never really known, a father who could love her only from a distance, who seemed to belong not to her but to the people. Somewhere deep inside her she must have harbored resentment and anger for a father who was absent during her childhood and adolescence. I could see right away that she was a strong and fiery young woman like her own mother had been when she was Zindzi’s age.

I knew she would be feeling uncomfortable, and I did my best to lighten the atmosphere. When she arrived I said to her, “Have you met my guard of honor?,” gesturing to the warders who followed me everywhere. I asked her questions about her life, her schooling, and her friends, and then tried to take her back to the old days that she barely remembered. I told her how I often recalled Sunday mornings at home when I dandled her on my knee while Mum was in the kitchen making a roast. I recollected small incidents and adventures in Orlando when she was a baby, and how she had rarely cried even when she was small. Through the glass, I could see her holding back her tears as I talked.

The one tragic note of the visit was when I learned from Winnie that Bram Fischer had died of cancer shortly after being let out of prison. Bram’s death affected me deeply. Although the government left no fingerprints on Bram’s body, it was the state’s relentless harassment of him that brought on the final illness that took him too soon. They hounded him even after death — the state confiscated his ashes after his cremation. Bram was a purist, and after the Rivonia Trial, he decided he could best serve the struggle by going underground and living the life of an outlaw. It burdened him that the men whom he was representing in court were going to prison while he lived freely. During the trial, I advised Bram not to take this route, stressing that he served the struggle best in the courtroom, where people could see this Afrikaner son of a judge president fighting for the rights of the powerless. But he could not let others suffer while he remained free. Like the general who fights side by side with his troops at the front, Bram did not want to ask others to make a sacrifice that he was unwilling to make himself.

Bram went underground while out on bail and was captured in 1965, and sentenced to life imprisonment for conspiracy to commit sabotage. I had tried to write him in prison, but regulations forbade prisoners from corresponding with each other. After he had been diagnosed with cancer, a newspaper campaign calling for his release on humanitarian grounds had influenced the government. It was just a few weeks after the authorities released him, still under house arrest, to his brother’s house in Bloemfontein that he died.

In many ways, Bram Fischer, the grandson of the prime minister of the Orange River Colony, had made the greatest sacrifice of all. No matter what I suffered in my pursuit of freedom, I always took strength from the fact that I was fighting with and for my own people. Bram was a free man who fought against his own people to ensure the freedom of others. A month after this visit I received word from Winnie that her most recent request for a visit had been turned down by the authorities on the absurd grounds that I did not wish to see her. I immediately made an appointment with Lieutenant Prins, who was then head of prison, to lodge a protest.

Prins was not what one would call a sophisticated man. When I went in to see him I explained the situation evenly and without animosity. But I said the situation as it stood was unacceptable and my wife must be permitted to visit. Prins did not appear to be listening, and when I had finished he said, “Ag, Mandela, your wife is only seeking publicity.” I told him that I resented his remark, and before I had even finished, he uttered something so offensive and uncomplimentary about my wife that I immediately lost my temper.

I rose from my chair and started to move around the desk toward the lieutenant. Prins began to retreat, but I soon checked myself. Instead of assaulting him with my fists, as I felt like doing, I pummeled him with words. I am not a man who approves of oaths or curses, but that day I violated my own principle. I finished by telling him that he was a contemptible man without honor, and that if he ever repeated those same words I would not hold myself back as I had that day.

When I had finished, I turned and stormed out of his office. As I was leaving, I saw Kathy and Eddie Daniels outside but I did not even greet them as I walked back to my cell. Even though I had silenced Prins, he had caused me to violate my self-control and I consider that a defeat at the hands of my opponent. After breakfast the following morning, two warders entered my cell and said I was wanted at the Head Office. When I reached the office, I was surrounded by a half-dozen armed warders. Off to one side was Lieutenant Prins and in the center of this circle was a warrant officer who was the prison prosecutor. The atmosphere was tense.

“Well, Mandela,” the prosecutor said, “I hear you had yourself a nice time yesterday, but today will not be so pleasant. I am charging you for having insulted and threatened the head of prison. It is a grave charge.” He then handed me the summons. “Do you have anything to say?” he asked. “No,” I replied. “You can speak with my attorney.” I then asked to be taken back to my cell. Prins did not say a word. I knew immediately what I would do: prepare a countersuit charging everyone from the lieutenant all the way up to the minister of justice with misconduct. I would indict the prison system as a whole as a racist institution that sought to perpetuate white supremacy. I would make the case a cause célèbre, and make them regret they had ever charged me in the first place.

I asked George Bizos to represent me, and a meeting was soon arranged. Before George’s visit I informed the authorities that I would be giving him written instructions. They asked me why and I replied frankly that I assumed the consultation room was bugged. The authorities then refused permission for me to give a written statement; I must make an oral one. I told them that they had no right to withhold permission, and the fact that they did only confirmed my suspicions.

The truth was that the authorities were afraid George would leak a written statement to the press. This was indeed part of our strategy. They were also concerned that I was using George as a conduit to communicate with Oliver in Lusaka, and assumed that the written statement would contain sensitive information. I had previously used George for such purposes, but the document in question did not contain such material. A date was set for the island’s disciplinary court, and a magistrate from Cape Town was assigned. A day before the hearing, I was told that my attorney would be arriving the following day and I would be free to give him my written statement. I met George at the head office in the morning and we briefly consulted before court was called into session. But the hearing had no sooner started than the prosecutor announced that the prison was withdrawing its case. The judge gaveled the session to a close and abruptly left the room. George and I looked at each other in surprise, and congratulated one another on an apparent victory. I was putting away my papers when another warrant officer came over and, pointing to my written statement, said, “Hand me that file.” I refused, saying it was a confidential matter between myself and my attorney. I called over the prosecutor and said: “Inform this man that these documents are protected by attorney-client privilege, and that I do not have to turn them over.” The prosecutor replied that they were, but that the case was over, court was no longer in session, and the only authority in the room was that of the warrant officer. The officer plucked the document off the table. There was nothing I could do to stop him. I believe the authorities dropped the case simply to get hold of that document — which, as they discovered, contained nothing they did not already know. As unlikely a prospect as it may have seemed, I nevertheless thought about escape the entire time I was on the island. Mac Maharaj and Eddie

Daniels, both brave and resourceful men, were always hatching plans and discussing possibilities. Most were far too dangerous, but that did not stop us from considering them. We had made certain advances. Jeff Masemola, our master craftsman, had managed to make a passkey that unlocked most of the doors in and around our section. One day, a warder had left his key on the desk in the office at the end of our corridor. Jeff took a piece of soap and made an imprint of the key. Using that outline, he took a piece of metal and filed it into the shape of the key. This key gave us access to some of the storerooms behind our cells as well as to the isolation section. But we never used it to leave our section. It was the sea, after all, that was the uncrossable moat around Robben Island.

In 1974, Mac had an idea how to cross that barrier. He had recently been taken to the dentist in Cape Town and discovered that the dentist himself was related by marriage to a well-known political prisoner. The dentist was sympathetic; he had refused to treat Mac unless Mac’s leg irons were first removed. Mac had also noticed that the window in the dentist’s second-floor waiting room was just a short drop to a small side-street where we might make a run for it.

When Mac returned, he met with a few of us and urged us to make appointments at the dentist. We did so, and learned that a day had been arranged for Mac, Wilton Mkwayi, me, and one other prisoner to go to Cape Town. The three of us were willing to make the attempt, but when Mac contacted the fourth man, he refused. We had doubts about this man’s loyalty, and it concerned me that he knew what we were planning. The three of us were taken by boat to Cape Town and then to the dentist’s office under heavy guard. All three of us had trained as soldiers and we probably had the best chance of actually executing an escape. Mac was also carrying a knife, and was prepared to use it. At the dentist’s office, the guards first cleared away all the other patients. We demanded to have our leg irons removed, and with the support of the dentist, our guardstook them off.

Mac led us over to the window and pointed out the street that was our escape route. But something about the street bothered Mac as soon as he saw it: we were in the center of Cape Town in the middle of the day, and yet the street was empty. When he had been here before, the street had been filled With traffic. “It’s a setup,” Mac whispered. I, too, had the sense that something was not right, and I agreed with Mac. Wilton, whose adrenaline was flowing, said Mac was talking nonsense. “Madiba, you’re losing your nerve,” he said. But I agreed with Mac, and the three of us simply ended up having our teeth examined. The dentist was curious as to why I had come, because my teeth were fine.

While Mac considered the most practical escape plans, Eddie Daniels hatched the most imaginative ones. During the early years, airplanes were not permitted to fly over the island. But by the mid-1970s, we noticed that not only were planes flying over our heads, but helicopters on their way to and from the tankers that sailed off the coast. Eddie came to me with a plan that would involve the organization using a helicopter, painted with the

South African military colors, to pick me up on the island and then deposit me on the roof of a friendly foreign embassy in Cape Town where I would seek asylum. It was not an ill-conceived plan, and I told Eddie he should smuggle out the suggestion to Oliver in Lusaka. Eddie did manage to get his idea to Lusaka, but we never received a response.

 
pp. 559-566

 

 78

 See: Mac Maharaj on Mandela, Zuma and South Africa (Alec Russell 2015)
https://www.ft.com/content/061882b4-338b-11e5-bdbb-35e55cbae175#axzz3h6zjRcP4


Birthday celebrations were bare-bones affairs on Robben Island. In lieu of cake and gifts, we would pool our food and present an extra slice of bread or cup of coffee to the birthday honoree. Fikile Bam and I were born on the same date, July 18, and I would save a few sweets that I had purchased at Christmas for the two of us to share on our mutual anniversary. My fiftieth birthday had passed without much notice in 1968, but in 1975, when I turned fifty-seven, Walter and Kathy approached me with a long-term plan that would make my sixtieth birthday more memorable.

One of the issues that always concerned us was how to keep the idea of the struggle before the people. During the previous decade, the government had silenced most of the radical press, and there remained a prohibition on publishing the words or pictures of any banned or imprisoned individuals. An editor could go to jail and his newspaper be shuttered for publishing so much as a snapshot of me or my colleagues.

One day, Kathy, Walter, and myself were talking in the courtyard when they suggested that I ought to write my memoirs. Kathy noted that the perfect time for such a book to be published would be on my sixtieth birthday. Walter said that such a story, if told truly and fairly, would serve to remind people of what we had fought and were still fighting for. He added that it could become a source of inspiration for young freedom fighters.

The idea appealed to me, and during a subsequent discussion, I agreed to go ahead.

When I decide to do something, I like to start immediately, and I threw myself into this new project. I adopted a rather unorthodox work schedule: I would write most of the night and sleep during the day. During the first week or two, I would take a nap after dinner, awake at ten o’clock, and then write until it was time for breakfast. After working at the quarry, I would then sleep until dinner, and the process would begin again. After a few weeks of this, I notified the authorities that I was not feeling well and would not be going to the quarry. They did not seem to care, and from then on I was able to sleep most of the day.

We created an assembly line to process the manuscript. Each day I passed what I wrote to Kathy, who reviewed the manuscript, and then read it to Walter. Kathy then wrote their comments in the margins. Walter and Kathy have never hesitated to criticize me, and I took their suggestions to heart, often incorporating their changes. This marked-up manuscript was then given to Laloo Chiba, who spent the next night transferring my writing to his own almost microscopic shorthand, reducing ten pages of foolscap to a single small piece of paper. It would be Mac’s job to smuggle the manuscript to the outside world.

The warders grew suspicious. They went to Mac and said, “What is Mandela up to? Why is he sitting up late at night?” But Mac merely shrugged his shoulders and said he had no idea. I wrote rapidly, completing a draft in four months. I did not hesitate over choosing a word or phrase. I covered the period from my birth through the Rivonia Trial, and ended with some notes about Robben Island.

I relived my experiences as I wrote about them. Those nights, as I wrote in silence, I could once again experience the sights and sounds of my youth in Qunu and Mqhekezweni; the excitement and fear of coming to Johannesburg; the tempests of the Youth League; the endless delays of the Treason Trial; the drama of Rivonia. It was like a waking dream and I attempted to transfer it to paper as simply and truthfully as I could.

Mac ingeniously hid the transcribed version of the manuscript inside the binding of a number of notebooks he used for his studies. In this way, he was able to safeguard the entire text from the authorities and smuggle it out when he was released in 1976. The arrangement was that Mac would secretly communicate when the manuscript was safely out of the country; only then would we destroy the original. In the meantime, we still had to dispose of a five-hundred-page manuscript. We did the only thing we could do: we buried it in the garden in the courtyard. Surveillance in the courtyard had become careless and sporadic. The warders usually sat in an office at the northern end talking among themselves. From that office, they could not see the southern end next to the isolation area where there was a small garden. I had casually inspected this area on my early morning walks, and it was there that I decided to bury the manuscript.

In order not to have to dig a great hole, we decided to bury the manuscript in three separate places. We divided it into two smaller segments and one larger one, wrapped each in plastic, and placed them inside empty cocoa containers. The work would have to be done quickly, and I asked Jeff Masemola to fashion some digging tools. Within a few days I was equipped with several sharp iron stakes.

One morning, after breakfast, Kathy, Walter, Eddie Daniels, and I drifted over to the garden at the southern end of the courtyard where we appeared to be having a political discussion. We were each hiding portions of the manuscript in our shirts. At a signal from me, we dropped down and began digging. I dug in the center, near a manhole cover that led to a drainpipe. When I reached the pipe, I carved out a space beneath it, and it was there that I placed the largest of the three containers. The others dug two shallower holes for their portions.

We finished just in time to line up for our march to the quarry. As I walked that morning, I felt a sense of relief that the manuscript was safely hidden. I then thought no more about it. A few weeks later, just after our wake-up call, I heard a sound in the courtyard that made me uneasy: it was the thud of picks and shovels on the ground. When we were allowed out of our cells for wash-up, I walked to the front of the corridor and managed to peer out the door and around the corner. There, at the south end of the courtyard, was a work crew from the general section. To my alarm, they were digging in the area where the manuscript was buried.

The authorities had decided to build a wall in front of the isolation section because they had discovered that the prisoners in isolation were able to communicate with us in the courtyard. The work crew was digging a shallow trench for the concrete foundation of the wall.

While washing up I managed to inform Walter and Kathy about the digging outside. Kathy thought that the main part of the manuscript, which was buried under the pipe, would probably be safe, but that the other two were vulnerable. When the drums of breakfast porridge were wheeled into the courtyard, the warders commanding the work crew ordered the men out of the yard. This was done to prevent any fraternization with the political prisoners.

With our bowls of porridge in hand, I led Walter and Kathy over to the south end of the courtyard as though I wanted to confer with them privately. The beginnings of the trench were already perilously close to the two smaller containers. At the same time, we were joined by Eddie Daniels, who immediately recognized the problem. There was only one thing to do: as inconspicuously as possible, the four of us began digging in the area where the two smaller pieces of manuscript would be. We managed to unearth the two containers rather quickly, and covered the area again with soil. To rescue the chunk of manuscript under the pipe would require more time, but we were confident that they would not find the manuscript because they would not dislodge the pipe in order to build the wall.

We hid the manuscript in our shirts as we walked back to our cells. Eddie was not going to the quarry that day, and we gave the containers to him, instructing him to destroy them as soon as possible. At great personal risk, Eddie agreed to do so. I breathed easier knowing that we had salvaged the two containers, and tried not to dwell on the remaining piece of manuscript as I worked that day.

When we returned from the quarry that afternoon, instead of washing up, which I normally did, I strolled over to the far end of the courtyard. I attempted to appear as casual as possible, but I was alarmed by what I saw. The prisoners had dug a trench that ran parallel to the wall of the isolation section and had actually removed the pipe altogether. They could not help but have uncovered the manuscript.

I must have flinched or reacted in some way that was noticeable. Unknown to me, I was being watched by a number of warders, who later said that my reaction confirmed that I knew a manuscript had been there. I returned to the corridor to wash up and told Walter and Kathy that I suspected the manuscript had been discovered. Eddie had meanwhile successfully disposed of the other two pieces.

Early the next morning, I was summoned to the office to see the commanding officer. Next to him stood a high prison official who had just arrived from Pretoria. Without any greeting whatsoever, the commanding officer announced: “Mandela, we have found your manuscript.”

I did not reply. The commanding officer then reached behind his desk and produced a sheaf of papers.

“This is your handwriting, is it not?” he demanded. Again, I remained silent.

“Mandela,” the commander said in some exasperation. “We know this is your work.”

“Well,” I replied, “you must produce some proof of that.” They scoffed at this, and said they knew the notations in the margin were made by Walter Sisulu and Ahmed Kathrada. Again, I said that they must furnish evidence if they were going to impose any penalties.

“We do not need evidence,” the commander said. “We have the evidence.”

Although he did not impose a penalty that day, a short while later, Walter, Kathy, and I were called before General Rue, the deputy commissioner of prisons, who told us that we had abused our study privileges in order to illegally write the manuscript. For that offense, our study privileges were being suspended indefinitely. As it turned out, we lost study privileges for four years. After Mac was released in December, he sent the notebooks overseas to England. He spent the next six months under house arrest in South Africa before slipping out of the country and going first to Lusaka to see Oliver, and then to London. He stayed there for six months; with a typist he reconstructed the manuscript and put together a typescript. He then returned to Lusaka and presented Oliver with a copy.

From there, the trail grows cold. I heard nothing from Lusaka about the manuscript and still do not know precisely what Oliver did with it. Although it was not published while I was in prison, it forms the spine of this memoir.

pp. 567-572

79

 

In 1976, I received an extraordinary visit: Jimmy Kruger, the minister of prisons, a prominent member of the prime minister’s cabinet, came to see me. Kruger was not only influential about prisons policy but he was critical to the government’s handling of the liberation struggle.

I had an inkling as to why he had come. The government was then engaged in a massive effort to make a success of its separate development policy, and “quasi-independent” homelands. The showpiece of separate development was the Transkei, led by my nephew and one-time benefactor, K. D. Matanzima, who had successfully repressed almost all legitimate opposition to his rule. I recalled that the commanding officer had recently said to me in a bantering way, “Mandela, you ought to retire to the Transkei and take a good long rest.”

As it turned out, that was precisely what Jimmy Kruger was proposing as well. He was a stout, blunt man, not nearly as polished as I would have expected from a cabinet minister. I approached the meeting as another opportunity to present our grievances, and at first he seemed content to listen. I began by reminding him of the letter we had sent him in 1969, which had gone unanswered. He merely shrugged. I then detailed the poor conditions on the island, reiterating once more that we were political prisoners, not criminals, and expected to be treated as such. But Kruger scoffed at this, saying, “Nah, you are all violent Communists!”

I then began to tell him a bit about the history of our organization and why we had turned to violence. It was clear that he knew almost nothing about the ANC, and what he did know was gleaned from the propaganda of the right-wing press. When I told him the organization was far older than the National Party, he was dumbfounded. I said that if he considered us Communists he should reread the Freedom Charter. He looked at me blankly. He had never heard of the Freedom Charter. I found it extraordinary that a cabinet minister should be so uninformed. Yet I should not have been surprised; Nationalist politicians routinely condemned what they didn’t understand. I raised the question of our release and reminded him of the case of the 1914 Afrikaner rebels, who had resorted to violence though they were represented in Parliament, could hold meetings, and could even vote. Even though General de Wet and General Kemp had led a force of twelve thousand and occupied towns and caused many deaths, they were both released soon after their convictions for high treason. I mentioned the case of Robey Leibbrandt, who set up an underground organization during the Second World War to oppose South Africa’s support for the Allies; he was sentenced to life imprisonment but soon pardoned. Kruger seemed as ignorant of these episodes in the history of his own people as he was of the Freedom Charter. It is difficult to negotiate with those who do not share the same frame of reference.

Kruger waved all of this aside. “That is ancient history,” he said. He came armed with a specific offer. Despite his reputation for brusqueness, he made his proposal in a deferential manner. He stated the matter simply: if I recognized the legitimacy of the Transkei government and was willing to move there, my sentence would be dramatically reduced.

I listened respectfully until he had finished. First, I said, I wholly rejected the bantustan policy, and would do nothing to support it, and second, I was from Johannesburg, and it was to Johannesburg that I would return. Kruger remonstrated with me, but to no avail. A month later he returned with the same proposal, and again I turned him down. It was an offer only a turncoat could accept.

pp. 573-574

80

 

As diligent as we were in gathering news and information, our knowledge of current events was always sketchy. Happenings in the outside world were muffled by the fact that we heard of them first through rumor; only later might they be confirmed by a newspaper account or an outside visitor.

In June of 1976, we began to hear vague reports of a great uprising in the country. The whispers were fanciful and improbable: the youth of Soweto had overthrown the military and the soldiers had dropped their guns and fled. It was only when the first young prisoners who had been involved in the June 16 uprising began to arrive on Robben Island in August that we learned what truly happened.

On June 16, 1976, fifteen thousand schoolchildren gathered in Soweto to protest the government’s ruling that half of all classes in secondary schools must be taught in Afrikaans. Students did not want to learn and teachers did not want to teach in the language of the oppressor. Pleadings and petitions by parents and teachers had fallen on deaf ears. A detachment of police confronted this army of earnest schoolchildren and without warning opened fire, killing thirteen-year-old Hector Pieterson and many others. The children fought with sticks and stones, and mass chaos ensued, with hundreds of children wounded, and two white men stoned to death.

The events of that day reverberated in every town and township of South Africa. The uprising triggered riots and violence across the country.

Mass funerals for the victims of state violence became national rallying points. Suddenly the young people of South Africa were fired with the spirit of protest and rebellion. Students boycotted schools all across the country. ANC organizers joined with students to actively support the protest.

Bantu Education had come back to haunt its creators, for these angry and audacious young people were its progeny.

In September, the isolation section was filled with young men who had been arrested in the aftermath of the uprising. Through whispered conversations  in an adjacent hallway we learned firsthand what had taken place. My comrades and I were enormously cheered; the spirit of mass protest that had seemed dormant through the 1960s was erupting in the 1970s. Many of these young people had left the country to join our own military movement, and then smuggled themselves back home. Thousands of them were trained in our camps in Tanzania, Angola, and Mozambique. There is nothing so encouraging in prison as learning that the people outside are supporting the cause for which you are inside.

These young men were a different breed of prisoner than we had ever seen before. They were brave, hostile, and aggressive; they would not take orders, and shouted “Amandla!” at every opportunity. Their instinct was to confront rather than cooperate. The authorities did not know how to handle them, and they turned the island upside down. During the Rivonia Trial, I remarked to a security policeman that if the government did not reform itself, the freedom fighters who would take our place would someday make the authorities yearn for us. That day had indeed come on Robben Island.

In these young men we saw the angry revolutionary spirit of the times. I had had some warning. At a visit with Winnie a few months before, she had managed to tell me through our coded conversation that there was a rising class of discontented youth who were militant and Africanist in orientation. She said they were changing the nature of the struggle and that I should be aware of them.

The new prisoners were appalled by what they considered the barbaric conditions of the island, and said they could not understand how we could live in such a way. We told them that they should have seen the island in 1964. But they were almost as skeptical of us as they were of the authorities. They chose to ignore our calls for discipline and thought our advice feeble and unassertive.

It was obvious that they regarded us, the Rivonia Trialists, as moderates. After so many years of being branded a radical revolutionary, to be perceived as a moderate was a novel and not altogether pleasant feeling. I knew that I could react in one of two ways: I could scold them for their impertinence or I could listen to what they were saying. I chose the latter.

When some of these men, such as Strini Moodley of the South African Students’ Organization and Saths Cooper of the Black People’s Convention, came into our section, I had them give us papers on their movement and philosophy. I wanted to know what had brought them to the struggle, what motivated them, what their ideas were for the future.

Shortly after their arrival on the island, the commanding officer came to me and asked me as a favor to address the young men. He wanted me to tell them to restrain themselves, to recognize the fact that they were in prison and to accept the discipline of prison life. I told him that I was not prepared to do that. Under the circumstances, they would have regarded me as a collaborator of the oppressor.

These fellows refused to conform to even basic prison regulations. One day I was at the Head Office conferring with the commanding officer. As I was walking out with the major, we came upon a young prisoner being interviewed by a prison official. The young man, who was no more than eighteen years old, was wearing his prison cap in the presence of senior officers, a violation of regulations. Nor did he stand up when the major entered the room, another violation.

The major looked at him and said, “Please, take off your cap.” The prisoner ignored him. Then in an irritated tone, the major said, “Take off your cap.” The prisoner turned and looked at the major, and said, “What for?” I could hardly believe what I had just heard. It was a revolutionary question: What for? The major also seemed taken aback, but managed a reply.

“It is against regulations,” he said. The young prisoner responded, “Why do you have this regulation? What is the purpose of it?” This questioning on the part of the prisoner was too much for the major, and he stomped out of the room, saying, “Mandela, you talk to him.” But I would not intervene on his behalf, and simply bowed in the direction of the prisoner to let him know that I was on his side.

This was our first exposure to the Black Consciousness Movement. With the banning of the ANC, PAC, and Communist Party, the Black Consciousness Movement helped fill a vacuum among young people. Black Consciousness was less a movement than a philosophy and grew out of the idea that blacks must first liberate themselves from the sense of psychological inferiority bred by three centuries of white rule. Only then could the people rise up in confidence and truly liberate themselves from repression. While the Black Consciousness Movement advocated a nonracial society, they excluded whites from playing a role in achieving that society. These concepts were not unfamiliar to me: they closely mirrored ideas I myself held at the time of the founding of the ANC Youth League a quarter-century before. We, too, were Africanists; we, too, stressed ethnic pride and racial self-confidence; we, too, rejected white assistance in the struggle. In many ways, Black Consciousness represented the same response to the same problem that had never gone away.

But just as we had outgrown our Youth League outlook, I was confident that these young men would transcend some of the strictures of Black Consciousness. While I was encouraged by their militancy, I thought that their philosophy, in its concentration on blackness, was exclusionary, and represented an intermediate view that was not fully mature. I saw my role as an elder statesman who might help them move on to the more inclusive ideas of the Congress Movement. I knew also that these young men would eventually become frustrated because Black Consciousness offered no program of action, no outlet for their protest.

Although we viewed the ranks of the BCM as a fertile ground for the ANC, we did not attempt to recruit these men. We knew that this would alienate both them and the other parties on the island. Our policy was to be friendly, to take an interest, to compliment them on their achievements, but not to proselytize. If they came to us and asked questions — “What is the ANC policy on the bantustans?” “What does the Freedom Charter say about nationalization?” — we would answer them — and a great many of them did come to us with questions.

I myself contacted some of these men through smuggled notes. I spoke with some who were from the Transkei and asked questions about my old home. Some of the men who arrived were already well known in the struggle. I had heard reports of the bravery of Patrick “Terror” Lekota, a leader of the South African Students’ Organization, and sent him a note of welcome to Robben Island.

Terror’s nickname comes from his prowess on the soccer field, but he was just as formidable in a debate. He disagreed with some of his colleagues on the issue of racial exclusiveness and inched closer to the ideas of the ANC. Once on the island, Terror decided that he wanted to join us, but we discouraged him — not because we did not want him but because we thought such a maneuver would create tensions in the general section.

But Terror would not take no for an answer and publicly switched his allegiance to the ANC. One day, not long afterward, he was assaulted with a garden fork by disgruntled BC members. After he was treated, the authorities charged the attackers and planned to put them on trial. But in the interest of harmony, we advised Terror not to lodge a complaint. He agreed, and refused to testify against those who had hurt him. The case was dropped. Such a trial, I felt, would only play into the hands of the authorities. I wanted these young men to see that the ANC was a great tent that could accommodate many different views and affiliations.

After that incident, the floodgates seemed to open and dozens of BC men decided to join the ANC, including some of those who had planned the attack on Terror. Terror rose to the top of the ANC hierarchy in the general section, and was soon teaching ANC policies to other prisoners. The courage and vision of men like Lekota confirmed to us that our views remained potent, and still represented the best hope for unifying the liberation struggle as a whole.

Political feuding continued in F and G. We learned of a clash among the ANC, the PAC, and the BCM in the general section. A number of ANC people had been beaten. A large number of ANC members were charged by the authorities, and a trial was set for the island’s administrative court.

The ANC men brought in an outside lawyer to handle the case. Although I had not witnessed the fight, I was asked to be a character witness. This was a troubling prospect. While I was more than willing to give testimonials for my comrades, I did not want to take any action that would heighten the bitterness between the ANC, the PAC, and the BCM.

I regarded my role in prison not just as the leader of the ANC, but as a promoter of unity, an honest broker, a peacemaker, and I was reluctant to take a side in this dispute, even if it was the side of my own organization. If I testified on behalf of the ANC, I would jeopardize my chances of bringing about reconciliation among the different groups. If I preached unity, I must act like a unifier, even at the risk of perhaps alienating some of my own colleagues.

I decided not to testify. This disappointed some of my colleagues, but I thought the issue was serious enough to risk their displeasure. It was more important to show the young Black Consciousness men that the struggle was indivisible and that we all had the same enemy

pp. 575-580

 

81

 
 
In their anxiousness to deal with these young lions, the authorities more or less let us fend for ourselves. We were in the second year of a goslow strike at the quarry, demanding a complete end to all manual labor. Our requirement was for the right to do something useful with our days, like studying or learning a trade. We no longer even went through the motions of working at the quarry; we simply talked among ourselves. In early 1977, the authorities announced the end of manual labor. Instead, we could spend our days in our section. They arranged some type of work for us to do in the courtyard, but it was merely a fig leaf to hide their capitulation.

This victory was the combined result of our own unceasing protests and simple logistics. The authorities normally preferred to have a ratio of one warder for every three prisoners. Even before the arrival of the post-Soweto prisoners, there was a shortage of warders, and the rebellious young men required even greater supervision. They were so bold that each man seemed to require his own warder. If we remained in our section, we required less supervision.

The end of manual labor was liberating. I could now spend the day reading, writing letters, discussing issues with my comrades, or formulating legal briefs. The free time allowed me to pursue what became two of my favorite hobbies on Robben Island: gardening and tennis.

To survive in prison, one must develop ways to take satisfaction in one’s daily life. One can feel fulfilled by washing one’s clothes so that they are particularly clean, by sweeping a hallway so that it is empty of dust, by organizing one’s cell to conserve as much space as possible. The same pride one takes in more consequential tasks outside of prison one can find in doing small things inside prison.

Almost from the beginning of my sentence on Robben Island, I asked the authorities for permission to start a garden in the courtyard. For years, they refused without offering a reason. But eventually they relented, and we were able to cut out a small garden on a narrow patch of earth against the far wall. The soil in the courtyard was dry and rocky. The courtyard had been constructed over a landfill, and in order to start my garden, I had to excavate a great many rocks to allow the plants room to grow. At the time, some of my comrades jested that I was a miner at heart, for I spent my days at the  quarry and my free time digging in the courtyard.

The authorities supplied me with seeds. I initially planted tomatoes, chilies, and onions — hardy plants that did not require rich earth or constant care. The early harvests were poor, but they soon improved. The authorities did not regret giving permission, for once the garden began to flourish, I often provided the warders with some of my best tomatoes and onions.

While I have always enjoyed gardening, it was not until I was behind bars that I was able to tend my own garden. My first experience in the garden was at Fort Hare where, as part of the university’s manual labor requirement, I worked in one of my professors’ gardens and enjoyed the contact with the soil as an antidote to my intellectual labors. Once I was in Johannesburg studying and then working, I had neither the time nor the space to cultivate a garden.

I began to order books on gardening and horticulture. I studied different gardening techniques and types of fertilizer. I did not have many of the materials that the books discussed, but I learned through trial and error. For a time, I attempted to grow peanuts, and used different soils and fertilizers, but finally I gave up. It was one of my only failures. A garden was one of the few things in prison that one could control. To plant a seed, watch it grow, to tend it and then harvest it, offered a simple but enduring satisfaction. The sense of being the custodian of this small patch of earth offered a small taste of freedom. In some ways, I saw the garden as a metaphor for certain aspects of my life. A leader must also tend his garden; he, too, plants seeds, and then watches, cultivates, and harvests the result. Like the gardener, a leader must take responsibility for what he cultivates; he must mind his work, try to repel enemies, preserve what can be preserved, and eliminate what cannot succeed.

I wrote Winnie two letters about a particularly beautiful tomato plant, how I coaxed it from a tender seedling to a robust plant that produced deep red fruit. But, then, either through some mistake or lack of care, the plant began to wither and decline, and nothing I did would bring it back to health. When it finally died, I removed the roots from the soil, washed them, and buried them in a corner of the garden. I narrated this small story at great length. I do not know what she read into that letter, but when I wrote it I had a mixture of feelings: I did not want our relationship to go the way of that plant, and yet I felt that I had been unable to nourish many of the most important relationships in my life.

Sometimes there is nothing one can do to save something that must die. One unanticipated result of ending manual labor was that I began to gain weight. Though we were doing barely enough labor at the quarry to work up a sweat, the walk there and back was enough to keep me trim.

I have always believed that exercise is not only a key to physical health but to peace of mind. Many times in the old days I unleashed my anger and frustration on a punching bag rather than taking it out on a comrade or even a policeman. Exercise dissipates tension, and tension is the enemy of serenity. I found that I worked better and thought more clearly when I was in good physical condition, and so training became one of the inflexible disciplines of my life. In prison, having an outlet for one’s frustrations wasabsolutely essential.

Even on the island, I attempted to follow my old boxing routine of doing roadwork and muscle-building from Monday through Thursday and then resting for the next three days. On Monday through Thursday, I would do stationary running in my cell in the morning for up to forty-five minutes. I would also perform one hundred fingertip push-ups, two hundred sit-ups, fifty deep kneebends, and various other calisthenics.

In my letters to my children, I regularly urged them to exercise, to play some fast-moving sport like basketball, soccer, or tennis to take their mind off whatever might be bothering them. While I was not always successful with my children, I did manage to influence some of my more sedentary colleagues. Exercise was unusual for African men of my age and generation. After a while, even Walter began to take a few turns around the courtyard in the morning. I know that some of my younger comrades looked at me and said to themselves, “If that old man can do it, why can’t I?” They too began to exercise.

From the very first meetings I had with outside visitors and the International Red Cross, I stressed the importance of having the time and facilities for proper exercise. Only in the mid-1970s, under the auspices of the International Red Cross, did we begin to receive things like volleyball equipment and a Ping-Pong table.

At roughly the same time we finished working at the quarry, one of the warders had the idea of converting our courtyard into a tennis court. Its dimensions were perfect. Prisoners from the general section painted the cement surface green and then fashioned the traditional configuration of white lines. A few days later a net was put up and suddenly we had our own Wimbledon in our front yard.

I had played a bit of tennis when I was at Fort Hare, but I was by no means an expert. My forehand was relatively strong, my backhand regrettably weak. But I pursued the sport for exercise, not style; it was the best and only replacement for the walks to and from the quarry. I was one of the first in our section to play regularly. I was a back-court player, only rushing the net when I had a clean slam.

Once manual labor ended, I had much more time for reading, but the books I had been using were now out-of-bounds. When my studies were canceled, I was still in the midst of pursuing my LL.B. at the University of London. I had started studying for the LL.B. during the Rivonia Trial and the suspension of study privileges for four years would undoubtedly assure me of the university record for the most number of years pursuing that degree.

But the suspension of study privileges had an unintended benefit, and that was that I began to read books that I would not otherwise have read.  Instead of poring over tomes about contract law, I was now absorbed by novels.

I did not have an unlimited library to choose from on Robben Island. We had access to many unremembered mysteries and detective novels and all the works of Daphne du Maurier, but little more. Political books were off-limits. Any book about socialism or communism was definitely out. A request for a book with the word red in the title, even if it was Little Red Riding Hood, would be rejected by the censors. War of the Worlds by H. G. Wells, though it is a work of science fiction, would be turned down because the word war appeared in its title.

From the first, I tried to read books about South Africa or by South African writers. I read all the unbanned novels of Nadine Gordimer and learned a great deal about the white liberal sensibility. I read many American novels, and recall especially John Steinbeck’s The Grapes of Wrath, in which I found many similarities between the plight of the migrant workers in that novel and our own laborers and farmworkers.

One book that I returned to many times was Tolstoy’s great work, War and Peace. (Although the word war was in the title, this book was permitted.) I was particularly taken with the portrait of General Kutuzov, whom everyone at the Russian court underestimated. Kutuzov defeated Napoleon precisely because he was not swayed by the ephemeral and superficial values of the court, and made his decisions on a visceral understanding of his men and his people. It reminded me once again that to truly lead one’s people one must also truly know them
 

pp. 581-585

 

 

82

 

IN THE WAKE of the Soweto student uprising, I learned that Winnie, along with my old friend and physician, Dr. Nthato Motlana, had become involved with the Black Parents Association, an organization of concerned local professionals and church leaders who acted as a guiding hand and intermediary for the students. The authorities seemed to be as wary of the parents association as of the young rebels. In August, less than two months after the student revolt, Winnie was detained under the Internal Security Act and imprisoned without charge in the Fort in Johannesburg, where she was held for five months. During that time, I was able to write to her and my daughters, who were at boarding school in Swaziland, expressing support and solidarity. I was greatly distressed by her imprisonment, though she was apparently not mistreated this time and emerged from jail in December even firmer in her commitment to the struggle.

Though banned, Winnie picked up where she left off, and the authorities were dismayed about her popularity with the young radicals of Soweto. They were determined to lessen her influence and did it with a brazen and shameless act: they sent her into internal exile. On the night of May 16, 1977, police cars and a truck pulled up outside of the house in Orlando West and began loading furniture and clothing into the back of the truck.

This time Winnie was not being arrested, or detained, or interrogated; she was being banished to a remote township in the Free State called Brandfort. I discovered the details from Kathy, wo had been given the information from a visiting Hindu priest.

Brandfort is about two hundred fifty miles southwest of Johannesburg, just north of Bloemfontein, in the Free State. After a long and rough ride, Winnie, Zindzi, and all their possessions were dumped in front of a three-room tin-roofed shack in Brandfort’s bleak African township, a desperately poor and backward place where the people were under the thumb of the local white farmers. Winnie was regarded with wariness and trepidation. The local language was Sesotho, which Winnie did not speak.

Her new circumstances saddened and angered me. At least when she was home in Soweto, I could picture her cooking in the kitchen or reading in the lounge, I could imagine her waking up in the house I knew so well. That was a source of comfort to me. In Soweto, even if she was banned, there were friends and family nearby. In Brandfort she and Zindzi would be alone.

I had passed through this township once on my way to Bloemfontein, and took no notice of it. There was nothing memorable in its all too typical poverty and desolateness. I did not know at the time how familiar the address — house number 802, Brandfort — would one day become to me.

Once again, I felt as though Winnie and I were in prison at the same time. Life in Brandfort was hard, as I learned from Winnie’s letters. They had no heat, no toilet, no running water. The township had no shops and the stores in town were hostile to African customers. The whites for the most part were Afrikaans-speaking and deeply conservative.

Winnie and Zindzi were under constant police surveillance and intermittent harassment. Within a few months Zindzi — who was not banned — was upset by the security police’s intimidation. In September, with the help of Winnie’s lawyers, I brought an urgent application for an interdict against the local Brandfort security police to restrain them from harassing my daughter. Affidavits filed before the judge described policemen bursting into the house and threatening Zindzi. The judge ruled that Zindzi could receive visitors in peace.

Winnie is a resilient person, and within a relatively short time, she had won over the people of the township, including some sympathetic whites in the vicinity. She supplied food to the people in the township with the help of Operation Hunger, started a crèche or nursery school for the township’s children, and raised funds to create a medical clinic in a place where few people had ever seen a doctor.

In 1978, Zeni, my second-youngest daughter and my first child with Winnie, married Prince Thumbumuzi, a son of King Sobhuza of Swaziland. They had met while Zeni was away at school. Being in prison, I was not able to fulfill the father’s traditional duties. In our culture, the father of the bride must interview the prospective groom and assess his prospects. He must also determine lobola, the bride-price, which is paid by the groom to the bride’s family. On the wedding day itself, the father gives away his daughter. Although I had no doubts about the young man, I asked my friend and legal adviser George Bizos to be a stand-in for me. I instructed George to interview the prince about how he intended to look after my daughter.

George met with the prince in his office and then arranged to consult with me on Robben Island. Because Zeni was under twenty-one years of age, it was necessary for me to give my legal consent for her to marry. I met George in the consulting room and he was surprised to find a warder in the consulting room with us. I explained that this was according to regulations because this was considered a family visit not a legal one. I jestingly reassured George by saying that I had no secrets from my guards.

George reported how much the two children loved one another and the bright prospects of my future son-in-law. His father, King Sobhuza, was an enlightened traditional leader and also a member of the ANC. As George relayed to me some of the requirements made by the young man’s family, he was at pains to point out that the boy was a Swazi prince. I told George to tell the young man that he was getting a Thembu princess.

There was a tremendous advantage in Zeni’s becoming a member of the Swazi royal family: she was immediately granted diplomatic privileges and could visit me virtually at will. That winter, after she and Thumbumuzi were married, they came to see me, along with their newborn baby daughter. Because of the prince’s status, we were allowed to meet one another in the consulting room, not the normal visiting area where one is separated from one’s family by thick walls and glass. I waited for them with some nervousness.

It was a truly wondrous moment when they came into the room. I stood up, and when Zeni saw me, she practically tossed her tiny daughter to her husband and ran across the room to embrace me. I had not held my now-grown daughter virtually since she was about her own daughter’s age. It was a dizzying experience, as though time had sped forward in a science fiction novel, to suddenly hug one’s fully grown child. I then embraced my new son and he handed me my tiny granddaughter whom I did not let go of for the entire visit. To hold a newborn baby, so vulnerable and soft in my rough hands, hands that for too long had held only picks and shovels, was a profound joy. I don’t think a man was ever happier to hold a baby than I was that day.

The visit had a more official purpose and that was for me to choose a name for the child. It is a custom for the grandfather to select a name, and the one I had chosen was Zaziwe — which means “Hope.” The name had special meaning for me, for during all my years in prison hope never left me — and now it never would. I was convinced that this child would be a part of a new generation of South Africans for whom apartheid would be a distant memory — that was my dream.

pp. 590-594

 

83


 

I do not know whether it was the upheaval inside the prison after the Soweto uprising or the upheaval in my family’s life outside of prison, but in the year or two following 1976 I was in a dreamy, nostalgic state of mind. In prison, one has time to review the past, and memory becomes both friend and foe. My memory transported me into moments of both great joy and sadness. My dream life became very rich, and I seemed to pass entire nights reliving the high and low times of the old days.

I had one recurring nightmare. In the dream, I had just been released from prison — only it was not Robben Island, but a jail in Johannesburg. I walked outside the gates into the city and found no one there to meet me. In fact, there was no one there at all, no people, no cars, no taxis. I would then set out on foot toward Soweto. I walked for many hours before arriving in Orlando West, and then turned the corner toward 8115. Finally, I would see my home, but it turned out to be empty, a ghost house, with all the doors and windows open, but no one at all there.

But not all my dreams of release were so dark. In 1976 I wrote to Winnie of a happier vision.


The night of 24 February, I dreamt arriving at 8115 finding the house full of youth dancing away to a mixture of jive and infiba. I caught all of them by surprise as I walked in unexpectedly. Some greeted me warmly, whilst others simply melted away shyly. I found the bedroom equally full with members of the family and close friends. You were relaxing in bed, with Kgatho [my son Makgatho], looking young and sleeping against the opposite wall. Perhaps in that dream I was recalling the two weeks in December 1956 when he was six and when I left Makhulu [Evelyn’s mother] alone in the house. He was living with his mother in O.E. [Orlando East] then, but a few days before I came back he joined Makhulu and slept in my bed. He was missing me very much and using the bed must have relieved the feeling of longing a bit.


While I took joy from dwelling on happy moments, I rued the pain I had often caused my family through my absence. Here is another letter from 1976.


As I woke up on the morning of 25 February I was missing you and the children a great deal as always. These days I spend quite some time thinking of you both as Dadewethu [Sister], Mum, pal and mentor. What you perhaps don’t know is how I often think and actually picture in my mind all that makes you up physically and spiritually — the loving remarks which came daily and the blind eye you’ve always turned against those numerous irritations that would have frustrated another woman. . . . I even remember a day when you were bulging with Zindzi, struggling to cut your nails. I now recall those incidents with a sense of shame. I could have done it for you. Whether or not I was conscious of it, my attitude was: I’ve done my duty, a second brat is on the way, the difficulties you are now facing as a result of your physical condition are all yours. My only consolation is the knowledge that I then led a life where I’d hardly enough time even to think. Only I wonder what it’ll be like when I return. . . . Your beautiful photo still stands about two feet above my left shoulder as I write this note. I dust it carefully every morning, for to do so gives me the pleasant feeling that I’m caressing you as in the old days. I even touch your nose with mine to recapture the electric current that used to flush through my blood whenever I did so. Nolitha stands on the table directly opposite me. How can my spirits ever be down when I enjoy the fond attentions of such wonderful ladies.

Nolitha was the one person who was not a member of the family whose photo I kept. I revealed the secret of her identity to my daughter Zindzi in another letter from 1976.

By the way, has Mum ever told you about Nolitha, the other lady in my cell from the Andaman Islands? She keeps you, Zeni, Ndindi and Nandi, Mandla [these last three are grandchildren], Maki and Mum company. It’s one matter over which Mum’s comments are surprisingly economic. She regards the pygmy beauty as some sort of rival and hardly suspects that I took her picture out of the National Geographic.


I thought continually of the day when I would walk free. Over and over, I fantasized about what I would like to do. This was one of the pleasantest
ways to pass the time. I put my daydreams on paper, again in 1976.


I wish I could drive you on a long, long journey just as I did on 12/6/58, with the one difference that this time I’d prefer us to be alone. I’ve been away from you for so long that the very first thing I would like to do on my return would be to take you away from that suffocating atmosphere, drive you along carefully, so that you could have the opportunity of breathing fresh and clean air, seeing the beauty spots of South Africa, its green grass and trees, colourful wild flowers, sparkling streams, animals grazing in the veld and be able to talk to the simple people we meet along the road. Our first stop would be to the place where Ma Radebe and CK [Winnie’s mother and father] sleep. I hope they lie next to each other.
Then I would be able to pay my respects to those who have made it possible for me to be as happy and free as I am now. Perhaps the stories I’ve so much wanted to tell you all these years would begin there. The atmosphere should probably sharpen your ears and restrain me to concentrate on those aspects which are tasty, edifying and constructive. Thereafter, we would adjourn and resume next to Mphakanyiswa and Nosekeni [my parents] where the environment would be similar. I believe we would then be fresh and solid as we drive back to 8115.


When the authorities began to allow us to receive photographs of immediate family members in the early 1970s, Winnie sent me an album. Whenever I received a photograph of Winnie, the children, or the grandchildren, I would carefully paste it in. I cherished this album; it was the one way that I could see those I loved whenever I wanted.

But in prison no privilege comes without some accompanying impediment. Though I was permitted to receive pictures and to keep the album, warders would often search my cell and confiscate pictures of Winnie. Eventually, however, the practice of seizing pictures ceased, and I built up my album so that it was thick with pictures of my entire family.

I do not remember who first asked to borrow my photo album, but it was undoubtedly someone in my section. I happily loaned it, and someone else asked, and then someone else. Soon it became so widely known that I possessed a photo album that I was receiving requests from men in F and G.

The men of F and G rarely received visitors or even letters, and it would have been ungenerous to deny them this window on the world. But before long I found that my precious photo album was in tatters, and that many of my irreplaceable photographs had been removed. These men were desperate to have something personal in their cells and could not help themselves. Each time this happened, resolved to build up my album once more.

Sometimes men would just ask me for a photograph rather than the album. I recall one day a young BC fellow from the general section who was bringing us food took me aside and said, “Madiba, I would like a photograph.” I said fine, I would send him one. “When?” he said rather brusquely. I replied that I would try to send it that weekend. This seemed to satisfy him, and he began to walk away, but suddenly he turned round and said, “Look, don’t send me a photograph of the old lady. Send me one of the young girls, Zindzi or Zeni — remember, not the old lady!"

 pp. 590-594

 

84

 

 

In 1978, after we had spent almost fifteen years agitating for the right to receive news, the authorities offered us a compromise. Instead of permitting us to receive newspapers or listen to radio, they started their own radio news service, which consisted of a daily canned summary of the news read over the prison’s intercom system.

The broadcasts were far from objective or comprehensive. Several of the island’s censors would compile a brief news digest from other daily radio bulletins. The broadcasts consisted of good news for the government and bad news for all its opponents.

The first broadcast opened with a report about the death of Robert Sobukwe. Other early reports concerned the victories of Ian Smith’s troops in Rhodesia and detentions of government opponents in South Africa. Despite the slanted nature of the news, we were glad to have it, and prided ourselves on reading between the lines and making educated guesses based on the obvious omissions.

That year, we learned via the intercom that P. W. Botha had succeeded John Vorster as prime minister. What the warders did not tell us was that Vorster resigned as a result of press revelations about the Department of Information's misuse of government funds. I knew little about Botha apart  from the fact that he had been an aggressive defense minister and had supported a military strike into Angola in 1975. We had no sense that he would be a reformer in any way.

I had recently read an authorized biography of Vorster (this was one of the books the prison library did have) and found that he was a man willing to pay for his beliefs; he went to prison for his support of Germany during the Second World War. We were not sorry to see Vorster go. He had escalated the battle against freedom to new heights of repression.

But even without our expurgated radio broadcast, we had learned what the authorities did not want us to know. We learned of the successful liberation struggles in Mozambique and Angola in 1975 and their emergence as independent states with revolutionary governments. The tide was turning our way.

In keeping with the increased openness on the island, we now had our own cinema. Almost every week, we watched films on a sheet in a large room adjacent to our corridor. Later, we had a proper screen. The films were a wonderful diversion, a vivid escape from the bleakness of prison life. The first films we saw were silent, black-and-white Hollywood action movies and westerns that were even before my time. I recall one of the first ones was The Mark of Zorro, with the swashbuckling Douglas Fairbanks, a movie that was made in 1920. The authorities seemed to have a weakness for historical films, particularly ones with a stern moral message. Among the early films we saw — now in color, with dialogue — were The Ten Commandments with Charlton Heston as Moses, The King and I, with Yul Brynner, and Cleopatra, with Richard Burton and Elizabeth Taylor.

We were intrigued by The King and I, for to us it depicted the clash between the values of East and West, and seemed to suggest that the West had much to learn from the East. Cleopatra proved controversial; many of my comrades took exception to the fact that the queen of Egypt was depicted by a raven-haired, violet-eyed American actress, however beautiful. The detractors asserted that the movie was an example of Western propaganda that sought to erase the fact that Cleopatra was an African woman. I related how on my trip to Egypt I saw a splendid sculpture of a young, ebony-skinned Cleopatra.

Later, we also saw local South African films with black stars whom we all knew from the old days. On those nights, our little makeshift theater echoed with the shouts, whistles, and cheers that greeted the appearance of an old friend on screen. Later, we were permitted to select documentaries — a form that I preferred — and I began to skip the conventional films. (Although I would never miss a movie with Sophia Loren in it.) The documentaries were ordered from the state library and usually selected by Ahmed Kathrada, who was our section’s librarian. I was particularly affected by a documentary we saw about the great naval battles of World War II, which showed newsreel footage of the sinking of the H.M.S. Prince of Wales by the Japanese. What moved me most was a brief image of Winston Churchill weeping after he heard the news of the loss of the British vessel. The image stayed in my memory a long time, and demonstrated to me that there are times when a leader can show sorrow in public, and that it will not diminish him in the eyes of his people.

One of the documentaries we watched concerned a controversial American motorcycle group, the Hell’s Angels. The film depicted the Hell’s Angels as reckless, violent, and antisocial, and the police as decent, upstanding, and trustworthy. When the film ended, we immediately began to discuss its meaning. Almost without exception the men criticized the Hell’s Angels for their lawless ways. But then Strini Moodley, a bright, young Black Consciousness member, stood up and accused the assembled group of being out of touch with the times, for the bikers represented the
 equivalent of the Soweto students of 1976 who rebelled against the authorities. He reproached us for being elderly middle-class intellectuals who identified with the movie’s right-wing authorities instead of with the bikers.


Strini’s accusations caused a furor, and a number of men rose to speak against him, saying the Hell’s Angels were indefensible and it was an insult to compare our struggle with this band of amoral sociopaths. But I considered what Strini said, and while I did not agree with him, I came to his defense. Even though the Hell’s Angels were unsympathetic, they were the rebels against the authorities, unsavory rebels though they were.

I was not interested in the Hell’s Angels, but the larger question that concerned me was whether we had, as Strini suggested, become stuck in a mind-set that was no longer revolutionary. We had been in prison for more than fifteen years; I had been in prison for nearly eighteen. The world that we left was long gone. The danger was that our ideas had become frozen in time. Prison is a still point in a turning world, and it is very easy to remain in the same place in jail while the world moves on. I had always attempted to remain open to new ideas, not to reject a position because it was new or different. During our years on the island we kept up a continuing dialogue about our beliefs and ideas;  we debated them, questioned them, and thereby refined them. I did not think we had stayed in one place; I believe we had evolved.

Although Robben Island was becoming more open, there was as yet still no sign that the state was reforming its views. Even so, I did not doubt that I would someday be a free man. We may have been stuck in one place, but I was confident the world was moving toward our position, not away from it. The movie reminded me once again that on the day I did walk out of prison, I did not want to appear to be a political fossil from an age long past.

It took fifteen years, but in 1979, the authorities announced over the intercom system that the diet for African, Coloured, and Indian prisoners would henceforth be the same. But just as justice delayed is justice denied, a reform so long postponed and so grudgingly enacted was hardly worth celebrating.

All prisoners were to receive the same amount of sugar in the morning: a spoonful and a half. But instead of simply increasing the African quota, the authorities reduced the amount of sugar that Coloured and Indian prisoners received by half a spoonful, while adding that amount for African prisoners. A while before, African prisoners had begun to receive bread in the morning, but that made little difference. We had been pooling bread for years.

Our food had already improved in the previous two years, but not because of the authorities. In the wake of the Soweto uprising, the authorities had decided that the island would become the exclusive home of South Africa’s “security prisoners.” The number of general prisoners had been drastically reduced. As a result, political prisoners were recruited to work in the kitchen for the first time. Once political prisoners were in the kitchen, our diet improved dramatically. This was not because they were better chefs, but because the smuggling of food immediately stopped. Instead of siphoning off food for themselves or to bribe the warders, the new cooks used all the food allotted us. Vegetables became more abundant, and chunks of meat began to appear in our soups and stews. Only then did we realize we should have been eating such food for years

pp. 595-599

 

 

85

 

In the Summer of 1979, I was playing tennis in the courtyard, when my opponent hit a cross-court shot that I strained to reach. As I ran across the court, I felt a pain in my right heel that was so intense I had to stop playing. For the next few days I walked with a severe limp.

I was examined by a doctor on the island who decided I should go to Cape Town to see a specialist. The authorities had become more solicitous of our health, afraid that if we died in prison they would be condemned by the international community.

Although under normal circumstances I and the other men would relish a visit to Cape Town, going as a prisoner was altogether different. I was handcuffed and kept in a remote corner of the boat surrounded by five armed warders. The sea was rough that day, and the boat shuddered at every wave. About midway between the island and Cape Town, I thought we were in danger of capsizing. I spied a lifejacket behind two warders young enough to be my grandsons. I said to myself, “If this boat goes under, I will commit my last sin on earth and run over those two boys to get that lifejacket.” But in the end, it was unnecessary.

On the docks, we were met by more armed guards and a small crowd. It is a humiliating experience to watch the fear and disgust on ordinary citizens’ faces when they watch a convict go by. My inclination was to duck down and hide, but one could not do that.

I was examined by a young surgeon who asked if I had ever before injured my heel. In fact, I had when I was at Fort Hare. One afternoon, I was playing soccer when I attempted to steal the ball and felt a searing pain in my heel. I was taken to the local hospital, the first time in my life I had ever been to a hospital or seen a doctor. Where I grew up, there was no such thing as an African doctor, and going to see a white doctor was unheard of.

The Fort Hare doctor examined my heel and said he would need to operate. The diagnosis alarmed me, and I abruptly told him that I did not want him to touch me. At that stage in my life I regarded seeing a doctor as unmanly and having a medical procedure seemed even worse. “Suit yourself,” he said, “but when you are old this thing will worry you.”

The Cape Town surgeon X-rayed my heel and discovered bone fragments that had probably been there since Fort Hare. He said he could remove them in a procedure that could be performed with a local anesthetic right in his office. I immediately agreed.

The surgery went well, and when it was over, the doctor was explaining to me how to care for my heel. He was abruptly interrupted by the head warder, who said that I had to return immediately to Robben Island. The surgeon was incensed by this and in his most authoritative manner said that it was necessary for Mr. Mandela to remain in hospital overnight and that he would not release me under any circumstances. The warder was intimidated and acquiesced.

My first night in a proper hospital turned out to be quite pleasant. The nurses fussed over me a good deal. I slept very well, and in the morning, a group of nurses came in and said that I should keep the pajamas and dressing gown that I had been given. I thanked them and told them that I would be the envy of all my comrades.

I found the trip instructive in another way because in that hospital I sensed a thawing in the relationship between black and white. The doctor and nurses had treated me in a natural way as though they had been dealing with blacks on a basis of equality all their lives. This was something new and different to me, and an encouraging sign. It reaffirmed my long-held belief that education was the enemy of prejudice. These were men and women of science, and science had no room for racism.

My only regret was that I did not have the opportunity to contact Winnie before I went into hospital. Rumors had appeared in newspapers that I was at death’s door and she had become quite concerned. But when I returned, I wrote to her to dispel her fears.

In 1980, we were granted the right to buy newspapers. This was a victory, but as always, each new privilege contained within it a catch. The new regulation stated that A Group prisoners were granted the right to buy one English- language newspaper and one Afrikaans newspaper a day. But the annoying caveat was that any A Group prisoner found sharing his newspaper with a non–A Group prisoner would lose his newspaper privileges. We protested against this restriction, but to no avail. We received two daily newspapers: the Cape Times and Die Burger. Both were conservative papers, especially the latter. Yet prison censors went through each of those newspapers every day with scissors, clipping articles that they deemed unsafe for us to see. By the time we received them, they were filled with holes. We were soon able to supplement these papers with copies of the Star, the Rand Daily Mail, and the Sunday Times, but these papers were even more heavily censored.

One story I was certainly not able to read was in the Johannesburg Sunday Post in March 1980. The headline was “FREE MANDELA!” Inside was a petition that people could sign to ask for my release and that of my fellow political prisoners. While newspapers were still barred from printing my picture or any words I had ever said or written, the Post’s campaign ignited a public discussion of our release.

The idea had been conceived in Lusaka by Oliver and the ANC, and the campaign was the cornerstone of a new strategy that would put our cause in the forefront of people’s minds. The ANC had decided to personalize the quest for our release by centering the campaign on a single figure. There is no doubt that the millions of people who subsequently became supporters of this campaign had no idea of precisely who Nelson Mandela was. (I am told that when “Free Mandela” posters went up in London, most young people thought my Christian name was Free.) There were a handful of dissenting voices on the island who felt that personalizing the campaign was a betrayal of the collectivity of the organization, but most people realized that it was a technique to rouse the people.

The previous year I had been awarded the Jawaharlal Nehru Human Rights Award in India, another bit of evidence of the resurgence of the struggle. I was of course refused permission to attend the ceremony, as was Winnie, but Oliver accepted the award in my absence. We had a sense of a reviving ANC. Umkhonto we Sizwe was stepping up its sabotage campaign, which had become far more sophisticated. In June, MK set off bombs at the vast Sasolburg refinery just south of Johannesburg. MK was orchestrating an explosion a week at some strategic site or another.

Bombs exploded at power stations in the eastern Transvaal, at police stations in Germiston, Daveyton, New Brighton, and elsewhere, and at the Voortrekkerhoogte military base outside Pretoria. These were all strategically significant locations, places that would attract attention and worry the state. The defense minister, General Magnus Malan, backed by P. W. Botha, introduced a policy known as “total onslaught,” which was a militarization of the country to combat the liberation struggle.

The Free Mandela campaign had its lighter side as well. In 1981, I learned that the students at the University of London had nominated me as a candidate for the honorific post of university chancellor. This was a wonderful honor, to be sure, and my rivals were none other than Princess Anne and the trade union leader Jack Jones. In the end, I polled 7,199 votes and lost to the daughter of the queen. I wrote to Winnie in Brandfort that I hoped the voting might have for a moment turned her humble shack into a castle, making its tiny rooms as grand as the ballroom at Windsor.

The campaign for our release rekindled our hopes. During the harsh days of the early 1970s, when the ANC seemed to sink into the shadows, we had to force ourselves not to give in to despair. In many ways, we had miscalculated; we had thought that by the 1970s we would be living in a democratic, nonracial South Africa. Yet as we entered the new decade my hopes for that South Africa rose once again. Some mornings I walked out into the courtyard and every living thing there, the seagulls and wagtails, the small trees, and even the stray blades of grass, seemed to smile and shine in the sun. It was at such times when I perceived the beauty of even this small, closed-in corner of the world, that I knew that someday my people and I would be free

pp. 600-604

 

86

 

Like my father before me, I had been groomed to be a counselor to the king of the Thembu. Although I had chosen a different path, I tried in my own fashion to live up to the responsibilities of the role for which I had been schooled. From prison, I did my best to remain in contact with the king and advise him as best I could. As I grew older, my thoughts turned more and more often to the green hills of the Transkei. Although I would never move there under the government’s auspices, I dreamed of one day returning to a free Transkei. Thus, it was with great dismay that I learned in 1980 that the king, Sabata Dalindyebo, the paramount chief of the Thembu, had been deposed by my nephew, K. D. Matanzima, the prime minister of the Transkei.

A group of Thembu chiefs requested an urgent visit with me, which was approved by the authorities, who were usually willing to countenance visits by traditional leaders — believing that the more involved I was in tribal and Transkei matters, the less committed I would be to the struggle.

The government promoted the power of traditional leaders as a counterpoint to the ANC. While many of my comrades thought we should disavow those leaders, my inclination was to reach out to them. There is no contradiction between being a traditional leader and a member of the ANC. This spurred one of the longest and most delicate debates we had on the island: whether or not the ANC should participate in governmentsponsored institutions. Many of the men considered this collaborationist. Once again, I thought it necessary to draw a distinction between principle and tactics. To me, the critical question was a tactical one: Will our organization emerge stronger through participating in these organizations or by boycotting them? In this case, I thought we would emerge stronger by participating.

I met with the chiefs in a large room in the visiting area, and they explained their dilemma. Although their hearts were with Sabata, they feared Matanzima. After listening to their presentation, I advised them to throw their support to Sabata against Matanzima, who was illegally and shamefully usurping power from the king. I sympathized with their situation, but I could not condone Matanzima’s actions. I asked them to convey my support to Sabata and my disapproval to Matanzima.

Matanzima had also proposed a visit to discuss Sabata and family matters. As my nephew, he had actually been requesting such a visit for a number of years. Although Matanzima claimed to want to discuss family matters, such a visit would have political consequences. From the moment of Matanzima’s first request, I referred the matter to the High Organ and the ANC men in our section. Some simply shrugged their shoulders and said, “He’s your nephew; he has a right to visit.” Raymond, Govan, and Kathy, however, insisted that although such a visit could be explained away
 as a family matter, it would be interpreted by many people inside and outside as a sign of my endorsement of the man and his policies. That was
 the reason why Matanzima wanted to visit, and the reason such a visit was unacceptable.

I understood and in large part agreed with their arguments, but I wanted to meet with my nephew. I have always had perhaps too high a regard for the importance of face-to-face meetings and of my own ability in such a meeting to persuade men to change their views. I was hoping I could convince Matanzima to modify his policies.

Eventually, the ANC men in our section decided not to object to a visit. In the interests of democracy, we then consulted with our men in F and G on the matter, and they were adamantly opposed. Steve Tshwete, who was one of the leading ANC figures in the general section, said such a visit would help Matanzima politically and was therefore out of the question. Many of them noted that Matanzima had already tried to coopt my approval by making Winnie’s father, Columbus Madikizela, the minister of agriculture in his government. This was bad enough, they said, without Madiba agreeing to see him. I bowed to the views of the membership in the general section and regretfully informed the authorities that I would not accept a visit from my nephew.

In March of 1982, I was told by the prison authorities that my wife had been in a car accident, and that she was in hospital. They had very little information. and I had no idea of her condition or what her circumstances were. I accused the authorities of holding back informaion, and I made an urgent application for my attorney to visit me. the authorities used information as a weapon, and it was a  successful one. I was preoccupied with my wife’s health until I was visited on March 31 by Winnie’s attorney and my friend Dullah Omar.

Dullah quickly eased my mind about Winnie. She had been in a car that overturned but she was all right. Our visit was brief, and as I was led back to Section B my mind was still dwelling on Winnie, and I was plagued by the feeling of powerlessness and my inability to help her.

I had not been in my cell long when I was visited by the commanding officer and a number of other prison officials. This was highly unusual; the commanding officer did not generally pay calls on prisoners in their cells. I stood up when they arrived, and the commander actually entered my cell. There was barely room for the two of us.
“Mandela,” he said, “I want you to pack up your things.”
I asked him why.
“We are transferring you,” he said simply.
Where?
“I cannot say,” he replied.
I demanded to know why. He told me only that he had received instructions from Pretoria that I was to be transferred off the island immediately. The commanding officer left and went in turn to the cells of Walter, Raymond Mhlaba, and Andrew Mlangeni and gave them the same order. I was disturbed and unsettled. What did it mean? Where were we going? In prison, one can only question and resist an order to a certain point, then one must succumb. We had no warning, no preparation. I had been on the island for over eighteen years, and to leave so abruptly? We were each given several large cardboard boxes in which to pack our things. Everything that I had accumulated in nearly two decades could fit in these few boxes. We packed in little more than half an hour.

There was a commotion in the corridor when the other men learned we were leaving, but we had no time to say a proper goodbye to our comrades of many years. This is another one of the indignities of prison. The bonds of friendship and loyalty with other prisoners count for nothing with the authorities. Within minutes we were on board the ferry headed for Cape Town. I looked back at the island as the light was fading, not knowing whether or not I would ever see it again. A man can get used to anything, and I had grown used to Robben Island. I had lived there for almost two decades and while it was never a home — my home was in Johannesburg — it had become a place where I felt comfortable. I have always found change difficult, and leaving Robben Island, however grim it had been at times, was no exception. I had no idea what to look forward to.

At the docks, surrounded by armed guards, we were hustled into a windowless truck. The four of us stood in the dark while the truck drove for what seemed considerably longer than an hour. We passed through various checkpoints, and finally came to a stop. The back doors swung open, and in the dark we were marched up some concrete steps and through metal doors into another security facility. I managed to ask a guard where we were. “Pollsmoor Prison,” he said.

pp. 605-608

 

PART TEN

 

TALKING WITH THE ENEMY

 

87

 

Pollsmoor Maximum Security Prison is located on the edge of a prosperous white suburb of green lawns and tidy houses called Tokai, a few miles southeast of Cape Town. The prison itself is set amidst the strikingly beautiful scenery of the Cape, between the mountains of Constantiaberge to the north and hundreds of acres of vineyards to the south. But this natural beauty was invisible to us behind Pollsmoor’s high concrete walls. At Pollsmoor I first understood the truth of Oscar Wilde’s haunting line about the tent of blue that prisoners call the sky.

Pollsmoor had a modern face but a primitive heart. The buildings, particularly the ones for the prison staff, were clean and contemporary; but the housing for the prisoners was archaic and dirty. With the exception of ourselves, all men at Pollsmoor were common-law prisoners, and their treatment was backward. We were kept separately from them and treated differently.

It was not until the next morning that we got a proper sense of our surroundings. The four of us had been given what was in effect the prison’s penthouse: a spacious room on the third and topmost floor of the prison. We were the only prisoners on the entire floor. The main room was clean, modern, and rectangular, about fifty feet by thirty, and had a separate section with a toilet, urinal, two sinks, and two showers. There were four proper beds, with sheets, and towels, a great luxury for men who had spent much of the last eighteen years sleeping on thin mats on a stone floor.

Compared to Robben Island, we were in a five-star hotel. We also had our own L-shaped terrace, an open, outdoor section that was as long as half a soccer field, where we were allowed out during the day. It had white concrete walls about twelve feet high, so that we could see only the sky, except in one corner where we could make out the ridges of the Constantiaberge mountains, in particular a section known as the Elephant’s Eye. I sometimes thought of this bit of mountain as the tip of the iceberg of the rest of the world.

It was greatly disorienting to be uprooted so suddenly and without explanation. One must be prepared for precipitate movements in prison, but one does not ever get used to them. Though we were now on the mainland, we felt more isolated. For us, the island had become the locus of the struggle. We took solace in each other’s company, and spent those early weeks speculating on why we had been transferred. We knew the authorities had long resented and feared the influence we had on younger prisoners. But the reason seemed to be more strategic: we believed the authorities were attempting to cut off the head of the ANC on the island by removing its leadership. Robben Island itself was becoming a sustaining myth in the struggle, and they wanted to rob it of some of its symbolic import by removing us. Walter, Raymond, and I were members of the High Organ, but the one piece that did not fit was the presence of Mlangeni. Andrew was not a member of the High Organ and had not been in the forefront of the island leadership, although we considered the possibility that the authorities did not know this. Their intelligence about the organization was often inexact. One of our hypotheses seemed to be confirmed a few months later when we were joined by Kathy, who had indeed been a member of the High Organ. More important, Kathy had been our chief of communications, and it was because of his work that we were able to communicate with new young prisoners.

A few weeks after Kathy arrived, we were also joined by a man we did not know who had not even come from Robben Island. Patrick Maqubela was a young lawyer and ANC member from the eastern Cape. He had been articled to Griffiths Mxenge, a highly respected attorney who had appeared for many detained ANC men and who had been assassinated near Durban the year before. Maqubela was serving a twenty-year sentence for treason and had been transferred to Pollsmoor from Diepkloof in Johannesburg, where he had made waves by organizing prisoners.

At first, we were skeptical of this new arrival, and wondered if he could perhaps be a security plant by the authorities. But we soon saw that this was not the case. Patrick was a bright, amiable, undaunted fellow with whom we got along very well. It could not have been easy for him bunking in with a group of old men set in their ways who had been together for the previous two decades.

We were now in a world of concrete. I missed the natural splendor of Robben Island. But our new home had many consolations. For one thing, the food at Pollsmoor was far superior; after years of eating pap three meals a day, Pollsmoor’s dinners of proper meat and vegetables were like a feast. We were permitted a fairly wide range of newspapers and magazines, and could receive such previously contraband publications as Time magazine and The Guardian weekly from London. This gave us a window on the wider world. We also had a radio, but one that received only local stations, not what we really wanted: the BBC World Service. We were allowed out on our terrace all day long, except between twelve and two when  the warders had their lunch. There was not even a pretense that we had to work. I had a small cell near our large one that functioned as a study, with a chair, desk, and bookshelves, where I could read and write during the day.

On Robben Island I would do my exercises in my own cramped cell, but now I had room to stretch out. At Pollsmoor, I would wake up at five and do an hour and a half of exercise in our communal cell. I did my usual regimen of stationary running, skipping rope, sit-ups, and fingertip press-ups. My comrades were not early risers and my program soon made me a very unpopular fellow in our cell.

I was visited by Winnie shortly after arriving at Pollsmoor and was pleased to find that the visiting area was far better and more modern than the one on Robben Island. We had a large glass barrier through which one could see the visitor from the waist up and far more sophisticated microphones so that we did not have to strain to hear. The window gave at least the illusion of greater intimacy, and in prison, illusions can offer comfort.

It was far easier for my wife and family to get to Pollsmoor than Robben Island, and this made a tremendous difference. The supervision of visits also became more humane. Often, Winnie’s visits were overseen by Warrant Officer James Gregory, who had been a censor on Robben Island. I had not known him terribly well, but he knew us, because he had been responsible for reviewing our incoming and outgoing mail.

At Pollsmoor I got to know Gregory better and found him a welcome contrast to the typical warder. He was polished and soft-spoken, and treated Winnie with courtesy and deference. Instead of barking, “Time up!” he would say, “Mrs. Mandela, you have five more minutes.”

The Bible tells us that gardens preceded gardeners, but that was not the case at Pollsmoor, where I cultivated a garden that became one of my happiest diversions. It was my way of escaping from the monolithic concrete world that surrounded us. Within a few weeks of surveying all the empty space we had on the building’s roof and how it was bathed in sun the whole day, I decided to start a garden and received permission to do so from the commanding officer. I requested that the prison service supply me with sixteen 44-gallon oil drums that I had them slice in half. The authorities then filled each half with rich, moist soil, creating in effect thirty-two giant flowerpots.

I grew onions, eggplant, cabbage, cauliflower, beans, spinach, carrots, cucumbers, broccoli, beetroot, lettuce, tomatoes, peppers, strawberries, and much more. At its height, I had a small farm with nearly nine hundred plants; a garden far grander than the one I had on Robben Island.

Some of the seeds I purchased and some — for example, broccoli and carrots — were given to me by the commanding officer, Brigadier Munro, who was particularly fond of these vegetables. Warders also gave me seeds of vegetables they liked, and I was supplied with excellent manure to use as fertilizer.

Each morning, I put on a straw hat and rough gloves and worked in the garden for two hours. Every Sunday, I would supply vegetables to the kitchen so that they could cook a special meal for the common-law prisoners. I also gave quite a lot of my harvest to the warders, who used to bring satchels to take away their fresh vegetables.

At Pollsmoor, our problems tended to be less consequential than those we experienced on Robben Island. Brigadier Munro was a decent, helpful man, who took extra pains to make sure we had what we wanted. Nevertheless, small problems sometimes got blown out of proportion. In 1983, during a visit with Winnie and Zindzi, I mentioned to my wife that I had been given shoes that were a size too small and were pinching my toe.

Winnie was concerned, and I soon learned thatthere were press reports that I was having a toe amputated. Because of the difficulty of communication information from prison often becomes exaggerated in the outside world. If I had simply been able to telephone my wife and tell her that my foot was fine, such confusion would not have happened. A short while later, Helen Suzman was permitted to visit, and she inquired about my toe. I thought the best answer was a demonstratioon. I took off my socks, held my bare foot up to the glass, and wiggled my toes.

We complained about the dampness in our cell, which was causing us to catch colds. Later, I heard reports that South African newspapers were writing that our cell was flooded. We asked for contact with other prisoners, and in general made the same basic complaint that we always had: to be treated as political prisoners.

In May of 1984, I found some consolation that seemed to make up for all the discomforts. At a scheduled visit from Winnie, Zeni, and her youngest daughter, I was escorted down to the visiting area by Sergeant Gregory, who instead of taking me to the normal visiting area, ushered me into a separate room where there was only a small table, and no dividers of any kind. He very softly said to me that the authorities had made a change. That day was the beginning of what were known as “contact” visits.

He then went outside to see my wife and daughter and asked to speak to Winnie privately. Winnie actually got a fright when Gregory took her aside, thinking that I was perhaps ill. But Gregory escorted her around the door and before either of us knew it, we were in the same room and in each other’s arms. I kissed and held my wife for the first time in all these many years. It was a moment I had dreamed about a thousand times. It was as if I were still dreaming. I held her to me for what seemed like an eternity. We were still and silent except for the sound of our hearts. I did not want to let go of her at all, but I broke free and embraced my daughter and then took her child into my lap. It had been twenty-one years since I had even touched my wife’s hand.

pp. 611-616

 

88

 

At Pollsmoor, we were more connected to outside events. We were aware that the struggle was intensifying, and that the efforts of the enemy were similarly increasing. In 1981, the South African Defense Force launched a raid on ANC offices in Maputo, Mozambique, killing thirteen of our people, including women and children. In December 1982, MK set off explosions at the unfinished Koeberg nuclear power plant outside Cape Town and placed bombs at many other military and apartheid targets around the country. That same month, the South African military again attacked an ANC outpost in Maseru, Lesotho, killing forty-two people, including a dozen women and children.

In August of 1982, activist Ruth First was opening her mail in Maputo, where she was living in exile, when she was murdered by a letter bomb. Ruth, the wife of Joe Slovo, was a brave anti-apartheid activist who had spent a number of months in prison. She was a forceful, engaging woman whom I first met when I was studying at Wits, and her death revealed the extent of the state’s cruelty in combating our struggle.

MK’s first car bomb attack took place in May of 1983, and was aimed at an air force and military intelligence office in the heart of Pretoria. This was an effort to retaliate for the unprovoked attacks the military had launched on the ANC in Maseru and elsewhere and was a clear escalation of the armed struggle. Nineteen people were killed and more than two hundred injured.

The killing of civilians was a tragic accident, and I felt a profound horror at the death toll. But as disturbed as I was by these casualties, I knew that such accidents were the inevitable consequence of the decision to embark on a military struggle. Human fallibility is always a part of war, and the price for it is always high. It was precisely because we knew that such incidents would occur that our decision to take up arms had been so grave and reluctant. But as Oliver said at the time of the bombing, the armed struggle was imposed upon us by the violence of the apartheid regime.

Both the government and the ANC were working on two tracks: military and political. On the political front, the government was pursuing its standard divide-and-rule strategy in attempting to separate Africans from Coloureds and Indians. In a referendum of November 1983, the white electorate endorsed P. W. Botha’s plan to create a so-called tricameral Parliament, with Indian and Coloured chambers in addition to the white Parliament. This was an effort to lure Indians and Coloureds into the system, and divide them from Africans. But the offer was merely a “toy telephone,” as all parliamentary action by Indians and Coloureds was subject to a white veto. It was also a way of fooling the outside world into thinking that the government was reforming apartheid. Botha’s ruse did not fool the people, as more than 80 percent of eligible Indian and Coloured voters boycotted the election to the new houses of Parliament in 1984.

Powerful grassroots political movements were being formed inside the country that had firm links to the ANC, the principal one being the United Democratic Front, of which I was named a patron. The UDF had been created to coordinate protest against the new apartheid constitution in 1983, and the first elections to the segregated tricameral Parliament in 1984. The UDF soon blossomed into a powerful organization that united over six hundred anti-apartheid organizations — trade unions, community groups, church groups, student associations.

The ANC was experiencing a new birth of popularity. Opinion polls showed that the Congress was far and away the most popular political organization among Africans even though it had been banned for a quarter of a century. The anti-apartheid struggle as a whole had captured the attention of the world; in 1984, Bishop Desmond Tutu was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. (The authorities refused to send Bishop Tutu my letter of congratulations.) The South African government was under growing international pressure, as nations all across the globe began to impose economic sanctions on Pretoria.

The government had sent “feelers” to me over the years, beginning with Minister Kruger’s efforts to persuade me to move to the Transkei. These were not efforts to negotiate, but attempts to isolate me from my organization. On several other occasions, Kruger said to me: “Mandela, we can work with you, but not your colleagues. Be reasonable.” Although I did not respond to these overtures, the mere fact that they were talking rather than attacking could be seen as a prelude to genuine negotiations.

The government was testing the waters. In late 1984 and early 1985, I had visits from two prominent Western statesmen, Lord Nicholas Bethell, a member of the British House of Lords and the European Parliament, and Samuel Dash, a professor of law at Georgetown University and a former counsel to the U.S. Senate Watergate Committee. Both visits were authorized by the new minister of justice, Kobie Coetsee, who appeared to be a new sort of Afrikaner leader.

I met Lord Bethell in the prison commander’s office, which was dominated by a large photograph of a glowering President Botha. Bethell was a jovial, rotund man and when I first met him, I teased him about his stoutness. “You look like you are related to Winston Churchill,” I said as we shook hands, and he laughed.

Lord Bethell wanted to know about our conditions at Pollsmoor and I told him. We discussed the armed struggle and I explained to him it was not up to us to renounce violence, but the government. I reaffirmed that we aimed for hard military targets, not people. “I would not want our men to assassinate, for instance, the major here,” I said, pointing to Major Fritz van Sittert, who was monitoring the talks. Van Sittert was a good-natured fellow who did not say much, but he started at my remark.

In my visit with Professor Dash, which quickly followed that of Lord Bethell, I laid out what I saw as the minimum for a future nonracial South Africa: a unitary state without homelands; nonracial elections for the central Parliament; and one-person-one-vote. Professor Dash asked me whether I took any encouragement from the government’s stated intention of repealing the mixed-marriage laws and certain other apartheid statutes. “This is a pinprick,” I said. “It is not my ambition to marry a white woman or swim in a white pool. It is political equality that we want.” I told Dash quite candidly that at the moment we could not defeat the government on the battlefield, but could make governing difficult for them.

I had one not-so-pleasant visit from two Americans, editors of the conservative newspaper the Washington Times. They seemed less intent on finding out my views than on proving that I was a Communist and a terrorist. All of their questions were slanted in that direction, and when I reiterated that I was neither a Communist nor a terrorist, they attempted to show that I was not a Christian either by asserting that the Reverend Martin Luther King never resorted to violence. I told them that the conditions in which Martin Luther King struggled were totally different from my own: the United States was a democracy with constitutional guarantees of equal rights that protected nonviolent protest (though there was still prejudice against blacks); South Africa was a police state with a constitution that enshrined inequality and an army that responded to nonviolence with force. I told them that I was a Christian and had always been a Christian. Even Christ, I said, when he was left with no alternative, used force to expel the moneylenders from the temple. He was not a man of violence, but had no choice but to use force against evil. I do not think I persuaded them.


Faced with trouble at home and pressure from abroad, P. W. Botha offered a tepid, halfway measure. On January 31, 1985, in a debate in Parliament, the state president publicly offered me my freedom if I “unconditionally rejected violence as a political instrument.” This offer was extended to all political prisoners. Then, as if he were staking me to a public challenge, he added, “It is therefore not the South Africa government which now stands in the way of Mr. Mandela’s freedom. It is he himself.”

I had been warned by the authorities that the government was going to make a proposal involving my freedom, but I had not been prepared for the fact that it would be made in Parliament by the state president. By my reckoning, it was the sixth conditional offer the government had made for my release in the past ten years. After I listened to the speech on radio, I made a request to the commander of the prison for an urgent visit by my wife and my lawyer, Ismail Ayob, so that I could dictate my response to the state president’s offer.

Winnie and Ismail were not given permission to visit for a week, and in the meantime I wrote a letter to the foreign minister, Pik Botha, rejecting the conditions for my release, while also preparing a public response. I was keen to do a number of things in this response, because Botha’s offer was an attempt to drive a wedge between me and my colleagues by tempting me to accept a policy the ANC rejected. I wanted to reassure the ANC in general and Oliver in particular that my loyalty to the organization was beyond question. I also wished to send a message to the government that while I rejected its offer because of the conditions attached to it, I nevertheless thought negotiation, not war, was the path to a solution. Botha wanted the onus of violence to rest on my shoulders and I wanted to reaffirm to the world that we were only responding to the violence done to us. I intended to make it clear that if I emerged from prison into the same circumstances in which I was arrested, I would be forced to resume the same activities for which I was arrested.

I met with Winnie and Ismail on a Friday; on Sunday, a UDF rally was to be held in Soweto’s Jabulani Stadium, where my response would be made public. Some guards with whom I was not familiar supervised the visit, and as we began discussing my response to the state president, one of the warders, a relatively young fellow, interrupted to say that only family matters were permitted to be discussed. I ignored him, and he returned minutes later with a senior warder whom I barely knew. This warder said that I must cease discussing politics, and I told him that I was dealing with a matter of national importance involving an offer from the state president. I warned him that if he wanted to halt the discussion he must get direct orders from the state president himself. “If you are not willing to telephone the state president to get those orders,” I said coldly, “then kindly do not interrupt us again.” He did not.

I gave Ismail and Winnie the speech I had prepared. In addition to responding to the government, I wanted to thank publicly the UDF for its fine work and to congratulate Bishop Tutu on his prize, adding that his award belonged to all the people. On Sunday, February 10, 1985, my daughter Zindzi read my response to a cheering crowd of people who had not been able to hear my words legally anywhere in South Africa for more than twenty years.

Zindzi was a dynamic speaker like her mother, and said that her father should be at the stadium to speak the words himself. I was proud to knowthat it was she who spoke my words.

I am a member of the African National Congress. I have always been a member of the African National Congress and I will remain a member of the African National Congress until the day I die. Oliver Tambo is more than a brother to me. He is my greatest friend and comrade for nearly fifty years. If there is any one amongst you who cherishes my freedom, Oliver Tambo cherishes it more, and I know that he would give his life to see me free. . . . I am surprised at the conditions that the government wants to impose on me. I am not a violent man. . . . It was only then, when all other forms of resistance were no longer open to us, that we turned to armed struggle. Let Botha show that he is different to Malan, Strijdom and Verwoerd. Let him renounce violence. Let him say that he will dismantle apartheid. Let him unban the people’s organization, the African National Congress. Let him free all who have been imprisoned, banished or exiled for their opposition to apartheid.
Let him guarantee free political activity so that people may decide who will govern them. I cherish my own freedom dearly, but I care even more for your freedom. Too many have died since I went to prison. Too many have suffered for the love of freedom. I owe it to their widows, to their orphans, to their mothers, and to their fathers who have grieved and wept for them. Not only I have suffered during these long, lonely, wasted years. I am not less life-loving than you are. But I cannot sell my birthright, nor am I prepared to sell the birthright of the people to be free. . . .
What freedom am I being offered while the organization of the people remains banned? What freedom am I being offered when I may be arrested on a pass offense? What freedom am I being offered to live my life as a family with my dear wife who remains in banishment in Brandfort? What freedom am I being offered when I must ask for permission to live in an urban area? . . . What freedom am I being offered when my very South African citizenship is not respected?
Only free men can negotiate. Prisoners cannot enter into contracts. . . . I cannot and will not give any undertaking at a time when I and you, the people, are not free.
Your freedom and mine cannot be separated. I will return

pp. 617-623

 

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In 1985 after a routine medical examination with the prison doctor, I was referred to a urologist, who diagnosed an enlarged prostate gland and recommended surgery. He said the procedure was routine. I consulted with my family and decided to go ahead with the operation.

I was taken to Volks Hospital in Cape Town, under heavy security. Winnie flew down and was able to see me prior to the surgery. But I had another visitor, a surprising and unexpected one: Kobie Coetsee, the minister of justice. Not long before, I had written to Coetsee pressing him for a meeting to discuss talks between the ANC and the government. He did not respond. But that morning, the minister dropped by the hospital unannounced as if he were visiting an old friend who was laid up for a few days. He was altogether gracious and cordial, and for the most part we simply made pleasantries. Though I acted as though this was the most normal thing in the world, I was amazed. The government, in its slow and tentative way, was reckoning that they had to come to some accommodation with the ANC. Coetsee’s visit was an olive branch.

Although we did not discuss politics, I did bring up one sensitive issue, and that was the status of my wife. In August, shortly before I entered the hospital, Winnie had gone to Johannesburg to receive medical treatment. The only trips she was permitted from Brandfort were to visit either me or her doctor. While in Johannesburg, her house in Brandfort and the clinic behind it were firebombed and destroyed. Winnie had no place in which to reside, and she decided to remain in Johannesburg despite the fact that the city was off-limits to her. Nothing happened for a few weeks, and then the security police wrote to inform her that the house in Brandfort had been repaired and she must return. But she refused to do so. I asked Coetsee to allow Winnie to remain in Johannesburg and not force her to return to Brandfort. He said he could promise nothing, but he would indeed look into it. I thanked him.

I spent several days in hospital recuperating from the surgery. When I was discharged, I was fetched at the hospital by Brigadier Munro. Commanding officers do not usually pick up prisoners at the hospital, so my suspicions were immediately aroused. On the ride back, Brigadier Munro said to me in a casual way, as though he were simply making conversation, “Mandela, we are not taking you back to your friends now.” I asked him what he meant. “From now on, you are going to be alone.” I asked him why. He shook his head. “I don’t know. I’ve just been given these instructions from headquarters.” Once again, there was no warning and no explanation.

Upon my return to Pollsmoor I was taken to a new cell on the ground floor of the prison, three floors below and in an entirely different wing. I was given three rooms, and a separate toilet, with one room to be used for sleeping, one across the hall for studying, and another for exercise. By prison standards, this was palatial, but the rooms were damp and musty and received very little natural light. I said nothing to the brigadier, for I knew the decision had not been his. I wanted time to consider the ramifications of the move. Why had the state taken this step?

It would be too strong to call it a revelation, but over the next few days and weeks I came to a realization about my new circumstances. The change, I decided, was not a liability but an opportunity. I was not happy to be separated from my colleagues and I missed my garden and the sunny terrace on the third floor. But my solitude gave me a certain liberty, and I resolved to use it to do something I had been pondering for a long while: begin discussions with the government. I had concluded that the time had come when the struggle could best be pushed forward through negotiations.  If we did not start a dialogue soon, both sides would be plunged into a dark night of oppression, violence, and war. My solitude would give me an opportunity to take the first steps in that direction, without the kind of scrutiny that might destroy such efforts.

We had been fighting against white minority rule for three-quarters of a century. We had been engaged in the armed struggle for more than two decades. Many people on both sides had already died. The enemy was strong and resolute. Yet even with all their bombers and tanks, they must have sensed they were on the wrong side of history. We had right on our side, but not yet might. It was clear to me that a military victory was a distant if not impossible dream. It simply did not make sense for both sides to lose thousands if not millions of lives in a conflict that wasunnecessary. They must have known this as well. It was time to talk.

This would be extremely sensitive. Both sides regarded discussions as a sign of weakness and betrayal. Neither would come to the table until the other made significant concessions. The government asserted over and over that we were a terrorist organization of Communists, and that they would never talk to terrorists or Communists. This was National Party dogma. The ANC asserted over and over that the government was fascistic and racist and that there was nothing to talk about until they unbanned the ANC, unconditionally released all political prisoners, and removed the troops from the townships.

A decision to talk to the government was of such import that it should only have been made in Lusaka. But I felt that the process needed to begin, and that I had neither the time nor the means to communicate fully with Oliver. Someone from our side needed to take the first step, and my new isolation gave me both the freedom to do so and the assurance, at least for a while, of the confidentiality of my efforts.

I was now in a kind of splendid isolation. Though my colleagues were only three floors above me, they might as well have been in Johannesburg. In order to see them, I had to put in a formal request for a visit, which had to be approved by the Head Office in Pretoria. It often took weeks to receive a response. If it was approved, I would then meet them in the visiting area. This was a novel experience: my comrades and fellow prisoners were now official visitors. For years, we had been able to talk for hours a day; now we hat to make official requests and appointments , and our conversations were monitored.

After I had been in my new cell for a few days, I asked the commanding officer to arrange such a meeting. He did so, and the four of us discussed the issue of my transfer. Walter, Kathy, and Ray were angry that we had been separated. They wanted to lodge a strong protest, and demand that we be reunited. My response was not what they expected. “Look, chaps,” I said, “I don’t think we should oppose this thing.” I mentioned that my new accommodations were superior, and maybe this would set a precedent for all political prisoners. I then added somewhat ambiguously, “Perhaps something good will come of this. I’m now in a position where the government can make an approach to us.” They did not care too much for this latter explanation, as I knew they would not.

I chose to tell no one of what I was about to do. Not my colleagues upstairs or those in Lusaka. The ANC is a collective, but the government had made collectivity in this case impossible. I did not have the security or the time to discuss these issues with my organization. I knew that my colleagues upstairs would condemn my proposal, and that would kill my initiative even before it was born. There are times when a leader must move out ahead of the flock, go off in a new direction, confident that he is leading his people the right way. Finally, my isolation furnished my organization with an excuse in case matters went awry: the old man was alone and completely cut off, and his actions were taken by him as an individual, not a representative of the ANC

pp. 624-627

 

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Within a few weeks of my move, I wrote to Kobie Coetsee to propose talks about talks. As before, I received no response. I wrote once more, and again there was no response. I found this peculiar and demoralizing, and I realized I had to look for another opportunity to be heard. That came in early 1986.

At a meeting of the British Commonwealth in Nassau in October 1985, the leaders could not reach agreement on whether to participate in international sanctions against South Africa. This was mainly because British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was adamantly opposed. To resolve the deadlock, the assembled nations agreed that a delegation of “eminent persons” would visit South Africa and report back on whether sanctions were the appropriate tool to help bring about the end of apartheid. In early 1986, the seven-member Eminent Persons Group, led by General Olusegun Obasanjo, the former military leader of Nigeria, and former Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser, arrived in South Africa on their fact-finding mission.

In February, I was visited by General Obasanjo to discuss the nature of the delegation’s brief. He was eager to facilitate a meeting between me and the full group. With the government’s permission, such a meeting was scheduled for May. The group would be talking with the cabinet after they saw me, and I viewed this as a chance to raise the subject of negotiations.

The government regarded my session with the group as something extraordinary. Two days before the meeting I was visited by Brigadier Munro, who had brought along a tailor. “Mandela,” the commander said, “we want you to see these people on an equal footing. We don’t want you to wear those old prison clothes, so this tailor will take your measurements and outfit you with a proper suit.” The tailor must have been some kind of wizard, for the very next day I tried on a pinstriped suit that fit me like a glove. I was also given a shirt, tie, shoes, socks, and underwear. The commander admired my new attire. “Mandela, you look like a prime minister now, not a prisoner,” he said and smiled.

At the meeting between myself and the Eminent Persons Group, we were joined by two significant observers: Kobie Coetsee and Lieutenant General W. H. Willemse, the commissioner of prisons. Like the tailor, these two men were there to take my measure. But, curiously, they left shortly after the session started. I pressed them to remain, saying I had nothing to hide, but they left anyway. Before they took their leave, I told them the time had come for negotiations, not fighting, and that the government and the ANC should sit down and talk.

The Eminent Persons Group had come with many questions involving the issues of violence, negotiations, and international sanctions. At the outset, I set the ground rules for our discussions. “I am not the head of the movement,” I told them. “The head of the movement is Oliver Tambo in Lusaka. You must go and see him. You can tell him what my views are, but they are my personal views alone. They don’t even represent the views of my colleagues here in prison. All that being said, I favor the ANC beginning discussions with the government.” Various members of the group had concerns about my political ideology and what a South Africa under ANC leadership might look like. I told them I was a South African nationalist, not a Communist, that nationalists came in every hue and color and that I was firmly committed to a nonracial society. I told them I believed in the Freedom Charter, that the charter embodied principles of democracy and human rights, and that it was not a blueprint for socialism. I spoke of my concern that the white minority feel a sense of security in any new South Africa. I told I thought many of our problems were a result of lack of communication between the government and the ANC and that some of these could be resolved though actual talks.

They questioned me extensively on the issue of violence, and while I was not yet willing to renounce violence, I affirmed in the strongest possible  terms that violence could never be the ultimate solution to the situation in South Africa and that men and women by their very nature required some kind of negotiated understanding. While I once again reiterated that these were my views and not those of the ANC, I suggested that if the government withdrew the army and the police from the townships, the ANC might agree to a suspension of the armed struggle as a prelude to talks.

I told them that my release alone would not stem the violence in the country or stimulate negotiations. After the group finished with me, they planned to see both Oliver in Lusaka and government officials in Pretoria. In my remarks, I had sent messages to both places. I wanted the government to see that under the right circumstances we would talk and I wanted Oliver to know that my position and his were the same.

In May, the Eminent Persons Group was scheduled to see me one last time. I was optimistic as they had been to both Lusaka and Pretoria, and I hoped that the seed of negotiations had been planted. But the day before we were to meet, the South African government took a step that sabotaged whatever goodwill had been engendered by the Commonwealth visitors. On the day the Eminent Persons Group was scheduled to meet with cabinet ministers, the South African Defense Force, under the orders of President Botha, launched air raids and commando attacks on

ANC bases in Botswana, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. This utterly poisoned the talks, and the Eminent Persons Group immediately left South Africa.

Once again, I felt my efforts to move negotiations forward had stalled. Oliver Tambo and the ANC had called for the people of South Africa to render the country ungovernable, and the people were obliging. The state of unrest and political violence was reaching new heights. The anger of the masses was unrestrained; the townships were in upheaval. International pressure was growing stronger every day. On June 12, 1986, the government imposed a State of Emergency in an attempt to keep a lid on protest.

In every outward way, the time seemed inauspicious for negotiations. But often, the most discouraging moments are precisely the time to launch an initiative. At such times people are searching for a way out of their dilemma. That month I wrote a very simple letter to General Willemse, the commissioner of prisons. In it, I merely said, “I wish to see you on a matter of national importance.” I handed the letter to Brigadier Munro on a Wednesday.

That weekend, I was told by the commanding officer to be prepared to see General Willemse, who was coming down from Pretoria. This meeting was not treated in the usual fashion. Instead of conferring with the general in the visiting area, I was taken to his residence on the grounds of Pollsmoor itself.

Willemse is a direct fellow and we got down to business immediately. I told him I wanted to see Kobie Coetsee, the minister of justice. He asked me why. I hesitated for a moment, reluctant to discuss political matters with a prison official. But I responded with frankness: “I want to see the minister in order to raise the question of talks between the government and the ANC.”

He pondered this for a moment, and then said, “Mandela, as you know, I am not a politician. I cannot discuss such issues myself, for they are beyond my authority.” He then paused, as if something had just occurred to him. “It just so happens,” he said, “that the minister of justice is in Cape Town. Perhaps you can see him. I will find out.”

The general then telephoned the minister and the two spoke for a few moments. After putting down the phone, the general turned to me and said, “The minister said, ‘Bring him round.’ ” Minutes later, we left the general’s residence in his car bound for the minister’s house in Cape Town. Security was light; only one other car accompanied the general’s vehicle. The ease and rapidity with which this meeting was set up made me suspect that the government might have planned this rendezvous ahead of time. Whether they had or not was immaterial; it was an opportunity to take the first step toward negotiations.

At his official residence in the city, Coetsee greeted me warmly and we settled down on comfortable chairs in his lounge. He apologized that I had not had a chance to change out of my prison clothes. I spent three hours in conversation with him and was struck by his sophistication and willingness to listen. He asked knowledgeable and relevant questions — questions that reflected a familiarity with the issues that divided the government and the ANC. He asked me under what circumstances would we suspend the armed struggle; whether or not I spoke for the ANC as a whole; whether I envisioned any constitutional guarantees for minorities in a new South Africa. His questions went to the heart of the issues dividing the government and the ANC.

After responding in much the same way as I did to the Eminent Persons Group, I sensed that Coetsee wanted some resolution. What is the next step? he asked. I told him I wanted to see the state president and the foreign minister, Pik Botha. Coetsee noted this on a small pad he had kept beside him, and said he would send my request through the proper channels. We then shook hands, and I was driven back to my solitary cell on the ground floor of Pollsmoor Prison.

I was greatly encouraged. I sensed the government was anxious to overcome the impasse in the country, that they were now convinced they had to depart from their old positions. In ghostly outline, I saw the beginnings of a compromise. I told no one of my encounter. I wanted the process to be under way before I informed anyone. Sometimes it is necessary to present one’s colleagues with a policy that is already a fait accompli. I knew that once they examined the situation carefully, my colleagues at Pollsmoor and in Lusaka would support me. But again, after this promising start, nothing happened. Weeks and then months passed without a word from Coetsee. In some frustration, I wrote him another letter.

 

pp. 628-635

 

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Although I did not get a direct response from Kobie Coetsee, there were other signs that the government was preparing me for a different kind of existence. On the day before Christmas, Lieutenant Colonel Gawie Marx, the deputy commander of Pollsmoor, wandered by my cell after breakfast and said quite casually, “Mandela, would you like to see the city?” I was not exactly certain what he had in mind, but I thought there was no harm in saying yes. Good, he said, come along. I walked with the colonel through the fifteen locked metal doors between my cell and the entrance, and when we emerged, I found his car waiting for us.

We drove into Cape Town along the lovely road that runs parallel to the coast. He had no destination in mind and simply meandered around the city in a leisurely fashion. It was absolutely riveting to watch the simple activities of people out in the world: old men sitting in the sun, women doing their shopping, people walking their dogs. It is precisely those mundane activities of daily life that one misses most in prison. I felt like a curious tourist in a strange and remarkable land.

After an hour or so, Colonel Marx stopped the car in front of a small shop on a quiet street. “Would you like a cold drink?” he asked me. I nodded, and he disappeared inside the shop. I sat there alone. For the first few moments, I did not think about my situation, but as the seconds ticked away,

I became more and more agitated. For the first time in twenty-two years, I was out in the world and unguarded. I had a vision of opening the door, jumping out, and then running and running until I was out of sight. Something inside was urging me to do just that. I noticed a wooded area near the road where I could hide. I was extremely tense and began to perspire. Where was the colonel? But then I took control of myself; such an action would be unwise and irresponsible, not to mention dangerous. It was possible that the whole situation was contrived to try to get me to escape, though I do not think that was the case. I was greatly relieved a few moments later when I saw the colonel walking back to the car with two cans of Coca-Cola.

As it turned out, that day in Cape Town was the first of many excursions. Over the next few months, I went out again with the colonel not only to Cape Town but to some of the sights around the city, its beautiful beaches and lovely cool mountains. Soon, more junior officers were permitted to take me around. One of the places I regularly visited with these junior officers was known as the “gardens,” a series of smallholdings on the edge of the prison grounds where crops were grown for the prison’s kitchen. I enjoyed being out in nature, being able to see the horizon and feel the sun on my shoulders.

One day I went to the gardens with a captain, and after walking in the fields we strolled over to the stables. There were two young white men in overalls working with the horses. I walked over to them, praised one of the animals, and said to the fellow, “Now, what is this horse’s name?” The young man seemed quite nervous and did not look at me. He then mumbled the name of the horse, but to the captain, not me. I then asked the other fellow in turn what the name of his horse was, and he had precisely the same reaction. As I was walking back to the prison with the captain, I commented on what I thought was the curious behavior of the two young men. The captain laughed. “Mandela, don’t you know what those two chaps were?” I said I did not. “They were white prisoners. They had never been questioned by a native prisoner in the presence of a white officer before.”

Some of the younger warders took me quite far afield, and we would walk on the beach and even stop at a café and have tea. At such places, I often tried to see if people recognized me, but no one ever did; the last published picture of me had been taken in 1962.

These trips were instructive on a number of levels. I saw how life had changed in the time I had been away, and because we mainly went to white areas, I saw the extraordinary wealth and ease that whites enjoyed. Though the country was in upheaval and the townships were on the brink of open warfare, white life went on placidly and undisturbed. Their lives were unaffected. Once, one of the warders, a very pleasant young man named Warrant Officer Brand, actually took me to his family’s flat and introduced me to his wife and children. From then on, I sent his children Christmas cards every year.

As much as I enjoyed these little adventures, I well knew that the authorities had a motive other than keeping me diverted. I sensed that they wanted to acclimatize me to life in South Africa and perhaps at the same time, get me so used to the pleasures of small freedoms that I might be willing to compromise in order to have complete freedom

pp. 636-639

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In 1987, I resumed contact with Kobie Coetsee. I had several private meetings with him at his residence, and later that year the government made its first concrete proposal. Coetsee said the government would like to appoint a committee of senior officials to conduct private discussions with me. This would be done with the full knowledge of the state president, Coetsee said. Coetsee himself would be head of the committee, and it would include General Willemse, the commissioner of prisons; Fanie van der Merwe, the director general of the Prisons Department; and Dr. Niel Barnard, a former academic who was then head of the National Intelligence Service. The first three individuals were associated with the prison system, so if talks foundered or were leaked to the press, both sides would be able to cover up and say we were discussing prison conditions and nothing more.

The presence of Dr. Barnard, however, disturbed me. He was the head of South Africa’s equivalent of the CIA, and was also involved with military intelligence. I could justify to my organization discussions with the other officials, but not Barnard. His presence made the talks more problematic and suggested a larger agenda. I told Coetsee that I would like to think about the proposal overnight.

That night I considered all the ramifications. I knew that P. W. Botha had created something called the State Security Council, a shadowy secretariat of security experts and intelligence officials. He had done this, according to the press, to circumvent the authority of the cabinet and increase his own power. Dr. Barnard was a key player in this inner council and was said to be a protégé of the president. I thought that my refusing Barnard would alienate Botha, and I decided that such a tack was too risky. If the state president was not brought on board, nothing would happen.

In the morning, I sent word to Coetsee that I accepted his offer. I knew that I had three crucial matters that I needed to address: first, I wanted to sound out my colleagues on the third floor before I proceeded any further; second, it was essential to communicate with Oliver in Lusaka about what was occurring; and finally, I intended to draft a memorandum to P.

W. Botha laying out my views and those of the ANC on the vital issues before the country. This memorandum would create talking points for any future discussion. I requested a meeting with my colleagues, and to my surprise, the authorities summarily refused. This was remarkable, and I assumed it reflected a great deal of nervousness about the prospect of secret talks between myself and the government. I took my complaints to more senior officials.

Finally, the request was approved, with the proviso that I could see my colleagues one by one, not together. I met them in the visiting area. I had resolved to leave out a few details; I would seek their counsel about the idea of having talks with the government without mentioning that an actual committee had been formed. Walter was first. I told him about my letter to the commissioner of prisons and my meeting with Coetsee. I said that I had discussed with Coetsee the idea of beginning talks with the government and that the government seemed interested. What were his views on the matter?

I have been through thick and thin with Walter. He was a man of reason and wisdom, and no man knew me better than he did. There was no one whose opinion I trusted or valued more. Walter considered what I told him. I could see he was uncomfortable, and at best, lukewarm. “In principle,” he said, “I am not against negotiations. But I would have wished that the government initiated talks with us rather than us initiating talks with them.” I replied that if he was not against negotiations in principle, what did it matter who initiated them? What mattered was what they achieved, not how they started. I told Walter that I thought we should move forward with negotiations and not worry about who knocked on the door first. Walter saw that my mind was made up and he said he would not stop me, but that he hoped I knew what I was doing.

Next was Raymond Mhlaba. I explained the entire situation to him as I had to Walter. Ray was always a man of few words, and for several moments he digested what I had said. He then looked at me and said, “Madiba, what have you been waiting for? We should have started this years ago.” Andrew Mlangeni’s reaction was virtually the same as Ray’s. The last man was Kathy. His response was negative; he was as resolutely against what I was suggesting as Raymond and Andrew were in favor. Even more strongly than Walter, he felt that by initiating talks it would appear that we were capitulating. Like Walter, he said he was not in principle against negotiations, and I responded exactly as I had with Walter. But Kathy was adamant; he felt I was going down the wrong path. But, despite his misgivings, he said he would not stand in my way.

Not long after this I received a note from Oliver Tambo that was smuggled in to me by one of my lawyers. He had heard reports that I was having secret discussions with the government and he was concerned. He said he knew I had been alone for some time and separated from my colleagues. He must have been wondering: What is going on with Mandela? Oliver’s note was brief and to the point: What, he wanted to know, was I discussing with the government? Oliver could not have believed that I was selling out, but he might have thought I was making an error in judgment.

In fact, the tenor of his note suggested that.I replied to Oliver in a very terse letter saying that I was talking to the government about one thing and  one thing only: a meeting between the National Executive Committee of the ANC and the South African Government. I would not spell out the details, for I could not trust the confidentiality of the communication. I simply said the time  had dome for such talks and that I would not compromise the organization in any way.

Although the ANC had called for talks with the government for decades, we had never been confronted with the actual prospect of such talks. It is one thing to consider them in theory, and quite another to engage in them. As I was writing my response to Oliver, I was also beginning to draft my memorandum to P. W. Botha. I would make sure that Oliver saw this as well. I knew that when Oliver and the National Executive read my memo, their fears that I had gone off the road would be allayed

 

pp. 640-643

 

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The first formal meeting of the secret working group took place in May 1988, at a posh officers’ club within the precincts of Pollsmoor. While I knew both Coetsee and Willemse, I had never before met van der Merwe and Dr. Barnard. Van der Merwe was a quiet, levelheaded man who spoke only when he had something important to say. Dr. Barnard was in his mid-thirties and was exceedingly bright, a man of controlled intelligence and self-discipline.

The initial meeting was quite stiff, but in subsequent sessions we were able to talk more freely and directly. I met with them almost every week for a few months, and then the meetings occurred at irregular intervals, sometimes not for a month, and then suddenly every week. The meetings were usually scheduled by the government, but sometimes I would request a session.

During our early meetings, I discovered that my new colleagues, with the exception of Dr. Barnard, knew little about the ANC. They were all sophisticated Afrikaners, and far more open-minded than nearly all of their brethren. But they were the victims of so much propaganda that it was necessary to straighten them out about certain facts. Even Dr. Barnard, who had made a study of the ANC, had received most of his information from police and intelligence files, which which were in the main inaccurate and sullied by the prejudices of the men who had gathered them. He could not help but be infected by the same biases.

I spent some time in the beginning sketching out the history of the ANC and then explaining our positions on the primary issues that divided the organization from the government. After these preliminaries, we focused on the critical issues: the armed struggle, the ANC’s alliance with the Communist Party, the goal of majority rule, and the idea of racial reconciliation.

The first issue to arise was in many ways the most crucial, and that was the armed struggle. We spent a number of months discussing it. They insisted that the ANC must renounce violence and give up the armed struggle before the government would agree to negotiations — and before I could meet President Botha. Their contention was that violence was nothing more than criminal behavior that could not be tolerated by the state.

I responded that the state was responsible for the violence and that it is always the oppressor, not the oppressed, who dictates the form of the struggle. If the oppressor uses violence, the oppressed have no alternative but to respond violently. In our case it was simply a legitimate form of self-defense. I ventured that if the state decided to use peaceful methods, the ANC would also use peaceful means. “It is up to you,” I said, “not us, to renounce violence.”

I think I advanced their understanding on this point, but the issue soon moved from a philosophical question to a practical one. As Minister Coetsee and Dr. Barnard pointed out, the National Party had repeatedly stated that it would not negotiate with any organization that advocated violence: therefore, how could it suddenly announce talks with the ANC without losing its credibility? In order for us to begin talks, they said, the ANC must make some compromise so that the government would not lose face with its own people.

It was a fair point and one that I could well understand, but I would not offer them a way out. “Gentlemen,” I said, “it is not my job to resolve your dilemma for you.” I simply told them that they must tell their people that there can be no peace and no solution to the situation in South Africa without sitting down with the ANC. People will understand, I said.

The ANC’s alliance with the Communist Party seemed to trouble them almost as much as the armed struggle. The National Party accepted the most hidebound of 1950s cold war ideology and regarded the Soviet Union as the evil empire and communism as the work of the devil. There was nothing that one could do to disabuse them of this notion. They maintained that the Communist Party dominated and controlled the ANC and that in order for negotiations to begin we must break with the party.

First of all, I said, no self-respecting freedom fighter would take orders from the government he is fighting against or jettison a longtime ally in the interest of pleasing an antagonist. I then explained at great length that the party and the ANC were separate and distinct organizations that shared the same short-term objectives, the overthrow of racial oppression and the birth of a nonracial South Africa, but that our long-term interests were not the same.

This discussion went on for months. Like most Afrikaners, they thought that because many of the Communists in the ANC were white or Indian, they were controlling the blacks in the ANC. I cited many occasions when the ANC and the CP had differed on policy and the ANC had prevailed, but this did not seem to impress them. Finally, in exasperation, I said to them, “You gentlemen consider yourselves intelligent, do you not? You consider yourselves forceful and persuasive, do you not? Well, there are four of you and only one of me, and you cannot control me or get me to change my mind. What makes you think the Communists can succeed where you have failed?”

They were also concerned about the idea of nationalization, insisting that the ANC and the Freedom Charter supported blanket nationalization for the South African economy. I explained that we were for a more even distribution of the rewards of certain industries, industries that were already monopolies, and that nationalization might occur in some of those areas. But I referred them to an article I wrote in 1956 for Liberation in which I said that the Freedom Charter was not a blueprint for socialism but for African-style capitalism. I told them I had not changed my mind since then.

The other main area of discussion was the issue of majority rule. They felt that if there was majority role, the rights of minorities would be trampled. How would the ANC protect the rights of the white minority? they wanted to know. I said that there was no organization in the history of South Africa to compare with the ANC in terms of trying to unite all the people and races of South Africa. I referred them to the preamble of the Freedom Charter: “South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and white.” I told them that whites were Africans as well, and that in any future dispensation the majority would need the minority. We do not want to drive you into the sea, I said.

pp. 644-648

 

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The meetings had a positive effect: I was told in the winter of 1988 that President Botha was planning to see me before the end of August. The country was still in turmoil. The government had reimposed a State of Emergency in both 1987 and 1988. International pressure mounted. More companies left South Africa. The American Congress had passed a sweeping sanctions bill.

In 1987, the ANC celebrated its seventy-fifth anniversary and held a conference at the end of the year in Tanzania attended by delegates from more than fifty nations. Oliver declared that the armed struggle would intensify until the government was prepared to negotiate the abolition of apartheid. Two years before, at the ANC’s Kabwe conference in Zambia marking the thirtieth anniversary of the Freedom Charter, members of other races were elected to the National Executive Committee for the first time, and the NEC pledged that no discussions with the government could be held until all ANC leaders were released from prison.

Although violence was still pervasive, the National Party had never been stronger. In the white general election of May 1987, the Nationalists won an overwhelming majority. Worse still, the liberal Progressive Federal Party had been replaced as the official opposition by the Conservative Party, which was to the right of the Nationalists and campaigned on the theme that the government was too lenient with the black opposition.

Despite my optimism about the secret talks, it was a difficult time. I had recently had a visit from Winnie and I learned that 8115 Orlando West, the house in which we had been married and which I considered home, had been burned down by arsonists. We had lost invaluable family records, photographs, and keepsakes — even the slice of wedding cake Winnie was saving for my release. I had always thought that someday when I left prison I would be able to recapture the past when looking over those pictures and letters, and now they were gone. Prison had robbed me of my freedom but not my memories, and now I felt some enemies of the struggle had tried to rob me of even those.

I was also suffering from a bad cough that I could not seem to shake, and I often felt too weak to exercise. I had continued to complain about the dampness of my cell, but nothing had been done about it. One day, during a meeting in the visiting area with my attorney, Ismail Ayob, I felt ill and vomited. I was taken back to my cell, examined by a doctor, and I soon recovered. A few days later, however, I was in my cell after dinner when a number of warders and a doctor arrived. The physician gave me a cursory examination, and then one of the warders told me to get dressed. “We are taking you to hospital in Cape Town,” I was told. Security was tight; I went in a convoy of cars and military vehicles accompanied by at least a dozen warders.

I was taken to Tygerberg Hospital, on the campus of the University of Stellenbosch, in a rich and verdant area of the Cape. As I later discovered, they had nearly chosen a different facility because the authorities feared I might attract sympathetic attention at a university hospital. The warders went in first and cleared everyone out of the entrance area. I was then escorted up to a floor that had been entirely emptied. The hall of the floor was lined with more than a dozen armed guards.

While sitting on a table in the examining room, I was looked at by a young and amiable doctor who was also a professor at the university medical school. He inspected my throat, tapped my chest, took some cultures, and in no time pronounced me fit. “There is nothing wrong with you,” he said with a smile. “We should be able to release you tomorrow.” I was anxious not to be diverted from my talks with the government, so I was pleased with his diagnosis.

After the examination, the doctor asked me if I would like some tea. I said I would and a few minutes later, a tall young Coloured nurse came in with a tray. The presence of all the armed guards and warders so frightened her that she dropped the tray on my bed, spilling the tea, before rushing out.

I spent the night in the empty ward under heavy guard. The first thing the next morning, even before I had breakfast, I was visited by an older doctor who was head of internal medicine at the hospital. He was a no-nonsense fellow and had far less of a bedside manner than the cordial young physician of the night before. Without any preliminaries, he tapped me roughly on my chest and then said gruffly, “There is water in your lung.” I told him that the previous doctor had done tests and said I was fine. With a hint of annoyance, he said, “Mandela, take a look at your chest.” He pointed out that one side of my chest was actually larger than the other, and said that it was probably filled with water.

He asked a nurse to bring him a syringe, and without further ado he poked it into my chest and drew out some brownish liquid. “Have you had breakfast?” he said. No, I replied. “Good,” he said, “we are taking you to the operating theater immediately.” He told me I had a great deal of water on my lung and he wanted to draw it out right away.

In the operating room I was given anesthesia, and the next thing I recalled was waking up in a room with the doctor present. I was groggy, but I concentrated on what he said: he had removed two liters of water from my chest and when the liquid was analyzed, a tuberculosis germ had been discovered. He said it was in the very early stages of the illness, and that the germ had done no damage to the lung. While full-blown tuberculosis normally took six months to cure, he said, I should be better in two months. The doctor agreed that it was probably the damp cell that had helped cause my illness.

I spent the next six weeks at Tygerberg recuperating and receiving treatment. In December, I was moved to the Constantiaberge Clinic, a luxurious facility near Pollsmoor that had never had a black patient before. My first morning there, I had an early visit from Kobie Coetsee, who was accompanied by Major Marais, a deputy commander responsible for looking after me. We had barely exchanged greetings when the orderly brought in my breakfast.

Because of my recent illness and my history of high blood pressure, I had been put on a strict low-cholesterol diet. That order had apparently not yet been conveyed to the clinic’s kitchen, for the breakfast tray contained scrambled eggs, three rashers of bacon, and several pieces of buttered toast. I could not remember the last time I had tasted bacon and eggs, and I was ravenous. Just as I was about to take a delicious forkful of egg, Major Marais said, “No, Mandela, that is against the orders of your physician,” and he reached over to take the tray. I held it tightly, and said, “Major, I am sorry. If this breakfast will kill me, then today I am prepared to die.” Once I was ensconced at Constantiaberge, I again began to meet with Kobie Coetsee and the secret committee. While I was still at the clinic Coetsee said he wanted to put me in a situation that was halfway between confinement and freedom. While he did not spell out what this meant, I had a notion of what he was talking about, and I merely nodded. I would not be so naïve as to consider his proposal to be freedom, but I knew that it was a step in that direction.

In the meantime, the clinic was extremely comfortable and for the first time I actually enjoyed a hospital convalescence. The nurses — who were white or Coloured, no black nurses were permitted — spoiled me; they brought extra desserts and pillows and were constantly visiting, even during their time off.

One day, one of the nurses came to me and said, “Mr. Mandela, we are having a party tonight and we would like you to come.” I said I’d be honored to attend, but that the authorities would undoubtedly have something to say about it. The prison authorities refused permission for me to go, which nettled the nurses, and as a result, they decided to hold their party in my room, insisting they could not have their party without me.

That night, a dozen or so of these young ladies in party frocks descended on my room with cake and punch and gifts. The guards seemed befuddled, but they could hardly consider these vivacious young girls a security risk. In fact, when one of the guards attempted to prevent some ofthe nurses from entering my room, I jestingly accused him of being jealous of an old man receiving so much attention from such beautiful young ladies.

 

pp. 649-652

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In early December 1988, security on my ward was tightened and the officers on duty were more alert than usual. Some change was imminent. On the evening of December 9, Major Marais came into my room, and told me to prepare myself to leave. Where to? I asked him. He could not say.

I packed my things and looked around for some of my loyal nurses; I was disappointed at not being able to thank them and bid them farewell. We left in a rush, and after about an hour on the road we entered a prison whose name I recognized: Victor Verster. Located in the lovely old Cape Dutch town of Paarl, Victor Verster is thirty-five miles northeast of Cape Town in the province’s wine-growing region. The prison had the reputation of being a model facility. We drove through the entire length of the prison, and then along a winding dirt road through a rather wild, wooded area at the rear of the property. At the end of the road we came to an isolated, whitewashed one-story cottage set behind a concrete wall and shaded by tall fir trees.

I was ushered into the house by Major Marais and found a spacious lounge, next to a large kitchen, with an even larger bedroom at the back of the house. The place was sparsely but comfortably furnished. It had not been cleaned or swept before my arrival, and the bedroom and living room were teeming with all kinds of exotic insects, centipedes, monkey spiders, and the like, some of which I had never seen before. That night, I swept the insects off my bed and windowsill and slept extremely well in what was to be my new home.

The next morning I surveyed my new abode and discovered a swimming pool in the backyard, and two smaller bedrooms. I walked outside and admired the trees that shaded the house and kept it cool. The entire place felt removed, isolated. The only thing spoiling the idyllic picture was that the walls were topped with razor wire, and there were guards at the entrance to the house. Even so, it was a lovely place and situation; a halfway house between prison and freedom.

That afternoon I was visited by Kobie Coetsee, who brought a case of Cape wine as a housewarming gift. The irony of a jailer bringing his prisoner such a gift was not lost on either of us. He was extremely solicitous and wanted to make sure that I liked my new home. He surveyed the house himself, and the only thing he recommended was that the walls outside the house be raised — for my privacy, he said. He told me that the cottage at Victor Verster would be my last home before becoming a free man. The reason behind this move, he said, was that I should have a place where I could hold discussions in privacy and comfort.

The cottage did in fact give one the illusion of freedom. I could go to sleep and wake up as I pleased, swim whenever I wanted, eat when I was hungry — all were delicious sensations. Simply to be able to go outside during the day and take a walk when I desired was a moment of private glory. There were no bars on the windows, no jangling keys, no doors to lock or unlock. It was altogether pleasant, but I never forgot that it was a gilded cage.

The prison service provided me with a cook, Warrant Officer Swart, a tall, quiet Afrikaner who had once been a warder on Robben Island. I did not remember him, but he said he sometimes drove us to the quarry and purposely steered the truck over bumps to give us a rocky ride. “I did that to you,” he said sheepishly, and I laughed. He was a decent, sweet-tempered fellow without any prejudice and he became like a younger brother to me. He arrived at seven in the morning and left at four, and would make my breakfast, lunch, and dinner. I had a diet outlined by my physician and he would follow it in his preparations. He was a lovely cook, and when he went home at four, he would leave me supper to heat up in the microwave oven, a device that was new to me.

Warrant Officer Swart baked bread, made home-brewed ginger beer and assorted other delicacies. When I had visitors, which was increasingly often, he would prepare gourmet meals. They always praised the food and I daresay my chef was the envy of all my visitors. When the authorities began to permit some of my ANC comrades and members of the United Democratic Front (UDF) and the Mass Democratic Movement (MDM) to visit me, I accused them of coming only for the food.

One day, after a delicious meal prepared by Mr. Swart, I went into the kitchen to wash the dishes. “No,” he said, “that is my duty. You must return to the sitting room.” I insisted that I had to do something, and that if he cooked, it was only fair for me to do the dishes. Mr. Swart protested, but finally gave in. He also objected to the fact that I would make my bed in the morning, saying it was his responsibility to do so. But I had been making my own bed for so long it had become a reflex.

We also traded off in another respect. Like many Afrikaans-speaking warders, he was keen to improve his English. I was always looking for ways to improve my Afrikaans. We made an agreement: he would speak to me in English and I would answer in Afrikaans, and in that way we both practiced the language at which we were weakest.

I would occasionally ask him to make certain dishes for me. I sometimes requested samp and beans, which I used to eat as a boy. One day, I said to him, “You know, I would like you to cook me some brown rice.” To my astonishment, he said, “What is brown rice?” Swart was a young man, and I explained to him that brown rice was the unrefined rice kernel, and we used to eat it during the war when white rice was unavailable. I said it was far healthier than white rice. He was skeptical, but managed to find me some. He cooked it and I enjoyed it very much. But Mr. Swart could not abide the taste and vowed that if I ever wanted it again, I would have to cook it myself.

Even though I was not a drinker, I wanted to be a proper host and serve wine to my guests. I would occasionally take a sip of wine in order to make my guests feel comfortable, but the only wine I can stomach is a South African semisweet wine, which is actually very sweet.

Before my guests came I would ask Mr. Swart to get a certain type of Nederburg wine, which I had tasted before and knew was a semisweet. One day, I was expecting my friends and lawyers for lunch, Dullah Omar, George Bizos, and Ismail Ayob, and asked Mr. Swart to purchase some Nederburg wine should George Bizos, not a Muslim, want some with his meal. I noticed that he grimaced when I said this, and asked him what was wrong.

“Mr. Mandela,” he said. “I always buy that wine for you because you ask me to, but it is cheap stuff and not very nice.” I reminded him that I did not like dry wines and I was sure George could not tell the difference anyway. Mr. Swart smiled at this and proposed a compromise: he would go out and buy two bottles, a dry wine and my Nederburg, and then he would ask my guest which wine he preferred. “Fine,” I said, “let us try your experiment.”

When all four of us were seated for lunch, Swart came out holding the two bottles and turned to the guests and said, “Gentlemen, which wine would you like?” Without even looking at me, George pointed to the bottle of dry white. Warrant Officer Swart just smiled

pp. 653-656

 

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The meetings with the committee continued, and we stalled on the same issues that had always prevented us from moving forward: the armed struggle, the Communist Party, and majority rule. I was still pressing Coetsee for a meeting with P. W. Botha. By this time, the authorities permmitted me to have rudimentary communications with my comrades at Pollsmoor and Robben Island and also the ANC in Lusaka.

Although I knew I was going out ahead of my colleagues, I did not want to go too far ahead and find that I was all alone. In January 1989, I was visited by my four comrades from Pollsmoor and we discussed the memorandum I was planning to send to the state president. The memorandum reiterated most of the points I had made in our secret committee meetings, but I wanted to make sure the state president heard them directly from me. He would see that we were not wild-eyed terrorists, but reasonable men.

“I am disturbed,” I wrote to Mr. Botha in the memorandum, sent to him in March, “as many other South Africans no doubt are, by the specter of a South Africa split into two hostile camps — blacks on one side . . . and whites on the other, slaughtering one another.” To avert this and prepare the groundwork for negotiations, I proposed to deal with the three demands made of the ANC by the government as a precondition to negotiations: renouncing violence; breaking with the SACP; and abandoning the call for majority rule.

On the question of violence I wrote that the refusal of the ANC to renounce violence was not the problem: “The truth is that the government is not yet ready . . . for the sharing of political power with blacks.” I explained our unwillingness to cast aside the SACP, and reiterated that we were not under its control. “Which man of honour,” I wrote, “will desert a lifelong friend at the insistence of a common opponent and still retain a measure of credibility with his people?” I said the rejection of majority rule by the government was a poorly disguised attempt to preserve power. I suggested he must face reality. “Majority rule and internal peace are like the two sides of a single coin, and white South Africa simply has to accept that there will never be peace and stability in this country until the principle is fully applied.”

At the end of the letter, I offered a very rough framework for negotiations.

Two political issues will have to be addressed; firstly, the demand for majority rule in a unitary state, secondly, the concern of white South Africa over this demand, as well as the insistence of whites on structural guarantees that majority rule will not mean domination of the white minority by blacks. The most crucial tasks which will face the government and the ANC will be to reconcile these two positions.

I proposed that this be done in two stages, the first being a discussion to create the proper conditions for negotiations, the second being the actual negotiations themselves. “I must point out that the move I have taken provides you with the opportunity to overcome the current deadlock, and to normalize the country’s political situation. I hope you will seize it without delay.”

But delay there was. In January, P. W. Botha suffered a stroke. While it did not incapacitate the president, it did weaken him and, according to his cabinet, made him even more irascible. In February, Botha unexpectedly resigned as head of the National Party, but kept his position as state president. This was an unparalleled situation in the country’s history: in the South African parliamentary system, the leader of the majority party becomes the head of state. President Botha was now head of state but not of his own party. Some saw this as a positive development: that Botha wanted to be “above party politics” in order to bring about true change in South Africa.

Political violence and international pressure continued to intensify. Political detainees all across the country had held a successful hunger strike, persuading the minister of law and order to release over nine hundred of them. In 1989, the UDF formed an alliance with the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) to form the Mass Democratic Movement (MDM), which then began organizing a countrywide “defiance campaign” of civil disobedience to challenge apartheid institutions. On the international front, Oliver held talks with the governments of Great Britain and the Soviet Union, and in January 1987 met with the U.S. secretary of state, George Shultz, in Washington. The Americans recognized the ANC as an indispensable element of any solution in South Africa. Sanctions against South Africa remained in force and even increased.

Political violence also had its tragic side. As the violence in Soweto intensified, my wife permitted a group of young men to act as her bodyguards as she moved around the township. These young men were untrained and undisciplined and became involved in activities that were unbecoming to a liberation struggle. Winnie subsequently became legally entangled in the trial of one of her bodyguards who was convicted of murdering a young comrade. This situation was deeply disconcerting to me, for such a scandal only served to divide the movement at a time when unity was essential. I wholly supported my wife and maintained that while she had shown poor judgment, she was innocent of any serious charges.

That July, for my seventy-first birthday, I was visited at the cottage at Victor Verster by nearly my entire family. It was the first time I had ever had my wife and children and grandchildren all in one place, and it was a grand and happy occasion. Warrant Officer Swart outdid himself in preparing a feast, and he did not even get upset when I permitted some of the grandchildren to eat their sweets before their main course. After the meal, the grandchildren went into my bedroom to watch a video of a horror movie while the adults stayed outside gossiping in the lounge. It was a deep, deep pleasure to have my whole family around me, and the only pain was the knowledge that I had missed such occasions for so many years

pp. 657-660

 

 

97

 

ON JULY 4, I was visited by General Willemse, who informed me that I was being taken to see President Botha the following day. He described the visit as a “courtesy call,” and I was told to be ready to leave at 5:30 A.M. I told the general that while I was looking forward to the meeting, I thought it appropriate that I have a suit and tie in which to see Mr. Botha. (The suit from the visit of the Eminent Persons Group had long since vanished.) The general agreed, and a short while later, a tailor appeared to take my measurements. That afternoon I was delivered a new suit, tie, shirt, and shoes.

Before leaving, the general also asked me my blood type, just in case anything untoward should happen the following day. I prepared as best I could for the meeting. I reviewed my memo and the extensive notes I had made for it. I looked at as many newspapers and publications as I could to make sure I was up to date. After President Botha’s resignation as head of the National Party, F. W. de Klerk had been elected in his place, and there was said to be considerable jockeying between the two men. Some might interpret Botha’s willingness to meet me as his way of stealing thunder from his rival, but that did not concern me. I rehearsed the arguments that the state president might make and the ones I would put in return. In every meeting with an adversary, one must make sure one has conveyed precisely the impression one intends to. I was tense about seeing Mr. Botha. He was known as die Groot Krokodil — the Great Crocodile — and I had heard many accounts of his ferocious temper. He seemed to me to be the very model of the old-fashioned, stiff-necked, stubborn Afrikaner who did not so much discuss matters with black leaders as dictate to them. His recent stroke had apparently only exacerbated this tendency. I resolved that if he acted in thatfinger-wagging fashion with me I would have to inform him that I found such behavior unacceptable, and I would then stand up and adjourn the meeting.

At precisely 5:30 in the morning, Major Marais, the commander of Victor Verster, arrived at my cottage. He came into the lounge where I stood in front of him in my new suit for inspection. He walked around me, and then shook his head from side to side. “No, Mandela, your tie,” he said. One did not have much use for ties in prison, and I realized that morning when I was putting it on that I had forgotten how to tie it properly. I made a knot as best I could and hoped no one would notice. Major Marais unbuttoned my collar, loosened and then removed my tie, and then, standing behind me, tied it in a double Windsor knot. He then stood back to admire his handiwork. “Much better,” he said.

We drove from Victor Verster to Pollsmoor, to the residence of General Willemse, where we were served breakfast by the general’s wife. After breakfast, in a small convoy, we drove to Tuynhuys, the official presidential office, and parked in an underground garage where we would not be seen. Tuynhuys is a graceful, nineteenth-century Cape Dutch-style building, but I did not get a proper look at it that day. I was essentially smuggled into the presidential suite.

We took an elevator to the ground floor and emerged in a grand, wood-paneled lobby in front of the president’s office. There we were met by Kobie Coetsee and Niel Barnard, and a retinue of prison officials. I had spoken extensively with both Coetsee and Dr. Barnard about this meeting, and they had always advised me to avoid controversial issues with the president. While we were waiting, Dr. Barnard looked down and noticed that my shoelaces were not properly tied and he quickly kneeled down to tie them for me. I realized just how nervous they were, and that did not make me any calmer. The door then opened and I walked in expecting the worst.

From the opposite side of his grand office, P. W. Botha walked toward me. He had planned his march perfectly, for we met exactly halfway. He had his hand out and was smiling broadly, and in fact, from that very first moment, he completely disarmed me. He was unfailingly courteous, deferential, and friendly.

We very quickly posed for a photograph of the two of us shaking hands, and then were joined at a long table by Kobie Coetsee, General Willemse, and Dr. Barnard. Tea was served and we began to talk. From the first, it was not as though we were engaged in tense political arguments but a lively and interesting tutorial. We did not discuss substantive issues, so much as history and South African culture. I mentioned that I had recently read an article in an Afrikaans magazine about the 1914 Afrikaner Rebellion, and I mentioned how they had occupied towns in the Free State. I said I saw our struggle as parallel to this famous rebellion, and we discussed this historical episode for quite a while. South African history, of course, looks very different to the black man than to the white man. Their view was that the rebellion had been a quarrel between brothers, whereas my struggle was a revolutionary one. I said that it could also be seen as a struggle between brothers who happen to be different colors.

The meeting was not even half an hour, and was friendly and breezy until the end. It was then that I raised a serious issue. I asked Mr. Botha to release unconditionally all political prisoners, including myself. That was the only tense moment in the meeting, and Mr. Botha said that he was afraid that he could not do that.

There was then a brief discussion as to what we should say if news of the meeting leaked out. We very quickly drafted a bland statement saying that we had met for tea in an effort to promote peace in the country. When this was agreed upon, Mr. Botha rose and shook my hand, saying what a pleasure it had been. Indeed, it had been. I thanked him, and left the way we had come.

While the meeting was not a breakthrough in terms of negotiations, it was one in another sense. Mr. Botha had long talked about the need to cross the Rubicon, but he never did it himself until that morning at Tuynhuys. Now, I felt, there was no turning back.

A little more than a month later, in August 1989, P. W. Botha went on national television to announce his resignation as state president. In a curiously rambling farewell address, he accused cabinet members of a breach of trust, of ignoring him and of playing into the hands of the African National Congress. The following day, F. W. de Klerk was sworn in as acting president and affirmed his commitment to change and reform.

To us, Mr. de Klerk was a cipher. When he became head of the National Party, he seemed to be the quintessential party man, nothing more and nothing less. Nothing in his past seemed to hint at a spirit of reform. As education minister, he had attempted to keep black students out of white universities. But as soon as he took over the National Party, I began to follow him closely. I read all of his speeches, listened to what he said, and began to see that he represented a genuine departure from his predecessor. He was not an ideologue, but a pragmatist, a man who saw change as necessary and inevitable. On the day he was sworn in, I wrote him a letter requesting a meeting.

In his inaugural address, Mr. de Klerk said his government was committed to peace and that it would negotiate with any other group committed to peace. But his commitment to a new order was demonstrated only after his inauguration when a march was planned in Cape Town to protest police brutality. It was to be led by Archbishop Tutu and the Reverend Allan Boesak. Under President Botha, the march would have been banned, marchers would have defied that ban, and violence would have resulted. The new president lived up to his promise to ease restrictions on political gatherings and permitted the march to take place, only asking that the demonstrators remain peaceful. A new and different hand was on the tiller

pp. 661-668

 

98

 

Even as de Klerk became president, I continued to meet with the secret negotiating committee. We were joined by Gerrit Viljoen, the minister of constitutional development, a brilliant man with a doctorate in classics, whose role was to bring our discussions into a constitutional framework. I pressed the government to display evidence of its good intentions, urging the state to show its bona fides by releasing my fellow political prisoners at Pollsmoor and Robben Island. While I told the committee that my colleagues had to be released unconditionally, I said the government could expect disciplined behavior from them after their release. That was demonstrated by the conduct of Govan Mbeki, who had been unconditionally released at the end of 1987.

On October 10, 1989, President de Klerk announced that Walter Sisulu and seven of my former Robben Island comrades, Raymond Mhlaba, Ahmed Kathrada, Andrew Mlangeni, Elias Motsoaledi, Jeff Masemola, Wilton Mkwayi, and Oscar Mpetha, were to be released. That morning, I had been visited by Walter, Kathy, Ray, and Andrew, who were still at Pollsmoor, and I was able to say good-bye. It was an emotional moment, but I knew I would not be too far behind. The men were released five days later from Johannesburg Prison. It was an action that rightly evoked praise here and abroad, and I conveyed my appreciation to Mr. de Klerk.

But my gratitude paled compared to my unalloyed joy that Walter and the others were free. It was a day we had yearned for and fought for over so many years. De Klerk had lived up to his promise, and the men were released under no bans; they could speak in the name of the ANC. It was clear that the ban on the organization had effectively expired, a vindication of our long struggle and our resolute adherence to principle.

De Klerk began a systematic dismantling of many of the building blocks of apartheid. He opened South African beaches to people of all colors, and stated that the Reservation of Separate Amenities Act would soon be repealed. Since 1953 this act had enforced what was known as “petty apartheid,” segregating parks, theaters, restaurants, buses, libraries, toilets, and other public facilities, according to race. In November, he announced that the National Security Management System, a secret structure set up under P. W. Botha to combat anti-apartheid forces, would be dissolved.

In early December, I was informed that a meeting with de Klerk was set for the twelfth of that month. By this time I was able to consult with my colleagues new and old, and I had meetings at the cottage with my old colleagues, and the leaders of the Mass Democratic Movement and the UDF. I received ANC people from all of the regions, as well as delegates from the UDF and COSATU. One of these young men was Cyril Ramaphosa, the general secretary of the National Union of Mine Workers and one of the ablest of the new generation of leadership. I also had visits from colleagues of mine from Robben Island, including Terror Lekota and Tokyo Sexwale, who stayed to lunch. They are both men with large appetites, and the only complaint I heard about them was from Warrant Officer Swart, who said, "Those fellows will eat us out of house and home!” With guidance from a number of colleagues, I then drafted a letter to de Klerk not unlike the one I had sent to P. W. Botha. The subject was talks between the government and the ANC. I told the president that the current conflict was draining South Africa’s lifeblood and talks were the only solution. I said the ANC would accept no preconditions to talks, especially not the precondition that the government wanted: the suspension of the armed struggle. The government asked for an “honest commitment to peace” and I pointed out that our readiness to negotiate was exactly that. I told Mr. de Klerk how impressed I was by his emphasis on reconciliation, enunciated in his inaugural address. His words had imbued millions of South Africans and people around the world with the hope that a new South Africa was about to be born. The very first step on the road to reconciliation, I said, was the complete dismantling of apartheid and all the measures used to enforce it.

But I said that the spirit of that speech had not been much in evidence of late. The government’s policies were perceived by many as a continuation of apartheid by other means. The government, I said, had spent too much time talking with black homeland leaders and others coopted by the system; these men, I asserted, were the agents of an oppressive past that the mass of black South Africans rejected.

I reiterated my proposal that talks take place in two stages. I told him I fully supported the guidelines the ANC had adopted in the Harare Declaration of 1989, which put the onus on the government to eliminate the obstacles to negotiations that the state itself had created. Those demands included the release of all political prisoners, the lifting of all bans on restricted organizations and persons, the end to the State of Emergency, and the removal of all troops from the townships. I stressed that a mutually agreed-upon cease-fire to end hostilities ought to be the first order of business, for without that, no business could be conducted. The day before our meeting the letter was delivered to Mr. de Klerk.

On the morning of December 13, I was again taken to Tuynhuys. I met de Klerk in the same room where I had had tea with his predecessor. Mr. de Klerk was accompanied by Kobie Coetsee, General Willemse, Dr. Barnard, and his colleague Mike Louw. I congratulated Mr. de Klerk on becoming president and expressed the hope that we would be able to work together. He was extremely cordial and reciprocated these sentiments.

From the first I noticed that Mr. de Klerk listened to what I had to say. This was a novel experience. National Party leaders generally heard what they wanted to hear in discussions with black leaders, but Mr. de Klerk seemed to be making an attempt to truly understand.

One of the issues I emphasized that day was the National Party’s recently introduced five-year plan, which contained the concept of “group rights.” The idea of “group rights” was that no racial or ethnic group could take precedence over any other. Although they defined “group rights” as a way of protecting the freedom of minorities in a new South Africa, in fact their proposal was a means of preserving white domination. I told Mr. de Klerk that this was unacceptable to the ANC.

I added that it was not in his interest to retain this concept, for it gave the impression that he wanted to modernize apartheid without abandoning it; this was damaging his image and that of the National Party in the eyes of the progressive forces in this country and around the world. An oppressive system cannot be reformed, I said, it must be entirely cast aside. I mentioned an editorial that I had recently read in Die Burger, the mouthpiece of the National Party in the Cape, implying that the group rights concept was conceived as an attempt to bring back apartheid through the back door. I told Mr. de Klerk that if that was how his party’s paper perceived group rights, how did he think we regarded it? I added that the ANC had not struggled against apartheid for seventy-five years only to yield to a disguised form of it and that if it was his true intention to preserve apartheid through the Trojan horse of group rights, then he did not truly believe in ending apartheid.

Mr. de Klerk, I saw that day, does not react quickly to things. It was a mark of the man that he listened to what I had to say and did not argue with me. “You know,” he said, “my aim is no different than yours. Your memo to P. W. Botha said the ANC and the government should work together to deal with white fears of black domination, and the idea of ‘group rights’ is how we propose to deal with it.” I was impressed with this response, but said that the idea of “group rights” did more to increase black fears than allay white ones. De Klerk then said, “We will have to change it, then.”

I then brought up the question of my freedom and said that if he expected me to go out to pasture upon my release he was greatly mistaken. I reaffirmed that if I was released into the same conditions under which I had been arrested I would go back to doing precisely those things for which I had been imprisoned. I made the case to him that the best way to move forward was to unban the ANC and all other political organizations, to lift the State of Emergency, to release political prisoners, and to allow the exiles to return. If the government did not unban the ANC, as soon as I was out of prison I would be working for an illegal organization. “Then,” I said, “you must simply rearrest me after I walk through those gates.”

Again, he listened carefully to what I had to say. My suggestions certainly came as no surprise to him. He said he would take all that I said under consideration, but that he would make no promises. The meeting was an exploratory one and I understood that nothing was going to be resolved that day. But it was extremely useful, for I had taken the measure of Mr. de Klerk just as I did with new prison commanders when I was on Robben Island. I was able to write to our people in Lusaka that Mr. de Klerk seemed to represent a true departure from the National Party politicians of the past. Mr. de Klerk, I said, echoing Mrs. Thatcher’s famous description of Mr. Gorbachev, was a man we could do business with

 pp. 672-678

 

99

 

On February 2, 1990, F. W. de Klerk stood before Parliament to make the traditional opening speech and did something no other South African head of state had ever done: he truly began to dismantle the apartheid system and lay the groundwork for a democratic South Africa. In dramatic fashion, Mr. de Klerk announced the lifting of the bans on the ANC, the PAC, the South African Communist Party, and thirty-one other illegal organizations; the freeing of political prisoners incarcerated for nonviolent activities; the suspension of capital punishment; and the lifting of various restrictions imposed by the State of Emergency. “The time for negotiation has arrived,” he said.

It was a breathtaking moment, for in one sweeping action he had virtually normalized the situation in South Africa. Our world had changed overnight. After forty years of persecution and banishment, the ANC was now a legal organization. I and all my comrades could no longer be arrested for being a member of the ANC, for carrying its green, yellow, and black banner, for speaking its name. For the first time in almost thirty years, my picture and my words, and those of all my banned comrades, could freely appear in South African newspapers. The international community applauded de Klerk’s bold actions. Amidst all the good news, however, the ANC objected to the fact that Mr. de Klerk had not completely lifted the State of Emergency or ordered the troops out of the townships.

On February 9, seven days after Mr. de Klerk’s speech opening Parliament, I was informed that I was again going to Tuynhuys. I arrived at six o’clock in the evening. I met a smiling Mr. de Klerk in his office and as we shook hands, he informed me that he was going to release me from prison the following day. Although the press in South Africa and around the world had been speculating for weeks that my release was imminent,

Mr. de Klerk’s announcement nevertheless came as a surprise to me. I had not been told that the reason Mr. de Klerk wanted to see me was to tell me that he was making me a free man. I felt a conflict between my blood and my brain. I deeply wanted to leave prison as soon as I could, but to do so on such short notice would not be  wise. I thanked Mr. de Klerk, and then said that at the risk of appearing ungrateful I would prefer to have a week’s notice in order that my family and my organization could be prepared for my release. Simply to walk out tomorrow, I said, would cause chaos. I asked Mr. de Klerk to release me a week from that day. After waiting twenty-seven years, I could certainly wait another seven days.

De Klerk was taken aback by my response. Instead of replying, he continued to relate the plan for my release. He said that the government would fly me to Johannesburg and officially release me there. Before he went any further, I told him that I strongly objected to that. I wanted to walk out of the gates of Victor Verster and be able to thank those who looked after me and greet the people of Cape Town. Though I was from Johannesburg, Cape Town had been my home for nearly three decades. I would make my way back to Johannesburg, but when I chose to, not when the government wanted me to. “Once I am free,” I said, “I will look after myself.”

De Klerk was again nonplused. But this time my objections caused a reaction. He excused himself and left his office to consult with others. After ten minutes he returned with a rather long face and said, “Mr. Mandela, it is too late to change the plan now.” I replied that the plan was unacceptable and that I wanted to be released a week hence and at Victor Verster, not Johannesburg. It was a tense moment and, at the time, neither of us saw any irony in a prisoner asking not to be released and his jailer attempting to release him.

De Klerk again excused himself and left the room. After ten minutes he returned with a compromise: yes, I could be released at Victor Verster, but, no, the release could not be postponed. The government had already informed the foreign press that I was to be set free tomorrow and felt they could not renege on that statement. I felt I could not argue with that. In the end, we agreed on the compromise, and Mr. de Klerk poured a tumbler of whisky for each of us to drink in celebration. I raised the glass in a toast, but only pretended to drink; such spirits are too strong for me.

I did not get back to my cottage until shortly before midnight, whereupon I immediately sent word to my colleagues in Cape Town that I was to be released the following day. I managed to get a message to Winnie and I telephoned Walter in Johannesburg. They would all fly in on a chartered plane the next day. That evening, a number of ANC people on what was known as the National Reception Committee came to the cottage to draft a statement that I would make the following day. They left in the early hours of the morning, and despite my excitement, I had no trouble falling asleep.

pp. 679-683

 

PART ELEVEN

 

FREEDOM

 
 

100

 

I awoke on the day of my release after only a few hours’ sleep at 4:30 A.M. February 11 was a cloudless, end-of-summer Cape Town day. I did a shortened version of my usual exercise regimen, washed, and ate breakfast. I then telephoned a number of people from the ANC and the UDF in Cape Town to come to the cottage to prepare for my release and work on my speech. The prison doctor came by to give me a brief checkup. I did not dwell on the prospect of my release, but on all the many things I had to do before then. As so often happens in life, the momentousness of an occasion is lost in the welter of a thousand details.

There were numerous matters that had to be discussed and resolved with very little time to do so. A number of comrades from the reception committee, including Cyril Ramaphosa and Trevor Manuel, were at the house bright and early. I wanted initially to address the people of Paarl, who had been very kind to me during my incarceration, but the reception committee was adamant that that would not be a good idea: it would look curious if I gave my first speech to the prosperous white burghers of Paarl. Instead, as planned, I would speak first to the people of Cape Town at the Grand Parade in Cape Town.

One of the first questions to be resolved was where I would spend my first night of freedom. My inclination was to spend the night in the Cape Flats, the bustling black and Coloured townships of Cape Town, in order to show my solidarity with the people. But my colleagues and, later, my wife argued that for security reasons I should stay with Archbishop Desmond Tutu in Bishop’s Court, a plush residence in a white suburb. It was not an area where I would have been permitted to live before I went to prison, and I thought it would send the wrong signal to spend my first night of freedom in a posh white area. But the members of the committee explained that Bishop’s Court had become multiracial under Tutu’s tenure, and symbolized an open, generous nonracialism.

The prison service supplied me with boxes and crates for packing. During my first twenty or so years in prison, I accumulated very few possessions, but in the last few years I had amassed enough property — mainly books and papers — to make up for previous decades. I filled over a dozen crates and boxes.

My actual release time was set for 3 P.M., but Winnie and Walter and the other passengers from the chartered flight from Johannesburg did not arrive until after two. There were already dozens of people at the house, and the entire scene took on the aspect of a celebration. Warrant Officer Swart prepared a final meal for all of us, and I thanked him not only for the food he had provided for the last two years but the companionship.

Warrant Officer James Gregory was also there at the house, and I embraced him warmly. In the years that he had looked after me from Pollsmoor through Victor Verster, we had never discussed politics, but our bond was an unspoken one and I would miss his soothing presence. Men like Swart, Gregory, and Warrant Officer Brand reinforced my belief in the essential humanity even of those who had kept me behind bars for the previous twenty-seven and a half years.

There was little time for lengthy farewells. The plan was that Winnie and I would be driven in a car to the front gate of the prison. I had told the authorities that I wanted to be able to say good-bye to the guards and warders who had looked after me and I asked that they and their families wait for me at the front gate, where I would be able to thank them individually.

At a few minutes after three, I was telephoned by a well-known SABC presenter who requested that I get out of the car a few hundred feet before the gate so that they could film me walking toward freedom. This seemed reasonable, and I agreed to do it. This was my first inkling that things might not go as calmly as I had imagined.

By 3:30, I began to get restless, as we were already behind schedule. I told the members of the reception committee that my people had been waiting for me for twenty-seven years and I did not want to keep them waiting any longer. Shortly before four, we left in a small motorcade from the cottage. About a quarter of a mile in front of the gate, the car slowed to a stop and Winnie and I got out and began to walk toward the prison gate.

At first, I could not really make out what was going on in front of us, but when I was within one hundred fifty feet or so, I saw a tremendous commotion and a great crowd of people: hundreds of photographers and television cameras and newspeople as well as several thousand wellwishers.

I was astounded and a little bit alarmed. I had truly not expected such a scene; at most, I had imagined that there would be several dozen people, mainly the warders and their families. But this proved to be only the beginning; I realized we had not thoroughly prepared for all that was about to happen.

Within twenty feet or so of the gate, the cameras started clicking, a noise that sounded like some great herd of metallic beasts. Reporters started shouting questions; television crews began crowding in; ANC supporters were yelling and cheering. It was a happy, if slightly disorienting chaos.

When a television crew thrust a long, dark, furry object at me, I recoiled slightly, wondering if it were some newfangled weapon developed while I was in prison. Winnie informed me that it was a microphone.

When I was among the crowd I raised my right fist and there was a roar. I had not been able to do that for twenty-seven years and it gave me a surge of strength and joy. We stayed among the crowd for only a few minutes before jumping back into the car for the drive to Cape Town. Although I was pleased to have such a reception, I was greatly vexed by the fact that I did not have a chance to say good-bye to the prison staff. As I finally walked through those gates to enter a car on the other side, I felt — even at the age of seventy-one — that my life was beginning anew. My ten thousand days of imprisonment were over.

Cape Town was thirty-five miles to the southwest, but because of the unexpected crowds at the gate, the driver elected to take a different path to the city. We drove round to the back of the prison, and our convoy took small roads and byways into town. We drove through beautiful green vineyards and manicured farms, and I relished the scenery around me.

The countryside was lush and well cared for, but what surprised me was how many white families were standing beside the road to get a glimpse of our motorcade. They had heard on the radio that we were taking an alternate route. Some, perhaps a dozen, even raised their clenched right fists in what had become the ANC power salute. This astonished me; I was tremendously encouraged by these few brave souls from a conservative farming area who expressed their solidarity. At one point, I stopped and got out of the car to greet and thank one such white family and tell them
 how inspired I was by their support. It made me think that the South Africa I was returning to was far different from the one I had left.

As we entered the outskirts of the city, I could see people streaming toward the center. The reception committee had organized a rally at the Grand Parade in Cape Town, a great open square that stretched out in front of the old City Hall. I would speak to the crowd from the balcony of that building, which overlooked the entire area. We heard sketchy reports that a great sea of people had been waiting there since morning. The plan was for our motorcade to avoid the crowd and drive around to the back of City Hall, where I would quietly enter the building.

The drive to Cape Town took forty-five minutes, and as we neared the Grand Parade we could see an enormous crowd. The driver was meant to turn right and skirt its edges, but instead, he inexplicably plunged straight into the sea of people. Immediately the crowd surged forward and enveloped the car. We inched forward for a minute or two but were then forced to stop by the sheer press of bodies. People began knocking on the windows, and then on the boot and the bonnet. Inside it sounded like a massive hailstorm. Then people began to jump on the car in their excitement. Others began to shake it and at that moment I began to worry. I felt as though the crowd might very well kill us with their love.

The driver was even more anxious than Winnie and I, and he was clamoring to jump out of the car. I told him to stay calm and remain inside, that others from the cars behind us would come to our rescue. Allan Boesak and others began to attempt to clear a way for our vehicle and push the people off the car, but with little success. We sat inside — it would have been futile to even attempt to open the door, so many people were pressing on it — for more than an hour, imprisoned by thousands of our own supporters. The scheduled beginning of the speech had long passed.

Several dozen marshals eventually came to the rescue and managed slowly to clear an exit path. When we finally broke free, the driver set off at great speed in the opposite direction from City Hall. “Man, where are you going?” I asked him in some agitation. “I don’t know!” he said, his voice tense with anxiety. “I’ve never experienced anything like that before,” he said, and then continued driving without any destination in mind.

When he began to calm down I gave him directions to the house of my friend and attorney Dullah Omar, who lived in the Indian area of the city. We could go there, I said, and relax for a few minutes. This appealed to him. Fortunately, Dullah and his family were home, but they were more than a bit surprised to see us. I was a free man for the first time in twenty-seven years, but instead of greeting me, they said with some concern, “Aren’t you meant to be at the Grand Parade?”

We were able to sip some cold drinks at Dullah’s, but we had only been there a few minutes when Archbishop Tutu telephoned. How he knew we were there I do not know. He was quite distressed and said, “Nelson, you must come back to the Grand Parade immediately. The people are growing restless. If you do not return straightaway I cannot vouch for what will happen. I think there might be an uprising!” I said I would return at once.

Our problem was the driver: he was deeply reluctant to return to the Grand Parade. But I remonstrated with him and soon we were on our way back to City Hall. The building was surrounded by people on all sides, but it was not as dense in the back, and the driver managed to make his way through to the rear entrance. It was almost dusk when I was led up to the top floor of this stately building whose halls had always been filled with shuffling white functionaries. I walked out onto the balcony and saw a boundless sea of people cheering, holding flags and banners, clapping, and laughing.

I raised my fist to the crowd and the crowd responded with an enormous cheer. Those cheers fired me anew with the spirit of the struggle. “Amandla!” I called out. “Ngawethu!” they responded. “iAfrika!” I yelled; “Mayibuye!” they answered. Finally, when the crowd had settled down a bit, I took out my speech and then reached into my breast pocket for my glasses. They were not there; I had left them at Victor Verster. I knew Winnie’s glasses were a similar prescription and I borrowed hers.

Friends, comrades and fellow South Africans. I greet you all in the name of peace, democracy and freedom for all! I stand here before you not as a prophet but as a humble servant of you, the people. Your tireless and heroic sacrifices have made it possible for me to be here today. I therefore place the remaining years of my life in your hands.

I spoke from the heart. I wanted first of all to tell the people that I was not a messiah, but an ordinary man who had became a leader because of extraordinary circumstances. I wanted immediately to thank the people all over the world who had campaigned for my release. I thanked the people of Cape Town, and I saluted Oliver Tambo and the African National Congress, Umkhonto we Sizwe, the South African Communist Party, the UDF, the South African Youth Congress, COSATU, the Mass Democratic Movement, the National Union of South African Students, and the Black Sash,a group formed by women that had long been a voice of conscience. I also publicly expressed my gratitude to my wife and family, saying, “I am convinced that [their] pain and suffering was far greater than my own.”

I told the crowd in no uncertain terms that apartheid had no future in South Africa, and that the people must not let up their campaign of mass action. “The sight of freedom looming on the horizon should encourage us to redouble our efforts.” I felt it was important publicly to explain my talks with the government. “Today,” I said, “I wish to report to you that my talks with the government have been aimed at normalizing the political situation in the country. I wish to stress that I myself have at no time entered into negotiations about the future of our country except to insist on a meeting between the ANC and the government.”

I said I hoped that a climate conducive to a negotiated settlement could soon be achieved, ending the need for the armed struggle. The steps to achieving such a climate, I said, had been outlined in the ANC’s 1989 Harare Declaration. As a condition to real negotiations, I said, the government must immediately end the State of Emergency and free all political prisoners.

I told the people that de Klerk had gone further than any other Nationalist leader to normalize the situation and then, in words that came back to haunt me, I called Mr. de Klerk “a man of integrity.” These words were flung back at me many times when Mr. de Klerk seemed not to live up to them.

It was vital for me to show my people and the government that I was unbroken and unbowed, and that the struggle was not over for me but beginning anew in a different form. I affirmed that I was “a loyal and disciplined member of the African National Congress.” I encouraged the people to return to the barricades, to intensify the struggle, and we would walk the last mile together.

It was evening by the time my speech was finished, and we were hustled back into our cars for the trip to Bishop’s Court. As we entered its pristine environs, I saw hundreds of black faces waiting to greet me. When they saw us, the people burst into song. When I greeted Archbishop Tutu, I enveloped him in a great hug; here was a man who had inspired an entire nation with his words and his courage, who had revived the people’s hope during the darkest of times. We were led inside the house where more family and friends met us, but for me, the most wonderful moment was when I was told that I had a telephone call from Stockholm. I knew immediately who it was. Oliver’s voice was weak, but unmistakable, and to hear him after all those years filled me with great joy. Oliver was in Sweden recuperating from a debilitating stroke he had suffered in August 1989. We agreed that we would meet as soon as possible.

My dream upon leaving prison was to take a leisurely drive down to the Transkei, and visit my birthplace, the hills and streams where I had played as a boy, and the burial ground of my mother, which I had never seen. But my dream had to be deferred, for I learned very quickly of the extensive plans that the ANC had for me, and none of them involved a relaxing journey to the Transkei


pp. 684-687

 

101

 

 

I was scheduled to hold a press conference the afternoon after my release, and in the morning I met with a number of my colleagues to talk about scheduling and strategy. A small mountain of telegrams and messages of congratulations had arrived, and I tried to review as many of these as possible. There were telegrams from all around the world, from presidents and prime ministers, but I remember one in particular from a white Cape Town housewife that amused me greatly. It read: “I am very glad that you are free, and that you are back among your friends and family, but your speech yesterday was very boring.”

Before I went to prison I never held such a press conference as I did that day. In the old days there were no television cameras, and most ANC press conferences were conducted clandestinely. That afternoon, there were so many journalists, from so many different countries, I did not know whom to speak with. I was pleased to see a high percentage of black journalists among the throng. At the press conference I was once again keen to reassert a number of themes: first, that I was a loyal and disciplined member of the ANC. I was mindful of the fact that the most senior ANC people would be watching my release from abroad, and attempting to gauge my fidelity from a distance. I was aware that they had heard rumors that I had strayed from the organization, that I was compromised, so at every turn I sought to reassure them. When asked what role I would play in the organization, I told the press that I would play whatever role the ANC ordered.

I told the reporters that there was no contradiction between my continuing support for the armed struggle and my advocating negotiations. It was the reality and the threat of the armed struggle that had brought the government to the verge of negotiations. I added that when the state stopped inflicting violence on the ANC, the ANC would reciprocate with peace. Asked about sanctions, I said the ANC could not yet call for the relaxation of sanctions, because the situation that caused sanctions in the first place — the absence of political rights for blacks — was still the status quo. I might be out of jail, I said, but I was not yet free.

I was asked as well about the fears of whites. I knew that people expected me to harbor anger toward whites. But I had none. In prison, my anger toward whites decreased, but my hatred for the system grew. I wanted South Africa to see that I loved even my enemies while I hated the system that turned us against one another. I wanted to impress upon the reporters the critical role of whites in any new dispensation. I have tried never to lose sight of this. We did not want to destroy the country before we freed it, and to drive the whites away would devastate the nation. I said that there was a middle ground between white fears and black hopes, and we in the ANC would find it. “Whites are fellow South Africans,” I said, “and we want them to feel safe and to know that we appreciate the contribution that they have made toward the development of this country.” Any man or woman who abandons apartheid will be embraced in our struggle for a democratic, nonracial South Africa; we must do everything we can to persuade our white compatriots that a new, nonracial South Africa will be a better place for all.

From my very first press conference I noticed that journalists were as eager to learn about my personal feelings and relationships as my political thoughts. This was new to me; when I went to prison, a journalist would never have thought of asking questions about one’s wife and family, one’s emotions, one’s most intimate moments. While it was understandable that the press might be interested in these things, I nevertheless found their curiosity difficult to satisfy. I am not and never have been a man who finds it easy to talk about his feelings in public. I was often asked by reporters how it felt to be free, and I did my best to describe the indescribable, and usually failed. After the press conference, Archbishop Tutu’s wife telephoned us from Johannesburg to say that we must fly there straightaway. Winnie and I had hoped to spend a few days in Cape Town relaxing, but the message we were getting was that the people of Johannesburg were getting restless and there might be chaos if I did not return directly. We flew to Johannesburg that evening, but I was informed that there were thousands of people surrounding our old home, 8115 Orlando West, which had been reconstructed, and that it would be unwise to go there. I reluctantly acceded; I yearned to spend my second night of freedom under my own roof. Instead, Winnie and I stayed in the northern suburbs at the home of an ANC supporter.

The following morning we flew by helicopter to the First National Bank Stadium in Soweto. We were able to make an aerial tour of Soweto, the teeming metropolis of matchbox houses, tin shanties, and dirt roads, the mother city of black urban South Africa, the only home I ever knew as a man before I went to prison. While Soweto had grown, and in some places prospered, the overwhelming majority of the people remained dreadfully poor, without electricity or running water, eking out an existence that was shameful in a nation as wealthy as South Africa. In many places, the poverty was far worse than when I went to prison.

We circled over the stadium, overflowing with 120,000 people, and landed in the center. The stadium was so crowded, with people sitting or standing in every inch of space, that it looked as though it would burst. I expressed my delight to be back among them, but I then scolded the people for some of the crippling problems of urban black life. Students, I said, must return to school. Crime must be brought under control. I told them that I had heard of criminals masquerading as freedom fighters, harassing innocent people and setting alight vehicles; these rogues had no place in the struggle. Freedom without civility, freedom without the ability to live in peace, was not true freedom at all.

Today, my return to Soweto fills my heart with joy. At the same time I also return with a deep sense of sadness. Sadness to learn that you are still suffering under an inhuman system. The housing shortage, the schools crisis, unemployment and the crime rate still remain. . . . As proud as I am to be part of the Soweto community, I have been greatly disturbed by the statistics of crime that I read in the newspapers. Although I understand the deprivations our people suffer I must make it clear that the level of crime in the township is unhealthy and must be eliminated as a matter of urgency.


I ended by opening my arms to all South Africans of goodwill and good intentions, saying that “no man or woman who has abandoned apartheid will be excluded from our movement toward a nonracial, united and democratic South Africa based on one-person one-vote on a common voters’ roll.” That was the ANC’s mission, the goal that I had always kept before me during the many lonely years in prison, the goal that I would work toward during the remaining years of my life. It was the dream I cherished when I entered prison at the age of forty-four, but I was no longer a young man, I was seventy-one, and I could not afford to waste any time.

That night, I returned with Winnie to number 8115 in Orlando West. It was only then that I knew in my heart that I had left prison. For me, 8115 was the centerpoint of my world, the place marked with an X in my mental geography. The house had been soundly rebuilt after the fire. When I saw the four-roomed house, I was surprised by how much smaller and humbler it was than I remembered it being. Compared to my cottage at VictorVerster, number 8115 could have been the servants’ quarters at the back. But any house in which a man is free is a castle when compared to even the plushest prison.

That night, as happy as I was to be home, I had a sense that what I most wanted and longed for was going to be denied me. I yearned to resume a normal and ordinary life, to pick up some of the old threads from my life as a young man, to be able to go to my office in the morning and return to my family in the evening, to be able to pop out and buy some toothpaste at the pharmacy, to visit in the evening with old friends. These ordinary things are what one misses most in prison, and dreams about doing when one is free. But I quickly realized that such things were not going to be possible. That night, and every night for the next weeks and months, the house was surrounded by hundreds of well-wishers. People sang and danced and called out, and their joy was infectious. These were my people, and I had no right and no desire to deny myself to them. But in giving myself to my people I could see that I was once again taking myself away from my family.

We did not sleep much that night, as the singing continued until the early hours, when members of the ANC and UDF who were guarding the house begged the crowd to remain quiet and allow us to rest. There were many in the ANC who advised me to move to the home a few blocks distant, in Diepkloof extension, that Winnie had built while I was in prison. It was a grand place by Soweto standards, but it was a house that held no meaning or memories for me. Moreover, it was a house that because of its size and expense seemed somehow inappropriate for a leader of the people. I rejected that advice for as long as I could. I wanted not only to live among my people, but like them

pp. 688-690

 

102

 
 

MY FIRST RESPONSIBILITY was to report to the leadership of the ANC, and on February 27, when I had been out of prison a little over two weeks, I flew to Lusaka for a meeting of the National Executive Committee. It was a wonderful reunion to be with old comrades whom I had not seen in decades. A number of African heads of state were also in attendance, and I had brief talks with Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, José Eduardo Dos Santos of Angola, Quett Masire of Botswana, Joaquim Chissano of Mozambique, and Yoweri Museveni of Uganda.

While the members of the executive were pleased that I had been freed, they were also eager to evaluate the man who had been released. I could see the questions in their eyes. Was Mandela the same man who went to prison twenty-seven years before, or was this a different Mandela, a reformed Mandela? Had he survived or had he been broken? They had heard reports of my conversations with the government and they were rightly concerned. I had not only been out of touch with the situation on the ground — since 1984 I had not even been able to communicate with my colleagues in prison.

I carefully and soberly explained the nature of my talks with the government. I described the demands I had made, and the progress that had been achieved. They had seen the memoranda I had written to Botha and de Klerk, and knew that these documents adhered to ANC policy. I knew that over the previous few years some of the men who had been released had gone to Lusaka and whispered, “Madiba has become soft. He has been bought off by the authorities. He is wearing three-piece suits, drinking wine, and eating fine food.” I knew of these whispers, and I intended to refute them. I knew that the best way to disprove them was simply to be direct and honest about everything that I had done.

At that session of the NEC I was elected deputy president of the organization while Alfred Nzo, the organization’s secretary-general, was named acting president while Oliver was recuperating. At a press conference after our meeting, I was asked about a suggestion made by Dr. Kaunda, the president of Zambia and a longtime supporter of the Congress, that the ANC should suspend armed operations inside South Africa now that I had been released. I replied that while we valued Mr. Kaunda’s wisdom and support, it was too soon to suspend the armed struggle, for we had not yet achieved the goal for which we took up arms; it was not the ANC’s job, I said, to help Mr. de Klerk placate his right-wing supporters.

I began a tour of Africa, which included many countries. During the first six months after my release, I spent more time abroad than at home. Nearly everywhere I went there were great enthusiastic crowds so that even if I felt weary the people buoyed me. In Dar es Salaam I was met by a crowd estimated at half a million.

I enjoyed my travels immensely. I wanted to see new — and old — sights, taste different foods, speak with all manner of people. I very quicklyhad to acclimatize myself to world radically different from the one I had left. With changes in travel, communication, and mass media, the world had accelerated; things now happened so fast it was sometimes difficult to keep up with them. Winnie tried to get me to slow down, but there was simply too much to do; the organization wanted to make sure we took advantage of the euphoria generated by my release.

In Cairo, the day after a private meeting with the Egyptian president, Hosni Mubarak, I was scheduled to address a large meeting in a local hall.  When I arrived, the crowd seemed to be spilling out of the building and there was precious little security. I mentioned to a policeman that I thought he needed reinforcements but he merely shrugged. Winnie and I waited in a room behind the hall, and at the appointed hour, a policeman motioned for me to go in. I told him to escort the rest of my delegation in first because I feared that when I went in there would be pandemonium and they would be cut off. But the policeman urged me to go first, and indeed as soon as I was in the hall, the crowd surged forward and overcame the cordon of policemen. In their enthusiasm, I was jostled and a bit shaken, and at one point I lost my shoe in the general confusion. When things began to calm down a few minutes later, I found that neither my shoe nor my wife could be located. Finally, after nearly half an hour, Winnie was brought onto the stage with me, quite cross that she had been lost. I was not able to even address the crowd, for they were shouting “Mandela! Mandela!” so furiously that I could not be heard above the din, and finally I left, without my shoe and with an uncharacteristically silent wife.

While in Cairo I held a press conference at which I said the ANC was “prepared to consider a cessation of hostilities.” This was a signal to the government. Both the ANC and the government were engaged in creating a climate whereby negotiations would succeed. While the ANC was demanding that the government normalize the situation in the country by ending the State of Emergency, releasing all political prisoners, and repealing all apartheid laws, the government was intent on first persuading the ANC to suspend the armed struggle. While we were not yet ready to announce such a suspension, we wanted to provide Mr. de Klerk with enough encouragement to pursue his reformist strategies. We knew that we would eventually suspend the armed struggle, in part to facilitate more serious negotiations and in part to allow Mr. de Klerk to go to his own constituency, the white voters of South Africa, and say, “Look, here are the fruits of my policy.”

After my last stop in Africa, I flew to Stockholm to visit Oliver. Seeing my old friend and law partner was the reunion I most looked forward to. Oliver was not well, but when we met we were like two young boys in the veld who took strength from our love for each other. We began by talking of old times, but when we were alone, the first subject he raised was the leadership of the organization. “Nelson,” he said, “you must now take over as president of the ANC. I have been merely keeping the job warm for you.” I refused, telling him that he had led the organization in exile far better than

I ever could have. It was neither fair nor democratic for a transfer to occur in such a manner. “You have been elected by the organization as the president,” I said. “Let us wait for an election; then the organization can decide.” Oliver protested, but I would not budge. It was a sign of his humility and selflessness that he wanted to appoint me president, but it was not in keeping with the principles of the ANC.

In April 1990, I flew to London to attend a concert at Wembley, held in my honor. Many international artists, most of whom I never knew, were performing and the event was to be televised worldwide. I took advantage of this to thank the world’s anti-apartheid forces for the tremendous work they had done in pressing for sanctions, for the release of myself and fellow political prisoners, and for the genuine support and solidarity they had shown the oppressed people of my country

pp. 691-694

 

 

103

 

When I emerged from prison, Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, the head of the Inkatha Freedom Party and the chief minister of KwaZulu, was one of the premier players on the South African political stage. But within ANC circles, he was a far from popular figure. Chief Buthelezi was descended from the great Zulu king Cetywayo, who had defeated the British at the Battle of Isandhlwana in 1879. As a young man, he attended Fort Hare and then joined the ANC Youth League. I saw him as one of the movement’s upcoming young leaders. He had become chief minister of the KwaZulu homeland with the tacit support of the ANC, and even his launching of Inkatha as a Zulu cultural organization was unopposed by the organization.

But over the years, Chief Buthelezi drifted away from the ANC. Though he resolutely opposed apartheid and refused to allow KwaZulu to become an “independent” homeland as the government wished, he was a thorn in the side of the democratic movement. He opposed the armed struggle.

He criticized the 1976 Soweto uprising. He campaigned against international sanctions. He challenged the idea of a unitary state of South Africa. Yet, Chief Buthelezi had consistently called for my release and refused to negotiate with the government until I and other political prisoners were liberated.

Chief Buthelezi was one of the first people I telephoned after my release to thank him for his long-standing support. My inclination was to meet with the chief as soon as possible to try to resolve our differences. During my initial visit to Lusaka, I brought up the idea of such a meeting and it was voted down. While I was at Victor Verster, Walter had been invited by the Zulu king, Goodwill Zwelithini, to visit him in Ulundi, KwaZulu’s capital, and I urged him to accept. I thought it was an excellent opportunity to influence the head of one of the most respected and powerful royal families in the country. The visit was tentatively approved by the NEC provided Walter went to the king’s palace in Nongoma; it was thought that going to Ulundi would suggest recognition of the authority of the homeland.

When I returned from Lusaka I telephoned both Chief Buthelezi and the king, and explained that Walter would be coming to see the king, not in Ulundi but at Nongoma. The king said he would not accept Walter coming to see him anywhere else but in the capital. “I am the king,” he said. “I have invited him to see me in Ulundi, and he has no right to say I will see you elsewhere.” “Your Majesty,” I said, “we are facing a wall of opposition from our membership who did not want Mr. Sisulu to go to KwaZulu at all. We managed to get this compromise approved, surely you can bend as well.” But he could not, and he refused to see Walter.

Relations deteriorated after this, and in May, I persuaded the ANC of the need for me to make a visit to the king and Buthelezi. The king approved, but a week or so before the visit I received a letter from him saying I must come alone. This proved to be the last straw, and the NEC would not give in to such a demand. I told the king that I could not come unless I was accompanied by my colleagues; the king regarded this as another slight and canceled the visit.

My goal was to forge an independent relationship with the king, separate from my relationship with Chief Buthelezi. The king was the true hereditary leader of the Zulus, who loved and respected him. Fidelity to the king was far more widespread in KwaZulu than allegiance to Inkatha. In the meantime, Natal became a killing ground. Heavily armed Inkatha supporters had in effect declared war on ANC strongholds across the Natal Midlands region and around Pietermaritzburg. Entire villages were set alight, dozens of people were killed, hundreds were wounded, and thousands became refugees. In March 1990 alone, 230 people lost their lives in this internecine violence. In Natal, Zulu was murdering Zulu, for Inkatha members and ANC partisans are Zulus. In February, only two weeks after my release, I went to Durban and spoke to a crowd of over 100,000 people at King’s Park, almost all of whom were Zulus. I pleaded with them to lay down their arms, to take each other’s hands in peace:

“Take your guns, your knives, and your pangas, and throw them into the sea! Close down the death factories. End this war now!” But my call fell on deaf ears. The fighting and dying continued. I was so concerned that I was willing to go to great lengths to meet Chief Buthelezi. In March, after one particularly horrifying spasm of violence, Iannounced on my own that I would meet Chief Buthelezi at a mountain hamlet outside of Pietermaritzburg. On a personal level, my relations with Chief Buthelezi were close and respectful, and I hoped to capitalize on that. But I found that such a meeting was anathema to ANC leaders in Natal.

They considered it dangerous and vetoed my meeting. I did go to Pietermaritzburg, where I saw the burned remains of ANC supporters and tried to comfort their grieving families, but I did not see Chief Buthelezi6

pp. 695-700

 

104

 

In March, after much negotiation within our respective parties, we scheduled our first face-to-face meeting with Mr. de Klerk and the government. These were to be “talks about talks,” and the meetings were to begin in early April. But on March 26, in Sebokeng Township, about thirty miles south of Johannesburg, the police opened fire without warning on a crowd of ANC demonstrators, killing twelve and wounding hundreds more, most of them shot in the back as they were fleeing. Police had used live ammunition in dealing with the demonstrators, which was intolerable. The police claimed that their lives were endangered, but many demonstrators were shot in the back and had no weapons. You cannot be in danger from an unarmed man who is running away from you. The right to assemble and demonstrate in support of our just demands was not a favor to be granted by the government at its discretion. This sort of action angered me like no other, and I told the press that every white policeman in South Africa regarded every black person as a military target. After consultation with the NEC, I announced the suspension of our talks and warned Mr. de Klerk that he could not “talk about negotiations on the one hand and murder our people on the other.”

But despite the suspension of our official talks, with the approval of the leadership, I met privately with Mr. de Klerk in Cape Town in order to keep up the momentum for negotiations. Our discussions centered primarily on a new date, and we agreed on early May. I brought up the appalling behavior at Sebokeng and the police’s unequal treatment of blacks and whites; police used live ammunition with black demonstrators, while they never unsheathed their guns at white right-wing protests.

The government was in no great rush to begin negotiations; they were counting on the euphoria that greeted my release to die down. They wanted to allow time for me to fall on my face and show that the former prisoner hailed as a savior was a highly fallible man who had lost touch with the present situation.

Despite his seemingly progressive actions, Mr. de Klerk was by no means the great emancipator. He was a gradualist, a careful pragmatist. He did not make any of his reforms with the intention of putting himself out of power. He made them for precisely the opposite reason: to ensure power for the Afrikaner in a new dispensation. He was not yet prepared to negotiate the end of white rule.

His goal was to create a system of power-sharing based on group rights, which would preserve a modified form of minority power in South Africa. He was decidedly opposed to majority rule, or “simple majoritarianism” as he sometimes called it, because that would end white domination in a single stroke. We knew early on that the government was fiercely opposed to a winner-takes-all Westminster parliamentary system, and advocated instead a system of proportional representation with built-in structural guarantees for the white minority. Although he was prepared to allow the black majority to vote and create legislation, he wanted to retain a minority veto. From the start I would have no truck with this plan. I described it to Mr. de Klerk as apartheid in disguise, a “loser-takes-all” system.

The Nationalists’ long-term strategy to overcome our strength was to build an anti-ANC alliance with the Inkatha Freedom Party and to lure the Coloured Afrikaans-speaking voters of the Cape to a new National Party. From the moment of my release, they began wooing both Buthelezi and the Coloured voters of the Cape. The government attempted to scare the Coloured population into thinking the ANC was anti-Coloured. They supported Chief Buthelezi’s desire to retain Zulu power and identity in a new South Africa by preaching to him the doctrine of group rights and federalism.

The first round of talks with the government was held over three days in early May. Our delegation consisted of Walter Sisulu, Joe Slovo, Alfred Nzo, Thabo Mbeki, Ahmed Kathrada, Joe Modise, Ruth Mompati, Archie Gumede, Reverend Beyers Naude, Cheryl Carolus, and myself. The setting was Groote Schuur, the Cape Dutch-style mansion that was the residence of South Africa’s first colonial governors, among them Cecil Rhodes. Some of our delegation joked that we were being led into an ambush on the enemy’s ground.

But the talks, contrary to expectation, were conducted with seriousness and good humor. Historic enemies who had been fighting each other for three centuries met and shook hands. Many wondered out loud why such discussions had not taken place long before. The government had granted temporary indemnities to Joe Slovo, the general secretary of the Communist Party, and Joe Modise, the commander of MK, and to see these two men shaking hands with the National Party leaders who had demonized them for decades was extraordinary. As Thabo Mbeki later said to reporters, each side had discovered that the other did not have horns.

The very fact of the talks themselves was a significant milestone in the history of our country; as I pointed out, the meeting represented not only what the ANC had been seeking for so many years, but an end to the master/servant relationship that characterized black and white relations in South Africa. We had not come to the meeting as supplicants or petitioners, but as fellow South Africans who merited an equal place at the table. The first day was more or less a history lesson. I explained to our counterparts that the ANC from its inception in 1912 had always sought negotiations with the government in power. Mr. de Klerk, for his part, suggested that the system of separate development had been conceived as a benign idea, but had not worked in practice. For that, he said, he was sorry, and hoped the negotiations would make amends. It was not an apology

for apartheid, but it went further than any other National Party leader ever had. The primary issue discussed was the definition of political prisoners and political exiles. The government argued for a narrow definition, wanting to restrict the number of our people who would qualify for an indemnity. We argued for the broadest possible definition and said that any person who was convicted of an offense that was politically motivated should qualify for an indemnity. We could not agree on a mutually satisfactory definition of “politically motivated” crimes, and this would be an issue that would bedevil us for quite a while to come.

At the end of the three-day meeting, we agreed on what became known as the Groote Schuur Minute, pledging both sides to a peaceful process of negotiations and committing the government to lifting the State of Emergency, which they shortly did everywhere except for the violence-ridden province of Natal. We agreed to set up a joint working group to resolve the many obstacles that still stood in our way.

When it came to constitutional issues, we told the government we were demanding an elected constituent assembly to draw up a new constitution; we believed that the men and women creating the constitution should be the choice of the people themselves. But before the election of an assembly, it was necessary to have an interim government that could oversee the transition until a new government was elected. The government could not be both player and referee, as it was now. We advocated the creation of a multiparty negotiating conference to set up the interim government and set out the guiding principles for the functioning of a constituent assembly

pp. 701-705

105

 

ALTHOUGH I HAD WANTED to journey to Qunu immediately after my release from prison, it was not until April that I was able to go. I could not pick up and leave whenever I wanted; security had to be arranged, as well as speeches prepared for local organizations. By April, the ANC and General Bantu Holomisa, the military leader of the Transkei and an ANC loyalist, had arranged for a visit. But what was foremost in my mind and heart was paying my respects to my mother’s grave.

I went first to Qunu and the site where my mother was buried. Her grave was simple and unadorned, covered only by a few stones and some upturned bricks, no different from the other graves at Qunu. I find it difficult to describe my feelings: I felt regret that I had been unable to be with her when she died, remorse that I had not been able to look after her properly during her life, and a longing for what might have been had I chosen to live my life differently.

In seeing my village again after so many years, I was greatly struck by what had changed and what had not. When I had been young, the people of Qunu were not political at all; they were unaware of the struggle for African rights. People accepted life as it was and did not dream of changing it.

But when I returned I heard the schoolchildren of Qunu singing songs about Oliver Tambo and Umkhonto we Sizwe, and I marveled at how knowledge of the struggle had by then seeped into every corner of African society.

What had endured was the warmth and simplicity of the community, which took me back to my days as a boy. But what disturbed me was that the villagers seemed as poor if not poorer than they had been then. Most people still lived in simple huts with dirt floors, with no electricity and no running water. When I was young, the village was tidy, the water pure, and the grass green and unsullied as far as the eye could see. Kraals were swept, the topsoil was conserved, fields were neatly divided. But now the village was unswept, the water polluted, and the countryside littered with plastic bags and wrappers. We had not known of plastic when I was a boy, and though it surely improved life in some ways, its presence in Qunu appeared to me to be a kind of blight. Pride in the community seemed to have vanished.

That month, I had another homecoming: I returned to Robben Island in order to persuade twenty-five MK political prisoners to accept the government’s offer of amnesty and leave the island. Though I had left the island eight years before, my memories of prison were still fresh and untinged by nostalgia. After all the years of being visited by others, it was a curious sensation to be a visitor on Robben Island.

But that day, I did not have much opportunity to sight-see for I met immediately with the men protesting the government offer of amnesty. They maintained that they would leave only after a victory on the battlefield, not the negotiating table. They were fiercely opposed to this particular settlement, in which they had to enumerate their crimes before receiving indemnity. They accused the ANC of retreating from the Harare Declaration demand for an unconditional, blanket amnesty covering political prisoners and exiles. One man said, “Madiba, I have been fighting the government all my life, and now I have to ask for a pardon from them.”

I could sympathize with their arguments, but they were being unrealistic. Every soldier would like to defeat his enemy on the field, but in this case, such a victory was out of reach. The struggle was now at the negotiating table. I argued that they were not advancing the cause by remaining in jail. They could be of greater service outside than inside. In the end, they agreed to accept the government’s offer.

In early June, I was scheduled to leave on a six-week tour of Europe and North America. Before going, I met privately with Mr. de Klerk, who wanted to discuss the issue of sanctions. Based on the changes he had made in South Africa, he asked me to mute the call for the continuation of international sanctions. While we were mindful of what Mr. de Klerk had done, in our view sanctions remained the best lever to force him to do more. I was aware that the European Community and the States were inclined to relax sanctions based on Mr. de Klerk’s reforms. I explained to Mr. de Klerk that we could not tell our supporters to relax sanctions until he had completely dismantled apartheid and a transitional government was in place. While he was disappointed at my response, he was not surprised.

The first leg of the trip took Winnie and me to Paris, where we were treated in very grand style by François Mitterrand and his charming wife, Danielle, a longtime ANC supporter. This was not my first trip to the European mainland, but I was still entranced by the beauties of the Old World.

Although I do not want to stint on the loveliness of the City of Light, the most important event that occurred while I was in France was that the government announced the suspension of the State of Emergency. I was pleased, but well aware that they had taken this action while I was in Europe in order to undermine my call for sanctions.

After stops in Switzerland, Italy, and the Netherlands, I went to England, where I spent two days visiting with Oliver and Adelaide. My next stop was the United States, but I would be returning to England on my way back to South Africa, which is when I was scheduled to meet with Mrs. Thatcher. As a courtesy, however, I phoned her before I left, and Mrs. Thatcher proceeded to give me a stern but well-meaning lecture: she said she had been following my travels and noting how many events I attended each day. “Mr. Mandela, before we discuss any issues,” she said, “I must warn you that your schedule is too heavy. You must cut it in half. Even a man half your age would have trouble meeting the demands that are being made on you. If you keep this up, you will not come out of America alive. That is my advice to you.”

I had read about New York City since I was a young man, and finally to see it from the bottom of its great glass-and-concrete canyons while millions upon millions of pieces of ticker tape came floating down was a breathtaking experience. It was reported that as many as a million people personally witnessed our procession through the city, and to see the support and enthusiasm they gave to the anti-apartheid struggle was truly humbling. I had always read that New York was a hard-hearted place, but I felt the very opposite of that on my first full day in the city.

The following day I went up to Harlem, an area that had assumed legendary proportions in my mind since the 1950s when I watched young men in Soweto emulate the fashions of Harlem dandies. Harlem, as my wife said, was the Soweto of America. I spoke to a great crowd at Yankee Stadium, telling them that an unbreakable umbilical cord connected black South Africans and black Americans, for we were together children of Africa. There was a kinship between the two, I said, that had been inspired by such great Americans as W. E. B. Du Bois, Marcus Garvey, and Martin Luther King Jr. As a young man, I idolized the Brown Bomber, Joe Louis, who took on not only his opponents in the ring but racists outside of it. In prison, I followed the struggle of black Americans against racism, discrimination, and economic inequality. To us, Harlem symbolized the strength of resistance and the beauty of black pride. This was brought home to me by a young man I had seen the previous day who wore a T-shirt that read, “BLACK BY NATURE, PROUD BY CHOICE.” We were linked by nature, I said, but we were proud of each other by choice.

After journeying to Memphis and Boston, I went to Washington to address a joint session of Congress and attend a private meeting with President Bush. I thanked the U.S. Congress for its anti-apartheid legislation and said the new South Africa hoped to live up to the values that created the two chambers before which I spoke. I said that as freedom fighters we could not have known of such men as George Washington, Abraham Lincoln, and Thomas Jefferson “and not been moved to act as they were moved to act.” I also delivered a strong message on sanctions, for I knew that the Bush administration felt it was time to loosen them. I urged Congress not to do so. Even before meeting Mr. Bush, I had formed a positive impression of him, for he was the first world leader to telephone me with congratulations after I left prison. From that point on, President Bush included me on his short list of world leaders whom he briefed on important issues. In person, he was just as warm and thoughtful, though we differed markedly on the issues of the armed struggle and sanctions. He was a man with whom one could disagree and then shake hands.

From the United States I proceeded to Canada, where I had a meeting with Prime Minister Mulroney and also addressed their Parliament. We were due to go to Ireland next, and before crossing the Atlantic, our plane, a small jet, stopped for refueling in a remote place above the Arctic Circle called Goose Bay. I felt like having a walk in the brisk air, and as I was strolling on the tarmac, I noticed some people standing by the airport fence. I asked a Canadian official who they were. Eskimos, he said.

In my seventy-two years on earth I had never met an Innuit and never imagined that I would. I headed over to that fence and found a dozen or so young people, in their late teens, who had come out to the airport because they had heard our plane was going to stop there. I had read about the Innuit (the name “Eskimo” was given to them by the colonists) as a boy, and the impression I received from the racist colonialist texts was that they were a backward culture.

But in talking with these bright young people, I learned that they had watched my release on television and were familiar with events in South Africa. “Viva ANC!” one of them said. The Innuit are an aboriginal people historically mistreated by a white settler population; there were parallels between the plights of black South Africans and the Innuit people. What struck me so forcefully was how small the planet had become during my decades in prison; it was amazing to me that a teenaged Innuit living at the roof of the world could watch the release of a political prisoner on the southern tip of Africa. Television had shrunk the world, and had in the process become a great weapon for eradicating ignorance and promoting democracy.

After Dublin, I went to London, where I had a three-hour meeting with Mrs. Thatcher. Standing out in the cold talking with the young Innuits had given me a chill. On the day I was to see Mrs. Thatcher it was wintry and raining, and as we were leaving, Winnie told me I must take a raincoat. We were already in the lobby of the hotel, and if I went back for my coat we would be late. I am a stickler about punctuality, not only because I think it is a sign of respect to the person you are meeting but in order to combat the Western stereotype of Africans as being notoriously tardy. I told Winnie we did not have time, and instead I stood out in the rain signing autographs for some children. By the time I got to Mrs. Thatcher I was feeling poorly, and I was later diagnosed as having a mild case of pneumonia.

But it did not interfere with our meeting, except that she chided me like a schoolmarm for not taking her advice and cutting down on my schedule. Even though Mrs. Thatcher was on the opposite side of the ANC on many issues, such as sanctions, she was always a forthright and solicitous lady. In our meeting that day, though, I could not make the slightest bit of headway with her on the question of sanctions.

pp. 706-711

 

106

 

WHEN I RETURNED to South Africa in July, after brief trips to Uganda, Kenya, and Mozambique, I requested a meeting with Mr. de Klerk. Violence in the country was worsening; the death toll of 1990 was already over fifteen hundred, more than all the political deaths of the previous year. After conferring with my colleagues, I felt it necessary to speed up the process of normalization. Our country was bleeding to death, and we had to move ahead faster.

Mr. de Klerk’s lifting the State of Emergency in June seemed to set the stage for a resumption of talks, but in July, government security forces arrested about forty members of the ANC, including Mac Maharaj, Pravin Gordhan, Siphiwe Nyanda, and Billy Nair, claiming that they were part of a Communist Party plot called Operation Vula to overthrow the government. De Klerk called for an urgent meeting with me and read to me from documents he claimed had been confiscated in the raid. I was taken aback because I knew nothing about it.

After the meeting I wanted an explanation and called Joe Slovo. Joe explained that the passages read by Mr. de Klerk had been taken out of context and that Vula was a moribund operation. But the government was intent on using this discovery to try to pry the ANC from the SACP and keep Joe Slovo out of the negotiations. I went back to Mr. de Klerk and told him that he had been misled by his own police and that we had no intention of parting ways with the SACP or dropping Joe Slovo from our negotiating team.

In the middle of July, shortly before a scheduled meeting of the National Executive Committee, Joe Slovo came to me privately with a proposition. He suggested we voluntarily suspend the armed struggle in order to create the right climate to move the negotiation process forward. Mr. de Klerk, he said, needed to show his supporters that his policy had brought benefits to the country. My first reaction was negative; I did not think the time was ripe.

But the more I thought about it, the more I realized that we had to take the initiative and this was the best way to do it. I also recognized that Joe, whose credentials as a radical were above dispute, was precisely the right person to make the proposal. He could not be accused of being a dupe of the government or of having gone soft. The following day I told Joe that if he brought up the idea in the NEC, I would support him.

When Joe raised the idea in the NEC the next day there were some who firmly objected, claiming that we were giving de Klerk’s supporters a reward but not our own people. But I defended the proposal, saying the purpose of the armed struggle was always to bring the government to the negotiating table, and now we had done so. I argued that the suspension could always be withdrawn, but it was necessary to show our good faith.

After several hours, our view prevailed. This was a controversial move within the ANC. Although MK was not active, the aura of the armed struggle had great meaning for many people. Even when cited merely as a rhetorical device, the armed struggle was a sign that we were actively fighting the enemy. As a result, it had a popularity out of proportion to what it had achieved on the ground.

On August 6, in Pretoria, the ANC and the government signed what became known as the Pretoria Minute, in which we agreed to suspend the armed struggle. As I was to say over and over to our followers: we suspended armed action, we did not terminate the armed struggle. The agreement also set forth target dates for the release of political prisoners and the granting of certain types of indemnity. The process of indemnity was scheduled to be completed by May 1991, and the government also agreed to review the Internal Security Act.

Of all the issues that hindered the peace process, none was more devastating and frustrating than the escalation of violence in the country. We had all hoped that as negotiations got under way, violence would decrease. But in fact the opposite happened. The police and security forces were making very few arrests. People in the townships were accusing them of aiding and abetting the violence. It was becoming more and more clear to me that there was connivance on the part of the security forces. Many of the incidents indicated to me that the police, rather than quelling violence, were fomenting it.

Over the next few months, I visited townships all across the violence-racked Vaal Triangle south of Johannesburg, comforting wounded people and grieving families. Over and over again, I heard the same story: the police and the defense force were destabilizing the area. I was told of the police confiscating weapons one day in one area, and then Inkatha forces attacking our people with those stolen weapons the next day. We heard stories of the police escorting Inkatha members to meetings and on their attacks.

In September, I gave a speech in which I said there was a hidden hand behind the violence and suggested that there was a mysterious “Third Force,” which consisted of renegade men from the security forces who were attempting to disrupt the negotiations. I could not say who the members of the Third Force were, for I did not know them myself, but I was certain that they existed and that they were murderously effective in their targeting of the ANC and the liberation struggle.

I came to this conclusion after becoming personally involved in two specific incidents. In July of 1990, the ANC received information that hostel dwellers belonging to the Inkatha Freedom Party were planning a major attack on ANC members in Sebokeng Township in the Vaal Triangle on July 22. Through our attorneys, we notified the minister of law and order, the commissioner of police, and the regional commissioner, warning them of the impending attacks and urging them to take the proper action. We asked the police to prevent armed Inkatha members from entering the township to attend an Inkatha rally.

On July 22, busloads of armed Inkatha members, escorted by police vehicles, entered Sebokeng in broad daylight. A rally was held, after which the armed men went on a rampage, murdering approximately thirty people in a dreadful and grisly attack. I visited the area the next day and witnessed scenes I have never before seen and never hope to see again. At the morgue were bodies of people who had been hacked to death; a woman had both her breasts cut off with a machete. Whoever these killers were, they were animals.

I requested a meeting with Mr. de Klerk the following day. When I saw him, I angrily demanded an explanation. “You were warned in advance,” I told him, “and yet did nothing. Why is that? Why is it that there have been no arrests? Why have the police sat on their hands?” I then told him that in any other nation where there was a tragedy of this magnitude, when more than thirty people were slain, the head of state would make some statement of condolence, yet he had not uttered a word. He had no reply to what I said. I asked de Klerk to furnish me with an explanation, and he never did.

The second incident occurred in November, when a group of Inkatha members entered a squatter camp known as Zonkizizwe (Zulu for “the place where all nations are welcome”) outside the city of Germiston, east of Johannesburg, and drove ANC people out, killing a number of them in the process. Inkatha members then proceeded to occupy the abandoned shacks and confiscate all the property. Residents of the area said that the Inkatha members were accompanied by the police. Once again, in the wake of this tragedy, the police and the government took no action. Black life in South Africa had never been so cheap.

Again, I met with Mr. de Klerk and his minister of law and order, Adriaan Vlok. Again, I asked Mr. de Klerk why no action by the police had been taken in the aftermath of these crimes. I said the attackers could easily be found because they were now occupying the shacks of the people they had killed. Mr. de Klerk asked Mr. Vlok for an explanation and then Vlok, in a rather rude tone, asked me on whose property the shacks were located, the implication being that these people were squatters and therefore had no rights. In fact, I told him, the land had been made available to these people by the local authorities. His attitude was like that of many Afrikaners who simply believed that black tribes had been killing each other since time immemorial. Mr. de Klerk again told me he would investigate and respond, but never did.

During this time, the government took another action that added fuel to the flames. It introduced a regulation permitting Zulus to carry so-called traditional weapons to political rallies and meetings in Natal and elsewhere. These weapons, assegais, which are spears, and knobkerries, wooden sticks with a heavy wooden head, are actual weapons with which Inkatha members killed ANC members. This gave me grave doubts about Mr. de Klerk’s peaceful intentions.

Those opposed to negotiations benefited from the violence, which always seemed to flare up when the government and the ANC were moving toward an agreement. These forces sought to ignite a war between the ANC and Inkatha, and I believe many members of Inkatha connived at this as well. Many in the government, including Mr. de Klerk, chose to look the other way or ignore what they knew was going on under their noses. We had no doubts that men at the highest levels of the police and the security forces were aiding the Third Force. These suspicions were later confirmed by newspaper reports disclosing that the South African police had secretly funded Inkatha.

As the violence continued to spiral, I began to have second thoughts about the suspension of the armed struggle. Many of the people in the ANC were restive, and in September, at a press conference, I said that the continuing violence might necessitate taking up arms once more. The situation looked very grim, and any understanding that had been achieved with the government seemed lost

pp. 712-717

 

 

107

 

In December of 1990, Oliver returned to South Africa after being in exile from his native land for three decades. It was wonderful to have him near. He returned for an ANC consultative conference in Johannesburg, which was attended by over fifteen hundred delegates from forty-five different regions, home and abroad.

At the meeting, I spoke in tribute to Oliver as the man who had led the ANC during its darkest hours and never let the flame go out. Now, he had ushered us to the brink of a future that looked bright and hopeful. During the twenty-seven years that I was in prison, it was Oliver who saved the ANC, and then built it into an international organization with power and influence. He took up the reins when most of its leaders were either in prison or in exile. He was a soldier, a diplomat, a statesman.

Although I criticized the government for its orchestrated campaign of counterrevolutionary activities, it was Oliver’s address that created a storm. He opened the meeting with a controversial speech in which he called for our sanctions policy to be reevaluated. The ANC, he maintained, faced “international marginalization” unless it took the initiative to deescalate sanctions. The European Community had already begun to scale back sanctions. The countries in the West, particularly the United Kingdom and the United States, wanted to reward Mr. de Klerk for his reforms, believing that this would encourage him to go further. We felt this was the wrong strategy, but we had to recognize international realities.

Although Oliver’s speech had been discussed and approved by the NEC, his proposal was met with indignation by ANC militants, who insisted that sanctions must be maintained unchanged. The conference decided to retain the sanctions policy as it was. I myself was the target of complaints by those who charged that the negotiators were out of touch with the grass roots and that we spent more time with National Party leaders than our own people. I was also criticized at the conference for engaging in “personal diplomacy” and not keeping the rank-and-file of the organization informed. As a leader of a mass organization, one must listen to the people, and I agreed that we had been remiss in keeping the entire organization informed about the course of the negotiations. But I also knew the delicacy of our talks with the government; any agreements that we arrived at depended in part on their confidentiality. Although I accepted the criticism, I believed we had no alternative but to proceed on the same course. I knew that I had to be more inclusive, brief more people as to our progress, and I proceeded with that in mind.

Each day, each weekend, the newspapers were filled with fresh reports of new and bloody violence in our communities and townships. It was clear that violence was the number one issue in the country. In many communities in Natal and on the Reef around Johannesburg, a poisonous mixture of crime, political rivalries, police brutality, and shadowy death squads made life brutish and untenable. As long as the violence was not dealt with, the progress to a new dispensation would remain uneven and uncertain.

To try to arrest the spiral of violence, I contacted Chief Buthelezi to arrange a meeting. We met at Durban’s Royal Hotel in January. Chief Buthelezi spoke first to assembled delegates and media and in the process opened old wounds rather than healing them. He catalogued the verbal attacks the ANC had made on him and criticized the ANC’s negotiating demands. When it was my turn to speak, I chose not to respond to his remarks but to thank him for his efforts over many years to secure my release from prison. I cited our long relationship and underlined the many matters that united our two organizations rather than divided us.

Progress was made during our private talks, and Chief Buthelezi and I signed an agreement that contained a code of conduct covering the behavior of our two organizations. It was a fair accord, and I suspect that if it had been implemented it would indeed have helped to staunch the bloodletting. But as far as I could tell, Inkatha never made any effort to implement the accord, and there were violations as well on our own side.

The violence continued between our two organizations. Each month people were dying by the hundreds. In March, Inkatha members launched an attack in Alexandra Township north of Johannesburg in which forty-five people were killed over three days of fighting. Again, no one was arrested. I could not sit idly by as the violence continued, and I sought another meeting with Chief Buthelezi. In April I went down to Durban and we again made strong statements and signed another agreement. But again, the ink was no sooner dry than it was drenched in blood. I was more convinced than ever that the government was behind much of the violence and the violence was impeding the negotiations. Mr. de Klerk’s failure to respond put our own relationship in jeopardy.

In April, at a two-day meeting of the National Executive Committee, I discussed my doubts about Mr. de Klerk. The NEC believed that the government was behind the violence and that the violence was upsetting the climate for negotiations. In an open letter to the government, we called for the dismissal of Magnus Malan, the minister of defense, and Adriaan Vlok, the minister of law and order; the banning of the carrying of traditional weapons in public; the phasing out of the migrant-worker hostels, where so many Inkatha members lived in the townships around Johannesburg; the dismantling of secret government counterinsurgency units; and the appointment of an independent commission to probe complaints of misconduct on the part of the security forces.

We gave the government until May to meet our demands. Mr. de Klerk responded by calling for a multiparty conference on violence to be held in May, but I replied that this was pointless since the government knew precisely what it had to do to end the violence. In May, we announced the suspension of talks with the government.In July 1991, the ANC held its first annual conference inside South Africa in thirty years. The conference was attended by 2,244 voting delegates who were democratically elected at ANC branches at home and abroad. At the conference I was elected president of the ANC without opposition.

Cyril Ramaphosa was elected secretary-general, evidence that the torch was being passed from an older generation of leadership to a younger one. Cyril, whom I met only upon my release from prison, was a worthy successor to a long line of notable ANC leaders. He was probably the most accomplished negotiator in the ranks of the ANC, a skill he honed as secretary-general of the National Union of Mine Workers.

In my speech I expressed my appreciation for the great honor that had been bestowed on me, and spoke of how difficult it would be to follow in the large footsteps of my predecessor, Oliver Tambo. Though we were then at loggerheads with the government, negotiations in and of themselves, I said, constituted a victory. The mere fact that the government was engaged in negotiations at all was a sign that they did not have the strength to sustain apartheid. I reiterated that the process would not be smooth, as we were dealing with politicians who do not want to negotiate themselves out of power. “The point which must be clearly understood is that the struggle is not over, and negotiations themselves are a theater of struggle, subject to advances and reverses as any other form of struggle.”

But negotiations could not wait. It was never in our interest to prolong the agony of apartheid for any reason. It was necessary, I said, to create a transitional government as soon as possible. The conference underlined one of the most important and demanding tasks before the ANC: to transform an illegal underground liberation movement to a legal mass political party. For thirty years, the ANC had functioned clandestinely in South Africa; those habits and techniques were deeply ingrained. We had to reconstruct an entire organization, from the smallest local branch to the national executive. And we had to do so in a matter of months during a period of extraordinary change.

A large part of the ANC and Communist Party leadership had been in exile. Most of them had returned for the conference in July. They were unfamiliar with present-day South Africa; it was a newfound land for them as well as me. There was, however, an extraordinary crop of young leaders of the United Democratic Front and COSATU who had remained in the country, who knew the political situation in a way that we did not.

These organizations had in some measure been surrogates for the ANC inside South Africa during the 1980s. The ANC had to integrate these men and women into the organization as well. We faced not only logistical problems but philosophical ones. It is a relatively simple proposition to keep a movement together when you are fighting against a common enemy. But creating a policy when that enemy is across the negotiating table is another matter altogether. In the new ANC, we had to integrate not only many different groups, but many different points of view. We needed to unite the organization around the idea of the negotiations.

In the first seventeen months of legal activity, the ANC had recruited 700,000 members. This was an impressive number, but there was no room for complacency. A proportionately low number of these members were from the rural areas, the regions where the ANC had historically been weakest. At the same time, the National Party was throwing open its doors to nonwhites and was busily recruiting disaffected Coloureds and Indians.

Ever since my release from prison, the state had continued its campaign to discredit my wife. After the alleged kidnapping of four youths who were staying in the Diepkloof house and the death of one of them, Winnie had first been vilified by a whispering campaign and was then charged with four counts of kidnapping and one of assault. The continuing aspersions cast on her character were such that both Winnie and I were eager for her to have her day in court and prove her innocence of the charges.

My wife’s formal trial began in February in the Rand Supreme Court in Johannesburg. I attended the trial on the first day, as did many senior figures in the ANC, and I continued to attend as often as I could. I did this both to support my wife and to show my belief in her innocence. She was ably defended by George Bizos, who attempted to demonstrate that Winnie had no involvement with either the kidnappings or the beatings.

After three and a half months, the court found her guilty of kidnapping charges and being an accessory to assault. The judge, however, acknowledged that she had not taken part in any assault herself. She was sentenced to six years in prison, but was released on bail pending her appeal. As far as I was concerned, verdict or no verdict, her innocence was not in doubt

pp. 718-720

 

 

 

108

 

On December 20, 1991, after more than a year and a half of talks about talks, the real talks began: CODESA — the Convention for a Democratic South Africa — represented the first formal negotiations forum between the government, the ANC, and other South African parties. All of our previous bilateral discussions had been laying the groundwork for these talks, which took place at the World Trade Centre, a modern exhibition center near Jan Smuts Airport in Johannesburg. CODESA comprised eighteen delegations covering the gamut of South African politics, plus observers from the United Nations, the Commonwealth, the European Community, and the Organization of African Unity. It was the widest cross section of political groups ever gathered in one place in South Africa.

The opening of such talks was an historic occasion, certainly the most important constitutional convention since that of 1909 when the British colonies of the Cape and Natal and the former Boer republics of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State agreed to form a single union. Of course, that convention was not a tribute to democracy but a betrayal of it, for none of the representatives there that day were black. In 1991, the majority of them were.

Our planning delegation, led by Cyril Ramaphosa, and including Joe Slovo and Valli Moosa, had been engaged in weekly discussions with the government on the issues of elections, the constitution, a constituent assembly, and a transitional government. Delegates from twenty different parties including the homeland governments had already agreed on the ground rules for the convention.

The optimism at the opening of the talks could not be dampened even by a few spoilers. The PAC decided to boycott the talks, accusing the ANC and the National Party of conspiring together to set up a multiracial government. This occurred despite the formation, a month before, of the Patriotic Front, an alliance of the ANC, the PAC, and the Azanian People’s Organization around a declaration of common goals. The PAC feared democratic elections because they knew such a vote would expose their meager popular support. Chief Buthelezi also boycotted the talks on the

grounds that he was not permitted three delegations: for Inkatha, the KwaZulu government, and King Zwelithini. We argued that the king should be above politics, and that if he were included then every tribe in South Africa should be able to send their paramount chief. There was not only a sense of history at the World Trade Centre, but of self-reliance. Unlike the negotiations preceding new dispensations in

African states like Zimbabwe and Angola, which required outside mediators, we in South Africa were settling our differences among ourselves. Mr. de Klerk talked about the need for a transitional, “power-sharing” government on a democratic basis. The National Party’s chief delegate to the talks, Dawie de Villiers, even offered an apology for apartheid.

In my own opening remarks, I said that with the dawn of CODESA, progress in South Africa had at last become irreversible. Governments, I said, derive their authority and legitimacy from the consent of the governed, and we had assembled to create such a legitimate authority. I said that CODESA marked the beginning of the road to an elected assembly that would write a new constitution, and I did not see any reason why an election for such a constituent assembly could not occur in 1992. I called on the government to usher in an interim government of national unity to supervise such an election, control the state media and the military, and generally oversee the transition to a new, nonracial, democratic South Africa.

On the convention’s first day, the lion’s share of the participating parties, including the National Party and the ANC, endorsed a Declaration of Intent, which committed all parties to support an undivided South Africa whose supreme law would be a constitution safeguarded by an independent judiciary. The country’s legal system would guarantee equality before the law, and a bill of rights would be drawn up to protect civil liberties. In short, there would be a multiparty democracy based on universal adult suffrage on a common voters’ roll. As far as we were concerned, this was the minimum acceptable constitutional threshold for a new South Africa. Inkatha refused to sign on the grounds that the phrase an “undivided” South Africa implied that a federal system was off-limits.

The convention created five working groups that would meet in early 1992 to prepare the way for the second round of CODESA scheduled for May 1992. The groups would explore the question of creating a free political climate, the future of the homelands, the restructuring of the South African Broadcasting Corporation, the examination of various constitutional principles such as federalism, and the creation and installation of an interim government. The parties agreed that decisions would be taken by “sufficient consensus,” which was never defined, but in practice meant an agreement between the government and the ANC and a majority of the other parties.

The first day of CODESA 1 was uneventful, until it came to a close. The night before the convention I had been negotiating with Mr. de Klerk on the telephone until after eight in the evening. Mr. de Klerk asked me whether I would agree to permit him to be the final speaker the next day. Though I was scheduled to give the concluding remarks, I told him that I would take up the matter with our National Executive Committee. I did so that evening, and despite their misgivings, I persuaded them to permit Mr. de Klerk to have the last word. I did not see the issue as a vital one, and I was prepared to do Mr. de Klerk the favor.

At the end of the session, all seemed well; I spoke about the importance of the talks and I was followed by Mr. de Klerk. He proceeded to underline the historic significance of the occasion and discuss the need for overcoming mutual distrust. But then Mr. de Klerk did a curious thing.

He began to attack the ANC for not adhering to the agreements that we had made with the government. He began to speak to us like a schoolmaster admonishing a naughty child. He berated the ANC for failing to disclose the location of arms caches and then rebuked us for maintaining a “private army,” Umkhonto we Sizwe, in violation of the National Peace Accord of September 1991. In intemperate language, he questioned whether the ANC was honorable enough to abide by any agreements it signed.

This was more than I could tolerate and I would now be damned if I would permit Mr. de Klerk to have the last word. When he finished, the meeting was meant to be over. But the room had grown very quiet; instead of allowing the session to end, I walked to the podium. I could not let his remarks go unchallenged. My voice betrayed my anger.

I am gravely concerned about the behavior of Mr. de Klerk today. He has launched an attack on the ANC and in doing so he has been less than frank. Even the head of an illegitimate, discredited minority regime, as his is, has certain moral standards to uphold. He has no excuse just because he is the head of such a discredited regime not to uphold moral standards. . . . If a man can come to a conference of this nature and play the type of politics he has played — very few people would like to deal with such a man.
The members of the government persuaded us to allow them to speak last. They were very keen to say the last word here. It is now clear why they did so. He has abused his  position, because he hoped that I would not respond. He was completely mistaken. I respond now.

I said it was unacceptable for Mr. de Klerk to speak to us in such llanguage. I reiterated that it was the ANC, not the government, that started the initiative of peace discussions, and it was the government, not the ANC, that time and again failed to live up to its agreements. I had told Mr. de Klerk before that it served no useful purpose to attack the ANC publicly, yet he continued to do so. I noted that we had suspended our armed struggle to show our commitment to peace, yet the government was still colluding with those waging war. We told him that we would turn in our weapons only when we were a part of the government collecting those weapons.

I added that it was apparent the government had a double agenda. They were using the negotiations not to achieve peace, but to score their own petty political gains. Even while negotiating, they were secretly funding covert organizations that committed violence against us. I mentioned the recent revelations about million-rand payoffs to Inkatha that Mr. de Klerk claimed not to have known about. I stated that if a man in his position “doesn’t know about such things, then he is not fit to be the head of government.”

I knew I had been harsh, but I did not want to capsize the whole ship of negotiations, and I ended on a more conciliatory note.

I ask him to place his cards on the table face upwards. Let us work together openly. Let there be no secret agendas. Let him not persuade us that he would be the last speaker because he wants to abuse that privilege and attack us in the hope that we won’t respond. I am prepared to work with him in spite of all his mistakes.

CODESA convened the following day for its final session, and both Mr. de Klerk and I took pains to show that no irreparable harm had been done. At the beginning of the session, he and I publicly shook hands and said we would work together. But much trust had been lost, and the negotiations were now in a state of disarray.

Six weeks after the opening of CODESA 1, the National Party contested an important by-election in Potchefstroom, a conservative university town in the Transvaal, traditionally the party’s stronghold. In a stunning upset, the Nationalists were defeated by the candidate of the right-wing Conservative Party. The Conservatives resolutely opposed the government’s policy of negotiations with the ANC, and were composed mainly of Afrikaners who felt that Mr. de Klerk was giving away the store. The election result seemed to cast doubt on Mr. de Klerk’s policy of reform and negotiations. The National Party was alarmed; these were their own voters in their own heartland rejecting their policies.

Mr. de Klerk decided to gamble. He announced that as a result of the by-election in Potchefstroom he would call a nationwide referendum for March 17 so that the white people of South Africa could vote on his reform policy and on negotiations with the ANC. He stated that if the referendum was defeated, he would resign from office. The referendum asked a plain and direct question of all white voters over the age of eighteen: “Do you support the continuation of the reform process which the state president began on 2 February 1990 which is aimed at a new constitution through negotiation?”

The ANC opposed the referendum on the principle that it was a vote that excluded all nonwhites. At the same time, we were realistic: we certainly did not want white voters to rebuff Mr. de Klerk’s efforts to pursue negotiations. Though we disdained the election on principle, we urged whites to vote yes. We saw such a vote as a signal of support for negotiations, not necessarily for de Klerk. We watched Mr. de Klerk’s campaign with interest and some consternation. He and the National Party conducted a sophisticated, expensive,

American-style political campaign accompanied by extensive newspaper and television advertisements, bumper stickers, and colorful rallies. We saw this as a dress rehearsal for the campaign Mr. de Klerk would wage against us. In the end, 69 percent of the white voters supported negotiations, giving de Klerk a great victory. He felt vindicated; I think the margin even swelled his head a bit. His hand was strengthened, and as a result, the Nationalists toughened their negotiating positions. This was a dangerous strategy.

pp. 721-727

 

109

 

On April 13, 1992, at a press conference in Johannesburg, flanked by my two oldest friends and comrades, Walter and Oliver, I announced my separation from my wife. The situation had grown so difficult that I felt that it was in the best interests of all concerned — the ANC, the family, and Winnie — that we part. Although I discussed the matter with the ANC, the separation itself was made for personal reasons.

I read the following statement.

The relationship between myself and my wife, Comrade Nomzamo Winnie Mandela, has become the subject of much media speculation. I am issuing this statement to clarify the  position and in the hope that it will bring an end to further conjecture.
Comrade Nomzamo and myself contracted our marriage at a critical time in the struggle for liberation in our country. Owing to the pressures of our shared commitment to the ANC and the struggle to end apartheid, we were unable to enjoy a normal family life. Despite these pressures our love for each other and our devotion to our marriage grew and intensified. . . .
During the two decades I spent on Robben Island she was an indispensable pillar of support and comfort to myself personally. . . . Comrade Nomzamo accepted the onerous burden of raising our children on her own. . . . She endured the persecutions heaped upon her by the Government with exemplary fortitude and never wavered from her commitment to the freedom struggle. Her tenacity reinforced my personal respect, love and growing affection. It also attracted the admiration of the world at large.
My love for her remains undiminished.
However, in view of the tensions that have arisen owing to differences between ourselves on a number of issues in recent months, we have mutually agreed that a separation would be best for each of us. My action was not prompted by the current allegations being made against her in the media. . . . Comrade Nomzamo has and can continue to rely on my unstinting support during these trying moments in her life.
I shall personally never regret the life Comrade Nomzamo and I tried to share together. Circumstances beyond our control however dictated it should be otherwise. I part from my wife with no recriminations. I embrace her with all the love and affection I have nursed for her inside and outside prison from the moment I first met her. Ladies and gentlemen, I hope you will appreciate the pain I have gone through.


Perhaps I was blinded to certain things because of the pain I felt for not being able to fulfill my role as a husband to my wife and a father to my children. But just as I am convinced that my wife’s life while I was in prison was more difficult than mine, my own return was also more difficult for her than it was for me. She married a man who soon left her; that man became a myth; and then that myth returned home and proved to be just a man after all.

As I later said at my daughter Zindzi’s wedding, it seems to be the destiny of freedom fighters to have unstable personal lives. When your life is the struggle, as mine was, there is little room left for family. That has always been my greatest regret, and the most painful aspect of the choice I made.

“We watched our children growing without our guidance,” I said at the wedding, “and when we did come out [of prison], my children said, ‘We thought we had a father and one day he’d come back. But to our dismay, our father came back and he left us alone because he has now become the father of the nation.’ ” To be the father of a nation is a great honor, but to be the father of a family is a greater joy. But it was a joy I had far too little of.

pp. 728-731

 

110

 

 

In May of 1992, after a four-month interruption, the multiparty conference held its second plenary session at the World Trade Centre. Known as CODESA 2, the talks had been prepared by secret meetings between negotiators from both the ANC and the government as well as talks between the ANC and other parties. These meetings culminated in a final session between me and Mr. de Klerk the day before the opening of CODESA 2, the first time the two of us had met since before CODESA 1.

Only days before CODESA 2 was to begin, the government was hit by two scandals. The first involved the revelation of massive corruption and bribery at the Department of Development Aid, which was responsible for improving black life in the homelands, and the second was the implication of high government security officials in the 1985 murder of four UDF activists, the best known of whom was Matthew Goniwe. These revelations were added to the recent evidence implicating the police in murders in Natal and suspicions that the Department of Military Intelligence was conducting covert operations against the ANC. These two scandals coming together undermined the credibility of the government and strengthened our hand.

Over the previous months, the government had made numerous proposals that fell by the wayside. Most of them, like the idea of a rotating presidency, sought to preserve their power. But through negotiations over the past months, the ANC and government teams had put together a tentative agreement involving a two-stage transitional period to a fully democratic South Africa. In the first stage, a multiparty “transitional executive council” would be appointed from the CODESA delegations to function as a temporary government in order to “level the playing field” for all parties and create an interim constitution. In the second stage, general elections would be held for a constituent assembly and legislature in which all political parties winning 5 percent or more of the vote would participate in the cabinet. Half the members of the assembly would be elected on a national basis and half on a regional one, and the assembly would be empowered both to write a new constitution and to pass legislation. An independent commission would preside over the election and make sure it was free and fair.

Yet there were many matters on which the ANC and the government could not reach agreement, such as the percentage of voting necessary in the assembly to decide constitutional issues and to agree on a bill of rights. Only days before CODESA 2, the government proposed a second body, a senate, composed of regional representatives, as a way of ensuring a minority veto. They also proposed that before all this, CODESA 2 first agree on an interim constitution, which would take months to draw up.

All of this bargaining was going on behind the scenes and by the time CODESA 2 opened on May 15, 1992, prospects for agreement looked bleak. What we disagreed about was threatening all that we had agreed upon. Mr. de Klerk and I had not managed to find a consensus on most of the outstanding issues. The government seemed prepared to wait indefinitely; their thinking was that the longer we waited, the more support we would lose.

The convention was deadlocked at the end of the first day. At that time, the two judges presiding over the talks told Mr. de Klerk and me to meet that evening to attempt to find a compromise. We did meet that night over coffee, and though we did not find a way out of the impasse, we agreed that the negotiations must not founder. “The whole of South Africa and the world is looking at you and me,” I told Mr. de Klerk. “Let us save the peace process. Let us reach some kind of agreement. Let us at least fix a date for the next round of talks.” We decided that we would each speak the following day in a spirit of constructive compromise.

The next afternoon we spoke in the reverse order that we had agreed to at CODESA 1: Mr. de Klerk first and I last. In his remarks, Mr. de Klerkinsisted that the National Party did not seek a “minority veto,” but that he did want a system of “checks and balances” so that the majority would not be able “to misuse its power.” Although this certainly sounded to me like outright opposition to the idea of majority rule, when I spoke after Mr. de Klerk, I merely said we needed to work in a constructive manner and dispel the tensions around the negotiations.

Despite our attempts to put a positive face on the matter, the convention ended the second day in a stalemate. The impasse, as I saw it, was caused by the National Party’s continuing reluctance to submit their fate to the will of the majority. They simply could not cross that hurdle.

Ultimately, CODESA 2 broke down on four fundamental issues: the government’s insistence on an unacceptably high percentage of votes in the assembly to approve the constitution (essentially a backdoor veto); entrenched regional powers that would be binding on a future constitution; an undemocratic and unelected senate that had veto power over legislation from the main chamber; and a determination to make an interim constitution negotiated by the convention into a permanent constitution.

These were all difficult issues, but not insoluble ones, and I was determined not to let the deadlock at CODESA 2 subvert the negotiation process. The government and the ANC agreed to continue bilateral talks to work toward a solution. But, then, other matters intruded to render this impossible.

With negotiations stalled, the ANC and its allies agreed on a policy of “rolling mass action,” which would display to the government the extent of our support around the country and show that the people of South Africa were not prepared to wait forever for their freedom. The mass action consisted of strikes, demonstrations, and boycotts. The date chosen for the start of mass action was June 16, 1992, the anniversary of the 1976 Soweto revolt, and the campaign was meant to culminate in a two-day national strike set for August 3 and 4.

But before that happened, another event occurred that drove the ANC and the government even further apart. On the night of June 17, 1992, a heavily armed force of Inkatha members secretly raided the Vaal township of Boipatong and killed forty-six people. Most of the dead were women and children. It was the fourth mass killing of ANC people that week. People across the country were horrified by the violence and charged the government with complicity. The police did nothing to stop the criminals and nothing to find them; no arrests were made, no investigation begun. Mr. de Klerk said nothing. I found this to be the last straw, and my patience snapped. The government was blocking the negotiations and at the same time waging a covert war against our people. Why then were we continuing to talk with them?

Four days after the murders, I addressed a crowd of twenty thousand angry ANC supporters and told them I had instructed ANC secretary general Cyril Ramaphosa to suspend direct dealings with the government. I also announced an urgent meeting of the National Executive Committee to examine our options. It was as if we had returned to the dark days of Sharpeville. I likened the behavior of the National Party to the Nazis in Germany, and publicly warned de Klerk that if he sought to impose new measures to restrict demonstrations or free expression, the ANC would launch a nationwide defiance campaign with myself as the first volunteer.

At the rally, I saw signs that read, “MANDELA, GIVE US GUNS” and “VICTORY THROUGH BATTLE NOT TALK.” I understood such sentiments; the people were frustrated. They saw no positive results of the negotiations. They were beginning to think that the only way to overthrow apartheid was through the barrel of a gun. After Boipatong, there were those in the NEC who said, “Why did we abandon the armed struggle? We should abandon negotiations instead; they will never advance us to our goal.” I was initially sympathetic to this group of hardliners, but gradually realized that there was no alternative to the process. It was what I had been urging for so many years, and I would not turn my back on negotiations. But it was time to cool things down. Mass action in this case was a middle course between armed struggle and negotiations. The people must have an outlet for their anger and frustration, and a mass action campaign was the best way to channel those emotions.

When we informed the government that we were suspending talks, we sent Mr. de Klerk a memo outlining the reasons for our withdrawal. In addition to resolving the constitutional deadlocks at CODESA 2, we demanded that the people responsible for the violence be tracked down and brought to justice and that some mechanism be found for fencing in and policing the hostels, the seedbeds of so much violence. Mr. de Klerk sent us back a memo asking for a face-to-face meeting with me, which we rebuffed. I felt such a meeting would suggest that we had something to talk about, and at the time we did not.

The mass action campaign culminated in a general strike on August 3 and 4 in support of the ANC’s negotiation demands and in protest against state-supported violence. More than four million workers stayed home in what was the largest political strike in South African history. The centerpiece of the strike was a march of one hundred thousand people to the Union Buildings in Pretoria, the imposing seat of the South African government, where we held an enormous outdoor rally on the great lawn in front of the buildings. I told the crowd that we one day would occupy these buildings as the first democratically elected government of South Africa.

In the face of this mass action, Mr. de Klerk said that if the ANC made the country ungovernable, the government might be forced to consider some unpleasant options. I warned Mr. de Klerk that any antidemocratic actions would have serious repercussions. It was because of such threats, I said, that it was absolutely critical to set up a transitional government.

Inspired by the success of the mass action campaign, a group within the ANC decided to march on Bisho, the capital of the Ciskei homeland in the eastern Cape, a bantustan led by Brigadier Oupa Gqozo. The Ciskei had a history of repression against the ANC and in 1991 Brigadier Gqozo had declared a State of Emergency in the Ciskei to curtail what he called ANC-sponsored terrorism. On the morning of September 7, 1992, seventy thousand protesters set out on a march to Bisho’s main stadium. When a group of marchers attempted to run through an opening in a fence and take a different path to town, the poorly trained homeland troops opened fire on the marchers and killed twenty-nine people, wounding over two hundred. Now Bisho joined Boipatong as a byword for brutality.

Like the old proverb that says that the darkest hour is before the dawn, the tragedy of Bisho led to a new opening in the negotiations. I met with Mr. de Klerk in order to find common ground and avoid a repetition of another tragedy like Bisho. Our respective negotiators began meeting regularly.

Both sides were making a good-faith effort to get the negotiations back on track, and on September 26, Mr. de Klerk and I met for an official summit. On that day, Mr. de Klerk and I signed the Record of Understanding, an agreement which set the mold for all the negotiations that followed. The agreement established an independent body to review police actions, created a mechanism to fence in the hostels, and banned the display of “traditional weapons” at rallies. But the real importance of the Record of Understanding was that it broke the constitutional deadlock of CODESA 2.

The government finally agreed to accept a single, elected constitutional assembly, which would adopt a new constitution and serve as a transitional legislature for the new government. All that was left to negotiate was a date for the election of the assembly and the percentage of majorities necessary for it to reach its decisions. We were now aligned on the basic framework that would take the country into a democratic future.

The Record of Understanding prompted Inkatha to announce its withdrawal from all negotiations involving the government and the ANC. The agreement infuriated Chief Buthelezi, who severed relations with the NP and formed an alliance with a group of discredited homeland leaders and white right-wing parties solely concerned with obtaining an Afrikaner homeland. Chief Buthelezi called for the abolition of the Record of Understanding, the ending of CODESA, and the disbanding of Umkhonto we Sizwe.

Just as Joe Slovo had taken the initiative concerning the suspension of the armed struggle, he again took the lead in making another controversial proposal: a government of national unity. In October, Joe published a paper in which he wrote that negotiations with the government were not armistice talks in which we could dictate terms to a defeated enemy. It would probably take years for the ANC to control the levers of government, even after an election. An ANC government would still require much of the present civil service to run the country. Joe proposed a “sunset clause” providing for a government of national unity that would include power-sharing with the National Party for a fixed period of time, an amnesty for security officers, and the honoring of contracts of civil servants. “Power-sharing” was a debased term within the ANC, considered a code-phrase for the government’s quest for a minority veto. But in this context it merely meant that the National Party would be part of any popularly elected government provided it polled enough votes.

After much discussion, I supported Joe’s proposal and it was endorsed by the National Executive Committee on November 18. The NEC agreed to support power-sharing, provided the minority parties did not have a veto. In December, we began a new round of secret bilateral talks with the government. These were held over a five-day period at a game lodge in the bush. The talks proved to be critical, for they built on the foundation established in the Record of Understanding. At this bush meeting we agreed in principle on a five-year government of national unity in which all parties polling over 5 percent in a general election would be proportionally represented in the cabinet. After five years, the government of national unity would become a simple majority-rule government. In February, the ANC and the government announced an agreement in principle on the fiveyear government of national unity, a multiparty cabinet, and the creation of a transitional executive council. Elections would be held as early as the end of 1993.

pp. 732-737

 

 

111

 

I have always believed that a man should have a home within sight of the house where he was born. After being released from prison, I set about plans to build a country house for myself in Qunu. By the fall of 1993, the house was complete. It was based on the floor plan of the house I lived in at Victor Verster. People often commented on this, but the answer was simple: the Victor Verster house was the first spacious and comfortable home I ever stayed in, and I liked it very much. I was familiar with its dimensions, so at Qunu I would not have to wander in the night looking for the kitchen.

In April, I was at my house in the Transkei on a brief holiday. On the morning of April 10, I had just gone outside to greet some members of the Transkei police rugby team when my housekeeper ran out and informed me of an urgent telephone call. She was weeping. I excused myself from the young men and learned from a colleague that Chris Hani, the secretary-general of the SACP, the former chief of staff of MK, and one of the most popular figures in the ANC, had been shot at point-blank range in front of his home in Boksburg, Johannesburg, a mostly white working-class suburb that Chris was seeking to integrate.

Chris’s death was a blow to me personally and to the movement. He was a soldier and patriot, for whom no task was too small. He was a great hero among the youth of South Africa; a man who spoke their language and to whom they listened. If anyone could mobilize the unruly youth behind a negotiated solution, it was Chris. South Africa was now deprived of one of its greatest sons, a man who would have been invaluable in transforming the country into a new nation.

The country was fragile. There were concerns that Hani’s death might trigger a racial war, with the youth deciding that their hero should become a martyr for whom they would lay down their own lives. I first flew via helicopter to pay my respects to Chris’s eighty-two-year-old father in Sabalele, a tiny, dusty town in the Cofimvaba district in the Transkei, a place well known to me because it was the home region of the Matanzima family. As I arrived in this village with no running water or electricity, I marveled at how this poor and tiny village could produce a man like Chris Hani, a man who stirred the entire nation with his passion and ability. His concern for the rural poor came from his childhood in Sabalele, for his roots were deep and true, and he never lost them. Chris’s father spoke eloquently of the pain of losing a son, but with satisfaction that he had died in the struggle.

Upon my return to Johannesburg I learned that the police had arrested a member of the militant right-wing Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB), a Polish immigrant to South Africa who had been captured after a courageous Afrikaner woman had phoned the police with the killer’s license plate number. The murder was an act of mad desperation, an attempt to derail the negotiations process. I was asked to speak on the SABC that night to address the nation. In this instance, it was the ANC, not the government, that sought to calm the nation.

I said that the process of peace and negotiations could not be halted. With all the authority at my command, I said, “I appeal to all our people to remain calm and to honor the memory of Chris Hani by remaining a disciplined force for peace.”

Tonight I am reaching out to every single South African, black and white, from the very depths of my being. A white man, full of prejudice and hate, came to our country and committed a deed so foul that our whole nation now teeters on the brink of disaster. A white woman, of Afrikaner origin, risked her life so that we may know, and bring to justice this assassin. . . . Now is the time for all South Africans to stand together against those who, from any quarter, wish to destroy what Chris Hani gave his life for — the freedom of all of us.

The assassination of Chris was an attempt by white supremacists to arrest the inevitable. They preferred that the country descend into civil war rather than have majority rule by peaceful means. We adopted a strategy to deal with our own constituency in the ANC. In order to forestall outbreaks of retaliatory violence, we arranged a weeklong series of mass rallies and demonstrations throughout the country. This would give people a means of expressing their frustration without resorting to violence. Mr. de Klerk and I spoke privately and agreed that we would not let Hani’s murder derail the negotiations.

We learned within days that a member of the Conservative Party, Clive Derby-Lewis, had been arrested in connection with the murder. More confirmation of a Third Force. It was Chris himself who had criticized a recent theft of weapons from an air force base; preliminary police reports suggested that the gun that killed him had come from that stockpile.

Exactly two weeks later, there was another significant passing. This one did not shake the nation as Chris’s had, but it shook me. Oliver had not been well for a long time, but the stroke that killed him occurred suddenly and without warning. His wife, Adelaide, phoned me early in the morning and I rushed to Oliver’s bedside. I did not have a chance to say a proper good-bye, for he was already gone.

In Plato’s allegory of the metals, the philosopher classifies men into groups of gold, silver, and lead. Oliver was pure gold; there was gold in his intellectual brilliance, gold in his warmth and humanity, gold in his tolerance and generosity, gold in his unfailing loyalty and self-sacrifice. As much as I respected him as a leader, that is how much I loved him as a man. Though we had been apart for all the years that I was in prison, Oliver was never far from my thoughts. In many ways, even though we were separated, I kept up a lifelong conversation with him in my head.. Perhaps that is why I felt so bereft when he died. I felt, as I told one colleague, like the loneliest man in the world. It was as though he had been snatched away from me just as we had finally been reunited. When I looked at him in his casket, it was as if a part of myself had died.

Though we were not yet in power, I wanted Oliver to have a state funeral, and that is what the ANC gave him. At a mass rally at a stadium in Soweto, hundreds of dignitaries from foreign governments gathered to pay their respects to the man who kept the ANC alive during its years of exile. MK troops marched in his honor and a twenty-one-gun salute was given at his graveside. Oliver had lived to see the prisoners released and the exiles return, but he had not lived to cast his vote in a free and democratic South Africa. That was what remained to be accomplished
 

pp. 738-741

 

 

112

 

Although few people will remember June 3, 1993, it was a landmark in South African history. On that day, after months of negotiations at the World Trade Centre, the multiparty forum voted to set a date for the country’s first national, nonracial, one-person-one-vote election: April 27, 1994.

For the first time in South African history, the black majority would go to the polls to elect their own leaders. The agreement was that voters would elect four hundred representatives to a constituent assembly, which would both write a new constitution and serve as a parliament. After convening, the first order of business for the assembly would be to elect a president.

The talks had reconvened in April. This time, the twenty-six parties included Inkatha, the Pan Africanist Congress, and the Conservative Party. We had been pressing the government to establish a date for months, and they had been stalling. But now the date was written in stone.

A month later, in July, the multiparty forum agreed on a first draft of an interim constitution. It provided for a bicameral parliament with a fourhundred- member national assembly elected by proportional representation from national and regional party lists and a senate elected indirectly by regional legislatures. Elections to regional legislatures would take place at the same time as national elections, and the regional bodies could draw up their own constitutions consistent with the national constitution.

Chief Buthelezi wanted a constitution drawn up before the election and walked out in protest against the setting of an election date before a constitution was finalized. A second draft interim constitution in August gave greater powers to the regions, but this did not placate either Chief Buthelezi or the Conservative Party. The Conservative Party described the resolutions as hostile to Afrikaner interests. A group called the Afrikaner Volksfront, led by General Constand Viljoen, a former chief of the South African Defense Force, was formed to unite conservative white organizations around the idea of a volkstaat, a white homeland.

Just after midnight on November 18, an interim constitution was approved by a plenary session of the multiparty conference. The government and the ANC had cleared the remaining hurdles. The new cabinet would be composed of those winning more than 5 percent of the vote and would make decisions by consensus, rather than the two-thirds majority proposed by the government; national elections would not take place until 1999, so that the government of national unity would serve for five years; and finally, the government gave way on our insistence on a single ballot paper for the election, rather than separate ballots for national and provincial legislatures. Two ballot papers would only confuse a majority of voters, most of whom would be voting for the first time in their lives. In the period leading up to the election, a Transitional Executive Council with members from each party would ensure the right climate for the elections. In effect, the TEC would be the government between December 22 and the election on

April 27. An Independent Electoral Commission with extensive powers would be responsible for the administration of the election. We were truly on the threshold of a new era. I have never cared very much for personal prizes. A man does not become a freedom fighter in the hope of winning awards, but when I was notified that I had won the 1993 Nobel Peace Prize jointly with Mr. de Klerk, I was deeply moved. The Nobel Peace Prize had a special meaning to me because of its involvement with South African history.

I was the third South African since the end of the Second World War to be so honored by the Nobel committee. Chief Albert Luthuli was awarded the prize in 1960. The second was Archbishop Desmond Tutu, who selflessly fought the evils of racism during the most terrible days of apartheid.

The award was a tribute to all South Africans and especially to those who had fought in the struggle; I would accept the award on their behalf. But the Nobel award was one I never thought about. Even during the bleakest years on Robben Island, Amnesty International would not campaign for us on the grounds that we had pursued an armed struggle, and their organization would not represent anyone who had embraced violence. It was for that reason that I assumed the Nobel committee would never consider the man who had started Umkhonto we Sizwe for the peace prize.

I had tremendous respect for the nations of Norway and Sweden. In the 1950s and 1960s, when we went to Western governments seeking contributions to the ANC, we were turned down flat. But in Norway and Sweden, we were greeted with open arms, and given assistance and scholarships and money for legal defense and humanitarian aid for political prisoners. I used my speech in Norway nor only to thank the Nobel committee and sketch out a vision of a future South Africa that was just and equitable, but to pay tribute to my fellow laureate, Mr. F. W. de Klerk.

He had the courage to admit that a terrible wrong had been done to our country and people through the imposition of the system of apartheid. He had the foresight to understand and accept that all the people of South Africa must, through negotiations and as equal participants in the process, together determine what they want to make of their future.


I was often asked how could I accept the award jointly with Mr. de Klerk after I had criticized him so severely. Although I would not take back my criticisms, I could say that he had made a genuine and indispensable contribution to the peace process. I never sought to undermine Mr. de Klerk, for the practical reason that the weaker he was, the weaker the negotiations process. To make peace with an enemy one must work with that enemy, and that enemy becomes one’s partner.

Although the official campaign for the national assembly was not scheduled to begin until February 1994, we started to campaign in earnest after the new constitution was ratified. That did not give us a head start; the National Party began its campaign the day they released me from prison.

Although the polls showed the ANC with a healthy margin, we never took victory for granted. I counseled everyone against overoptimism. We had all read dozens of accounts of parties favored to win who came in second. We faced an experienced, well-organized, and well-financed rival.

Our campaign was under the capable leadership of Popo Molefe, Terror Lekota, and Ketso Gordhan, all veteran UDF activists adept at mass mobilization. The task was a formidable one. We estimated that there would be over twenty million people going to the polls, most of them voting for the first time. Many of our voters were illiterate, and were likely to be intimidated by the mere idea of voting. According to the Independent Electoral Commission, there would be ten thousand polling stations around the country. We sought to train over one hundred thousand people to assist with voter education.

The first stage of our election effort was what was known as People’s Forums. ANC candidates would travel all over the country and hold meetings in towns and villages in order to listen to the hopes and fears, the ideas and complaints, of our people. The People’s Forums were similar to the town meetings that candidate Bill Clinton held in America on his way to the presidency. The forums were parliaments of the people, not unlike the meetings of chiefs at the Great Place that I witnessed as a boy.

I reveled in the People’s Forums. I began in Natal in November, and then went to the PWV area, the northern Transvaal, and the Orange Free State. I attended as many as three or four forums in a day. The people themselves enjoyed them immensely. No one had ever come to solicit their opinion on what should be done in their own country.

After incorporating the suggestions from the forums, we traveled the country delivering our message to the people. Some in the ANC wanted to make the campaign simply a liberation election, and tell the people: Vote for us because we set you free. We decided instead to offer them a vision of the South Africa we hoped to create. We wanted people to vote for the ANC not just because we had fought apartheid for eighty years, but because we were best qualified to bring about the kind of South Africa they hoped to live in. I felt that our campaign should be about the future, not the past.

The ANC drafted a 150-page document known as the Reconstruction and Development Program, which outlined our plan to create jobs through public works; to build a million new houses with electricity and flush toilets; to extend primary health care and ten years of free education to all South Africans; to redistribute land through a land claims court; and to end the value-added tax on basic foodstuffs. We were also committed to extensive affirmative action measures in both the private and public sectors. This document was translated into a simpler manifesto called “A Better Life for All,” which in turn became the ANC’s campaign slogan.

Just as we told the people what we would do, I felt we must also tell them what we could not do. Many people felt life would change overnight after a free and democratic election, but that would be far from the case. Often, I said to crowds, “Do not expect to be driving a Mercedes the day after the election or swimming in your own backyard pool.” I told our supporters, “Life will not change dramatically, except that you will have increased your self-esteem and become a citizen in your own land. You must have patience. You might have to wait five years for results to show.” I challenged them; I did not patronize them: “If you want to continue living in poverty without clothes and food,” I told them, “then go and drink in the shebeens. But if you want better things, you must work hard. We cannot do it all for you; you must do it yourselves.”

I told white audiences that we needed them and did not want them to leave the country. They were South Africans just like ourselves and this was their land, too. I would not mince words about the horrors of apartheid, but I said, over and over, that we should forget the past and concentrate on building a better future for all.

Each rally was also designed to teach people how to vote. The ballot itself was a long, narrow piece of paper with the parties listed in descending order to the left, and then the symbol of the party and a picture of its leader to the right. Voters were to place an X in the box next to the party of their choice. I would tell audiences, “On election day, look down your ballot and when you see the face of a young and handsome man, mark an X.”

pp. 742-745

 

113

 
 
The road to freedom was far from smooth. Although the Transitional Executive Council began functioning in the new year, some parties opted out. Inkatha rejected participation in the election and gave itself over to the politics of resistance. King Zwelithini, supported by Chief Buthelezi, called for an autonomous and sovereign KwaZulu, and discouraged everyone in his province from voting. The white right called the elections a betrayal and clamored for a volkstaat, yet they still had not proposed where it would be located or how it would work. There was no magisterial district in all of South Africa where whites constituted a majority of residents.

February 12, 1994, was the deadline for registration of all parties, and on that day, Inkatha, the Conservative Party, and the Afrikaner Volksfront failed to sign. The government of the Bophuthatswana homeland also refused to participate and resisted reincorporation into a united South Africa.

I was disturbed that these important groups were choosing not to participate. To bring them on board, we proposed certain significant compromises: we agreed to the use of double ballots for provincial and national legislatures; guarantees of greater provincial powers; the renaming of Natal province as KwaZulu/Natal; and the affirmation that a principle of “internal” self-determination would be included in the constitution for groups sharing a common cultural and language heritage.

I arranged to meet Chief Buthelezi in Durban on March 1. “I will go down on my knees to beg those who want to drag our country into bloodshed,” I told a rally before this meeting. Chief Buthelezi agreed to provisionally register for the elections in exchange for a promise to subject our differences over constitutional issues to international mediation. To this I gladly assented. Before the final registration deadline, General Viljoen also registered under a new party known as the Freedom Front.

Though Lucas Mangope, the president of Bophuthatswana, had chosen to keep his homeland out of the election, the tide of events soon altered the situation. I spoke to him on a number of occasions urging him to let his people decide, but he would not listen. Those who wanted to participate launched mass demonstrations and strikes, which soon spread to the Bophuthatswana civil service. The radio and television networks went off the air. On the streets of Mafikeng, battles broke out between the homeland police and striking workers and students. Mangope called in military help from his white right-wing allies. Soon, his own forces deserted him and he was ousted in a coup in early March. A few weeks later, Brigadier Gqozo in the Ciskei capitulated and asked South Africa to take over the homeland.

Violence in Natal worsened. Inkatha supporters were blocking our efforts to campaign in Natal. Fifteen ANC election workers were shot and hacked to death after putting up ANC posters. In March, Judge Johann Kriegler reported to me and Mr. de Klerk that because of the lack of cooperation from the KwaZulu government, free elections could not be held there without direct political intervention. To demonstrate our strength in Natal, the ANC held a mass march through the center of Durban. Then Inkatha attempted to do the same in Johannesburg, with dire results.

On March 28, thousands of Inkatha members, brandishing spears and knobkerries, marched through Johannesburg to a rally in the center of town. At the same time, an armed Inkatha group attempted to enter Shell House, the ANC headquarters, but were repulsed by armed guards. Shots by unidentified gunmen were also fired in the city center, and altogether fifty-three people died. It was a grisly spectacle that made South Africa appear as if it was on the brink of internal war. Inkatha was attempting to postpone the election, but neither Mr. de Klerk nor I would budge. That day was sacrosanct.

I had agreed to international mediation, and on April 13 a delegation arrived led by Lord Carrington, the former British foreign secretary, and Henry Kissinger, the former American secretary of state. But when Inkatha was informed that the election date was not subject to mediation, they refused to see the mediators, who left without talking to anyone. Now Chief Buthelezi knew the election would take place no matter what. On April 19, barely a week before the election, Chief Buthelezi accepted the offer of a constitutional role for the Zulu monarchy and agreed to participate.

Ten days before the vote, Mr. de Klerk and I held our single television debate. I had been a fair debater at Fort Hare, and in my early years in the organization I had engaged in many impassioned debates on the platform. On Robben Island, we had honed our debating skills while we chipped away at limestone. I was confident, but the day before, we held a mock debate in which the journalist Allister Sparks ably performed as Mr. de Klerk. Too ably, according to my campaign advisers, for they chided me for speaking too slowly and not aggressively enough.

When the time came for the actual debate, however, I attacked the National Party quite firmly. I accused the National Party of fanning race hatred between Coloureds and Africans in the Cape by distributing an inflammatory comic book that said the ANC’s slogan was “Kill a Coloured, kill a farmer.” “There is no organization in this country as divisive as the new National Party,” I declared. When Mr. de Klerk criticized the ANC’s plan to spend billions of dollars on housing and social programs, I scolded him, saying he was alarmed that we would have to devote so many of our resources to blacks.

But as the debate was nearing an end, I felt I had been too harsh with the man who would be my partner in a government of national unity. In summation, I said, “The exchanges between Mr. de Klerk and me should not obscure one important fact. I think we are a shining example to the entire world of people drawn from different racial groups who have a common loyalty, a common love, to their common country. . . . In spite of criticism of Mr. de Klerk,” I said, and then looked over at him, “sir, you are one of those I rely upon. We are going to face the problem of this country together.” At which point I reached over to take his hand and said, “I am proud to hold your hand for us to go forward.” Mr. de Klerk seemed surprised, but pleased.

 
pp. 746-751

 

 

114
 

 

I voted on April 27, the second of the four days of voting, and I chose to vote in Natal to show the people in that divided province that there was no danger in going to the polling stations. I voted at Ohlange High School in Inanda, a green and hilly township just north of Durban, for it was there that John Dube, the first president of the ANC, was buried. This African patriot had helped found the organization in 1912, and casting my vote near his grave site brought history full circle, for the mission he began eighty-two years before was about to be achieved.

As I stood over his grave, on a rise above the small school below, I thought not of the present but of the past. When I walked to the voting station, my mind dwelt on the heroes who had fallen so that I might be where I was that day, the men and women who had made the ultimate sacrifice for a cause that was now finally succeeding. I thought of Oliver Tambo, and Chris Hani, and Chief Luthuli, and Bram Fischer. I thought of our great African heroes, who had sacrificed so that millions of South Africans could be voting on that very day; I thought of Josiah Gumede, G. M. Naicker, Dr. Abdullah Abdurahman, Lilian Ngoyi, Helen Joseph, Yusuf Dadoo, Moses Kotane. I did not go into that voting station alone on April 27; I was casting my vote with all of them.

Before I entered the polling station, an irreverent member of the press called out, “Mr. Mandela, who are you voting for?” I laughed. “You know,” I said, “I have been agonizing over that choice all morning.” I marked an X in the box next to the letters ANC and then slipped my folded ballot paper into a simple wooden box; I had cast the first vote of my life.

The images of South Africans going to the polls that day are burned in my memory. Great lines of patient people snaking through the dirt roads and streets of towns and cities; old women who had waited half a century to cast their first vote saying that they felt like human beings for the first time in their lives; white men and women saying they were proud to live in a free country at last. The mood of the nation during those days of voting was buoyant. The violence and bombings ceased, and it was as if we were a nation reborn. Even the logistical difficulties of the voting, misplaced ballots, pirate voting stations, and rumors of fraud in certain places could not dim the overwhelming victory for democracy and justice.

It took several days for the results to be counted. We polled 62.6 percent of the national vote, slightly short of the two-thirds needed had we wished to push through a final constitution without support from other parties. That percentage qualified us for 252 of 400 seats in the national assembly. The ANC thoroughly dominated the northern and eastern Transvaal, the northwest, the eastern Cape and the Free State. We won 33 percent of the vote in the western Cape, which was won by the National Party, which did extremely well among Coloured voters. We captured 32 percent in KwaZulu/Natal, which was won by Inkatha. In Natal, fear of violence and intimidation kept many of our voters at home. There were charges, as well, of vote fraud and vote rigging. But in the end, that did not matter. We had underestimated Inkatha’s strength in KwaZulu, and they had demonstrated it on election day.

Some in the ANC were disappointed that we did not cross the two-thirds threshold, but I was not one of them. In fact I was relieved; had we won two-thirds of the vote and been able to write a constitution unfettered by input from others, people would argue that we had created an ANC constitution, not a South African constitution. I wanted a true government of national unity.

On the evening of May 2, Mr. de Klerk made a gracious concession speech. After more than three centuries of rule, the white minority was conceding defeat and turning over power to the black majority. That evening, the ANC was planning a victory celebration at the ballroom of the Carlton Hotel in downtown Johannesburg. I was suffering from a bad case of the flu and my doctors ordered me to remain at home. But there was nothing that could keep me away from that party. I went onstage at about nine o’clock and faced a crowd of happy, smiling, cheering faces. I explained to the crowd that my voice was hoarse from a cold and that my physician had advised me not to attend. “I hope that you will not disclose to him that I have violated his instructions,” I told them. I congratulated Mr. de Klerk for his strong showing. I thanked all those in the ANC and the democratic movement who had worked so hard for so long. Mrs. Coretta Scott King, the wife of the great freedom fighter Martin Luther King Jr., was on the podium that night, and I looked over to her as I made reference to her husband’s immortal words.

This is one of the most important moments in the life of our country. I stand here before you filled with deep pride and joy — pride in the ordinary, humble people of this country. You have shown such a calm, patient determination to reclaim this country as your own, and now the joy that we can loudly proclaim from the rooftops — Free at last! Free at last! I stand before you humbled by your courage, with a heart full of love for all of you. I regard it as the highest honor to lead the ANC at this moment in our history. I am your servant. . . . It is not the individuals that matter, but the collective. . . . This is a time to heal the old wounds and build a new South Africa.

From the moment the results were in and it was apparent that the ANC was to form the government, I saw my mission as one of preaching reconciliation, of binding the wounds of the country, of engendering trust and confidence. I knew that many people, particularly the minorities, whites, Coloureds, and Indians, would be feeling anxious about the future, and I wanted them to feel secure. I reminded people again and again that the liberation struggle was not a battle against any one group or color, but a fight against a system of repression.
At every opportunity, I said all South Africans must now unite and join hands and say we are one country, one nation, one people, marching together into the future

 pp. 742-745

 

115

 

May 10 dawned bright and clear. For the past few days, I had been pleasantly besieged by arriving dignitaries and world leaders who were coming to pay their respects before the inauguration. The inauguration would be the largest gathering ever of international leaders on South African soil.

The ceremonies took place in the lovely sandstone amphitheater formed by the Union Buildings in Pretoria. For decades, this had been the seat of white supremacy, and now it was the site of a rainbow gathering of different colors and nations for the installation of South Africa’s first democratic, nonracial government.

On that lovely autumn day I was accompanied by my daughter Zenani. On the podium, Mr. de Klerk was first sworn in as second deputy president. Then Thabo Mbeki was sworn in as first deputy president. When it was my turn, I pledged to obey and uphold the constitution and to devote myself to the well-being of the republic and its people. To the assembled guests and the watching world, I said:

Today, all of us do, by our presence here . . . confer glory and hope to newborn liberty. Out of the experience of an extraordinary human disaster that lasted too long, must be born a society of which all humanity will be proud.. . . We, who were outlaws not so long ago, have today been given the rare privilege to be host to the nations of the world on our own soil. We thank all of our distinguished international guests for having come to take possession with the people of our country of what is, after all, a common victory for justice, for peace, for human dignity.
We have, at last, achieved our political emancipation. We pledge ourselves to liberate all our people from the continuing bondage of poverty, deprivation, suffering, gender, and other discrimination.
Never, never, and never again shall it be that this beautiful land will again experience the oppression of one by another. . . . The sun shall never set on so glorious a human achievement.
Let freedom reign. God bless Africa!

A few moments later we all lifted our eyes in awe as a spectacular array of South African jets, helicopters, and troop carriers roared in perfect formation over the Union Buildings. It was not only a display of pinpoint precision and military force, but a demonstration of the military’s loyalty to democracy, to a new government that had been freely and fairly elected. Only moments before, the highest generals of the South African Defense Force and police, their chests bedecked with ribbons and medals from days gone by, saluted me and pledged their loyalty. I was not unmindful of the fact that not so many years before they would not have saluted but arrested me. Finally a chevron of Impala jets left a smoke trail of the black, red, green, blue, white, and gold of the new South African flag.

The day was symbolized for me by the playing of our two national anthems, and the vision of whites singing “Nkosi Sikelel’ iAfrika” and blacks singing “Die Stem,” the old anthem of the republic. Although that day, neither group knew the lyrics of the anthem they once despised, they would soon know the words by heart.

On the day of the inauguration, I was overwhelmed with a sense of history. In the first decade of the twentieth century, a few years after the bitter Anglo-Boer War and before my own birth, the white-skinned peoples of South Africa patched up their differences and erected a system of racial domination against the dark-skinned peoples of their own land. The structure they created formed the basis of one of the harshest, most inhumane societies the world has ever known. Now, in the last decade of the twentieth century, and my own eighth decade as a man, that system had been overturned forever and replaced by one that recognized the rights and freedoms of all peoples regardless of the color of their skin.

That day had come about through the unimaginable sacrifices of thousands of my people, people whose suffering and courage can never be counted or repaid. I felt that day, as I have on so many other days, that I was simply the sum of all those African patriots who had gone before me.

That long and noble line ended and now began again with me. I was pained that I was not able to thank them and that they were not able to see what their sacrifices had wrought.

The policy of apartheid created a deep and lasting wound in my country and my people. All of us will spend many years, if not generations, recovering from that profound hurt. But the decades of oppression and brutality had another, unintended effect, and that was that it produced the Oliver Tambos, the Walter Sisulus, the Chief Luthulis, the Yusuf Dadoos, the Bram Fischers, the Robert Sobukwes of our time — men of such extraordinary courage, wisdom, and generosity that their like may never be known again. Perhaps it requires such depth of oppression to create such heights of character. My country is rich in the minerals and gems that lie beneath its soil, but I have always known that its greatest wealth is its people, finer and truer than the purest diamonds.

It is from these comrades in the struggle that I learned the meaning of courage. Time and again, I have seen men and women risk and give their lives for an idea. I have seen men stand up to attacks and torture without breaking, showing a strength and resiliency that defies the imagination. I learned that courage was not the absence of fear, but the triumph over it. I felt fear myself more times than I can remember, but I hid it behind a mask of boldness. The brave man is not he who does not feel afraid, but he who conquers that fear.

I never lost hope that this great transformation would occur. Not only because of the great heroes I have already cited, but because of the courage of the ordinary men and women of my country. I always knew that deep down in every human heart, there is mercy and generosity. No one is born hating another person because of the color of his skin, or his background, or his religion. People must learn to hate, and if they can learn to hate, they can be taught to love, for love comes more naturally to the human heart than its opposite. Even in the grimmest times in prison, when my comrades and I were pushed to our limits, I would see a glimmer of humanity in one of the guards, perhaps just for a second, but it was enough to reassure me and keep me going. Man’s goodness is a flame that can be hidden but never extinguished.

We took up the struggle with our eyes wide open, under no illusion that the path would be an easy one. As a young man, when I joined the African National Congress, I saw the price my comrades paid for their beliefs, and it was high. For myself, I have never regretted my commitment to the struggle, and I was always prepared to face the hardships that affected me personally. But my family paid a terrible price, perhaps too dear a price for my commitment.

In life, every man has twin obligations — obligations to his family to his parents, to his wife and children; and he has an obligation to his people, his community, his country. In a civil and humane society, each man is able to fulfill those obligations according to his own inclinations and abilities. But in a country like South Africa, it was almost impossible for a man of my birth and color to fulfill both of those obligations. In South Africa, a man of color who attempted to live as a human being was punished and isolated. In South Africa, a man who tried to fulfill his duty to his people was  inevitably ripped from his family and his home and was forced to live a life apart, a twilight existence of secrecy and rebellion. I did not in the beginning choose to place my people above my family, but in attempting to serve my people, I found that I was prevented from fulfilling my obligations as a son, a brother, a father, and a husband.

In that way, my commitment to my people, to the millions of South Africans I would never know or meet, was at the expense of the people I knew best and loved most. It was as simple and yet as incomprehensible as the moment a small child asks her father, “Why can you not be with us?” And the father must utter the terrible words: “There are other children like you, a great many of them . . .” and then one’s voice trails off. I was not born with a hunger to be free. I was born free — free in every way that I could know. Free to run in the fields near my mother’s hut, free to swim in the clear stream that ran through my village, free to roast mealies under the stars and ride the broad backs of slow-moving bulls. As long as I obeyed my father and abided by the customs of my tribe, I was not troubled by the laws of man or God.

It was only when I began to learn that my boyhood freedom was an illusion, when I discovered as a young man that my freedom had already been taken from me, that I began to hunger for it. At first, as a student, I wanted freedom only for myself, the transitory freedoms of being able to stay out at night, read what I pleased, and go where I chose. Later, as a young man in Johannesburg, I yearned for the basic and honorable freedoms of achieving my potential, of earning my keep, of marrying and having a family — the freedom not to be obstructed in a lawful life.

But then I slowly saw that not only was I not free, but my brothers and sisters were not free. I saw that it was not just my freedom that was curtailed, but the freedom of everyone who looked like I did. That is when I joined the African National Congress, and that is when the hunger for my own freedom became the greater hunger for the freedom of my people. It was this desire for the freedom of my people to live their lives with dignity and self-respect that animated my life, that transformed a frightened young man into a bold one, that drove a law-abiding attorney to become a criminal, that turned a family-loving husband into a man without a home, that forced a life-loving man to live like a monk. I am no more virtuous or selfsacrificing than the next man, but I found that I could not even enjoy the poor and limited freedoms I was allowed when I knew my people were not free. Freedom is indivisible; the chains on any one of my people were the chains on all of them, the chains on all of my people were the chains on me.

It was during those long and lonely years that my hunger for the freedom of my own people became a hunger for the freedom of all people, white and black. I knew as well as I knew anything that the oppressor must be liberated just as surely as the oppressed. A man who takes away another man’s freedom is a prisoner of hatred, he is locked behind the bars of prejudice and narrow-mindedness. I am not truly free if I am taking away someone else’s freedom, just as surely as I am not free when my freedom is taken from me. The oppressed and the oppressor alike are robbed of their humanity.

When I walked out of prison, that was my mission, to liberate the oppressed and the oppressor both. Some say that has now been achieved. But I know that that is not the case. The truth is that we are not yet free; we have merely achieved the freedom to be free, the right not to be oppressed.

We have not taken the final step of our journey, but the first step on a longer and even more difficult road. For to be free is not merely to cast off one’s chains, but to live in a way that respects and enhances the freedom of others. The true test of our devotion to freedom is just beginning.

I have walked that long road to freedom. I have tried not to falter; I have made missteps along the way. But I have discovered the secret that after climbing a great hill, one only finds that there are many more hills to climb. I have taken a moment here to rest, to steal a view of the glorious vista    that surrounds me, to look back on the distance I have come. But I can rest only for a moment, for with freedom come responsibilities, and I dare not linger, for my long walk is not yet ended.

pp.746-751

 

7. GERMAN TRADITION


Digitales Wörterbuch der deutschen Sprache
Grimmsches Wörterbuch: Bote - Botschaft
Wikipedia: Odin
Wikipedia: Geschichte der Post
Wikipedia: Nachricht
Fürst Thurn und Taxis Hofbíbliothek
Immanuel Kant
Friedrich Nietzsche
Theodor W. Adorno
Martin Heidegger: Aus einem Gespräch von der Sprache
Martin Heidegger: Zollikoner Seminare
Martin Heidegger: Zum Ereignis-Denken
Martin Heidegger: Vigiliae und Notturno
Martin Heidegger: Logik als die Frage nach dem Wesen der Sprache
Hans UIrich Gumbrecht und K. Ludwig Pfeiffer (Hg.): Materialität der Kommunikation
Niklas Luhmann: Soziale Systeme
Vilém Flusser: Kommunikologie
Michael Giesecke: Die Entdeckung der kommunikativen Welt
Rafael Capurro et al.: On the Relevance of Angeletics and Hermeneutics for Information Technology
Rafael Capurro - Makoto Nakada: A Dialogue on Intercultural Angeletics
Rafael Capurro: On the Genealogy of Information
Verena Huber: Die Rolle des Boten im Minnesang
Horst Wenzel u.a. (Hg.): Gespräche - Boten - Briefe. Körpergedächtnis und Schriftgedächtnis im Mittelalter
Peter Sloterdijk: Über den Unterschied zwischen einem Idioten und einem Engel
Peter Sloterdijk: Zur Metaphysik der Telekommunikation
Rafael Capurro:  Die Lehre Japans: Theorie und Praxis der Botschaft bei Franz-Xaver
Rafael Capurro: Theorie der Botschaft
Uwe Wirth: Die Frage nach dem Medium als Frage nach der Vermittlung
Sybille Krämer: Medium, Bote, Übertragung. Kleine Metaphysik der Medialität
Friedrich A. Kittler: Die Wahrheit der technischen Welt
Friedrich Kitler: Martin Heidegger, Medien und die Götter Griechenlands
Rafael Capurro: Einführung in die Digitale Ontologie
Michael Eldred: Entwurf einer digitalen Ontologie / The Digital Cast of Being
Michael Eldred: Digital Being, the Real Continuum, the Rational and the Irrational
Michael Eldred: Continuum and Time: Weyl after Heidegger
Hanna Arendt: Totalitäre Propaganda




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Wörterbücher
"Die Botschaft hör ich wohl, allein mir fehlt der Glaube" (Goethe, Faust I 765)
Etymologie
Bote m. ‘Überbringer, Abgesandter’, 
ahd. boto (8. Jh.), mhd. bote, 
asächs. bodo, mnd. mnl. bōde, nl. bode, aengl. boda, 
anord. boði ‘der mit einem Auftrag Ausgesandte’ (germ. *budan-) ist Nomen agentis, das (wie Ge-, Verbot) im Ablaut zu den unter bieten (s. d.) genannten Verben in ihrer alten Bedeutung ‘zur Kenntnis bringen, verkünden’ steht. 
Botschaft f. ‘Verkündigung, Mitteilung’,
ahd. botascaf (9. Jh.), mhd. bote-, botschaft; 
im 15. bis 17. Jh. auch ‘Abgesandter’ bzw. die ‘Gruppe der Abgesandten’. 
Botschafter m. ‘Bote, der mit politischem Auftrag Abgesandte’ (15. Jh.), 
dann ‘Leiter einer Gesandtschaft’ und seit dem 18. Jh. Staatstitel in der Übersetzung von frz. ambassadeur. 
Vorbote m. ‘Vorläufer, Anzeichen’, ahd. foraboto (9. Jh.), 
mhd.vorbote ‘der Verkünder der Ankunft seines Auftraggebers’; 
heute meist übertragen ‘An-, Vorzeichen’. 
botmäßig Adj. ‘untertan, tributpflichtig’ (14. Jh.), 
zusammengesetzt mit mhd. bot n. ‘Gebot’ (zu bieten im Sinne von ‘befehlen’ wie in ge-, verbieten); 
Botmäßigkeit f. ‘Herrschaft’ (16. Jh.). 
Dazu im 19. Jh.unbotmäßig Adj. ‘widersetzlich’, Unbotmäßigkeit f. 



GRIMMSCHES WÖRTERBUCH

Bote
nuntius
,
der entsendet wird, um zu entbieten, zu verkündigen, zu laden,
eigentlich um gebot, dann auch andere meldung und nachricht mündlich zu bringen oder zu holen,
endlich um briefe zu tragen, sl. posel von poslati senden;
ein noch älteres wort und weiterer bedeutung war goth. airus, pl. airjus;
alts. eru (oder êru?), pl. eri Hel. 17, 3;
ags. âr pl. âras; altn. âr pl. ârar;
wovon ahd. nur ârunti botschaft, ags.ærende, altn. erindi übrig ist, in welchem worte die vocalbestimmung schwierigkeit hat. von biudan kommt kein goth. buda vor, wäre aber wol möglich, alle übrigen sprachen haben die bildung:
ahd. poto (Graff 3, 80), mhd. bote (Ben. 1, 183ᵃ), alts.bodo, mnl. nnl. bode, ags. fries. boda, engl. ausgestorben, altn. bođi, schw. baͦd, dän. bod. nhd. wurde zur bezeichnung der kürze lange noch bott, botten geschrieben.

Botschaft
nuntius, ahd. potascaf, potascaft (Graff 3, 81), mhd. boteschaft (Ben. 1,184ᵇ),
alts.bodscepi, nnl. boodschap, ags. bodscipe, altn. bođskapr, dän. budskab.



WIKIPEDIA: ODIN

 
Odin oder Wodan (südgermanisch Wōdan; altisländisch Óðinn, altenglisch Wōden, altsächsisch Uuoden, althochdeutsch Wuotan, langobardisch Godan oder Guodan, neuhochdeutsch nach Richard Wagner Wotan; aus diesen Formen erschließt sich der gemeingermanische Göttername *Wôðanaz) ist der Hauptgott in der nordischen Mythologie der eddischen Dichtung. Dort fungiert er als Göttervater, Kriegs- und Totengott, als ein Gott der Dichtung und Runen, der Magie und Ekstase mit deutlich schamanischen Zügen.

Darstellung

Odin, auf dem Thron sitzend, Fund aus Gammel Lejre, Dänemark

Bisher liegen Odin zugeschriebene Darstellungen meist in Form eines Reiters vor. Entscheidend ist, dass Odin, wie auf der Illustration rechts, meist einäugig dargestellt wird, da er Mimir ein Auge als Pfand überließ, um in die Zukunft sehen zu können. 2009 wurde bei Ausgrabungen in Gammel Lejre in Dänemark eine 1,75 cm hohe und 1,98 cm breite vergoldete Figur aus Silber gefunden. Das Museum Roskilde datiert den einzigartigen Fund auf 900–1000 n. Chr. Es handelt sich dabei um eine Darstellung von Odin und seinem magischen Thron Hlidskialf mit den Raben Hugin und Munin. Der Thron befähigt Odin, alle neun Welten zu sehen. Dass das linke Auge auf manchen Abbildungen schlecht zu sehen ist, verweist jedoch nicht auf das Auge, das Odin opferte, um Weisheit zu erlangen. Die linke Gesichtshälfte wurde nur nachträglich etwas blanker geschliffen. Kleine Throne wurden auch bei anderen archäologischen Ausgrabungen gefunden, darunter auch in Haithabu. Jedoch fehlt auf diesen eine Person. Der Fund in Gammel Lejre ist die älteste bekannte Darstellung von Odin und seinem magischen Thron Hlidskialf.

Herkunft

Als früheste Nachweise der germanischen Gottesvorstellung wurden Felsbilder in Skandinavien gedeutet, die übermannsgroße Figuren in phallischer Pose und mit einem Speer bewaffnet zeigen. Diese Deutungen sind aber umstritten und beruhen auf den spätheidnisch-skandinavischen schriftlichen sowie bildhaften Darstellungen Odins als einer mit einem Speer attributierten Gottheit neben Thor mit seinem Hammer und Tyr als Schwertgott.

Tacitus benennt im neunten Kapitel seiner ethnographischen Abhandlung, der landläufig verkürzt betitelten Germania, den ihm übermittelten Abriss zu den religiösen Verhältnissen der Germanen. In der Eröffnung zitiert er wörtlich Caesar nach dessen Gallischem Krieg. Tacitus führt als höchste verehrte Gottheit in römischer Interpretation den Mercurius an. Aus der weiteren Benennung der zwei weiteren Hauptgottheiten Hercules und Mars für Donar/Thorund Tiwas/Tyr wird für Mercurius Wodan/Odin erschlossen. Die Einführung des Tacitus ist jedoch wohl nicht ganz deckungsgleich mit den vermuteten tatsächlichen Verhältnissen. Auch die problembehaftete Identifizierung des Hercules mit Donar/Thor zeigt, dass eine differenzierte Wertung zwingend ist.

In den ersten nachchristlichen Jahrhunderten wurde Wodan in der Germania inferior durch Weihesteine geehrt, die in der Regel von Germanen gestiftet wurden, die in römischen Militär- oder Staatsdiensten standen. Die Steine tragen Inschriften, die den Namen des Mercurius mit germanischen Begrifflichkeiten paaren, seien es Bezüge zu Örtlichkeiten, zu einzelnen Stämmen oder Namensformen mit anderen Bezügen. Beispielhafte Inschriften sind Mercurius Cimbrianus „Wodan der Kimbern“' und Mercurius Leudisius „Wodan von Lüttich“.

Die Deutungen der Felsbilder führten neben anderen Aspekten in der Forschung zu einer ungeklärten Streitfrage. Auf der einen Seite steht die in Anlehnung an Georges Dumézil und andere vertretene These, dass Wodan/Odin eine gesamtgermanische Götterfigur aus indogermanischer Zeit sei. Auf der anderen Seite steht die These der allmählichen Wanderung des Wodan-Kults, der sich vor der Zeitenwende im niederrheinisch-nordwestdeutschen Raum entwickelt und von dort ausgebreitet habe und dabei den alten Hoch- und Himmelsgott Tiwaz aus dessen Stellung verdrängte. Dieser Prozess müsse dann im Kontext der Auseinandersetzungen mit dem Römischen Reich sowie der Veränderung innergermanischer Verhältnisse gesehen werden.

Schriftzeugnisse im kontinental-germanischen Bereich sind spärlich, hauptsächlicher Nachweis sind hier spätere, zum Teil nach der Christianisierung verfasste Quellen (Edda), welche die im Brauchtum tief verwurzelten Erinnerungen an die heidnische vorchristliche Zeit und deren religiöse Riten und Mythologien reflektieren. Zudem ist in den isländisch-eddischen Schriften des Hochmittelalters der Einfluss der Christianisierung und sowohl christlicher als auch griechisch-römischer Vorstellungen auch und gerade bei der Darstellung Odins zu erkennen. Otto Höfler stellte auf Grundlage der disparaten Quellensituation zu Odin/Wodan fest, dass man diesen nicht zu einem einheitlichen anthropomorphen, menschengestaltigen Charakterbild zusammenfassen kann, jedoch lässt sich über die Epoche des germanischen Paganismus hinweg ein einheitlicher Kulttypus feststellen. Dieser manifestiert sich, wie in der etymologischen Deutung kurz umrissen, folgend:

die Beziehung zur Ekstase
der Bezug zu den Toten beziehungsweise Totenkult
die Verwandlungsfähigkeit
kriegerische, vegetative und dämonische Züge




Entwicklung in Europa

Nach dem Zerfall des Weströmischen Reiches gab es in Europa nur noch eine reduzierte Nachrichtenübermittlung. Überregionale Institutionen waren die katholische Kirche mit den missionierenden Mönchen wie Bonifatius und das Großreich der Karolinger, das mit Hilfe von Boten vernetzt war. Für die Behauptung, dass bereits Karl der Große (768–814) über Pferdestafetten verfügte, fanden sich jedoch keine Beweise.
Im Hochmittelalter wurde die Nachrichtenübermittlung in Europa von drei Einrichtungen dominiert, der katholischen Kirche, den Herrschern in den verschiedenen Ländern und dem europäischen Fernhandel.
Die zentrale Lenkung der Kirche in Rom (bzw. 1309–1378 in Avignon) und die häufigen Papstwahlen erzwangen einen ständigen Schriftverkehr mit den Bistümern. Dazu gehörte auch die Einbindung der Klöster, die eigene Botendienste unterhielten. Auch die deutsch-römischen Herrscher und die Könige in Frankreich und England benötigten eine zentrale Kommunikation in ihren Ländern. Sie setzten aber in der Regel nur Fußboten ein, die manchmal auch Leihpferde von Herbergen an Reisestraßen [4] oder Flussschiffe nutzten.
Im späten Mittelalter bildete sich in europäischen Städten wie Antwerpen, Augsburg, Frankfurt, Nürnberg, Leipzig, den Hansestädten wie Hamburg, Bremen oder Lübeck, dem Deutschen Orden, London, Marseille, Nowgorod und der Republik Venedig ein Fernhandel heraus, verbunden mit einem regen Schriftverkehr der länderübergreifenden Kaufmannspost. Im 15. Jahrhundert entstanden in Italien, im Heiligen Römischen Reich und in den Niederlanden große Bank- und Handelshäuser. Zentren waren Florenz, Mailand, Rom, Venedig, Augsburg, Brüssel und Antwerpen. Diese Häuser waren miteinander vernetzt.
Einen privaten Briefverkehr gab es im Mittelalter kaum. Pergament war teuer. Erst die Einführung von billigem Papier führte ab dem 15. Jahrhundert zu einem wachsenden Schriftverkehr. So transportierten Marktschiffe auf Flüssen auch Schriftstücke. In vielen Regionen Deutschlands übernahmen Metzger den Austausch von Briefen. Auch Universitäten unterhielten Botendienste, so etwa in Paris. Bedeutend wurden auch die städtischen Botenanstalten im Heiligen Römischen Reich. Sie beförderten gegen Bezahlung private Briefe und die Kaufmannspost. Diese Dienste waren untereinander vernetzt und beherrschten während des 16. Jahrhunderts den größten Teil des privaten und kaufmännischen Briefverkehrs. Ihr Niedergang erfolgte erst nach dem Dreißigjährigen Krieg.

Entwicklung ab der Frühen Neuzeit in Europa

Postalischer Eintrag mit Nennung von Janetto, Franz und Johann Baptista von Taxis in den Innsbrucker Raitbüchern 1489/90.
Seit dem 13. Jahrhundert boten Herbergen an Reisestraßen in Spanien, in Italien und in Deutschland Leihpferde an. Erste staatliche Stafetten zur Nachrichtenübermittlung mittels Reiter- und Pferdewechsel entstanden schon vor 1400 im Herzogtum Mailand.

In der zweiten Hälfte des 15. Jahrhunderts unterhielt König Ludwig XI. aus Frankreich einige Postenketten mit Pferdewechsel.
Die erste zeitlich und räumlich zentral organisierte Postverbindung war der so genannte Niederländische Postkurs. Er wurde im Jahr 1490 von Janetto von Taxis mit Hilfe seines Bruders Franz und seines Neffen Johann Baptista zwischen dem Hof Maximilians I. in Innsbruck und jenem seines minderjährigen Sohnes Philipp in den Burgundischen Niederlanden eingerichtet. Als Philipp nach dem Tod Isabellas im November 1504 kastilischer König wurde, verlängerte Franz von Taxis die Postlinien bis nach Kastilien. 1516 erhielt er vom spanischen König und späteren Kaiser Karl V. das Privileg eines Hauptpostmeisters der Niederlande. Die Postkurse wurden je nach Bedarf bis Rom, Neapel, Verona und zu anderen Städten ausgedehnt.
Es ist beachtlich, dass durch die straffe Organisation des Postwesens, die einen rationellen Reiter- und Pferdewechsel an Poststationen festlegte, täglich im Durchschnitt 166 Kilometer Postweg bewältigt werden konnten. Diese Transportgeschwindigkeit von 6,6 km pro Stunde einschließlich Stopps konnte nur durch zahlreiche Pferdewechsel erreicht werden. Zum Vergleich: Beim militärisch-sportlichen Distanzritt zwischen Berlin und Wien 1892 schafften ohne Pferdewechsel die Sieger zwar 7,8 km pro Stunde, aber ihre Pferde verendeten wenige Stunden nach dem Wettkampf.
Zu Beginn war die Post für den privaten Briefverkehr gesperrt. Es durften nur Briefe und Kleingüter aus dem dynastischen Bereich befördert werden. Nach 1520 nahm die Beförderung der Privatpost auf dem Niederländischen Postkurs einen solchen Umfang an, dass sie zunächst stillschweigend geduldet und schließlich genehmigt wurde. Neben Briefen und ähnlichen Sendungen beförderte die Post auch Personen, die mit Begleitung von Poststation zu Poststation reisten und dabei die Reitpferde wechselten.
Im Jahre 1596 wurde Leonhard I. von Taxis zum Generaloberstpostmeister im Heiligen Römischen Reich ernannt. Das Postwesen selbst galt seit 1597 als kaiserliches Regal. 1624 wurde Lamoral von Taxis in den Reichsgrafenstand erhoben und mit dem Lehen des Generaloberstpostmeisters bedacht. In den österreichischen Erblanden ging das Postlehen 1624 auf das Haus derer von Paar über.
Der zunehmende Postverkehr führte schon früh zu Versuchen administrativer Verbesserungen und Vereinfachungen. Sie galten vorwiegend der Abschaffung postalischer Unzulänglichkeiten bei der Zustellung, der Verminderung hoher Verlustquoten der Sendungen, dem Wunsch nach größerer Sicherheit für die der Post anvertrauten Briefe und Güter und der Einstellung zuverlässiger Boten, die ausreichenden Lohn erhalten sollten.
1622 verband Hamburg und Lübeck, 1624 Nürnberg und Leipzig ein regelmäßiger Postdienst. In der Mitte des 17. Jahrhunderts entstand als Konkurrenz zur Kaiserlichen Reichspost, die von den Thurn und Taxis betrieben wurde, eine brandenburgisch-preußische Staatspost. Ebenso begann nach dem Ende des Dreißigjährigen Krieges der Einsatz von Postkutschen, zunächst im Personenverkehr. Entlang der Postkurse entstanden an den Poststationen Gaststätten, die mit den Postgesellschaften kooperierten. Die noch heute bestehenden Bezeichnungen wie Gasthaus zur Post erinnern daran.
Um 1800 waren alle mitteleuropäischen Städte durch regelmäßige Postverbindungen miteinander verbunden. Ab dem Zeitalter der Aufklärung, etwa ab der Mitte des 18. Jahrhunderts, ist eine Steigerung der Reisetätigkeit belegt.[5]
„Die materielle Basis für diese neue Dimension des Reisens schafft die Post[6].“

 
[4] Ernst Kießkalt: Die Entstehung der Post. Bamberg 1930
[5] Vgl. Petra Krempien: Geschichte des Reisens und des Tourismus. Ein Überblick von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart. FBV-Medien-Verl.-GmbH, Limburgerhof 2000, 94-97 und Klaus Beyrer: Des Reisebeschreibens ,Kutsche‘: Aufklärerisches Bewußtsein im Postreiseverkehr des 18. Jahrhunderts. In: Wolfgang Griep, Hans-Wolf Jäger (Hg.): Reisen im 18. Jahrhundert. Winter, Heidelberg 1986, 50-90.
[6] Klaus Beyrer: Des Reisebeschreibens ,Kutsche‘: Aufklärerisches Bewußtsein im Postreiseverkehr des 18. Jahrhunderts. In: Wolfgang Griep, Hans-Wolf Jäger (Hg.): Reisen im 18. Jahrhundert. Winter, Heidelberg 1986, 50.
[7] Fritz Ohmann: Die Anfänge des Postwesens und die Taxis. Leipzig 1909, S. 326–329

 


Laut dem Deutschen Wörterbuch ist die Nachricht eine „mitteilung zum darnachrichten“.[1] Seit etwa 1600 steht Nachricht für eine ‚Mitteilung‘. Im 16. bis 18. Jahrhundert ist Nachrichtung für etwas ‚wonach man sich zu richten hat, Anweisung‘ bezeugt, was aber allmählich verdrängt wird. Im Plural werden seit dem 20. Jahrhundert mit Nachrichten ‚(über Rundfunk, Fernsehen gesendete) aktuelle, besonders politische Meldungen‘ bezeichnet.[2] 
Die neueste Nachrichtendefinition stammt von Dietz Schwiesau und Josef Ohler: 
„Die Nachricht ist eine direkte, auf das Wesentliche konzentrierte und möglichst objektive Mitteilung über ein neues Ereignis, das für die Öffentlichkeit wichtig und/oder interessant ist.“ 

1. „NACHRICHT, f. erst seit dem 17. jahrh.
- mittheilung zum darnachrichten und die darnachachtung....
- überhaupt mittheilung einer begebenheit u.s.w.“.
Jacob und Wilhelm Grimm: Deutsches Wörterbuch. Band 7. Leipzig 1889, S. 103

2. Etymologisches Wörterbuch des Deutschen nach Pfeifer, online auf DWDS

nach Adv. Präp. (mit Dativ), zur Bezeichnung einer Richtung und eines räumlichen oder zeitlichen Nacheinanders. Ahd. nāh Adv. ‘nahe, beinahe, danach’, Präp. ‘nahe, bei, hinter, gemäß’ (8. Jh.), mhd. nā(ch), mnd. mnl. nā, nl. na, aengl. nēah gehört zu dem unter nahe (s. d.) behandelten Adjektiv und ist von diesem zunächst auch in der Bedeutung nicht zu trennen. Auszugehen ist von adverbiellem Gebrauch bei Verben der Bewegung ‘in die Nähe von etw.’, woraus sich ‘auf etw. zu’ bzw. (bei beweglichem Ziel) ‘hinterher’ entwickelt; in der Übertragung auf Zeitliches steht nach als Gegenwort zu vor. Oft in Präfixverben (nachfahren, -kommen) und in festen Verbindungen (nach wie vor ‘noch immer’, nach und nach ‘allmählich’). 
nachahmen Vb. ‘nachmachen, imitieren, zu kopieren suchen’ (16. Jh.), eigentl. ‘nachmessen’, zu mhd. āmen ‘visieren, eichen’, abgeleitet von mhd. āme, (md.) ōme‘(Flüssigkeits)maß’, nhd. (heute unüblich) Ohm, entlehnt aus mlat. ama ‘(Wein)maß, Faß’, lat. ama, hama ‘Feuereimer’, griech. ámē (ἄμη) ‘Schaufel, Eimer’. 
nachdem Konj. Adv. ‘später als, nach dieser Zeit’, frühnhd. noch mit Getrenntschreibung nach dem (15. Jh.); statt des Dativs steht in älterer Sprache der Instrumental ahd. nāh diu ‘so wie, nachdem, dementsprechend, wonach’. 
nacheinander Adv. ‘einer nach dem andern, hintereinander’ (15. Jh.). 
nachgerade Adv. ‘allmählich, schließlich, direkt, geradezu’, im 17. Jh. aus dem Nd. ins Hd. aufgenommen, vgl. mnd. nāgerāde, auch nārāde‘allmählich’, dieses aus mnd. nā und vielleicht mnd. rāt ‘Reihe, Reihenfolge, Ordnung’ (vgl. anord. rǫð ‘Reihe’), also eigentl. ‘nach der Reihe’ und daher ‘allmählich’. 
nachhaltig Adj. ‘lange nachwirkend, ausdauernd’ (um 1800), zu nachhalten ‘anhaltend wirken, von längerer Dauer sein’ (18. Jh.), älter ‘nachfolgen, nachstellen, nachträglich vorhalten’ (16. Jh.), und veraltetem Nachhalt ‘Rückhalt, Reserve’ (18. Jh.). 
Nachnahme f. ‘im Frachtbrief vermerkte Auslagen und Spesen, die der Empfänger nachträglich zu zahlen hat’ (1. Hälfte 19. Jh.), danach im Postwesen (1870) ‘Erhebung einer Geldsumme (Rechnungsbetrag, Gebühr) bei Aushändigung einer Postsendung’ (anstelle von frz. remboursement); zu nachnehmen ‘nachträglich nehmen’. 
Nachricht f. ‘Mitteilung’ (um 1600), älteres, vom 16. bis 18. Jh. bezeugtes Nachrichtung ‘wonach man sich zu richten hat, Anweisung’ allmählich verdrängend.Nachrichten Plur. ‘(über Rundfunk, Fernsehen gesendete) aktuelle, bes. politische Meldungen’ (20. Jh.). 
Nachruf m. ‘Würdigung eines Verstorbenen, Nekrolog’ (19. Jh.); zuvor von Zesen 1648 als Verdeutschung für Echo empfohlen. 
Nachtisch m. ‘Nachspeise’ (16. Jh.). 
Nachtrag m. ‘Zusatz, Ergänzung’ (18. Jh.). Nachwelt f. ‘kommende Generationen’ (17. Jh.) 
Nachwort n. ‘Schlußwort mit Erläuterungen für ein Buch’ (19. Jh.), frühnhd. auch ‘nachträglich hinzugefügtes Wort, Nachrede’, mhd. nāchwort ‘nachträglich geltend gemachte Forderung’ (14. Jh.)



FÜRST THURN UND TAXIS HOFBIBLIOTHEK

Sonderbestand "Post"

thurn und taxis

Zu dieser Sachgruppe zählen ca. 2.500 Titel mit Bezug zur Geschichte des europäischen Postwesens seit dem 17. Jahrhundert. Besonderes Augenmerk finden dabei die Werke zu den Thurn- und Taxisschen Postanstalten.
Neben Standardwerken zur Frage des Postregals aus dem 17. und 18. Jahrhundert, wie Turrianus: Glorwürdiger Adler (1694) oder Ockel, Andreas: Post-Regal (1685), enthält dieser Bestand Reisehandbücher vom frühen 17. bis 19. Jahrhundert. Dazu kommen Postalmanache sowie Amtsblattserien der deutschen und österreichischen Postverwaltung des 19. Jahrhunderts, des Weiteren ältere Fachzeitschriften und Amtsdruckschriften deutscher Staaten zum Postwesen.
Einen großen Teil der Sammlung bilden die vor 1806 auch am Reichstag veröffentlichten Streit- und Druckschriften zu rechtlichen, wirtschaftlichen und finanziellen Fragen des Reichspostwesen und der Thurn- und Taxisschen Lehenposten. Letztere stammen teilweise aus der Druckschriftensammlung der fürstlichen Generalpostdirektion.
Zum Bestand Postwesen zählt auch die philatelistische Literatur, vor allem Veröffentlichungen diverser Sammlervereine. Überwiegend sind Werke aus dem deutschsprachigen Bereich vom 20. Jahrhundert bis in die Gegenwart vertreten.
Eine Besonderheit stellt die Frankfurter Oberpostamtszeitung dar, von der Ausgaben zwischen 1722 und 1858 verwahrt werden.



IMMANUEL KANT

Über ein vermeintes Recht aus Menschenliebe zu lügen

http://www.zeno.org/Philosophie/M/Kant,+Immanuel/%C3%9Cber+ein+vermeintes+Recht+aus+Menschenliebe+zu+l%C3%BCgen

In der Schrift: Frankreich im Jahr 1797, Sechstes Stück, Nr. I: Von den politischen Gegenwirkungen, von Benjamin Constant, ist Folgendes S. 123 enthalten.

 

»Der sittliche Grundsatz: es sei eine Pflicht, die Wahrheit zu sagen, würde, wenn man ihn unbedingt und vereinzelt nähme, jede Gesellschaft zur Unmöglichkeit machen. Den Beweis davon haben wir in den sehr unmittelbaren Folgerungen, die ein deutscher Philosoph aus diesem Grundsatze gezogen hat, der so weit geht zu behaupten: daß die Lüge gegen einen Mörder, der uns fragte, ob unser von ihm verfolgter Freund sich nicht in unser Haus geflüchtet, ein Verbrechen sein würde.1«

Der französische Philosoph widerlegt S. 124 diesen Grundsatz auf folgende Art. »Es ist eine Pflicht, die Wahrheit zu sagen. Der Begriff von Pflicht ist unzertrennbar von dem Begriff des Rechts. Eine Pflicht ist, was bei einem Wesen den Rechten eines anderen entspricht. Da, wo es keine Rechte gibt, gibt es keine Pflichten. Die Wahrheit zu sagen, ist also eine Pflicht; aber nur gegen denjenigen, welcher ein Recht auf die Wahrheit hat. Kein Mensch aber hat Recht auf eine Wahrheit, die anderen schadet.«

Das prôton pseudos liegt hier in dem Satze: »Die Wahrheit zu sagen ist eine Pflicht, aber nur gegen denjenigen, welcher ein Recht auf die Wahrheit hat«.

Zuerst ist anzumerken, daß der Ausdruck: ein Recht auf die Wahrheit haben, ein Wort ohne Sinn ist. Man muß vielmehr sagen: der Mensch habe ein Recht auf seine eigene Wahrhaftigkeit (veracitas), d.i. auf die subjektive Wahrheit in seiner Person.

Denn objektiv auf eine Wahrheit ein[637] Recht haben, würde so viel sagen als: es komme, wie überhaupt beim Mein und Dein, auf seinen Willen an, ob ein gegebener Satz wahr oder falsch sein solle; welches dann eine seltsame Logik abgeben würde.

Nun ist die erste Frage: ob der Mensch, in Fällen, wo er einer Beantwortung mit Ja oder Nein nicht ausweichen kann, die Befugnis (das Recht) habe, unwahrhaft zu sein.

Die zweite Frage ist: ob er nicht gar verbunden sei, in einer gewissen Aussage, wozu ihn ein ungerechter Zwang nötigt, unwahrhaft zu sein, um eine ihn bedrohende Missetat an sich oder einem anderen zu verhüten.

Wahrhaftigkeit in Aussagen, die man nicht umgehen kann, ist formale Pflicht des Menschen gegen jeden,2 es mag ihm oder einem andern daraus auch noch so großer Nachteil erwachsen; und, ob ich zwar dem, welcher mich ungerechter weise zur Aussage nötigt, nicht Unrecht tue, wenn ich sie verfälsche, so tue ich doch durch eine solche Verfälschung, die darum auch (obzwar nicht im Sinn des Juristen) Lüge genannt werden kann, im wesentlichsten Stücke der Pflicht überhaupt Unrecht: d.i. ich mache, so viel an mir ist, daß Aussagen (Deklarationen) überhaupt keinen Glauben finden, mithin auch alle Rechte, die auf Verträgen gegründet werden, wegfallen und ihre Kraft einbüßen; welches ein Unrecht ist, das der Menschheit überhaupt zugefügt wird.

 Die Lüge also, bloß als vorsätzlich unwahre Deklaration gegen einen andern Menschen definiert, bedarf nicht des Zusatzes, daß sie einem anderen schaden müsse; wie die Juristen es zu ihrer Definition verlangen (mendacium est falsiloquium in praeiudicium alterius). Denn sie schadet jederzeit einem anderen, wenn gleich nicht einem andern Menschen, doch der Menschheit überhaupt, indem sie die Rechtsquelle unbrauchbar macht.[638]

Diese gutmütige Lüge kann aber auch durch einen Zufall (casus) strafbar werden, nach bürgerlichen Gesetzen; was aber bloß durch den Zufall der Straffälligkeit entgeht, kann auch nach äußeren Gesetzen als Unrecht abgeurteilt werden.

Hast du nämlich einen eben itzt mit Mordsucht Umgehenden durch eine Lüge an der Tat verhindert, so bist du für alle Folgen, die daraus entspringen möchten, auf rechtliche Art verantwortlich. Bist du aber strenge bei der Wahrheit geblieben, so kann dir die öffentliche Gerechtigkeit nichts anhaben; die unvorhergesehene Folge mag sein welche sie wolle.

Es ist doch möglich, daß, nachdem du dem Mörder, auf die Frage, ob der von ihm Angefeindete zu Hause sei, ehrlicherweise mit Ja geantwortet hast, dieser doch unbemerkt ausgegangen ist, und so dem Mörder nicht in den Wurf gekommen, die Tat also nicht geschehen wäre; hast du aber gelogen, und gesagt, er sei nicht zu Hause, und er ist auch wirklich (obzwar dir unbewußt) ausgegangen, wo denn der Mörder ihm im Weggehen begegnete und seine Tat an ihm verübte: so kannst du mit Recht als Urheber des Todes desselben angeklagt werden.

Denn hättest du die Wahrheit, so gut du sie wußtest, gesagt: so wäre vielleicht der Mörder über dem Nachsuchen seines Feindes im Hause von herbeigelaufenen Nachbarn ergriffen, und die Tat verhindert worden.

Wer also lügt, so gutmütig er dabei auch gesinnt sein mag, muß die Folgen davon, selbst vor dem bürgerlichen Gerichtshofe, verantworten und dafür büßen: so unvorhergesehen sie auch immer sein mögen; weil Wahrhaftigkeit eine Pflicht ist, die als die Basis aller auf Vertrag zu gründenden Pflichten angesehn werden muß, deren Gesetz, wenn man ihr auch nur die geringste Ausnahme einräumt, schwankend und unnütz gemacht wird.

 Es ist also ein heiliges, unbedingt gebietendes, durch keine Konvenienzen einzuschränkendes Vernunftgebot; in allen Erklärungen wahrhaft (ehrlich) zu sein.

 Wohldenkend und zugleich richtig ist hiebei Hrn. Constants Anmerkung über die Verschreiung solcher strenger und sich vorgeblich in unausführbare Ideen verlierender, hiemit aber verwerflicher Grundsätze. –

»Jedesmal (sagt er[639] S. 123 unten) wenn ein als wahr bewiesener Grundsatz unanwendbar scheint, so kömmt es daher, daß wir den mittlern Grundsatz nicht kennen, der das Mittel der Anwendung enthält.«

Er führt (S. 121) die Lehre von der Gleichheit als den ersten die gesellschaftliche Kette bildenden Ring an:

»Daß (S. 122) nämlich kein Mensch anders als durch solche Gesetze gebunden werden kann, zu deren Bildung er mit beigetragen hat. In einer sehr ins Enge zusammengezogenen Gesellschaft kann dieser Grundsatz auf unmittelbare Weise angewendet werden, und bedarf, um ein gewöhnlicher zu werden, keines mittleren Grundsatzes. Aber in einer sehr zahlreichen Gesellschaft muß man einen neuen Grundsatz zu demjenigen noch hinzufügen, den wir hier anführen. Dieser mittlere Grundsatz ist: daß die einzelnen zur Bildung der Gesetze entweder in eigener Person oder durch Stellvertreter beitragen können. Wer den ersten Grundsatz auf eine zahlreiche Gesellschaft anwenden wollte, ohne den mittleren dazu zu nehmen, würde unfehlbar ihr Verderben zuwege bringen. Allein dieser Umstand, der nur von der Unwissenheit oder Ungeschicklichkeit des Gesetzgebers zeugte, würde nichts gegen den Grundsatz beweisen.« –

Er beschließt S. 125 hiemit:

»Ein als wahr anerkannter Grundsatz muß also niemal verlassen werden: wie anscheinend auch Gefahr dabei sich befindet«.

(Und doch hatte der gute Mann den unbedingten Grundsatz der Wahrhaftigkeit, wegen der Gefahr, die er für die Gesellschaft bei sich führe, selbst verlassen; weil er keinen mittleren Grundsatz entdecken konnte, der diese Gefahr zu verhüten diente, und hier auch wirklich keiner einzuschieben ist.)

Wenn man die Namen der Personen, sowie sie hier aufgeführt werden, beibehalten will: so verwechselte »der französische Philosoph« die Handlung, wodurch jemand einem anderen schadet (nocet), indem er die Wahrheit, deren Geständnis er nicht umgehen kann, sagt, mit derjenigen, wodurch er diesem Unrecht tut (laedit). 

Es war bloß ein Zufall (casus), daß die Wahrhaftigkeit der Aussage dem Einwohner des Hauses schadete, nicht eine freie Tat (in juridischer Bedeutung). Denn aus seinem Rechte, von einem[640] anderen zu fordern, daß er ihm zum Vorteil lügen solle, würde ein aller Gesetzmäßigkeit widerstreitender Anspruch folgen. Jeder Mensch aber hat nicht allein ein Recht, sondern sogar die strengste Pflicht zur Wahrhaftigkeit in Aussagen, die er nicht umgehen kann: sie mag nun ihm selbst oder andern schaden. Er selbst tut also hiemit dem, der dadurch leidet, eigentlich nicht Schaden, sondern diesen verursacht der Zufall.

Denn jener ist hierin gar nicht frei, um zu wählen; weil die Wahrhaftigkeit (wenn er einmal sprechen muß) unbedingte Pflicht ist. –

Der »deutsche Philosoph« wird also den Satz (S. 124): »Die Wahrheit zu sagen ist eine Pflicht, aber nur gegen denjenigen, welcher ein Recht auf die Wahrheit hat«, nicht zu seinem Grundsatze annehmen: erstlich wegen der undeutlichen Formel desselben, indem Wahrheit kein Besitztum ist, auf welchen dem einen das Recht verwilligt, anderen aber verweigert werden könne; dann aber vornehmlich, weil die Pflicht der Wahrhaftigkeit (als von welcher hier allein die Rede ist) keinen Unterschied zwischen Personen macht, gegen die man diese Pflicht haben, oder gegen die man sich auch von ihr lossagen könne, sondern weil es unbedingte Pflicht ist, die in allen Verhältnissen gilt.

Um nun von einer Metaphysik des Rechts (welche von allen Erfahrungsbedingungen abstrahiert) zu einem Grundsatze der Politik (welcher diese Begriffe auf Erfahrungsfälle anwendet), und vermittelst dieses zur Auflösung einer Aufgabe der letzteren, dem allgemeinen Rechtsprinzip gemäß, zu gelangen: wird der Philosoph

1) ein Axiom, d.i. einen apodiktisch-gewissen Satz, der unmittelbar aus der Definition des äußern Rechts (Zusammenstimmung der Freiheit eines jeden mit der Freiheit von jedermann nach einem allgemeinen Gesetze) hervorgeht,

2) ein Postulat (des äußeren öffentlichen Gesetzes, als vereinigten Willens aller nach dem Prinzip der Gleichheit, ohne welche keine Freiheit von jedermann Statt haben würde),

3) ein Problem geben, wie es anzustellen sei, daß in einer noch so großen Gesellschaft dennoch Eintracht nach Prinzipien der Freiheit und Gleichheit erhalten werde (nämlich vermittelst[641] eines repräsentativen Systems); welches dann ein Grundsatz der Politik sein wird, deren Veranstaltung und Anordnung nun Dekrete enthalten wird, die, aus der Erfahrungserkenntnis der Menschen gezogen, nur den Mechanism der Rechtsverwaltung, und wie dieser zweckmäßig einzurichten sei, beabsichtigen. – –

Das Recht muß nie der Politik, wohl aber die Politik jederzeit dem Recht angepaßt werden.

»Ein als wahr anerkannter (ich setze hinzu: a priori anerkannter, mithin apodiktischer) Grundsatz muß niemal verlassen werden, wie anscheinend auch Gefahr sich dabei befindet«, sagt der Verfasser. Nur muß man hier nicht die Gefahr (zufälligerweise) zu schaden, sondern überhaupt Unrecht zu tun verstehen: welches geschehen würde, wenn ich die Pflicht der Wahrhaftigkeit, die gänzlich unbedingt ist und in Aussagen die oberste rechtliche Bedingung ausmacht, zu einer bedingten und noch andern Rücksichten untergeordneten mache; und, obgleich ich durch eine gewisse Lüge in der Tat niemanden Unrecht tue, doch das Prinzip des Rechts in Ansehung aller unumgänglich notwendigen Aussagen überhaupt verletze (formaliter, obgleich nicht materialiter, Unrecht tue): welches viel schlimmer ist als gegen irgend jemanden eine Ungerechtigkeit begehn, weil eine solche Tat nicht eben immer einen Grundsatz dazu im Subjekte voraussetzt.

Der, welcher die Anfrage, die ein anderer an ihn ergehen läßt: ob er in seiner Aussage, die er itzt tun soll, wahrhaft sein wolle oder nicht? nicht schon mit Unwillen über den gegen ihn hiemit geäußerten Verdacht, er möge auch wohl ein Lügner sein, aufnimmt, sondern sich die Erlaubnis ausbittet, sich erst auf mögliche Ausnahmen zu besinnen, ist schon ein Lügner (in potentia); weil er zeigt, daß er die Wahrhaftigkeit nicht für Pflicht an sich selbst anerkenne, sondern sich Ausnahmen vorhält von einer Regel, die ihrem Wesen nach keiner Ausnahme fähig ist, weil sie sich in dieser geradezu selbst widerspricht.

Alle rechtlich-praktische Grundsätze müssen strenge Wahrheit enthalten, und die hier sogenannten mittleren[642] können nur die nähere Bestimmung ihrer Anwendung auf vorkommende Fälle (nach Regeln der Politik), aber niemal Ausnahmen von jenen enthalten; weil diese die Allgemeinheit vernichten, derentwegen allein sie den Namen der Grundsätze führen.

Königsberg.

I. Kant.[643]

Fußnoten

1 »I. D. Michaelis in Göttingen hat diese seltsame Meinung noch früher vorgetragen als Kant. Daß Kant der Philosoph sei, von dem diese Stelle redet, hat mir der Verfasser dieser Schrift selbst gesagt.

K. Fr. Cramer.«

Daß dieses wirklich an irgend einer Stelle, deren ich mich aber itzt nicht mehr besinnen kann, von mir gesagt worden, gestehe ich hiedurch.

I. Kant.

2 Ich mag hier nicht den Grundsatz bis dahin schärfen, zu sagen: »Unwahrhaftigkeit ist Verletzung der Pflicht gegen sich selbst«. Denn dieser gehört zur Ethik; hier aber ist von einer Rechtspflicht die Rede. – Die Tugendlehre sieht in jener Übertretung nur auf die Nichtswürdigkeit, deren Vorwurf der Lügner sich selbst zuzieht.

 

FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE

Über Wahrheit und Lüge im außermoralischen Sinn

http://www.zeno.org/Philosophie/M/Nietzsche,+Friedrich/%C3%9Cber+Wahrheit+und+L%C3%BCge+im+au%C3%9Fermoralischen+Sinn?hl=nietzsche+luge

 

1

In irgendeinem abgelegenen Winkel des in zahllosen Sonnensystemen flimmernd ausgegossenen Weltalls gab es einmal ein Gestirn, auf dem kluge Tiere das Erkennen erfanden. Es war die hochmütigste und verlogenste Minute der »Weltgeschichte«; aber doch nur eine Minute. Nach wenigen Atemzügen der Natur erstarrte das Gestirn, und die klugen Tiere mußten sterben. –

So könnte jemand eine Fabel erfinden und würde doch nicht genügend illustriert haben, wie kläglich, wie schattenhaft und flüchtig, wie zwecklos und beliebig sich der menschliche Intellekt innerhalb der Natur ausnimmt. Es gab Ewigkeiten, in denen er nicht war; wenn es wieder mit ihm vorbei ist, wird sich nichts begeben haben. Denn es gibt für jenen Intellekt keine weitere Mission, die über das Menschenleben hinausführte. Sondern menschlich ist er, und nur sein Besitzer und Erzeuger nimmt ihn so pathetisch, als ob die Angeln der Welt sich in ihm drehten. Könnten wir uns aber mit der Mücke verständigen, so würden wir vernehmen, daß auch sie mit diesem Pathos durch die Luft schwimmt und in sich das fliegende Zentrum dieser Welt fühlt. Es ist nichts so verwerflich und gering in der Natur, was nicht durch einen kleinen Anhauch jener Kraft des Erkennens sofort wie ein Schlauch aufgeschwellt würde; und wie jeder Lastträger seinen Bewunderer haben will, so meint gar der stolzeste Mensch, der Philosoph, von allen Seiten die Augen des Weltalls teleskopisch auf sein Handeln und Denken gerichtet zu sehen.

Es ist merkwürdig, daß dies der Intellekt zustande bringt, er, der doch gerade nur als Hilfsmittel den unglücklichsten, delikatesten, vergänglichsten Wesen beigegeben ist, um sie eine Minute im Dasein festzuhalten, aus dem sie sonst, ohne jene Beigabe, so schnell wie Lessings Sohn zu flüchten allen Grund hätten. Jener mit dem Erkennen und Empfinden verbundene Hochmut, verblendende Nebel über die[309] Augen und Sinne der Menschen legend, täuscht sich also über den Wert des Daseins, dadurch, daß er über das Erkennen selbst die schmeichelhafteste Wertschätzung in sich trägt. Seine allgemeinste Wirkung ist Täuschung – aber auch die einzelsten Wirkungen tragen etwas von gleichem Charakter an sich.

Der Intellekt als Mittel zur Erhaltung des Individuums entfaltet seine Hauptkräfte in der Verstellung; denn diese ist das Mittel, durch das die schwächeren, weniger robusten Individuen sich erhalten, als welchen einen Kampf um die Existenz mit Hörnern oder scharfem Raubtier-Gebiß zu führen versagt ist. Im Menschen kommt diese Verstellungskunst auf ihren Gipfel: hier ist die Täuschung, das Schmeicheln, Lügen und Trügen, das Hinter-dem-Rücken-Reden, das Repräsentieren, das im erborgten Glanze leben, das Maskiertsein, die verhüllende Konvention, das Bühnenspiel vor anderen und vor sich selbst, kurz das fortwährende Herumflattern um die eine Flamme Eitelkeit so sehr die Regel und das Gesetz, daß fast nichts unbegreiflicher ist, als wie unter den Menschen ein ehrlicher und reiner Trieb zur Wahrheit aufkommen konnte.

Sie sind tief eingetaucht in Illusionen und Traumbilder, ihr Auge gleitet nur auf der Oberfläche der Dinge herum und sieht »Formen«, ihre Empfindung führt nirgends in die Wahrheit, sondern begnügt sich, Reize zu empfangen und gleichsam ein tastendes Spiel auf dem Rücken der Dinge zu spielen. Dazu läßt sich der Mensch nachts ein Leben hindurch im Traume belügen, ohne daß sein moralisches Gefühl dies je zu verhindern suchte: während es Menschen geben soll, die durch starken Willen das Schnarchen beseitigt haben. Was weiß der Mensch eigentlich von sich selbst! Ja, vermöchte er auch nur sich einmal vollständig, hingelegt wie in einen erleuchteten Glaskasten, zu perzipieren? Verschweigt die Natur ihm nicht das allermeiste, selbst über seinen Körper, um ihn, abseits von den Windungen der Gedärme, dem raschen Fluß der Blutströme, den verwickelten Fasererzitterungen, in ein stolzes gauklerisches Bewußtsein zu bannen und einzuschließen! Sie warf den Schlüssel weg: und wehe der verhängnisvollen Neubegier, die durch eine Spalte einmal aus dem Bewußtseinszimmer heraus und hinab zu sehen vermöchte und die jetzt ahnte, daß auf dem Erbarmungslosen, dem Gierigen, dem Unersättlichen, dem Mörderischen der Mensch[310] ruht in der Gleichgültigkeit seines Nichtwissens und gleichsam auf dem Rücken eines Tigers in Träumen hängend. Woher, in aller Welt, bei dieser Konstellation der Trieb zur Wahrheit!

Soweit das Individuum sich gegenüber andern Individuen erhalten will, benutzt es in einem natürlichen Zustand der Dinge den Intellekt zumeist nur zur Verstellung: weil aber der Mensch zugleich aus Not und Langeweile gesellschaftlich und herdenweise existieren will, braucht er einen Friedensschluß und trachtet danach, daß wenigstens das allergrößte bellum omnium contra omnes aus seiner Welt verschwinde. Dieser Friedensschluß bringt etwas mit sich, was wie der erste Schritt zur Erlangung jenes rätselhaften Wahrheitstriebes aussieht. Jetzt wird nämlich das fixiert, was von nun an »Wahrheit« sein soll, das heißt, es wird eine gleichmäßig gültige und verbindliche Bezeichnung der Dinge erfunden, und die Gesetzgebung der Sprache gibt auch die ersten Gesetze der Wahrheit: denn es entsteht hier zum ersten Male der Kontrast von Wahrheit und Lüge.

Der Lügner gebraucht die gültigen Bezeichnungen, die Worte, um das Unwirkliche als wirklich erscheinen zu machen; er sagt zum Beispiel: »Ich bin reich«, während für seinen Zustand gerade »arm« die richtige Bezeichnung wäre. Er mißbraucht die festen Konventionen durch beliebige Vertauschungen oder gar Umkehrungen der Namen. Wenn er dies in eigennütziger und übrigens Schaden bringender Weise tut, so wird ihm die Gesellschaft nicht mehr trauen und ihn dadurch von sich ausschließen.

Die Menschen fliehen dabei das Betrogenwerden nicht so sehr als das Beschädigtwerden durch Betrug: sie hassen, auch auf dieser Stufe, im Grunde nicht die Täuschung, sondern die schlimmen, feindseligen Folgen gewisser Gattungen von Täuschungen. In einem ähnlichen beschränkten Sinne will der Mensch auch nur die Wahrheit: er begehrt die angenehmen, Leben erhaltenden Folgen der Wahrheit, gegen die reine folgenlose Erkenntnis ist er gleichgültig, gegen die vielleicht schädlichen und zerstörenden Wahrheiten sogar feindlich gestimmt. Und überdies: wie steht es mit jenen Konventionen der Sprache? Sind sie vielleicht Erzeugnisse der Erkenntnis, des Wahrheitssinnes, decken sich die Bezeichnungen und die Dinge? Ist die Sprache der adäquate Ausdruck aller Realitäten?

Nur durch die Vergeßlichkeit kann der Mensch je dazu kommen[311] zu wähnen, er besitze eine »Wahrheit« in dem eben bezeichneten Grade. Wenn er sich nicht mit der Wahrheit in der Form der Tautologie, das heißt mit leeren Hülsen begnügen will, so wird er ewig Illusionen für Wahrheiten einhandeln. Was ist ein Wort? Die Abbildung eines Nervenreizes in Lauten. Von dem Nervenreiz aber weiterzuschließen auf eine Ursache außer uns, ist bereits das Resultat einer falschen und unberechtigten Anwendung des Satzes vom Grunde. Wie dürften wir, wenn die Wahrheit bei der Genesis der Sprache, der Gesichtspunkt der Gewißheit bei den Bezeichnungen allein entscheidend gewesen wäre, wie dürften wir doch sagen: der Stein ist hart: als ob uns »hart« noch sonst bekannt wäre, und nicht nur als eine ganz subjektive Reizung! Wir teilen die Dinge nach Geschlechtern ein, wir bezeichnen den Baum als männlich, die Pflanze als weiblich: welche willkürlichen Übertragungen!

Wie weit hinausgeflogen über den Kanon der Gewißheit! Wir reden von einer »Schlange«: die Bezeichnung trifft nichts als das Sichwinden, könnte also auch dem Wurme zukommen. Welche willkürlichen Abgrenzungen, welche einseitigen Bevorzugungen bald der, bald jener Eigenschaft eines Dinges! Die verschiedenen Sprachen, nebeneinandergestellt, zeigen, daß es bei den Worten nie auf die Wahrheit, nie auf einen adäquaten Ausdruck ankommt: denn sonst gäbe es nicht so viele Sprachen.

Das »Ding an sich« (das würde eben die reine folgenlose Wahrheit sein) ist auch dem Sprachbildner ganz unfaßlich und ganz und gar nicht erstrebenswert. Er bezeichnet nur die Relationen der Dinge zu den Menschen und nimmt zu deren Ausdruck die kühnsten Metaphern zu Hilfe. Ein Nervenreiz, zuerst übertragen in ein Bild! Erste Metapher. Das Bild wird nachgeformt in einem Laut! Zweite Metapher. Und jedesmal vollständiges Überspringen der Sphäre, mitten hinein in eine ganz andre und neue. Man kann sich einen Menschen denken, der ganz taub ist und nie eine Empfindung des Tones und der Musik gehabt hat: wie dieser etwa die chladnischen Klangfiguren im Sande anstaunt, ihre Ursachen im Erzittern der Saite findet und nun darauf schwören wird, jetzt müsse es wissen, was die Menschen den »Ton« nennen, so geht es uns allen mit der Sprache. Wir glauben etwas von den Dingen selbst zu wissen, wenn wir von Bäumen, Farben, Schnee und Blumen reden, und besitzen doch nichts als Metaphern der Dinge,[312] die den ursprünglichen Wesenheiten ganz und gar nicht entsprechen. Wie der Ton als Sandfigur, so nimmt sich das rätselhafte X des Dings an sich einmal als Nervenreiz, dann als Bild, endlich als Laut aus. Logisch geht es also jedenfalls nicht bei der Entstehung der Sprache zu, und das ganze Material, worin und womit später der Mensch der Wahrheit, der Forscher, der Philosoph arbeitet und baut, stammt, wenn nicht aus Wolkenkuckucksheim, so doch jedenfalls nicht aus dem Wesen der Dinge.

Denken wir besonders noch an die Bildung der Begriffe. Jedes Wort wird sofort dadurch Begriff, daß es eben nicht für das einmalige ganz und gar individualisierte Urerlebnis, dem es sein Entstehen verdankt, etwa als Erinnerung dienen soll, sondern zugleich für zahllose, mehr oder weniger ähnliche, das heißt streng genommen niemals gleiche, also auf lauter ungleiche Fälle passen muß. Jeder Begriff entsteht durch Gleichsetzendes Nichtgleichen. So gewiß nie ein Blatt einem andern ganz gleich ist, so gewiß ist der Begriff Blatt durch beliebiges Fallenlassen dieser individuellen Verschiedenheiten, durch ein Vergessen des Unterscheidenden gebildet und erweckt nun die Vorstellung, als ob es in der Natur außer den Blättern etwas gäbe, das »Blatt« wäre, etwa eine Urform, nach der alle Blätter gewebt, gezeichnet, abgezirkelt, gefärbt, gekräuselt, bemalt wären, aber von ungeschickten Händen, so daß kein Exemplar korrekt und zuverlässig als treues Abbild der Urform ausgefallen wäre. Wir nennen einen Menschen »ehrlich«; warum hat er heute so ehrlich gehandelt? fragen wir. Unsere Antwort pflegt zu lauten: seiner Ehrlichkeit wegen.

Die Ehrlichkeit! Das heißt wieder: das Blatt ist die Ursache der Blätter. Wir wissen ja gar nichts von einer wesenhaften Qualität, die »die Ehrlichkeit« hieße, wohl aber von zahlreichen individualisierten, somit ungleichen Handlungen, die wir durch Weglassen des Ungleichen gleichsetzen und jetzt als ehrliche Handlungen bezeichnen; zuletzt formulieren wir aus ihnen eine qualitas occulta mit dem Namen: »die Ehrlichkeit«. Das Übersehen des Individuellen und Wirklichen gibt uns den Begriff, wie es uns auch die Form gibt, wohingegen die Natur keine Formen und Begriffe, also auch keine Gattungen kennt, sondern nur ein für uns unzugängliches und undefinierbares X. Denn auch unser Gegensatz von Individuum und Gattung ist anthropomorphisch[313] und entstammt nicht dem Wesen der Dinge, wenn wir auch nicht zu sagen wagen, daß er ihm nicht entspricht: das wäre nämlich eine dogmatische Behauptung und als solche ebenso unerweislich wie ihr Gegenteil.

Was ist also Wahrheit? Ein bewegliches Heer von Metaphern, Metonymien, Anthropomorphismen, kurz eine Summe von menschlichen Relationen, die, poetisch und rhetorisch gesteigert, übertragen, geschmückt wurden und die nach langem Gebrauch einem Volke fest, kanonisch und verbindlich dünken: die Wahrheiten sind Illusionen, von denen man vergessen hat, daß sie welche sind, Metaphern, die abgenutzt und sinnlich kraftlos geworden sind, Münzen, die ihr Bild verloren haben und nun als Metall, nicht mehr als Münzen, in Betracht kommen.

Wir wissen immer noch nicht, woher der Trieb zur Wahrheit stammt: denn bis jetzt haben wir nur von der Verpflichtung gehört, die die Gesellschaft, um zu existieren, stellt: wahrhaft zu sein, das heißt die usuellen Metaphern zu brauchen, also moralisch ausgedrückt: von der Verpflichtung, nach einer festen Konvention zu lügen, herdenweise in einem für alle verbindlichen Stile zu lügen.

Nun vergißt freilich der Mensch, daß es so mit ihm steht; er lügt also in der bezeichneten Weise unbewußt und nach hundertjährigen Gewöhnungen – und kommt eben durch diese Unbewußtheit, eben durch dies Vergessen zum Gefühl der Wahrheit. An dem Gefühl, verpflichtet zu sein, ein Ding als »rot«, ein anderes als »kalt«, ein drittes als »stumm« zu bezeichnen, erwacht eine moralische, auf Wahrheit sich beziehende Regung: aus dem Gegensatz des Lügners, dem niemand traut, den alle ausschließen, demonstriert sich der Mensch das Ehrwürdige, Zutrauliche und Nützliche der Wahrheit.

Er stellt jetzt sein Handeln als »vernünftiges« Wesen unter die Herrschaft der Abstraktionen; er leidet es nicht mehr, durch die plötzlichen Eindrücke, durch die Anschauungen fortgerissen zu werden, er verallgemeinert alle diese Eindrücke erst zu entfärbteren, kühleren Begriffen, um an sie das Fahrzeug seines Lebens und Handelns anzuknüpfen. Alles, was den Menschen gegen das Tier abhebt, hängt von dieser Fähigkeit ab, die anschaulichen Metaphern zu einem Schema zu verflüchtigen, also ein Bild in einen Begriff aufzulösen.

Im Bereich jener Schemata nämlich ist etwas möglich,[314] was niemals unter den anschaulichen ersten Eindrücken gelingen möchte: eine pyramidale Ordnung nach Kasten und Graden aufzubauen, eine neue Welt von Gesetzen, Privilegien, Unterordnungen, Grenzbestimmungen zu schaffen, die nun der andern anschaulichen Welt der ersten Eindrücke gegenübertritt als das Festere, Allgemeinere, Bekanntere, Menschlichere und daher als das Regulierende und Imperativische.

Während jede Anschauungsmetapher individuell und ohne ihresgleichen ist und deshalb allem Rubrizieren immer zu entfliehen weiß, zeigt der große Bau der Begriffe die starre Regelmäßigkeit eines römischen Kolumbariums und atmet in der Logik jene Strenge und Kühle aus, die der Mathematik zu eigen ist. Wer von dieser Kühle angehaucht wird, wird es kaum glauben, daß auch der Begriff, knöchern und achteckig wie ein Würfel und versetzbar wie jener, doch nur als das Residuum einer Metapher übrigbleibt, und daß die Illusion der künstlerischen Übertragung eines Nervenreizes in Bilder, wenn nicht die Mutter, so doch die Großmutter eines jeden Begriffs ist.

Innerhalb dieses Würfelspiels der Begriffe heißt aber »Wahrheit«, jeden Würfel so zu gebrauchen, wie er bezeichnet ist, genau seine Augen zu zählen, richtige Rubriken zu bilden und nie gegen die Kastenordnung und gegen die Reihenfolge der Rangklassen zu verstoßen. Wie die Römer und Etrusker sich den Himmel durch starke mathematische Linien zerschnitten und in einem solchermaßen abgegrenzten Raum als in ein templum, einen Gott bannten, so hat jedes Volk über sich einen solchen mathematisch zerteilten Begriffshimmel und versteht nun unter der Forderung der Wahrheit, daß jeder Begriffsgott nur in seiner Sphäre gesucht werde.

Man darf hier den Menschen wohl bewundern als ein gewaltiges Baugenie, dem auf beweglichen Fundamenten und gleichsam auf fließendem Wasser das Auftürmen eines unendlich komplizierten Begriffsdomes gelingt – freilich, um auf solchen Fundamenten Halt zu finden, muß es ein Bau wie aus Spinnefäden sein, so zart, um von der Welle mit fortgetragen, so fest, um nicht von jedem Winde auseinandergeblasen zu werden. Als Baugenie hebt sich solchermaßen der Mensch weit über die Biene: diese baut aus Wachs, das sie aus der Natur zusammenholt, er aus dem weit zarteren Stoff der Begriffe, die er erst aus sich fabrizieren muß.

Er ist hier sehr zu bewundern – aber nur nicht wegen seines Triebes zur Wahrheit,[315] zum reinen Erkennen der Dinge. Wenn jemand ein Ding hinter einem Busche versteckt, es ebendort wieder sucht und auch findet, so ist an diesem Suchen und Finden nicht viel zu rühmen: so aber steht es mit dem Suchen und Finden der »Wahrheit« innerhalb des Vernunft-Bezirkes. Wenn ich die Definition des Säugetieres mache und dann erkläre nach Besichtigung eines Kamels: »Siehe, ein Säugetier«, so wird damit eine Wahrheit zwar ans Licht gebracht, aber sie ist von begrenztem Werte, ich meine, sie ist durch und durch anthropomorphisch und enthält keinen einzigen Punkt, der »wahr an sich«, wirklich und allgemeingültig, abgesehen von dem Menschen, wäre. Der Forscher nach solchen Wahrheiten sucht im Grunde nur die Metamorphose der Welt in den Menschen, er ringt nach einem Verstehen der Welt als eines menschenartigen Dinges und erkämpft sich besten Falles das Gefühl einer Assimilation. Ähnlich wie der Astrolog die Sterne im Dienste der Menschen und im Zusammenhange mit ihrem Glück und Leid betrachtete, so betrachtet ein solcher Forscher die ganze Welt als geknüpft an den Menschen, als den unendlich gebrochenen Wiederklang eines Urklanges, des Menschen, als das vervielfältigte Abbild des einen Urbildes, des Menschen. Sein Verfahren ist, den Menschen als Maß an alle Dinge zu halten: wobei er aber von dem Irrtum ausgeht, zu glauben, er habe diese Dinge unmittelbar, als reine Objekte vor sich. Er vergißt also die originalen Anschauungsmetaphern als Metaphern und nimmt sie als die Dinge selbst.

Nur durch das Vergessen jener primitiven Metapherwelt, nur durch das Hart- und Starrwerden einer ursprünglichen, in hitziger Flüssigkeit aus dem Urvermögen menschlicher Phantasie hervorströmenden Bildermasse, nur durch den unbesiegbaren Glauben, diese Sonne, dieses Fenster, dieser Tisch sei eine Wahrheit an sich, kurz nur dadurch, daß der Mensch sich als Subjekt, und zwar als künstlerisch schaffendes Subjekt, vergißt, lebt er mit einiger Ruhe, Sicherheit und Konsequenz: wenn er einen Augenblick nur aus den Gefängniswänden dieses Glaubens herauskönnte, so wäre es sofort mit seinem »Selbstbewußtsein« vorbei.

Schon dies kostet ihn Mühe, sich einzugestehen, wie das Insekt oder der Vogel eine ganz andere Welt perzipieren als der Mensch, und daß die Frage, welche von beiden Weltperzeptionen richtiger ist, eine ganz sinnlose ist, da hierzu bereits mit dem Maßstabe der richtigen[316] Perzeption, das heißt mit einem nicht vorhandenen Maßstabe, gemessen werden müßte. Überhaupt aber scheint mir »die richtige Perzeption« – das würde heißen: der adäquate Ausdruck eines Objekts im Subjekt – ein widerspruchsvolles Unding: denn zwischen zwei absolut verschiedenen Sphären, wie zwischen Subjekt und Objekt, gibt es keine Kausalität, keine Richtigkeit, keinen Ausdruck, sondern höchstens ein ästhetisches Verhalten, ich meine eine andeutende Übertragung, eine nachstammelnde Übersetzung in eine ganz fremde Sprache: wozu es aber jedenfalls einer frei dichtenden und frei erfindenden Mittelsphäre und Mittelkraft bedarf.

Das Wort »Erscheinung« enthält viele Verführungen, weshalb ich es möglichst vermeide: denn es ist nicht wahr, daß das Wesen der Dinge in der empirischen Welt erscheint. Ein Maler, dem die Hände fehlen und der durch Gesang das ihm vorschwebende Bildausdrücken wollte, wird immer noch mehr bei dieser Vertauschung der Sphären verraten, als die empirische Welt vom Wesen der Dinge verrät. Selbst das Verhältnis eines Nervenreizes zu dem hervorgebrachten Bilde ist an sich kein notwendiges: wenn aber dasselbe Bild millionenmal hervorgebracht und durch viele Menschengeschlechter hindurch vererbt ist, ja zuletzt bei der gesamten Menschheit jedesmal infolge desselben Anlasses erscheint, so bekommt es endlich für den Menschen dieselbe Bedeutung, als ob es das einzig notwendige Bild sei und als ob jenes Verhältnis des ursprünglichen Nervenreizes zu dem hergebrachten Bilde ein strenges Kausalitätsverhältnis sei: wie ein Traum, ewig wiederholt, durchaus als Wirklichkeit empfunden und beurteilt werden würde. Aber das Hart- und Starr-Werden einer Metapher verbürgt durchaus nichts für die Notwendigkeit und ausschließliche Berechtigung dieser Metapher.

Es hat gewiß jeder Mensch, der in solchen Betrachtungen heimisch ist, gegen jeden derartigen Idealismus ein tiefes Mißtrauen empfunden, so oft er sich einmal recht deutlich von der ewigen Konsequenz, Allgegenwärtigkeit und Unfehlbarkeit der Naturgesetze überzeugte; er hat den Schluß gemacht: hier ist alles, soweit wir dringen, nach der Höhe der teleskopischen und nach der Tiefe der mikroskopischen Welt so sicher ausgebaut, endlos, gesetzmäßig und ohne Lücken; die Wissenschaft wird ewig in diesen Schachten mit Erfolg zu graben haben, und alles Gefundene wird zusammenstimmen und sich nicht[317] widersprechen. Wie wenig gleicht dies einem Phantasieerzeugnis: denn wenn es dies wäre, müßte es doch irgendwo den Schein und die Unrealität erraten lassen.

Dagegen ist einmal zu sagen: hätten wir noch, jeder für sich, eine verschiedenartige Sinnesempfindung, könnten wir selbst nur bald als Vogel, bald als Wurm, bald als Pflanze perzipieren oder sähe der eine von uns denselben Reiz als rot, der andere als blau, hörte ein dritter ihn sogar als Ton, so würde niemand von einer solchen Gesetzmäßigkeit der Natur reden, sondern sie nur als ein höchst subjektives Gebilde begreifen. Sodann: was ist für uns überhaupt ein Naturgesetz? Es ist uns nicht an sich bekannt, sondern nur in seinen Wirkungen, das heißt in seinen Relationen zu andern Naturgesetzen, die uns wieder nur als Summen von Relationen bekannt sind. Also verweisen alle diese Relationen immer nur wieder aufeinander und sind uns ihrem Wesen nach unverständlich durch und durch; nur das, was wir hinzubringen, die Zeit, der Raum, also Sukzessionsverhältnisse und Zahlen, sind uns wirklich daran bekannt.

Alles Wunderbare aber, das wir gerade an den Naturgesetzen anstaunen, das unsere Erklärung fordert und uns zum Mißtrauen gegen den Idealismus verführen könnte, liegt gerade und ganz allein nur in der mathematischen Strenge und Unverbrüchlichkeit der Zeit, und Raum-Vorstellungen. Diese aber produzieren wir in uns und aus uns mit jener Notwendigkeit, mit der die Spinne spinnt; wenn wir gezwungen sind, alle Dinge nur unter diesen Formen zu begreifen, so ist es dann nicht mehr wunderbar, daß wir an allen Dingen eigentlich nur eben diese Formen begreifen: denn sie alle müssen die Gesetze der Zahl an sich tragen, und die Zahl gerade ist das Erstaunlichste in den Dingen. Alle Gesetzmäßigkeit, die uns im Sternenlauf und im chemischen Prozeß so imponiert, fällt im Grunde mit jenen Eigenschaften zusammen, die wir selbst an die Dinge heranbringen, so daß wir damit uns selber imponieren. Dabei ergibt sich allerdings, daß jene künstlerische Metapherbildung, mit der in uns jede Empfindung beginnt, bereits jene Formen voraussetzt, also in ihnen vollzogen wird; nur aus dem festen Verharren dieser Urformen erklärt sich die Möglichkeit, wie nachher wieder aus den Metaphern selbst ein Bau der Begriffe konstituiert werden konnte. Dieser ist nämlich eine Nachahmung der Zeit-, Raum- und Zahlenverhältnisse auf dem Boden der Metaphern.

 

2

[318] An dem Bau der Begriffe arbeitet ursprünglich, wie wir sahen, die Sprache, in späteren Zeiten die Wissenschaft. Wie die Biene zugleich an den Zellen baut und die Zellen mit Honig füllt, so arbeitet die Wissenschaft unaufhaltsam an jenem großen Kolumbarium der Begriffe, der Begräbnisstätte der Anschauungen, baut immer neue und höhere Stockwerke, stützt, reinigt, erneut die alten Zellen und ist vor allem bemüht, jenes ins Ungeheure aufgetürmte Fachwerk zu füllen und die ganze empirische Welt, das heißt die anthropomorphische Welt, hineinzuordnen. Wenn schon der handelnde Mensch sein Leben an die Vernunft und ihre Begriffe bindet, um nicht fortgeschwemmt zu werden und sich nicht selbst zu verlieren, so baut der Forscher seine Hütte dicht an den Turmbau der Wissenschaft, um an ihm mithelfen zu können und selbst Schutz unter dem vorhandenen Bollwerk zu finden. Und Schutz braucht er: denn es gibt furchtbare Mächte, die fortwährend auf ihn eindringen und die der wissenschaftlichen »Wahrheit« ganz anders geartete »Wahrheiten« mit den verschiedenartigsten Schildzeichen entgegenhalten.

Jener Trieb zur Metapherbildung, jener Fundamentaltrieb des Menschen, den man keinen Augenblick wegrechnen kann, weil man damit den Menschen selbst wegrechnen würde, ist dadurch, daß aus seinen verflüchtigten Erzeugnissen, den Begriffen, eine reguläre und starre neue Welt als eine Zwingburg für ihn gebaut wird, in Wahrheit nicht bezwungen und kaum gebändigt. Er sucht sich ein neues Bereich seines Wirkens und ein anderes Flußbett und findet es im Mythus und überhaupt in der Kunst. Fortwährend verwirrt er die Rubriken und Zellen der Begriffe dadurch, daß er neue Übertragungen, Metaphern, Metonymien hinstellt, fortwährend zeigt er die Begierde, die vorhandene Welt des wachen Menschen so bunt unregelmäßig, folgenlos unzusammenhängend, reizvoll und ewig neu zu gestalten, wie es die Welt des Traumes ist.

An sich ist ja der wache Mensch nur durch das starre und regelmäßige Begriffsgespinst darüber im klaren, daß er wache, und kommt eben deshalb mitunter in den Glauben, er träume, wenn jenes Begriffsgespinst einmal durch die Kunst zerrissen wird. Pascal hat recht, wenn er behauptet, daß wir, wenn uns jede[319] Nacht derselbe Traum käme, davon ebenso beschäftigt würden als von den Dingen, die wir jeden Tag sehen: »Wenn ein Handwerker gewiß wäre, jede Nacht zu träumen, volle zwölf Stunden hindurch, daß er König sei, so glaube ich«, sagt Pascal, »daß er ebenso glücklich wäre als ein König, welcher alle Nächte während zwölf Stunden träumte, er sei Handwerker.«

Der wache Tag eines mythisch erregten Volkes, etwa der älteren Griechen, ist durch das fortwährend wirkende Wunder, wie es der Mythus annimmt, in der Tat dem Traume ähnlicher als dem Tag des wissenschaftlich ernüchterten Denkers. Wenn jeder Baum einmal als Nymphe reden oder unter der Hülle eines Stieres ein Gott Jungfrauen wegschleppen kann, wenn die Göttin Athene selbst plötzlich gesehn wird, wie sie mit einem schönen Gespann in der Begleitung des Pisistratus durch die Märkte Athens fährt – und das glaubte der ehrliche Athener –, so ist in jedem Augenblicke wie im Traume alles möglich, und die ganze Natur umschwärmt den Menschen, als ob sie nur die Maskerade der Götter wäre, die sich nur einen Scherz daraus machten, in allen Gestalten den Menschen zu täuschen.

Der Mensch selbst aber hat einen unbesiegbaren Hang, sich täuschen zu lassen, und ist wie bezaubert vor Glück, wenn der Rhapsode ihm epische Märchen wie wahr erzählt oder der Schauspieler im Schauspiel den König noch königlicher agiert, als ihn die Wirklichkeit zeigt.

Der Intellekt, jener Meister der Verstellung, ist so lange frei und seinem sonstigen Sklavendienste enthoben, als er täuschen kann, ohne zu schaden, und feiert dann seine Saturnalien. Nie ist er üppiger, reicher, stolzer, gewandter und verwegener: mit schöpferischem Behagen wirft er die Metaphern durcheinander und verrückt die Grenzsteine der Abstraktionen, so daß er zum Beispiel den Strom als den beweglichen Weg bezeichnet, der den Menschen trägt, dorthin, wohin er sonst geht. Jetzt hat er das Zeichen der Dienstbarkeit von sich geworfen: sonst mit trübsinniger Geschäftigkeit bemüht, einem armen Individuum, dem es nach Dasein gelüstet, den Weg und die Werkzeuge zu zeigen, und wie ein Diener für seinen Herrn auf Raub und Beute ausziehend, ist er jetzt zum Herrn geworden und darf den Ausdruck der Bedürftigkeit aus seinen Mienen wegwischen. Was er jetzt auch tut, alles trägt im Vergleich mit seinem früheren Tun die Verstellung, wie das frühere[320] die Verzerrung an sich.

Er kopiert das Menschenleben, nimmt es aber für eine gute Sache und scheint mit ihm sich recht zufrieden zu geben. Jenes ungeheure Gebälk und Bretterwerk der Begriffe, an das sich klammernd der bedürftige Mensch sich durch das Leben rettet, ist dem freigewordnen Intellekt nur ein Gerüst und ein Spielzeug für seine verwegensten Kunststücke: und wenn er es zerschlägt, durcheinanderwirft, ironisch wieder zusammensetzt, das Fremdeste paarend und das Nächste trennend, so offenbart er, daß er jene Notbehelfe der Bedürftigkeit nicht braucht und daß er jetzt nicht von Begriffen, sondern von Intuitionen geleitet wird. Von diesen Intuitionen aus führt kein regelmäßiger Weg in das Land der gespenstischen Schemata, der Abstraktionen: für sie ist das Wort nicht gemacht, der Mensch verstummt, wenn er sie sieht, oder redet in lauter verbotenen Metaphern und unerhörten Begriffsfügungen, um wenigstens durch das Zertrümmern und Verhöhnen der alten Begriffsschranken dem Eindrucke der mächtigen gegenwärtigen Intuition schöpferisch zu entsprechen.

Es gibt Zeitalter, in denen der vernünftige Mensch und der intuitive Mensch nebeneinanderstehn, der eine in Angst vor der Intuition, der andere mit Hohn über die Abstraktion; der letztere ebenso unvernünftig, als der erstere unkünstlerisch ist. Beide begehren über das Leben zu herrschen; dieser, indem er durch Vorsorge, Klugheit, Regelmäßigkeit den hauptsächlichsten Nöten zu begegnen weiß, jener, indem er als ein »überfroher Held« jene Nöte nicht sieht und nur das zum Schein und zur Schönheit verstellte Leben als real nimmt. Wo einmal der intuitive Mensch, etwa wie im älteren Griechenland, seine Waffen gewaltiger und siegreicher führt als sein Widerspiel, kann sich günstigenfalls eine Kultur gestalten und die Herrschaft der Kunst über das Leben sich gründen: jene Verstellung, jenes Verleugnen der Bedürftigkeit, jener Glanz der metaphorischen Anschauungen und überhaupt jene Unmittelbarkeit der Täuschung begleitet alle Äußerungen eines solchen Lebens. Weder das Haus noch der Schritt noch die Kleidung, noch der tönerne Krug verraten, daß die Notdurft sie erfand: es scheint so, als ob in ihnen allen ein erhabenes Glück und eine olympische Wolkenlosigkeit und gleichsam ein Spielen mit dem Ernste ausgesprochen werden sollte.

Während der von Begriffen und Abstraktionen geleitete Mensch durch diese das Unglück nur abwehrt,[321] ohne selbst aus den Abstraktionen sich Glück zu erzwingen, während er nach möglichster Freiheit von Schmerzen trachtet, erntet der intuitive Mensch, inmitten einer Kultur stehend, bereits von seinen Intuitionen, außer der Abwehr des Übels, eine fortwährend einströmende Erhellung, Aufheiterung, Erlösung. Freilich leidet er heftiger, wenn er leidet: ja er leidet auch öfter, weil er aus der Erfahrung nicht zu lernen versteht und immer wieder in dieselbe Grube fällt, in die er einmal gefallen.

Im Leide ist er dann ebenso unvernünftig wie im Glück, er schreit laut und hat keinen Trost. Wie anders steht unter dem gleichen Mißgeschick der stoische, an der Erfahrung belehrte, durch Begriffe sich beherrschende Mensch da! Er, der sonst nur Aufrichtigkeit, Wahrheit, Freiheit von Täuschungen und Schutz vor berückenden Überfällen sucht, legt jetzt, im Unglück, das Meisterstück der Verstellung ab wie jener im Glück; er trägt kein zuckendes und bewegliches Menschengesicht, sondern gleichsam eine Maske mit würdigem Gleichmaße der Züge, er schreit nicht und verändert nicht einmal seine Stimme: wenn eine rechte Wetterwolke sich über ihn ausgießt, so hüllt er sich in seinen Mantel und geht langsamen Schrittes unter ihr davon.[322]

 
Quelle:
Friedrich Nietzsche: Werke in drei Bänden. München 1954, Band 3.
Entstanden 1873.
Permalink:
http://www.zeno.org/nid/20009257756

 






THEODOR W. ADORNO


https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theodor_W._Adorno

Wirkungsgeschichte

Adorno hat zumindest im institutionellen Sinn keine „Schule“ gebildet, obwohl es ihm an Schülern nicht mangelte. Das hatte Auswirkungen: Sein Lehrstuhl für Philosophie und Soziologie wurde nach seinem Tod aufgeteilt und mit Wissenschaftlern besetzt, die teils entgegengesetzte Positionen vertraten. Das Institut für Sozialforschung wurde damit zu einem vorwiegend empirisch ausgerichteten Forschungsinstitut unter der Geschäftsführung Ludwig von Friedeburgs und Gerhard Brandts.

Das schriftstellerische Werk Adornos wurde von seinem Schüler Rolf Tiedemann bald in umfangreichen Ausgaben herausgegeben: Gesammelte Schriften (1970 ff.) und Nachgelassene Schriften (1993 ff.), die im Frankfurter Suhrkamp Verlag erschienen. Tiedemann schildert in einem editorischen Nachwort, dass Adorno sich für eine Aufarbeitung seines Werkes gar nicht interessiert habe: „Ihr macht das dann schon“, sei stets die ausweichende Antwort gewesen. Adorno habe es abgelehnt, zum „Museumswärter seines eigenen Denkens“ zu werden. Dies und der Rundfunkvortrag Erziehung zur Mündigkeit sowie Kritik an Denkschulen (Jargon der Eigentlichkeit) lassen den Schluss zu, dass Adorno kein Meister für seine Schüler sein, sondern eher das selbstständige, kritische Denken befördern wollte. Bemerkenswert ist in diesem Zusammenhang, dass er bestimmte Texte als „Flaschenpost“ bezeichnete, also als eine Botschaft, deren Dechiffrierung zeitlich, räumlich und in der Person des Finders äußerst unbestimmt in der Zukunft liegt.




Josef Früchtl: Heimkehr der Flaschenpost.
Umfangreicher Nachlaß: Briefe, Fragmente, Vorlesungen, Notizen, Gespräche.
Adorno-Archiv in Frankfurt am Main, 9. August 1985.

In: ZEIT-Online

Am Ende der "Dialektik der Aufklärung" ziehen Max Horkheimer und Theodor W. Adorno ein resignatives Resümee über den Sinn ihres Tuns: das Reden und Schreiben. "Wenn die Rede heute an einen sich wenden kann, so sind es weder die sogenannten Massen, noch der einzelne, der ohnmächtig ist, sondern eher ein eingebildeter Zeuge, dem wir es hinterlassen, damit es doch nicht ganz mit uns untergeht." Das Buch entsteht im amerikanischen Exil während des Zweiten Weltkriegs. Ein eingebildeter Zeuge nur noch ist es, den Hitler, Stalin und Hollywood einer Theorie zurücklassen, der es um die Einlösung des alten Programms der Aufklärung geht, selber zu denken. Philosophie ist – nicht anders als die Neue Musik, für die Adorno die berühmte Metapher zur selben Zeit zuerst gebraucht – eine "Flaschenpost", "keiner will mit ihr etwas zu tun haben, sie verhallt ungehört, ohne Echo".

Ob Theorien ihre Adressaten finden und gar praktisch wirksam werden, hängt auch von Umständen ab, die sie nicht selber bestimmen können. Leo Löwenthal, neben Friedrich Pollock und Herbert Marcuse ebenfalls zum engen Kreis der "Kritischen Theorie" gehörend, hat verwundert bemerkt, "mit welch einem Knall diese Flasche in den sechziger Jahren entkorkt worden ist". Auf immer ein Exilierter geblieben zu sein, trifft aber auf Adorno mehr zu als auf alle anderen: ein Jude in Deutschland, ein "typisch" deutscher Professor in Amerika, ein verspäteter Aristokrat in der Kleinbürgerkultur des Wirtschaftswunders, ein substantieller Demokrat in der Politik der Restauration.

Eine ganz andere, bescheidenere Heimkehr hat sich in diesem Frühjahr ereignet: In Frankfurt am Main ist ein Adorno-Archiv eingerichtet worden. Sein Material wird in fünf, sechs Jahren, sobald es geordnet ist, öffentlich zugänglich sein. Da der Nachlaß Horkheimers, Pollocks und Marcuses schon Eigentum der Stadt- und Universitätsbibliothek ist, sieht ein Gesamtkonzept vor, die verschiedenen Archive von 1990 an, nach dem Umzug der Deutschen Bibliothek, in deren Räumen dann als eine Abteilung der Spezialsammlungen und Forschungsbibliothek unterzubringen.

Impulse für die Forschung im engeren philosophischen Bereich könnten durch die Archivierung vor allem Horkheimer und Marcuse zugute kommen. Während Adorno, wie durch die Frankfurter Konferenz 1983, ein Hamburger Symposion 1984 und jährlich neu erscheinende Dissertationen dokumentiert, seit seinem Tod Gegenstand einer zunehmend produktiven Aneignung ist, tritt Horkheimer mit ihm zusammen meist nur als Dioskurenpaar unter dem Firmenschild "Kritische Theorie auf und scheint Marcuses lebenslanges Thema, das Verhältnis von Kunst und Revolution als befreiter Triebstruktur, bei Neostrukturalismus zeitspezifisch aufgehoben: Befreiung als ästhetisch-anarchistische Revolte.

Am ergiebigsten erscheinen, sagt Barbara Brick, die Leiterin des Marcuse-Archivs, die Briefe. Sie belegen erneut oder verdeutlichend den Streit innerhalb des"Instituts für Sozialforschung" um einen diskursiven oder aphoristischen Schreibstil, Marcuses Vorwürfe der Unverständlichkeit an Adorno und dessen Replik einer Gefahr politischer Vereinnahmung; die unterschiedliche Einschätzung der Rolle des "Instituts" nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg; Marcuses streitbares Verhältnis zu seinem ehemaligen Mentor Martin Heidegger, dem er 1945 ein Care-Paket zukommen läßt.

In dem Maße, in dem die Kritische Theorie sich selbst ausdrücklich über ihren Bezug zur jeweiligen Zeit und zur individuellen Lebenserfahrung begreift, sind alle Briefe theoriegeschichtlich wichtig; auch sie spiegeln die Ausbildung der Theorie. Jeweils 100 000 Blatt liegen von Horkheimer und Adorno vor, eine Menge, die, wie Gunzelin Schmid Noerr, der Leiter des Horkheimer-Archivs, sagt, aus zwei Gründen erklärbar ist: dem äußeren Grund einer mit der Emigration sprunghaft ansteigenden Korrespondenz, bei Horkheimer verbunden mit der Funktion des alle Formalitäten erledigenden Instituts-Direktors (wobei in diesem Zusammenhang die Kleinarbeit Pollocks nicht unterbewertet werden darf) und dem Bewußtsein, eine öffentliche Person zu sein. Daß Horkheimer und Adorno immer öffentlich gedacht haben, mag – zumal wenn jedes Blatt Papier schon seit Kindheitstagen aufbewahrt wird – nicht frei sein von einem eitel getönten Selbstbewußtsein, es sollte aber sicher das Bild der Theorie prägnanter hervortreten lassen. Wie rigide dabei die Selektion ausfallen muß, kann man daran ermessen, daß – im Falle Horkheimers – lediglich fünf Prozent in drei Bänden der Nachgelassenen Schriften Platz finden.

Am umfangreichsten ist dabei der Nachlaß Adornos. Neben den Briefen enthält er Fragmente zu Beethoven, zur musikalischen Reproduktion und zu einer in englischer Sprache verfaßten Radio-Theorie; fünfzehn vollständige, meist frei gehaltene Vorlesungen von 1958 bis zu seinem Tod; ein 1938 beginnendes philosophisches Tagebuch in vierzig Notizheften; Gespräche, poetische Versuche und Traumprotokolle. Selbstverständlich ist er auch Fundgrube für Kurioses wie einen Brief des Dreijährigen an den Weihnachtsmann und Philologisches wie die Beschreibung jener Komposition, die Thomas Mann dann im "Doktor Faustus" unter minimalen stilistischen Veränderungen übernommen hat.

Rolf Tiedemann, seit langem schon mit der Edition der Adornoschen Schriften betraut, schätzt, daß sich zu den zwanzig Bänden der Gesammelten Schriften noch einmal vierzig addieren lassen. Bemerkenswert ist, daß dieses Editionsunternehmen nicht von Institutionen jener Stadt Frankfurt finanziell getragen wird, die sich sonst auf ihre bürgerliche Stifter-Tradition so viel zugute hält, sondern – wie man inzwischen respektvoll sagen muß: wieder einmal – von der "Hamburger Stiftung zur Förderung von Wissenschaft und Kultur" des Jan-Phillip Reemtsma.

Ist die zentrale Archivierung des Nachlasses der Kritischen Theorie für die Forschung sicher ein Gewinn und ein Renommee für die Stadt, deren Name sie als "Frankfurter Schule" berühmt machte, so wäre vielleicht nur noch zu wünschen, den Organisationsrahmen auch im Sinne der Öffentlichkeitsarbeit auszubauen. Symposien, Diskussionen zu Einzelaspekten, Vorträge könnten veranstaltet werden, stünden die Räumlichkeiten zur Verfügung. Selbst ein Treffpunkt im Stil zwischen Kneipe und Seminar könnte sich einpendeln, schließlich hieß das "Institut" zunächst durchaus freundlich "Café Marx". All das könnte als Verstärkungseffekt der verhallenden Kritischen Theorie dienen, von der Adorno doch auch sagt: "Das einmal Gesagte verhallt kaum gänzlich, das Böse nicht und nicht das Gute, die Parole von der Endlösung so wenig wie die Hoffnung auf Versöhnung."

 

Hellings J. (2014) Aesthetic Messages in a Bottle and Progress.
In: Adorno and Art. Palgrave Macmillan, London
https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137315717_5

Aesthetic Messages in a Bottle and Progress

In searching for the source of Adorno’s image of messages in a bottle and to better understand its pivotal position within his wider project, it is appropriate to concentrate less on the (a)politicism of his critical theory and philosophical work and more on his aesthetic theory and the work of art. This is no heroic leap of faith, for in his first substantial publication, a book on Kierkegaard, which appeared on the very same day that Hitler seized power: 30 January 1933 – meaningfully subtitled, Construction of the Aesthetic – Adorno opened with, appropriately, an oceanic image extracted from Edgar Allan Poe:

The boat appeared to be hanging, as if by magic, midway down, upon the interior surface of a funnel vast in circumference, prodigious in depth, and whose perfectly smooth sides might have been mistaken for ebony, but for the bewildering rapidity with which they spun around, and for the gleaming and ghastly radiance they shot forth, as the rays of the full moon, from that circular rift amid the clouds ... streamed in a flood of golden glory along the black walls, and far away down into the inmost recesses of the abyss. ( K vi)

The aesthetic Poe constructed clearly impressed the young Adorno. Perhaps, it is the experience of being lost to the overwhelmingly sublime force of Nature’s rough seas in full hurricane-induced swell or ‘A Descent into the Maelström’ as Poe himself entitled his 1841 tall-tale. Poe’s short story tells of the possibility of the impossible, of a descent and ascent – a near escape from the centrifugal revolutions of a whirlpool off the coast of Norway. Poe’s image of a dark vortex recollects Saul Bellow’s eye of the storm, invoked in the epigraph for Part I. Particular to each of these images is a certain crystallised motion or static dynamism, arrested development, quietude, refuge and repose – stillness in the midst of chaos. This is precisely how art, aesthetics and dialectics work: as a ‘moment of becoming at a standstill’ ( AT 80 / 84 / 85 / 100 / 176 / 179). ‘Every artwork’ Adorno declared, ‘is an instant; every successful work is a cessation, a suspended moment of the process, as which it reveals itself to the unwavering eye’ ( AT 6 / 79), which also repeats Bellow’s sentiment that art has something to do with an arrest of attention in the midst of distraction.

Poe wrote of maelströms and Adorno valorised this image and made use of it in the construction of his aesthetic, as the following lines attest: 1

In central passages of Poe (...) the concept of newness emerges. (...) in the description of the maelstrom and the shudder it inspires – equated with ‘the novel’ – of which none of the traditional reports is said to give an adequate idea (...). [I]t is an unknown threat that the subject embraces and which, in a dizzy reversal, promises joy. The new, a blank place in consciousness, awaited as if with shut eyes, seems the formula by means of which a stimulus is extracted from dread and despair. (...) Poe’s allegory of the ‘novel’ is that of the breathlessly spinning yet in a sense stationary movement of the helpless boat in the eye of the maelstrom. ( MM 235–6)

Previously, in 1833, Poe had published, ‘MS. Found in a Bottle,’ and it is evident that this imagery too held sway over Adorno’s consciousness. He appears to have been influenced not only by the image and the idea but also the form of Poe’s text, which is written as a series of fragmented messages, journal entries, not dissimilar to Adorno’s own preferred style of composing texts paratactically, anti-systematically and non-cumulatively. Perhaps, Poe’s imaginative fiction may lay claim to being the true source of Adorno’s model of social praxis and/or his theoretical model of communication? 2

In ‘MS. Found in a Bottle’ Poe’s reader learns from the fragments, purportedly published as found by the bottles’ keeper, of a traveller’s fateful voyage at sea. The messages speak of an ecstatic encounter with the eye of a storm wherein it is necessary for the traveller to lash himself to the ship’s mast in a cunning bid for survival. The storm rages, and the ship, together with the tied-up traveller, sinks into the dark abyss. Miraculously, however, the traveller is transferred onto another vessel, only to learn that onboard this extra-worldly ship he is, ‘doomed to hover continually upon the brink of eternity, without taking a final plunge into the abyss.’3


2. Celan may offer an alternative source: ‘a poem is a message in a bottle, sent out in the — not always greatly hopeful — belief that somewhere and sometime it could wash up on land, on heartland perhaps.’ Cited here in: Macdonald, I. ‘Returning to the “House of Oblivion”: Celan Between Adorno and Heidegger,’ Adorno and Literature, Eds David Cunningham and Nigel Mapp (London: Continuum, 2006), 129.

3. Poe, E. A. [1833], ‘MS. Found in a Bottle,’ Edgar Allan Poe: Selected Tales, Ed. David van Leer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 10. Hereafter cited in the text as MSFB.

See: http://www.capurro.de/angeletics_notes_varia2.html#EDGAR_ALLAN_POE:_MS._FOUND_IN_A_BOTTLE



MARTIN HEIDEGGER: AUS EINEM GESPRÄCH VON DER SPRACHE
Zwischen einem Japaner und einem Fragenden

In: ders.: Unterwegs zur Sprache. Pfullingen 1975, 142 ff




F    Wie heißt das japanische Wort für "Sprache"?
J   (nach weiterem Zögern) Es heißt "Koto ba"
F   Und was sagt dies?
J   ba nennt die Blätter, auch und zumal die Blütenblätter. Denken Sie an die Kirschblüte und an die Pflaumenblüte.
F   Und was sagt Koto?
J   Diese Frage ist am schwersten zu beantworten. Indessen wird ein Versuch dadurch erleichtert, daß wir das Iki zuerläutern wagten: das reine Entzücken der rufenden Stille. Das Wehen der Stille, die dies rufende Entzücken ereignet, ist das Waltende, das jene Entzücken kommen läßt. Koto nennt aber immer zugleich das jeweils entzückende selbst, das einzig je im unwiederholbaren Augenblick mit der Fülle seines Anmutens zum Scheinen kommt.
F Koto wäre dann das das Ereignis der lichtenden Botschaft der Anmut.
J Herrlich gesagt; nur führt das Wort "Anmut" das heutige Vorstellen zu leicht in die Irre...
F nämlich weg in den Bezirk der Impressionen...
J denen die Expression zugeordnet bleibt als die Art der Befreiung. Hilfreicher scheint mir die Zuwendung zum griechischen Wort 
χάρις, das ich in dem schönen Spruch fand, den Sie in Ihrem Vortrag "...dichterisch wohnet der Mensch..." aus Sophokles anführten, und das Sie mit "Huld" übersetzten. Darin spricht eher das wehende Ankommen der Stille des Entzückens.
F Zugleich noch anderes, was dort gesagt sein möchte, aber im Rahmen des Vortrages nicht dargetan werden konnte. Die χάρις heißt dort τίκτουσα - die her-vor-bringende. Unser deutsches Wort dichten, tihton, sagt das Selbe. So kündigt sich im Spruch des Sophokles für uns an, daß die Huld selbst dichterisch, das eigentlich Dichtende ist, das Quellen der Botschaft des Entbergens der Zwiefalt.
J Ich bräuchte mehr Zeit, als das Gespräch verstattet, um den neuen Ausblicken nachzudenken, die sich mit Ihrem Hinweis öffnen. Aber eines sehe ich sogleich, daß er mir hilft, Ihnen noch deutlicher zu sagen, was Koto ist.
F Das scheint mir unumgänglich zu sein, um Ihr japanisches Wort für "Sprache" Koto ba auch nur einigermaßen mitdenken zu können.
J Sie erinnern wohl die Stelle unseres Gespräch, wo ich Ihnen die vermeintlich entsprechenden japanischen Worte zu der Unterscheidung des aistheton  und noeton nannte: Iro und meint mehr als Farbe und das sinnlich Wahrnehmbare jeder Art. Ku, das Offene, die Leere des Himmel, meint mehr als das Übersinnliche.
F Worin das "mehr" beruht, konnten Sie nicht sagen.
J Doch jetzt kann ich einen Wink folgen, den beide Worte bergen.
F Wohin winken sie?
J In das, von woher das Widerspiel beider zueinander sich ereignet.
F Und das ist?
J Koto, das Ereignis der lichtenden Bortschaft der hervorbringenden Huld.
F Koto wäre das waltende Ereignen...
J und zwar dessen, was die Hut des Gedeihenden und Erblühenden braucht.
F Was sagt dann Koto ba als Name für die Sprache?
J Aus diesem Wort gehört, ist die Sprache: Blütenblätter, die aus Koto stammen.
F Das ist ein wundersames und darum unausdenkbares Wort. Es nennt anderes als das, was uns die metaphysisch verstandenen Namen: Sparche, glossa, lingua, langue und language vorstellen. Ich gebrauche seit langem nur ungern das Wort "Sprache", wenn ich ihrem Wesen nachdenke.
J Aber finden Sie ein gemäßeres?
F Ich meine, es gefunden zu haben; möchte es jedoch davor bewahren, daß es als geläufiger Titel verwendet und zur Bezeichnung für einen Begriff umgefälscht wird.
J Welches Wort gebrauchen Sie?
F Das Wort "die Sage". Es meint: das Sagen und sein Gesagtes und das zu-Sagende.
J Was heißt sagen?
F Vermutlich das Selbe wie zeigen im Sinne von: erscheinen- und scheinenlassen, dies jedoch in der Weise des Winkens.
J Die Sage ist darnach nicht der Name für das menschliche Sprechen...
F sondern für jenes Wesende, das Ihr japanisches Wort Koto ba erwinkt: Das Sagenhafate...
J in dessen Winken ich jetzt erst durch unser Gespräch heimisch geworden bin, so daß ich auch klarer sehe, wie gut geleitet Graf Kuki war, als er unter Ihrer Anleitung dem Hermeneutischen nachzusinnen versuchte.
F Sie erkennen aber auch, wie dürftig es um meine Anleitung bestellt sein mußte; den mit dem Blick in das Wesen der Sage beginnt das Denken erst jenen Weg, der uns aus dem nur metaphysischen Vorstellen zurücknimmt in das Achten auf die Winke jener Botschaft, deren Botengänger wir eigens werden möchten.
J Der Weg dahin ist weit.
F Weniger, weil er in die erne, als weil er durch das Nahe führt.
J Das so nah ist, lang schon so nah gewesen ist, wie uns Japanern das bislang unbedachte Wort für das Wesen der Sprache: Koto ba.
F Blüttenblätter, die aus Koto stammen. Die Einbildungskraft möchte ausschweifen in unerfahrene Bereiche, wenn dieses Wort sein Sagen beginnt.
J Schweifen könnte sie nur, wenn sie in das bloße Vorstellen losgelassen würde. Wo sie jedoch als Quell des Denkens springt, scheint sie mir eher zu versammeln als zu schweifen. Dergleichen ahnte schon Kant, wie Sie selber zeigen.
F Aber ist unser Denken schon an diesem Quell?
J Wenn nicht, dann doch unterwegs dorthin, sobald es den Pfad sucht, auf den, wie ich jetzt deutlicher Sehe, unser japanisches Wort für "Sprache" winken möchte.
F Um diesem Wink uns fügen zu können, müßten wir erfahrener sein im Wesen der Sprache.
J Mir scheint, Bemühungen darun begleiten seit Jahrzehnten Ihren Denkweg und dies so vielfältig, daß Sie vorbereitet genug sind, etwas vom Wesen der Sprache als Sage zu sagen.
F Aber Sie wissen auch ebensogut, daß eigene Bemühung allein nie zureicht.
J Das bleibt wahr. Doch wir können, was sterbliche Kraft für sich nie vermag, eher erlangen, wenn wir von der Bereitschaft erfüllt sind, auch das wegzuschenken, was wir von uns aus nur immer versuchen, ohne daß es die Vollendung erreicht hat.
F Vorläufiges habe ich in dem Vortrag gewagt, den ich in den letzten Jahren einige Male hielt unter dem Titel "Die Sprache".
J Von diesem Vortrag über die Sprache habe ich Berichte und sogar eine Nachschrift gelesen.
F Solche Nachschriften, auch die sorgfältigen, bleiben, wie ich schon sagte, zweifelhafte Quellen, und jede Nachschrift des genannten Vortrages ist ohnehin eine Verunstaltung seines Sagens.
J Wie meinen Sie dieses harte Urteil?
F Es ist kein Urteil über die Nachschriften, sondern über eine unklare Kennzeichnung des Vortrages.
J Inwiefern?
F Der Vortrag ist kein Sprechen über die Sprache...
J Sondern?
F Wenn ich Ihnen jetzt antworten könnte, wäre das Dunkel um den Weg gelichtet. Aber ich kann nicht antworten. Der Grund dafür ist derselbe, der mich bisher davor zurückgehalten hat, den Vortrag als Schrift erscheinen zu lassen.
J Es wäre aufdringlich, wollte ich diesen Grund wissen. Nach der Art, wie Sie vorhin unser japanisches Wort für "Sprache" in Ihr Gehör aufnahmen, und aus dem, was Sie von der Botschaft der Entbergung der Zwiefalt und vom Botengang des Menschen andeuteten, kann ich nur unbestimmt vermuten, was es heißt, die Frage nach der Sprache in eine Besinnung auf das Wesen der Sage zu verwandeln.
F Sie verzeihen, wenn ich mit den Hinweisen sparsam bleibe, die vielleicht dahin führen könnten, das Wesen der Sage zu erörtern.
J Hierfür bedarf es einer Wanderung in die Ortschaft des Wesens der Sage.
F Dies vor allem. Aber ich meine jetzt zuvor etwas anderes. Was mich zur Zurückhaltung bestimmt, ist die wachsende Einsicht in das Unantastbare, was uns das Geheimnis der Sage verhüllt. Mit der bloßen Aufhellung des Unterschiedes zwischen Sagen und Sprechen ist wenig gewonnen.
J Wir Japaner haben für Ihre Art der Zurückhaltung - ich darf wohl sagen- ein angeborenes Verständnis. Ein Geheimnis ist erst recht dann ein Geheimnis, wenn nicht einmal dies zum Vorschein kommt, daß es ein Geheimnis waltet.
F Für die oberflächlich Eiligen nicht minder als für die sinnend Bedächtigen muß es so aussehen, als gäbe es nirgends ein Geheimnis.
J Wir stehen jedoch mitten in der Gefahr nicht nur zu laut vom Geheimnis zu reden, sondern sein Walten zu verfehlen.
F Dessen reinen Quell zu hüten, dünkt mich das Schwerste.
J Aber dürfen wir deshalb kurzerhand der Mühe und dem Wagnis ausweichen, über die Sprache zu sprechen?
F Keineswegs. Wir müssen uns unablässig um ein solches Sprechen bemühen. Sein Gesprochenes kann freilich nie in die Form einer wissenschaftlichen Abhandlung eingehen...
J weil dadurch die Bewegung des hier verlangten Fragens zu leicht erstarrt.
F Dies wäre der geringste Verlust. Schwerer wiegt ein anderes: ob es nämlich je ein Sprechen über die Sprache gibt.
J Daß es dies gibt, bezeugt doch unser eigenes Tun.
F Ich fürchte, nur allzusehr.
J Dann verstehe ich Ihr Bedenken nicht.
F Ein Sprechen über die Sprache macht sie fast unausweichlich zu einem Gegenstand.
J Dann entschwindet ihr Wesen.
F Wir haben uns über die Sprache gestellt, statt von ihr zu hören.
J Dann gäge es nur ein Sprechen von der Sprache...
F in der Weise, daß es von ihrem Wesen her gerufen un dahin geleitet wäre.
J Wie vermögen wir solches?
F Ein Sprechen von der Sprache könnte nur ein Gespräch sein.
J Darin bewegen wir uns ohne Zweifel.
F ABer ist es ein Gespräch vom Wesen der Sprache her?
J Mir scheint, wir bewegen uns jetzt im Kreis. Ein Gespräch von der Sprache muß von ihrem Wesen gerufen sein. Wie vermag es dergleichen, ohne selber erst auf ein Hören sich einzulassen, das sogleich ins Wesen reicht?
F Dieses seltsame Verhältnis nennte ich einmal den hermeneutischen Zirkel.
J Er besteht überall im Hermeneutischen, also dort, wo nach Ihrer heutigen Erläuterung das Verhältnis von Botschaft und Botengang waltet.
F Der Botengänger muß schon von der Botschaft herkommen. Er muß aber auch schon auf sie zugegangen sein.
J Sagten Sie früher nicht, dieser Zirkel sei unausweichlich; statt zu versuchen, ihnals einen vermeintlich logischen Widerspruch zu vermeiden, müsse man ihn gehen?
F Gewiß. Aber diese notwendige Anerkennung des hermeneutischen Zirkels bedeutet noch nicht, daß mit der Vorstellung des anerkannten Kreisens der hermeneutische Bezug ursprünglich erfahren ist.
J Sie würden also Ihre frühere Auffassung preisgeben.
F Allerdings - und zwar insofern, als die Rede von einem Zirkel stets vordergründig bleibt.
J Wie würden Sie jetzt den hermeneutischen Bezug darstellen?
F Ich möchte eine Darstellung ebenso entschieden vermeiden wie ein Sprechen über die Sprache.
J So läge alles daran, in ein entsprechendes Sagen von der Sprache zu gelangen.
F Ein solches sagendes Entsprechen könnte nur ein Gespräch sein.
J Aber offenkundig ein Gespräch ganz eigener Art.
F Ein solches, das dem Wesen der Sage ursprünglich vereignet bliebe.
J Dann dürten wir aber nicht mehr jedes Miteinanderreden ein Gespräch nennen...
F falls wir diesen Namen fortan so hörten, daß er uns die Versammlung auf das Wesen der Sprache nennt.
J In diesem Sinne wären dann auch Platons Dialoge keine Gespräche?
F Ich möchte die Frage offenlassen und nur darauf weisen, daß sich die Art eines Gesprächs aus dem bestimmt, von woher die dem Anschein nach allein die Sprechenden, die Menschen, angesprochen sind.
J Wo das Wesen der Sprache als die Sage die Mehen anspräche (ansagte), ergäbe sie das eigentliche Gespräch...
F das nicht "über" die Sprache, sondern von ihr, als von ihrem Wesen gebraucht, sagte.
J Wobei es sogleich von untergeordneter Bedeutung bliebe, ob das Gespräch als ein geschriebenes vorliegt oder als ein irgendwann gesprochenes verklungen ist.
F Gewiß - weil alles daran liegt, ob dieses eigentliche Gepräch, mag es geschrieben oder gesprochen sein oder nicht, fortwährend im Kommen bleibt.
J Der Gang eines solchen Gespräches müßte einen eigenen Charakter haben, demgemäß mehr geschwiegen als geredet würde.
F Geschwiegen vor allem über das Schweigen...
J weil das Reden und Schreiben über das Schweigen das verderblichste Gerede veranlaßt...
F Wer vermöchte es, einfach vom Schweigen zu schweigen?
J Dies müßte das eigentliche Sagen sein...
F und das stete Vorspiel zum eigentlichen Gespräch von der Sprache bleiben.
J Ob wir so nicht das Unmögliche versuchen?
F Allerdings - solange dem Menschen nicht jener Botengang rein gewährt ist, den die Botschaft braucht, die dem Menschen die Entbergung der Zwiefalt zuspricht.
J Diesen Botengang hervorzurufen, gar nocht, ihn zu gehen, dünkt mich noch unvergleichlich schwerer als das Wesen des Iki zu erörtern.
F Gewiß. Denn es müßte sich etwas ereignen, wodurch sich dem Botengang jene Weite öffnete und zuleuchtete, inder das Wesen der Sage zum Scheinen kommt.
J Ein Stillendes müßte sich ereignen, was das Wehen der Weite in das Gefüge der rufenden Sage beruhigte.
F Überall spielt das verhüllte Verhältnis von Botschaft und Botengang.
J In unserer alten japanischen Dichtung singt ein unbekannter Dichter vom Ineinanderduften der Kirschblüte und Pflaumenblüte am selben Zweig.
F So denke ich mir das Zueinanderwesen von Weite und Stille im selben Ereignis der Botschaft der Entbergung der Zwiefalt.
J Doch wer von den Heutigen könnte darin einen Anklang des Wesens der Sprache hören, das unser Wort Koto ba nennt, Blütenblätter, die aus der lichtenden Botschaft der hervorbringenden Huld gedeihen?
F Wer möchte in all dem eine brauchbare Aufhellung des Wesens der Sprache finden?
J Man wird es nie finden, solange man Auskünfte in Gestalt von Leitzsätzen und Merkworten fordert.
F Doch manch einer könnte in das Vorspiel eines Botenganges einbezogen werden, sobald er sich für ein Gespräch von der Sprache bereithält.
J Mir will scheinen, als hätten wir jetzt selber, statt über die Sprache zu sprechen, einige Schritte auf einem Gang versucht, der sich dem Wesen der Sage anvertraut.
F Sich ihm zusagt. Freuen wir uns, wenn es nicht nur so scheint, sondern so ist.
J Was ist dann, wenn es so ist?
F Dann ereignet sich der Abschied von allem "Es ist".
J Den Abschied denken Sie aber doch nicht als Ver und Verneinung?
F Keineswegs.
J Sondern?
F Als die Ankunft des Gewesen.
J Aber das Vergangene geht doch, ist gegangen, wie soll es kommen?
F Das Vergehen ist anderes als das Gewesen.
J Wie sollen wir dieses denken?
F Als die Versammlung des Währenden...
J das, wie Sie neulich sagten, währt als das Gewährende...
F und das Selbe bleibt wie die Botschaft...
J die uns als Botengänger braucht.


MARTIN HEIDEGGER: ZOLLIKONER SEMINARE


Gesamtausgabe Bd. 89, Frankfurt a.M. 2018 (Hrsg. P. Trawni)


XII. Seminar vom 1. und 3. März 1966 in Zollikon

21. "Stress"

Die Beanspruchung
    die Überbeanspruchung durch das Nichts in der Angst.
    [das ontische Nichts
– die Leere – vgl. Plügge].
    Das ontologische Nichts
– / das Nichts – vgl. Kants Tafel, und (Plaas). [Peter Plaas: Kants Theorie der Naturwissenschaft. Eine Untersuchung zur Vorrede von Kants Metaphysischen Anfrangsgründen der Naturwissenschaft. Diss. Hamburg 1965.]
    Bean-spruchung
– Anspruch; ansprechbar – [Ansprechen als Nachricht – Meldung –].
    "Zumutung"
                        
– "Gemüt"
    "Anmutung"
    Kann ein Tier beansprucht werden? vgl. Buytendijk
– (Plügge)
    Warum nicht
– was liegt dann vor –?
    Bedrängnis? Drang
–?

A. Stress

[Der Mensch – das noch nicht fest-gestellte Tier?

"Der Reiz"-Begriff

ontologische These] – das Modell für den "Menschen".
Das Tier: der reduzierte (worauf zurück) Mensch – methodische These.
"Belasung" (Jores)( [Dasein als Last]
"Austrag".
Die Bedeutungsmannigfaltigkeit und deren Richtungen bei den Wörtern

körperhaft                 /                                                   / die Sprache
daseinsmäßig            /      > die Sprache spricht  /         und das Ereignis
leiblich                     /
"seinslogisch"          /

(S. 596-597)


22. "In-der-Welt-sein" – Wohnen

besagt das nur: "daß der Mensch von seiner Welt nicht zu treffen ist", H. Plügge, 237b
    Die Einmaligkeit des persönlichen Leiblichen

    die Einmaligkeit der Existenz.

(S. 596-697)


 XIII. Seminar vom 18. - und 21. März 1969


13. "Ereignis"

etymologisch und im Denken.
    Was wird hier zusammengesehen, d.h. aus Einem genannt
Lichten und Gehen. Willkür oder freiendes Lassen?
    Eignen
Eignung Zueignung
    Eigen und verloren haben
besitzen – leibeigen / zugehörig – eignen nicht verwandt  mit ereginen.
    Er-äugen
– vor Augen stellen sehen lassen –  [lichten – /
    Sich zeigen
– es zeigt sich – stellt sich heraus – geschieht.
    Er-eignissi
– Sich zeigen – ahd. / Sich Zeigen
   
"Auge" oft
– der Seher:
             öugen 
–  vor Augen bringen –  mhd.
    Äugen
–  scharf blicken.

(S. 626)

I. Gespräche mit Martin Heidegger in Sizilien
vom 24. April bis 6. Mai 1963


Heidegger: Die Endlichkeit des Menschen besteht darin, daß er die Anwesenheit des Seienden im Ganzen, des Schon-gewesenen und Noch-kommenden, nicht in einer unmittelbar gegenwärtigen Anwesenheit als Sein in einem nunc stans erfahren kann. Solches ist Gott vorbehalten im Christlichen. Auch die christliche Mystik wollte nichts anderes. (Auch alles indische "Meditieren" will nichts anderes als diese Erfahrung des nunc stans erreichen, als den Aufstieg in dieses nunc stans vollziehen, in dem Vergangenheit und Zukunft aufgehoben sind in einer unwandelbaren Gegenwart.)

Die Endlichkeit ist noch besser zu umgekehrt zu sagen: Sie ist die Erfahrung der Anwesenheit des Seienden in den drei Modi der Gewesenheit, Gegenwart und Zukunft.

Jetzt spreche ich nicht mehr von Endlichkeit, sondern sage: Es macht gerade den Reichtum des Menschen aus, daß er nicht auf die bloße gegenwärtige Anwesenheit von Jetzt- zu Jetzt-Ablauf angewiesesn ist, wodurch ich das Ganze des Seins nicht verstehen kann, wobei es verschlossen bleibt, daß das Dasein seinem Wesen nach in die Fülle dieser Modi entfaltet ist.

Das Sterben-müssen des Menschen folgt nicht aus dem Gebrauchtwerden des Menschen in das Ereignis hinein. Es ist einfach so, daß er sterben muß.

(S. 664)

V. Protokolle des Seminars vom 10. und 12. März 1965


Wir leben in einem seltsamen befremdlichen, unheimlichen Zeitalter. Je rasender sich die Menge der Informationen steigert, um so entschiedener breitet sich die Verblendung und Blindheit für die Phänomene aus. Mehr noch, je maßloser die Information, je geringer das Vermögen zur Einsicht, daß das moderne Denken mehr und mehr erblindet und zum blicklosen Rechnen wird, das nur die eine Chance hat, auf den Effekt und möglicherweise die Sensation rechnen zu können. Aber noch sind einige, die zu erfahren vermögen, daß das Denken kein Rechnen ist, sondern ein Danken, insofern das Denken sich dem verdankt, d.h. hinnehmend ausgesetzt bleibt dem Anspruch der Offenbarkeit: Seiendes ist und nicht nichts. In diesem "ist" spricht die ungesprochene Sprache des Seins den Menschen an, dessen Auszeichnung und Gefährdung zugleich darin beruht, offenständig zu sein in mannigfaltigen Weisen für das Seiende als das Seiende.


(S. 763-764)


VII. Protokolle des Seminars vom 6. und 8. Juli 1965


Das Hiersein als existierender Mensch ist immer in eins und in sich ein Dortsein mit Ihnen, z.B. bei der brennenden Kerze dort auf dem Tisch, wobei das Leiben als Sehen mit den Augen mitbeteiligt ist. Wenn Sie ein reiner, leibloser Geist wären, könnten sie die Kerze nicht als gelblich leuchtendes icht sehen. Auch beim Vernehmen des Bedeutungsgehaltes einer Lampe, wenn ich mir eine solche auch nur vergegenwärtige und nicht leibhaftig vor mir sehe, ist das Leiben mitbeteiigt, insofern zur Lampe als Lampe ihr Leuchten gehört.
Durch welche Methode hat sich Ihnen, sofern es überhaupt schon geschah, die Funktion dese Leibens in diesem Beispiel erschlossen? Auf welchem Wege wurden Sie des Phänomens des erörterten Hierseins als Sein bei... inne?
Sie wurden gewahr, daß Sie in dieser Weise immer schon bei dem Begegnenden waren. Sie mußten sich freimachen von den gewohnten Vorstellungen von einem bloß subjektiven Vorgestelltsein der Dinge im Inneren Ihrer Köpfe und mußten sich einlassen auf die Weise des Existierens, worin Sie schon sind. Es galt, dieses Sicheinlassen in die Seinsart, in der Sie immer schon sind, eigens zu vollziehen. Dieses eigens Vollziehen und sich Einlassen ist indessen keineswegs gleichbedeutend mit einem Verstehen dieser Seinsart, insofern Sie unter Verstehen ein "etwas denken", es begreifen können, meinen, ein bloßes Verstehen von etwas als etwas. Man kann sogar das Sein bei... so verstehen, daß man darüber nachdenkt und sich dabei gerade noch nicht auf es eigens eingelassen und es als das Grundverhältnis des Menschen zu dem Begegnenden erfahren hat. (S. 813)
[...]
Alle unsere Erörterungen dürfen nun aber keineswegs als wissenschaftsfeindlich aufgefaßt werden. Die Wissenschaft als solche wird in keiner Weise zurückgewiesen. Nur ihr Absolutheitsanspruch, der Maßstab für alle wahre Sätze zu sein, wird als Anmaßung abgewehrt.
Diesem unzulässigen Anspruch gegenüber scheint mir als Kennzeichnung unserer ganz anderen Methode der Namen des "Eigens Sich-einlassen in unser Verhältnis zu dem Begegnenden", in dem wir schon immer uns aufhalten, notwendig zu sein. Zur Phänomenologie gehört in gewissem Sinne der Willensakt, sich nicht gegen dieses Sich-einlaslsen zu sperren. Das Sich-einlassen heißt auch bei weitem nicht bloß ein Sich-Bewußtmachen meiner Seinsart. Von Bewußtmachen kann ich nur dann reden, wenn ich versuchen will zu bestimmen, wie dieses unser ursprüngliches Sein bei... mit anderen Bestimmungen des Daseins zusammenhängt.
Das Sich-einlassen ist ein ganz anderer Weg, eine ganz andere Methode als die wissenscahftliche Methode, wenn wir das Wort Methode in seinem ursprünglichen, echten Sinne zu gebrauchen wissen:
μετὰ-ὁδός, der Weg nach... Sie müssen dabei vom Begriff der Methode die diesem üblicherweise gegebene Bedeutung einer bloßen Untersuchungstechnik fernhalten.
Wir müssen also den Weg zu uns selbst gehen. Dies aber ist nicht mehr der Weg zu einem isolierten, zunächst allein gegebenen Ich.
(S. 815-816)


VIII. Protokolle des Seminars vom 23. und 26. November 1965


Das Wort "Dasein" bedeutet nach der Überlieferung Vorhandensein, Existenz. In diesem Sinne spricht man z.B. von den Beweisen für das Dasein Gottes. In "Sein und Zeit" wird Dasein jedoch anders verstanden. Das haben zunächst auch die französischen Existenzialisten nicht beachtet, weshalb sie Dasein in "Sein und Zeit" mit être-là übersetzten, was bedeutet: da und nicht dort sein. Das Da  meint in "Sein und Zeit" nicht eine Ortsangebe für ein Seiendes, sondern soll die Offenheit nennen, in der für den Menschen Seiendes anwesend sein kann, auch er selbt für sich selbst. Das Da zu sein zeichnet das Menschensein aus. Die rede vom menschlichen Dasein ist darnach ein – auch in "Sein und Zeit" – nicht überall vermiedener Pleonasmus. Die gemäße französische Übersetzung für Dasein müßte lauten: être le là, und die sinngemäße im Deutschen statt Dasein: Da-sein.
[...]
H. Wir blieben bei der Erläuterung des Daseins besser gesagt bei der Frage stehen, warum in "Sein und Zeit" vom Dasein die Rede ist und nicht einfach vom Menschsein. Der Grund dafür liegt darin, dasß in "Sein und Zeit" die Seinsfrage alles bestimm, d.h. die Frage, inwiefern Sein (Anwesenheit) seine Offenbarkeit in der Zeit hat.
Weil aber der Mensch nur Mensch sein kann, indem er Sein versteht, d.h. indem er in der Offenheit von Sein steht, ist das Menschsein als solches dadurch ausgezeichnet, auf seine Weise diese Offenheit selbst zu sein. Die aus dem Hinblick auf die Seinsfragezu bestimmende zeit läßt sich mit dem überlieferten Seisnbegriff wie ihn Aristoteles im vierten Buch seiner "Physik" maßgebend entfaltete, nicht verstehen. In der Philosophie wird seit Aristoteles die Zeit vom Sein im Sinne von Anwesenheit des Jetzt her verstanden und nicht das Sein aus der Zeit.
Also ist gefragt: Worin gründet die Möglichkeit, daß der Mensch vom Sein als Sein angesprochen wird, d.h. woran liegt es, daß Sein selbst offenbar werden kann für den Menschen im Sinne von Anwesenheit? Offenbarkeit des Seins für den Menschen besagt aber keineswegs schon. daß das Sein als solches oder gar seine Offenbarkeit vom Menschen und vom Denken der Philosophie eigens thematisch erfaßt wäre.
Nun erhebt sich die Frage: Wie muß das Menschsein angesetzt werden, damit die Bestimmung des Menschen dem Grundphänomen der Offenbarkeit von Sein entspricht? Woher kommt der Einblick, daß der Mensch selbst in dieser Lichtung des Seins steht, d.h. daß das Sein des Da ekstatisch ist, daß der mensch als Dasein existiert? Die Interpretation der Hauptstrukturen, die das so angesetzte Sein des Da ausmachen, nämlich sein Existieren, ist die existenziale Analytik des Daseins. Existenzial ist gebraucht im Unterschied zu kategorial. Kategorie meint im heutigen Gebrauch eine Klasse oder Gruppe, in die bestimmte Dinge fallen. [...]  In "Sein und Zeit" versuchte ich, die spezifischen Seinscharaktere des Daseins qua Dasein gegenüber den Seinscharakteren des nicht Daseinsmäßigen, der Natur z.B., herauszustellen, und haben sie deshalb Existenzialien gennant. Die Daseinsanalytik das Daseins ist als existenziale, ganz formal gesprochen, eine Art von Ontologie. Sofern es nun diejenige Ontologie ist, die die fundamentale Frage nach dem Sein als Sein vorbereiet, ist es eine Fundamentalontologie. Von hier aus wird aufs neue deutlich, welche Mißdeutung darin liegt, wenn man "Sein und Zeit" als eine Anthropologie versteht.
(S. 830-833)

Das Entscheidende ist, daß die jeweiligen Phänomene, die im Verhältnis von Analysand und Analytiker auftreten, in ihrer Zugehörigkeit zum betreffenden konkreten Patienten von sich her in ihrem phänomenalen Gehalt zur Sprache gebracht und nicht einfach pauschal unter ein Existenzial untergeordnet werden. (S. 836)


III. Teil – 26. November 1965


Es ergab sich dann, daß in "Sein und Zeit" selber häufig die Rede von Daseinsanalyse ist. Dabei besagt hier Daseinsanlyse nichts anderes als Vollzug des Aufweisens der in der Daseinsanalytik zum Thema gemachten Bestimmungen des Daseins, die, sofern dieses als existierendes bestimmt ist, Existenzialien heißen. Dieser Begriff von Daseinsanalyse gehört also noch in die Daseinsanalytik und damit in eine Ontologie.
Davon ist grundsätzlich "Daseinsanalyse" im Sinne des nachweisens und Beschreibens jeweils faktisch sich zeigender Phänomene an einem bestimmten existierenden Dasein zu unterscheiden. Diese Analyse ist, weil auf jeweiliges Existierendes gerichtet, notwendig an den Grundbestimmungen des Seins dieses Seienden orientiert, d.h. an dem, was die Daseinsanalytik als Existenzialien herausstellt. Dabei ist zu beachten, daß das, was in der Daseinsanalytik hinsichtlich des Daseins und seiner existenzialen Strukturen herausgestllt ist, begrenzt ist, und zwar begrenzt durch die fundamentale Aufgabe der Frage nach dem Sein. Die Beschränkung ist dadurch gegeben, daß im Hinblick auf den Zeitcharachter des Seins qua Anwesenheit es darauf ankommt, das Dasein als Zeitlichkeit zu interpretieren. Es ist deshalb keine Analytik des Daseins, die der geforderten Vollständigkeit für eine Grundlegung einer philosophischen Anthropologie genügen könnte (Siehe Sein und Zeit, S. 17; GA 2, S. 23 f)
Hier zeigt sich der notwendige Zirkel aller Hermeneutik: als existenzial-ontologische Analytik setzt die Daseinsanalytik schon gewisse Bestimmtheiten des Seins voraus, dessen vollständige Bestimmung gerade durch die Analytik vorbereitet werden soll.
Neben dieser dritten Bestimmung von Daseinsanalyse kann man eine vierte festlegen. Damit wäre gemeint: das Ganze einer möglichen Disziplin, die sich zur Aufgabe macht, die aufweisbaren existenziellen Phänomene des gesellschaftlich-geschichtlichen und individuellen Daseins in einem Zusammenhang darzustellen im Sinne einer daseinsanalytisch geprägten ontischen Anthropologie. Die dritte Bestimmung ist der Vollzug der vierten Bestimmung, wie die zweite Bestimmung der Vollzug der ersten ist. Diese anthropologische Daseinanalyse kann man noch einmal gliedern in a) und b) nämlich in einer Normal-Anthropologie und eine darauf bezogene daseinsanalytische Pathologie. Weil es sich um eine anthropologische Analyse des Daseins handelt, kann eine bloße Klassifikation der herausgestellten Phänomene nicht genügen, sondern muß orientiert sein auf die konkrete geschichtliche Existenz des heutigen Menschen, d.h. des in der heutigen Industriegesellscahft existierenden Menschen.
(S. 836-838)

Wir können jetzt nur noch kurz auf die Frage zurückkommen: Ist die Daseinsanylse wissenschaftsfeindlich oder nicht? Auch nach den versuchten Erläuterungen läßt sich noch keine zureichende Antwort geben, weil wir einen entscheidenden Punkt noch nicht beachtet haben. Das Entscheidende einer Wissenschaft ist immer, daß ihre Art der Untersuchung ihrer Sache entspricht. Es gibt auch Sachen, die ich gar nicht erfasse, wenn ich sie zum Gegenstand eine begrifflichen Vorstellens mache. Eine Angst oder eine Furcht ist keine Gegensatn. Ich kann sie höchstens zum Thema machen. Also gehört zur Strenge einer Wissenschaft, daß sie in ihren Entwürfen und in ihrer Methode der Sache angemessen ist. Aber nicht jede strenge Wissenschaft ist notwendig exakte Wissenschaft. Exaktheit ist nur eine bestimmte Form der Strenge einer Wissenschaft, weil es Exaktheit nur da gibt, wo der Gegenstand im vorhinein als etwas Berechenbares angesetzt ist. Wenn es aber Sachen gibt, die ihrer Natur nach der Berechenbarkeit widerstreben, dann ist jeder versuch, deren Bestimmung an der Methode einer exakten Wissenscahft zu messen, unsachlich.
(S. 846-847)

IX. Protokolle des Seminars vom 1. und 3. März 1966 in Zollikon


Die hier und im folgenden eingestreuten "kritischen" Bemerkungen dienen nur als Anlaß, auf die Vielfalt der Phänomene hinzuweisen, die mit dem Titel "Streß" belegt sind. Eine zureichende kritische Stellungnahme zu den Forschungen der Autoren der ausgewählten Texte kann nicht beansprucht werden.
Indes bieten die Texte furchtbare Ansätze zu einer klärenden phänomenologischen Besinnung. Dies gilt z.B. schon allein vom titel des Buches von Herber Pflügge, "Wohlbefinden und Mißbefinden".
Es handelt von dem Befinden, das wir meinen, wenn wir den anderen fragen: Wie befinden Sie sich?, d.h. Wie geht es Ihnen? Diese Frage braucht sich nicht notwendig nur auf das "körperliche Befinden" zu beziehen. Die Frage kann sich nach der gerade faktischen Situation des anderen erkundigen. Ein solches Befinden ist jedoch zu unterscheiden von dem, was in "Sein und Zeit"  als die Befindlichkeit ausgelegt wird. Sie ist die das Dasein be-stimmende Gestimmtheit seines jeweiligen Bezugs zur Welt, zum Mitdasein der Mitmenschen und zu sich selbst. Die Befindlichkei fundiert das jeweilige Wohl- un Mißbefinden, ist jedoch ihrerseits wiederum fundiert in der Ausgesetztsein des Menschen an das Seiende im Ganzen. Damit ist schon gesagt, daß zu dieser Ausgesetztheit (Geworfenheit) das Verstehen des Seienden als eines Seienden gehört; insgleichen gibt es aber auch kein Verstehen, das nicht schon ein geworfenes ist.
Geworfenheit und Verstehen gehören wechselweise zusammen in einer Zusammengehörigkeit, deren Einheit durch die Sprache bestimmt ist. Sprache ist hier zu denken als Sagen, in dem Seiendes als Seiendes, d.h. aus dem Hinblick auf Sein, sich zeigt. Erst auf dem Grunde der Zusammengehörigkeit von Geworfenheit und Verstehen durch die Sprache als Sage ist der Mensch von Seiendem ansprechbar (vgl. S. 160 ff., Sein und Zeit, GA 2, A.a.O. S. 213 ff). Ansprechbarkeit aber ist die Bedingung der Möglichkeit von Beanspruchung, sei dies eines Belastung oder eine Entlastung.
Damit ist, wenngleich nur erst in groben Zügen, der Bereich gezeigt, in den so etwas wie der Streß mit all seinen möglichen Abwandlungen gehört. Streß hat den Grundcharakter der Beanspruchung eines Angesprochenwerdens. Dergleichen ist nur auf dem Grund von Sprache möglich. Sprache wird hier nicht als ein Vermögen der Mitteilung verstanden, sondern als die ursprüngliche und vom Menschen in verschiedenen Weisen bewahrte Offenbarkeit von solchen, das ist. Insofern der Mensch Mitsein ist, auf den Mitmenschen wesenhaft bezogen bleibt, ist die Sprache als solche Gespräch. Hölderling sagt: "Seit ein Gespräch wir sind" (Friedensfeier). Deutlicher ist zu sagen: Insofern wir Gespräch sind, gehört zum Menschsein das Mitsein.
Wie oben gesagt wurde, gehört der Streß in den Wesenzusammenhang von Beanspruchung und Entsprechen, d.h. in die Dimension des Gesprächs in dem weiten Sinne, der auch ein "Sprechen" mit den Dingen einschließt. Das Gespräch wiederum bildet den fundamentalen Bereich, innerhalb dessen eine Auslegung möglich wird. So ist der "hermeneutische Zirkel" kein circulus vitiosus, sondern eine wesenhafte Verfassung des Menschseins; er charakterisiert die Endlichkeit des Menschen. Der Mensch ist in seinem höchsten Sein in sich gerade durch seine Offenheit für das Sein begrenzt. Dieser Sat kann freilich auf Grund des bislang Erörterten noch nicht verstanden werden." (S. 858-860)



MARTIN HEIDEGGER: ZUM EREIGNIS-DENKEN


GA 73.1 Frankfurt a.M. 2013
 

Die Herkunft der Gottheit

Der Abschied der Gottheit als die Ankunft der Herkunft

 

Die Herkunft der Gottheit

 

Das Seyn ist in sich die Rück-kehr in das Einstige. Dies aber, das Einstige, ist das wahre Ewige.

Menschliche Rück-kehr ist das Gedächtnis. Das Gedenken ist die Hut des Seyns, die das Seyn in sich braucht, damit es nicht in der Glut der Innigkeit versengt werde, mit der es ins Einzige zurück kehrt.

Darum erst, weil das Seyn als das Ereignis zurück-kehrend sein Einstiges also ereignet, schmerzinnig glutend, darum erst, weil Rück-kehr ist zögernde Ankunft ist zögernde Ankunft im Einstigen, darum erst, weil Ankunft gehütet bleibt in der Botschaft des Wortes, darum sind Boten der gewahrten Glut der Innigkeit im Schmerz, darum sind Himmel (Feuer und Licht), und Erde (bergende Milde der dunkelnden Tiefe) und die Heitere (worinnen Himmel und Erde ineinander entgegnen), darum sind die einigen drei Boten des Ereignisses, die Engel des Seyns, "Götter" nennt sie und als Götter, undeutlich und auch undeutbar für sie im Wesen, nimmt sie die Metaphysik.

Was sich in dem unentfalteten Reichtum der so jetzt sagbaren Herkunft der Gottheit noch verbirgt, ist ein heiliger Schatz.

Indem sich jedoch die Herkunft der Gottheit ins Wissen des Menschen ergibt, erfährt das Denken den Abschied der Götter. Das Scheiden der Götter ereignet sich zugunsten der Engel; deren Wesen wiederum erst sich reiner enthüllt, wenn die Rück-kehr als die Ankunft der Einstigen ihr botschaftliches Wesen lichtet, welche Lichtung in eins geht mit der Enthüllung des Wesens des Wortes und der Geburt der Sprache.

Aus der Herkunft der Engel lernen wir erst das beginnlich erfahren, was vordem "Natur" hieß und war – Aether, Himmel, Erde – und was als Gegenstand der Technik dann die Verwüstung von Erde und Himmel verstattet.

Die Verwüstung des Himmels wird erst folgen, wenn die planetarischen Luftverkehrsgesellschaften eingerichtet sind und jeder Funktionär der Weltherrschaft sein Privatflugzeug hat.

Zuvor muß jedoch der Mensch in das Äußerste seines metaphysischen Wesens geraten sein. Das trifft dann zu, wenn er als ihr regulatives Bestandstück in die Maschine selbst sich eingelassen hat. Die Maschine tritt an die Stelle des ζῷον: das Lebewesen ist als Maschine begriffen; alle Biologie ist auf diesen Weg gejagt. Der  λόγος aber ist die Ratio der technischen Regulation (Planung, Einrichtung, Lenkung).

Dann erst ist das schlechthin Unvereinbare vorbereitet: der Mensch: das regulative Bestandstück der Maschine. Der Mensche: das Gedächtnis im Ereignis.

Von der Wahrheit des Seyns, vom Ereignis, her gesehen, bedarf es nur der niederen und ursprunglosen sich vergessenden Kräfte des Menschen, um dem Maschinenwesen zu genügen und das zu erfüllen, was von der Maschine gefordert wird.

Dieser dürftigen Einförmigkeit der Leere des Maschinenganges kann daher das Massenwesen des Menschen am leichtesten genügen, weil diesem die Mittelmäßigkeit und die Einebnung von Oben nach Unten gemäß ist.

Die Ansprüche, die jetzt noch aus dem Sein an den Menschen ergeben, sind die geringsten. Da Sein selbst hat sich fast dem Menschen entzogen. Der Mensch kann als der Vollstrecker des Willens zum Willen meinen, dieser Wille selbst zu sein und also nichts "über" und nichts "vor" sich zu haben, was ihn bedrängen und belasten könnte. Nur solange alles noch im Übergang ist aus der christlich-bürgerlichen Humanität in das unbedingte organisierte Maschinenwesen, wird dieser Vorgang noch in einer Sphäre von Brutalität und als Verlust frühere Genüsse und Vorrechte empfunden, so zwar, daß die hier sich noch regende Empfindsamkeit alsbald einer Abstumpfung und Gleichgültigkeit weicht, durch die sich dem technischen Wesen gemäße Langeweile vorbereitet.

Wie aber nun, wenn die vormalige "Natur" sich in das Wesen des Engelhaften lichtet und aus diesem Wesen erst die Rück-kehr in das Geheimnis beginnt? Wie muß da der Frühling seien? Ist deshalb in uns ein gewandeltes Erwarten dieser Zeit inmitten des Grauens?

(S. 813-814).

13. [Das Engelhafte]

 

Engel  – Bote.
Jeder Engel ist Bote.
Bieten   darreichen wissen lassen  er-eignen.
Aber nicht jeder Bote ist Engel.
Das Engelhafte.
Das Seyn als das sich entbietende.

(Hehlende)

(S. 825)




GA 73.2, Frankfurt a.M. 2013

D. Die Erörterung der Seinsfrage in die Seins-Vergessenheit 

(Ge-Stell)

Die Seinsfrage in "Sein und Zeit"

Der beirrende Bezirk des Übergangs von der Leitfrage zur Grundfrage

Die Seinsfrage auf dem Holzweg

6. Die Seinsfrage. 23.IX

 

"Seinsverständnis":

1. Verstehen als Entwurf im ekstatischen Da-sein im Freien der Lichtung von Anwesen;

2. geworfen – / geschichtlich in die Lichtung des Sichverbergens;

3. nicht "subjektiv" und bloße Vorgestelltheit von Sein als Vorstellung immanent im Bewußtsein eines Subjekts;

4. das transcendens schlechthin auch und gerade Da-sein;

5. "Zeit" als Begrenzung (péras) nicht Gesichtskreis eines Subjekts [so: das sein nur meine Vorstellung].

Horizont – Begrenzung der Lichtung – der jeweiligen von Anwesen –

Verstehen (Sein und Zeit) kein Vor-stellen – Botschaft bringen – zeigen – das eigentliche Zeigen das Ent-sagen – nicht nur: rechnen <–> besinnen ("Sein") – sondern Vor-stellen <–> Ent-sagen ("Horizont").

Gleichwohl  der Holzweg: noch nicht von Sein als solchem –das "als solches" von "Zeit" her – "Zeit" nur ein Vorname.

Sprache: Haus des Seins – aber Sein zurück in Ereignis und die Sprache spricht – als Sage im Ereignis.

Weder mystisch – noch mythisch – noch vor-ontologisches Seinsverständnis und "Sprache"

(S. 1312)

 

 

26. [Seins-Geschick]

 

1. Ge-Stell als Geschick

/ das Stellen von Bestand als letztes (inwiefern?)

* Schicken [Vollendung der Ver-gessenheit]

2. Ge-Stell als Vorbote (-schein) des Ereignisses

3. Ereignis und Geschick

4. Vergessenheit und Enteignis

* Wie die Zweideutigkeit des Ge-Stells zeigen? sagen?

(S. 1323)

 

B. Die Ortschaft

[im Echo des Parmenides]?

 

9. [Die eigentliche Kehre]

 

Die eigentliche Kehre, d.h. die dem Ereignis gehörende:
der Wandel des Ge-stelles in die Ge-Stellnis
als Vorbotschaft des Ereignisses.

(S. 1479)

 

MARTIN HEIDEGGER: VIGILIAE UND NOTTURNO

SCHWARZE HEFTE 1952/53 bis 1957


GA 100. Frankfurt a.M. 2020

Vigiliae II

 

Verwirrung – Verständigung – Schonung

 

Eine in ihrer geheimen Gewalt noch kaum ermeßliche Verwirrung überzieht die Erde. Wirr, durcheinander-gewirbelt, in einen Wirbel gebannt sind die Ansichten, Glaubensformen, Vorstellungsarten und Denkweisen der Menschen. Verwirrt sind die unausgesprochenen Ansprüche. Die Verwirrung betrifft weniger das Was als das Wie des Vorstellens und Vorgehens und Sagens (77 f.)

Die Verwirrung ist eine planetarische. Ihre Herkunft ist älter als die unmittelbar nachweislichen Ursachen. Die Verwirrung liegt außerhalb der Reichweite von Anschuldigungen, wenngleich der Mensch an ihr beteiligt bleibt.

Das Verwirrendste der Verwirrung ist die Einebnung der Glaubensformen, Vorstellungsarten und Denkweisen auf das Unterschiedslose eines überall eindringenden und alles überfallenden Geredes, das allem alles in allen bestellbaren Formen zugänglich macht.

Vielleicht hat die Verwirrung ihre Herkunft im Unvermögen zur Unterscheidung der Weisen von Meinen, Glauben, Vorstellen, Denken, dies Unvermögen zur Unterscheidung aber könnte die Folge der Vergessenheit des "Unterschieds" sein.

Können wir etwas dazu tun, die Verwirrung zu entwirren?

Die Verwirrung führt zu gegensätzlichen, wenn nicht gar feindseligen Haltungen auf allen Gebieten menschlichen Tuns und Wirkens. Vielleicht liegt mit ein Grund für das alles Anzehrende und Fortschwehlende der Verwirrung darin, daß diese Gebiete (Glauben, Wissenschaft, Kunst, Wirtschaft, Gesellschaftsordnung, Dichtung) nur noch Gebiete sind, nämlich des menschlichen Leistens, daß hier kein Auftrag, keine Weihe, kein Anruf mehr waltet und nirgends das Fügende bleibt.

Darum sucht man auch allzu eilig der Verwirrung, soweit man sie sieht, zu steuern auf den Bahnen des Leistens d.h. durch Verständigung und deren Organisation.

Durch die Verständigung einigt man sich auf ein Gemeinsames unter Hintansetzung der Gegensätze. In der Verständigung findet man sich auf einer Ebene wechselseitiger Duldung im Ausgleich (vgl. u. 78 f.). Man bezahlt mit der Preisgabe, einer vorgetäuschten , des Eigenen und Eigentlichen. Verständigung ist die Einebnung der entschiedenen Gegnerschaften auf dem verabredeten Anschein des Nichtbestehens von Gegensätzen. Die Verständigung sichert so unauffällig den Fortbestand der Verwirrung. Verständigung schiebt die Aus-einandersetzung weg und erreicht doch überall den Anschein des tätigen Wollens, das nur Einigung und Einigkeit will.

So erscheint dann zunächst die Schonung im Vergleich mit der Verständigung erst recht als das tatenlose, willensschwache Nachgeben. Schonung sieht aus wie das Ausweichen vor dem Aufflammen der Gegensätze. Indes ist Schonung, wesentlich erfahren, alles andere als bloße Nachgiebigkeit.

Zur Schonung gehören:

1. das Sich aus-einander-Setzen in das je Eigene;

2. das Ent-gegnen, das die Zwiesprache sucht, aber das Gegensätzliche nicht aufhebt vielmehr

3. das Anerkennen des Anderen in seinem Eigenen bereitet;

4. und so das Wesen des je Eigenen in sein Eigentliches hüttet.

5. In der Schonung entwirrt sich die Verwirrung.

Schonung ist die Bereitschaft des entgegnend auseinader-setzenden Anerkennens der Hut des Eigenen; dessen Eigentum ruht im Ereignis der Schonung wirkt, wenn ihr je ein "Wirken" eignet, im Unscheinbaren, langsam vorbereitend, jäh den Wandel.  Schonung er-bringt die Verwandlung der Verwirrung.

Schonung ruht im Vermögen der Unterscheidung, die sie  so bestätigt, als täte sie nichts und ließe alles gleiten.

Die Verwandlung der Verwirrung geht auf weiten Wegen und diese haben ihre eigenen Pfade. Einer der Wege mag derjenige sein, der eigens der Unterscheidnung nachgeht, denkend den "Unterschied".

(S. 144-146)


MARTIN HEIDEGGER: LOGIK ALS DIE FRAGE NACH DEM WESEN DER SPRACHE

Freiburger Vorlesung Sommersemester 1934

Frankfurt a.M. 2020 (GA 38 A), S. 85-90; 158-168

§ 19. Menschliches Geschehen im Wissen und Wollen:

Die Kunde


So bleibt uns kein anderer Weg, als die begonnene vergleichende Betrachtung mit dem nichtgeschichtlichen Seienden Erde Pflanze Tier weiterzuführen. Nur genügt eben das bisherige Vorgehen nicht, wenn wir etwa in der Gegenüberstellung von Veränderungen der Erdkruste Laufen der Maschinen Lebensvorgängen bei Pflanze und Tier auf der einen Seite und etwaErmordung Cäsars, Sturz Bismarcks, Ausbruch des Weltkrieges auf der anderen Seite – wenn wir dabei gleichsam gefühlsmäßig einen Unterschied ahnen und das übrige allgemeinen Phrasen überlassen. Der Unterschied muß in der inneren Verfassung der verschiedenen Seinsbereiche liegen. | Die Erdveränderungen sind ein mechanisches oder sonstwie physikalisch-chemisch bestimmbares Geschiebe das pflanzliche und tierische Leben ist ein triebmäßiger-instinkhafter Vorgang das menschliche Geschehen ist willentlich und dadurch wissentlich.  | Und zwar nicht  nur jeweils in sich insofern, als das Geschehen bewußtes bleibt eine Kunde davon bewahrt wird oder neu erkundbar ist.

Ein Jahrhunderte alter Wald hat von seinem Wachstum, Altern und Absterben nicht nur keine Aufzeichnungen und Berichte, sondern überhaupt keine Kunde. Die Ameisen, die Raubzüge unternehmen, bewahren diese nicht in Kriegserinnerungen und Chroniken
– sie lassen ihre Vergangenheit einfach hinter sich ja strenggenommen können sie ihre Vergangenheit nicht einmal vergessen. Sie haben von dem, was in den Lebensvorgängen | mit ihnen vor sich geht | keine Kunde. Dagegen erwächst  im willentlich wissenstllichen Geschehen des Menschen immer eine Kunde von diesem Geschehen, darin dieses erkundbar ist und zugliech sich immer wieder ankündigt. Weil dieses Geschehen ein willentlich | wissentliches ist, steht es immer in einer Kunde. | Für Erkunden haben die Griechen das Wort ἱστορεῖν und es bekam im Verlauf ihrer Geschichte die Bedeutung der Geschichtskunde und bedeutet für uns heute in dem Titel "Historie"  das Wissen von der Geschichte. Geschichtlich ist ein Ereignis, sofern es geschieht, historisch ist dieses Geschehen, sofern es in einer Kunde steht. Die Frage bleibt: ist das Historische nur eine Zugabe zum Geschichtlichen oder gibt es nur dort überhaupt Geschichte, wo Historie ist, so daß der Satz herausspringt: Keine Geschichte ohne Historie!


§ 20. Das Verhältnis von Geschichte, Geschichtskunde (Historie) und Geschichtswissenschaft


Aber diese enge Verkoppelung von Geschichte und Geschichtskunde (Historie) läßt sich am Ende doch nicht halten. | Zwar muß wohl bestehen bleiben, daß das Geschehen als Geschichte weil eben menschliches ein willentliches und wissentliches ist. Wobei allerdings doch auch hier sogleich zu vermerken bleibt: das Geschehen ist nie nur willentlich-wissend. Es bleibt den Umständen, der Macht der Verhältnisse dem Zufall verhaftet. Der Zufall ist das Tor, durch das alle Mächte in ihrer Unberechenbarkeit in das Geschehen Einlaß finden. Aber auch dan noch, wenn wir der Einschränkung des Machtbereics von Wille und Wissen in der Geschichte Rechnung tragen bleibt  jene Betonung der Geschichtskunde eine Unmöglichkeit. Denn 1.) und vor allem muß doch jeweils die Geschichte erst geschehen sein, bevor sie in eine Kunde eingeht und "Gegenstand"  einer Historie werden kann; 2.) aber kann doch überhaupt Geschichte geschehen ohne daß von ihr Kunde gegeben wird. Vieles geschieht in der Geschichte und nicht das Unwichtigste wovon uns nie eine Kunde erreicht.

Die Verkoppelung von Geschichte und Geschichtskunde ist genau so widersinnig wie etwa die Behauptung: keine Natur ohne Naturwissenschaft! Was kümmert sich die Natur um die Naturwissenschaft? Und ebenso
was kümmert sich Geschichte um Geschichtswissenschaft? Diese ist zwar auf jene angewiesen aber nicht umgekehrt. Nun haben wir allerdings nicht gesagt: keine Geschichte ohne Geschichtswissenschaft sondern keine Geschichte ohne Historie.Wir setzen mit Bedacht Kunde (Historie) nicht gleich mit Wissenschaft. / Aber andererseits ist doch gerade Geschichtswissenschaft die geordnete und gegründete, prüfende und gemäße Entfaltung und Ausgestaltung der Geschichtskunde. Sie geht hinaus über das zufällige Erfahren von Begebenheiten, das Berichten von Sonderbarkeiten, die Darstellung von Merkwürdigkeiten. Sie zielt  auf den geschlossenen Zusammenhang des Geschehens. Die Geschichtskunde ist nur eine ungenügende Vorform der Historie –; deren wahre Gestalt ist die Geschichtswissenschaft. Sonach werden wir auf dem Wege über  eine Klärung der Wissenschaft von der Geschichte am sichersten  über das Wesen des Geschehens unterrichtet.

Wenn 
aber so die Geschichtswissenschaft die eigentliche Historie ausmacht, die Historie aber nach unserem Satz zur Geschichte als solcher gehört, dann muß doch eine Geschichte
ein geschichtliches Zeitalter um so geschichtlicher sein, je umfassendere, je quellenmäßiger, je strenger die herrschende Geschichtswissenschaft sich ausbaut und ausbreitet.

Aber dem ist offenbar nicht so!
Eine blühende Wissenschaft mit vollendet archivarischer Technik, mit der größen Verfügung über die Quellenbestände, mit der glänzendsten Organisation ihrer internationalen Kongresse
– kann das Gegenteil bewirken: eine Abschnürung von
der Geschichte, ein Verkennen des geschichtlichen Geschehens, eine Lähmung und Verkehrung des Geschichltichen Seins.

Und wir reden da nicht von einer bloßen Möglichkeit
sondern von einer Tatsache daß die Historiker am spätesten, am schwärsten, am umständlichsten begreifen, was geschichtlich geschieht. Und das nicht etwa deshalb, weil sie vielleicht "politisch"  anders "eingestellt" sind sondern eben weil sie Historiker sind Historiker, wie sie die heutige Geschichtswissenschaft seit jahrzehnten fordert und heranzieht. | Es darf hier nicht das Mißverständnis aufkommen, als sollten die Leistungen der Geschichtswissenschaft und ihrer Vertreter in den verschiedenen Bereichen herabgesetzt werden. Trotzdem müssen wir uns darüber klar sein: nicht jeder, der in einem Archiv arbeitet und zu einer historischen Kommission gehört, ist schon Historiker; nicht jeder Professor der Geschichtswissenschaft, nicht jeder Geschichtslehrer an der Schule, nicht jeder Student als Mitglied eines historischen Seminars ist Historiker. Wir gebrauchen zwar diese Bezeichnung in einem weiteren Sinne und sagen "die Historiker hatten eine gut gelungene Nikolausfeier". Historiker meint hier und sonst solche Leute, die sich mit Geschichtswissenschaft beschäftigen; so gibt es viele die sich mit Medizin beschäftigen und keine Ärzte sind, solche, die sich mit Philosophie beschäftigen und zeitlebens nie philosophieren. Geschichtswissenschaft kann von der Geschichte aussperren  und der Hitoriker kann jener sein, der sich lediglich um das Blühen und Ansehen der Wissenschaft bekümmert / daß deren Gegenstand "die Geschichte" ist, das ist belanglos zumal ja jedermann weiß, was das ist.

Mit solchen Hinweisen haben wir nun aber selbst unseren Satz
keine Geschichte ohne Historie – widerlegt; denn die Historie kann abseits von der Geschichte stehen, ja ihrer Erfassung unwissentlich Abbruch tun und so ein In-der-Geschichte-stehen | hemmen und unterbinden. Allein, ist dieses Unterbinden und Hemmen etwa kein Verhältnis zur Geschichte? ist es nicht vielmehr ein sehr verhängnisvolles und vielleicht sehr hartnäckiges und amit der eindeutigste Beleg  für unseren Satz, wonach das Sein zur Geschichte und in der Geschichte sich mitbestimmt durch die Historie.

Allerdings ergibt sich hieraus zugleich, daß die Geschichtswissenschaft ebensogut wie hemmendes
so auch ein förderndes Verhältnis zur Geschichte haben kann und daß es nur darauf ankommt, ein solches Verhältnis zu schaffen und d.h. die Voraussetzungen bereitzustellen. Und zu diesen Voraussetziungen gehört eben, daß Klarheit darüber herrscht: wie Geschichtswissenschaft sich zur Geschichtskunde verhält; ob Geschichtswissenschaft notwenig die höhere und eigentliche Form der Geschichtskunde darstellt, also diese in jener gegründet ist; oder ob es umgekehrt  liegt, daß Geschichtswissenschaft hinsichtlich der Echtheit und Klarheit ihres Tuns sich bestimmt au der jeweils herrschenden Geschichtskunde, ja dasß diese überhaupt entscheidet, ob Geschichtswissenschaft nicht notwendig sowenig wie irgendeine andere. Zumal da ja etwas geschichtswissenschaftlich unrichtig sein kann, was als Geschichtskunde doch in einem wesentlichen Sinne das Geschichtliche Sein zu bestimmen vermag eine Möglichkeit, vor der sich der Spießbürger allerdings bekreuzigt; aber er ist ja zum Glück nicht der Maßstab der Geschichte. [...]

So viel muß schon klar geworden sein, daß wir unter Geschichtskunde nicht verstehen
irgendwelche Kenntnis irgendwelcher Geschehnisse; sondern: unter Geschichtskunde verstehen wir die jeweilige Art und Weise der Offenbarkeit, in der für ein Zeitalter die Geschichte steht so zwar, daß diese Offenbarkeit das geschichtliche Sein mitträgt und mitleitet.
(S. 85-90)

[...]

§ 30. Die Sprengung des Subjektseins

b) Das Geschehen der Geschichte ist in sich Kunde der Offenbarkeit des Seienden.
Die historische Kenntnis als Herabsetzung der eröffnenden großen Augenblicke


Das Geschehen der Geschichte ist wesensmäßig in sich – ausgesetztes – entrückt erstrecktes –; das bedeutet: dasjenige – inmittten dessen Geschichte geschieht – ist durch das Geschehen als solches offenbar. Es bedrängt und bedroht – hemmt und eröffnet als Seiendes. Mit anderen Worten: das Geschehen ist in sich Kunde – es kündet das Seiende – in das es  – auseinandergezogen in sich eingefügt bleibt. / Die Frage, die wir zunächst ungelöst stehen ließen, erhält jetzt ihre Antwort; / die Kunde ist der Geschichte nicht von außen aufgeklebt, sondern Geschehen als ausgesetztes – entrücktes – ist kündend – nämlich das, worin die Geschichte ausgesetzt – wohin sie entrückt ist; und die Kunde ist dabei nicht irgendeine beiherlaufende Kenntnisnahme dessen, was "passiert" – sondern als  zur Erstreckung des Geschichtlichen gehörig – kündet sie jeweils das ganze Geschehen und die Lage seines Augenbllickes.  Diese ist nicht die bloße Lagerung  von Umständen bald so – bald so – sondern eine geschichtliche Lage kündet in sich jeweils das geschichtliche Sein im Ganzen; kündet – das besagt nicht – gibt nur Kenntnis und Nachricht – sondern stellt vor Auftrag und Sendung und Arbeit. / Das eigentlich Geschichtliche  liegt immer in der Künderschaft der großen Augenblicke  und ihrer das ganze Geschehen in sich sammelden Umwälzungen; nicht aber dort wo man gemeinhin die Geschichte aufsucht – im beruhigten Abklingen des Augenblickes welches Ausklingen und Auslaufen man gern als Entwicklung deutet – von der aus gesehen die großen Augenblicke sich wie Störungen und Einbrüche  ausnehmen. In den historischen Kenntnissen wird die Kunde des Geschehens meist herabgesetzt in das Flache und Platte der verständigen Biederkeit, die vor nichts halt macht weil sie allesl chon weiß und besser weiß. So bekommt das Nachrichtenmäßige  und Anekdotische  der Geschichte freie Bahn, das Belanglose und Berechenbare. Und was außerhalb der Behäbigkeit und Ordentlichkeit liegt, das Außerordentliche Übermäßige – was das Herkömmliche und Herzugelaufene jederzeit überbietet – wird als das bloß Unberechenbare Unklare – und Peinliche weggeschoben. / Allein, die echte Kunde der Geschichte kündet gerade, indem sie uns vor das Verborgene stellt. Das Geheimnis des Augenbllicks ist die Kunde des Übermäßigen und Unumgänglichen. Im Geheimnis hat das Geschehen der Geschichte seine eigenste Gediegenheit.

c) Das geschichtliche Dasein des Menschen als die Entschlossenheit zum Augenblick

Je einfacher das Geheimnis, umso mächtiger die Ausgesetztheit in das Seiende und damit dessen Verschlossenheit. Und deshalb kann das Dasein des Menschen als geschichtliches nur eigentlich geschichtlich sein in der Entschlossenheit zum Augenblick
–; Entschlossenheit – nicht etwa die blinde Ladung einer großen Menge von sogenannter Willenskraft – sondern das für das Geheimnis aufgeschlossene in das Sein entrückte Handeln, dem die Möglichkeit des Untergangs, d.h. das Opfer – unausgesetzt nahebleibt. Daher ist es auch eine irrige Erwartung, zu meinen, man könnte über Auftrag und Sendung benachrichtigt und auf dem Laufenden gehalten werden wie etwa über das Wetter. Die Kunde der Geschichte wird nur dem, der in der Entschlossenheit steht, nur er kann wissen und darf wissen die Unumgänglichkeit des geschichtlichen Daseins. / Die Unwissenden aber und gar die, die im Unwesen der Geschichte umgetrieben sind, können sich gleichwohl nie von der Geschichte und der Arbeit entbinden. Denn selbst die Unentschlossenheit, das sich verschließende Nur eben auch Mit-Taumeln ist jederzeit, weil wesensmäßig, / noch anderes als jene schnappende Befangenheit des Tieres in der Natur. Unentschlossenheit ist als Verleugnung des Wesens des menschlichen geschichtlichen Daseins immer die Bejahung seines Unwesens. Dagegen bewahrt das Tier jederzeit – / in seiner Weise / – das Wesens des Lebens.

Auch im Abfall vom Aufgabe und Auftrag kann der Mensch seinem Sein nicht ausweichen; auch im Verfall muß er bezeugen, daß / wer ere auch ist und wie er ist
sein Sein und Seinkönnen ihm übereignet bleibt.


d) Das menschliche Sein als Sorge:
Ausgesetztheit in das Seiende und Überantwortung
an das Sein. Zurückweisung der Mißdeutungen der Sorge:
Sorge als Freiheit des geschichtlichen Selbstseins



Mit dem jetzt Gesagten weisen wir in eine noch ursprünglichere Tiefe dese menschlichen Daseins. Schon mehrfach wurden verschiedene Arten des Seins gegeneinander abgehoben: vorhandene Ablauf des Leblosen, Leben von Pflanze udn Tier, Bestand der Zahl im weiteren Sinne. / Dasein als Menschsein. Es genügt aber nicht, die Seinsweise des Menschen in ihrer eigenen Verfassung zu verdeutlichen, sondern es gilt zu sehen, inwiefern dieses Seiende, das wir selbst sind
zu seinem Sein ein Verhältnis hat. Dagegen ist alles nichtmenschliche Seiende nicht etwa nur dem eigenen Sein entfremdet; denn auch Entfremdung gegen das Sein ist noch ein Verhältnis zu ihm.

Das nichtmenschliche Seiende ist im Unterschied zu Übereignung und Entfremdnung befangen
– eingerollt, dumpf, gedrungen und abgedichtet. Nicht einmal gleichgültig verhält dieses Seiende sich zur Weise des Seins. Wir dagegen sind dergestalt, daß in diesem "sind": Sein liegt: übereignet und überantwortet an das Sein, als um welches es geht, sofern wir und solange wir Seiende sind. Und weil zu unserem Sein gehört die Ausgesetztheit und Entrückung in das Sein gerade auch des Seienden, das wir nicht sind, besagt die Überantwortung an das Sein soviel wie die Übereignung an das Sein des Seienden im Ganzen.

Diese Überantwortung macht das geschichtliche Dasein des Menschen zu demjenigen Seienden, daß jederzeit so oder so in seiner Bestimmung auf das Sein antworten, es verantworten muß. Ausgesetztheit in das offenbare Seiende, Entrückung in das bearrbeitete und erarbeitete Sein des Werkes, Erstreckuong und Schickung in Auftrag und Sendung
– all dieses in Einheit heißt zugleich ursprünglich: Überantwortung an das Sein. Aus ihr und in ihr geschieht jedes Geschehnis des Daseins. Dieses Grundwesen des menschlichen Seins: Ausgesetztheit an das Sein meinte ich und nenne ich auch künftig die Sorge.

Dieses Auslegung des Wesens des menschlichen Daseins als Sorge ist nach  allen möglichen Richtungen mißdeutet worden. / Die schnalzende Behäbigkeit  des Spießbürgers meinte, das mesnchliche Dasein dürfe nicht ausschließlich so trübsinnig als Sorge ausgegeben werden – es gehöre zum menschlichen Leben auch die Liebe. Um das zu beweisen, wurde im Organ der Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, d.h. in der DLZ [Paul Hofmann: Sein und Zeit / Martin Heidegger, Halle 1927. In: Deutsche Literaturzeitung für Kritik der internationalen Wissenschaft (Berlin). 50. Jahrgang. Nr. 6 (1929), S. 155-172)], prompt auf den unvermeidlichen Goethe verwiesen. Andere finden, die Auffassung des Daseins als Sorge sei der Ausdruck der mühseligen und beschaulichen Menschen. / Aber alle sind mit ihren unter sich entgegengesetzten  Bedenken auf dem Holzweg; besser, sie sind überhaupt noch nicht auf dem Weg zu begreifen, was deutlich genug gesagt ist, daß mit der Kennzeichnung des menschlichen Seins als Sorge nicht ein zufälliger Affekt des menschlichen Subjekts gegenüber anderen übersteigert und hervorgekehrt werden soll – sondern das Sorge hier besagt die Ausgesetztheit in das Sein – d.h. die Sprengung aller Subjektivität – / die Grundverfassung des Menschseins als Zeitlichkeit aus der überhaupt erst jegliche Stimmung – möglich wird.
[...]
Es ist kein Zufall, daß die höchste und schärfste Vereinzelung des Selbstseins auf das je eigene Dasein im Verhältnis zum Tode geschieht, worin sich die weiteste Ausgesetztheit, die härteste Entrückung und die tiefste Erstreckung des Menschen in das Sein und damit die ursprünglichste Enteignung aller Ichheit bekundet.
Weil das Dasein Sorge ist, deshalb hat es den Wesenscharakter des Selbst; und weil es diesen hat, deshalb ist die Frage nach dem Sein Seienden, daß wir Mensch nennen, nicht eine Wasfrage, sondern die desWerfrage. Indem die Werfrage gestellt wird an den Menschen, rücken wir durch das Wer-Fragen selbst bezüglich unseres Seins
– als eines geschichtlichen in die Frage ein.
Sorge ist das Grundwesen unseres Seins, das besagt: es geht um unser Sein, d.h. nach Früherem um unsere Bestimmung in dem dreifachen Sinne. Sorge ist in sich: Sorge der Bestimmung. Sorge besagt: das Wesen des Daseins ist solcherart, daß es ausgesetzt in das offenbare Seiende übereignet bleibt der Unumgänglilchkeit des Seins. Aufgeschlossene Bindung in das Unumgängliche bedeutet Freiheit. / Sorge ist als solche Sorge der Freiheit des geschichtlichen Selbstseins. Freiheit ist nicht die Ungebundenheit des Tund und Lassens
– sondern Durchsetzung der Unumgänglichkeit des Seins; / Übernahme des geschichtlichen Seins in den wissenden Willen. / Umprägung der Unumgänglichkeit des Seins in die Herrschaft einer gefügten Ordnugn des Volkes; Sorge der Freiheit des geschichtlichen Seins ist in sich Ermächtigung der Macht des Staates als des Wesensgestztes einer geschichtlichen Sendung.

e) Der Staat als geschichtliches Seins des Volkes

Weil das Sein des geschichtlichen Daseins des Menschen in der Zeitlichkeit, d.h. der Sorge, gründet, deshalb ist der Staat wesensnotwendig; / "der Staat"
nicht als ein Abstraktum und nicht als hergeleitet aus einem erdachten auf eine zeitlose Menschennatur an sich bezogenen Recht – sondern der Staat – als das Wesensgesetz des geschichtlichen Seins, kraft dessen Fügung das volk allein echte geschichtliche Dauer und d.h. die Bewahrung seiner Sendung und den Kampf um seinen Auftrag sich sichert. Der Staat ist das geschichtliche Sein des Volkes. Weder ist das Volk jene quallige und schwammige Sentimentalität, als welche es heute oft phrasenhaft herumgeboten wird, noch ist der Staat die nur heutige – gleichsam stillgestellte Organisationsform einer Gesellschaft –; sondern Staat "ist" nur, sofern und solange die Durchsetzung des  Herrschaftswillens geschieht, der aus Sendung und Auftrag entspringt / und unmittelbar zu Arbeit und Werk wird. Der Mensch, das Volk, die Zeit, die Geschichte, das Sein, der Staat – das sind keine abgezogene Begriffe als Gegenstände für Definitionsübungen – sondern das Wesensverständnis ist jederzeit ein geschichtliches – d.h. aber zukünftig-gewesendes sich entscheiden. Alles Überkommene der echten und unechten Überlieferung muß in den Schmelztiegel der Kritik der geschichtlichen Entschlossenheit. Das gilt nicht zuletzt von dem Titel, der die Gestaltung unseres geschichtlichen Seins bezeichnen soll – vom Sozialismus. Er bedeutet keine bloße Änderung der Wirtschaftsgesinnung, er meint nicht eine öde Gleichmacherei und Verherrlichung des Unzulängllichen; er meint nicht das wahllose Betreiben eines ziellosen Gemeinwohls, sondern er bedeutet die Sorge um die Maßstäbe und das Wesensgefüge unseres geschichtlichen Seins und er will deshalb die Rangordnung nach Berufung und Werk, er will die unantastbare Ehre jeder Arbeit, er will die Unbedingtheit des Dienstes als des Grundverhältnissess zur Unumgänglichkeit des Seins. Aus dem Wesen des geschichtlichen Seins als Zeitlichkeit, als Sorge, entspringt das Fragen noch unserem Selbstsein – denn dieses Fragen ist eben, wie sich jetzt zeigen muß, nicht die Neugier der nebenan stehenden Beobachter sondern Fragen ist in sich die Sorge des Wissens. Wissen aber ist die Arbeit der Durchsetzung der Wahrheit des Daseins als einer ergriffenen und begriffenen.

DRITTES KAPITEL

Menschsein und Sprache

Frage und Antwort nach dem Wesen des Menschen haben sich uns von Grund aus gewandelt. Und das Entscheidende ist hier nicht, daß dieses Fragen und Antworten lediglich anders  ist als das bekannte
oder neu –; denn alt und neu, das sind immer nur Wertungen aus dem Gesichtskreis der Geschäftigkeit und Langeweile des Heutigen; was an unserem Fragen und Antworten wesentlich bleibt, ist dieses, daß sie selbst aus dem Sein unseres geschichtlichen Daseins / aus der Sorge / begriffen werden müssen, daß dieses Fragen und Antworten nur das ist, was es sein soll, wenn es und solange es den Charakter unseres Seins – den Charakter der Inständigkeit hat inständig bleibt – ein inständiges, die Fragenden mit einbegreifendes – inbegriffliches Fragen.
Die Frage aber: wer ist der Mensch? mußte gefragt werden, weil wir die Frage nach dem Wesen der Sprache stellten; denn jede Wesensfrage ist Vor-frage. Wir fragten im Voraus: wo und wie ist überhaupt Sprache. Es ergab sich, Sprache ist nur, sofern der Mensch ist und demgemäß nur so, wie der Mensch ist. In welcher Weise aber der Mensch ist, das begründet sich in dem, wer er ist. Wir versuchten das Wesen des menschlichen Daseins aufzuhellen und begriffen das Sein des Menschen als Zeitlichkeit, Sorge, Sorge der Bestimmung.
Jetzt bliebe nur noch, daß wir die Sprache gleichsam in die herausgestellte Verfassung des menschlichen Daseins hineinbauten. "Die Sprache"
– ja, wissen wir denn, was die Sprache ist? Nein. Wir wissen es so wenig, daß uns jetzt aus dem Begriff des menschlichen Daseins die Sprache erst fragwürdig – im echt begründeten Sinne fragbar wird. Es wäre ein billiger Trick, wenn wir uns jetzt daran machten, mit Hilfe der gewonnenen Einsicht, in die Wesensverfassung des Daseins und der dabei erwachsenen Begriffe, das Wesen der Sprache zu definieren.


§ 31. Sprache als das Walten der weltbildenden und
bewahrenden Mitte des geschichtlichen Daseins des Volkes


Wir sagten zwar mehrfach im Verlauf unseres Fragens, es sei, wenn auch nicht ausdrücklich, dabei immer schon von der Sprache gehandelt. Inwiefern? Sofern die Macht der Zeit als Zeitlichkeit unsesr Wesen ausmacht, sind wir ausgesetzt  in das offenbare  Seiende, und d.h. zugleich das Sein des Seienden ist uns übereignet. Das Sein im Ganzen, wie es uns da durchwaltet und umwaltet, die waltende Ganzheit dieses Ganzen ist die Welt. Die Welt ist nicht die eine Idee der theoretischen Vernunft, sondern Welt kündet sich in der Kunde des geschichtlichen Seins und diese Kunde ist die Offenbarkeit dees Seins des Seienden im Geheimnis. / In dieser Kunde und durch sie waltet die Welt. / Diese Kunde aber geschieht im Urgeschehnis der Sprache. In ihr geschieht die Überantowortung an das Sein. / Kraft der Sprache und nur kraft ihrer waltet die Welt
"ist" Seiendes. Die Sprache ist nichts, was im abgekapselten Subjekt vorkommt und dann als Verkehrsmittel unter Subjekten herumgereicht wird – die Sprache ist weder etwas Subjektives noch etwas Objektives –; sie fällt überhaupt nicht in den Bereich dieser grundlosen Unterscheidung; / Die Sprache ist als geschichtliche nichts anderes als das Geschehnis der an das Sein überantworteten Ausgesetztheit in das Seiende im Ganzen. // Die Lieblichkeit des Tales und das Drohen des Gebirges, die Erhabenheit der Gestirne, die Gelassenheit des tobenden Meeres, die Versunkenheit der Pflanze und die Befangenheit des Tieres, das berechnete Rasen der Maschinen und die Härte des geschichtlichen Handelns, der gebändigte Rausch des geschaffenen Werkes und die kalte Kühnheit des wissenden Fragens, die gefestigte Nürchternheit der Arbeit und die Verschwiegenheit des Herzens – allesl das "ist" Sprache, gewinnt und verliert das Sein nur im Geschehnis der Sprache. Die Sprache ist die das Walten der Welt bildende und bewahrende Mitte des geschichtlichen Daseins des Volkes. Nur wo Zeitlichkeit sich zeitigt, / geschieht Sprache und umgekehrt.



§ 32. Logik als noch unbegriffene Auftrag des
geschichtlichen Daseins: Die Sorge um das Walten der Welt
im Geschehnis der Sprache



Warum aber fragen  wir nach dem Wesen der Sprache? Weil unser Dasein die Sorge ist – / ; die Sorge der Bestimmungihrer Erweckung und Übernahme und Bewahrung. Weil die Sorge als Sorge der Freiheit ist die Sorge des Wissens und Wissenskönnens um das Wesen alles Seienden. Weil uns als Wissen nicht gelten darf weder die flüchtige Kenntnis von bloßen Tatsachen, noch das über alle Dinge daherfahrende Gerede; weil Wissen nur gegründet und geprägt, nur überliefert und erweckt werden kann durch das Verantwortliche Wort, d.h. durch die gewachsene Gedigenheit der schaffenden Sprache  in der geschichtlichen Arbeit.
Und warum nennen wir dieses Fragen nach dem Wesen der Sprache "Logik"? Weil die Logik vom λόγος handelt und λόγος die Rede, d.h. die Sprache bedeutet; // und weil eben durch die so genannte Logik vorschnell das Wesen der Rede verflacht und veräußerlicht und mißdeutet wurde, deshalb ist "Logik" ein noch unbegriffener Auftrag des menschlich-geschichtlichen Daseins. Und weil die bisherige Logik als  Lehre von den Denkregeln gleichwohl beanspruchte, als oberste und maßgebende Regel aller Bestimmung des Seins zu gelten, deshalb muß dieser Anspruch ursprünglicher gefaßt und rüchsichtsloser erneuert werden aus dem ursprünglichen Begreifen des Wesens der Sprache. "Logik" ist uns nichts, was ein Einzelner über Nacht verfertigen und als Lehrbuch auf den Markt  bringen könnte. / Logik ist nicht und nie um der Logik willen.– Ihr Fragen geschieht als die Soge des Wissens um das Sein des Seienden, welches Sein zur Macht kommt, indem das Walten der Welt geschieht in der Sprache.


§ 33. Dichtung als eigentliche Sprache

Solches Fragen nach dem Wesen der Sprache kann diese aber nicht in ihrem Unwesen aufgreifen und darf sich an diesem Schein des Wesens nicht vergreifen und alles mißdeuten. / Das Wesen der Sprache bekundet sich dort,  wo sie vernutzt und verflacht, verdreht und verzwungen zum Verkehrsmittel und zum bloß äußeren Ausdruck eines sogenannten Inneren herabgesunken ist. Das Wesen der Sprache west dort, wo sie eben als weltbildende Macht geschieht, d.h. wo sie das Sein des Seienden im voraus erst vorbildet und ins Gefüge bringt. / Die ursprüngliche Sprache ist die Sprache der Dichtung.
Der Dichter aber ist nicht / jener, der über das jeweilige Heute Verse macht, nicht eine Beruhigung für schwärmende kleine Mädchen, nicht ein Reiz für Aestheten, die meinen, Kunst sei zum genießen und zum belecken.
Wahre Dichtung ist die Sprache von jenem Sein, das uns seit langem schon weit vorausgesprochen ist und das wir nie noch eingeholt haben. / Deshalb ist die Sprache des Dichters nie zeitgenössisch; zeitgenössische Dichter lassen sich zwar organisieren
– aber sie bleiben trotzdem ein Widersinn. Dichtung und damit eigentliche Sprache geschieht nur dort, wo das Walten des Seins in die überlegene Unberührbarkeit des ursprünglichen Werkes gebracht ist.
Um dieses zu begreifen, müssen die Deutschen, die heute so viel von Zucht reden, lernen, was es heißt, das zu bewahren, was sie schon besitzen.


(158-168)



HANS ULRICH GUMBRECHT UND K. LUDWIG PFEIFFER (Hg.:): MATERIALITÄT DER KOMMUNIKATION

Frankfurt/M. 1988


Vor-Satz
K. Ludwig Pfeiffer: Materialität der Kommunikation?

I Vor-Geschichten

Werner H. Kelber: Die Fleischwerdung des Worts in der Körperlichkeit des Textes
Dietmar Kamper: Poesie, Prosa, Klartext. Von der Kommunion der Körper zur Kommunikation der Maschinen
Albrecht Riethmüller: "Stoff der Musik ist Klang und Körperbewegung"
Jürgen Trabant: Vom Ohr zur Stimme. Bemerkungen zum Phonozentrismus zwischen 1770 und 1830
Harald Weinrich: Über Sprache, Leib und Gedächtnis
Nancy Kobrin: Die psychoanalytische Übertratung als historisches Symptom. Freud und seine fueros
Rainer Rosenberg: Die Sublimierung der Literaturgeschichte oder: ihre REinigung von den Materialitäten der Kommunikation
Karlheinz Barck: Materialität, Materialismus, performance

II Semantische Umverteilungen / Historisch

Jan Assmann: Im Schatten junger Medienblüte. Ägypten und die Materialität des Zeichens
Michel Zink: Materialität und Literarizität des Gebets. Beispiele aus dem französischen Mittelalter
Horst Wenzel: Partizipation und Mimesis. Die Lesbarkeit der Körper am Hof und in der höfischen Literatur
Jan-Dirk Müller: Der Körper des Buchs. Zum Medienwechsel zwischen Handschrift und Druck
Helmut Pfeiffer: Melancholie des Schreibens. Girolamo Cardano und sein De vita propria
Aleida Assmann: Die Sprache der Dinge. Der lange Blick und die wilde Semiose
Gerhard Rupp: Körper-Konzept und sinnliche Erfahrung in früheren Autobiographien der (Post-)Moderne
Martin Fontius: Post und Brief
Véronique Zanetti: Kann man ohne Körper denken? Über das Verhältnis von Leib und Bewußtsein bei Luhman und Kant
Wolfgang Scherer: "Aus der Seele muß man spielen". Instumentelle und technische Bedingungen der musikalischen Empfindsamkeit
Bettina Rommel: Psychophysiologie der Buchstaben
Martin Stingelin: Kugeläußerungen. Nietzsches Spiel auf der Schreibmaschine
Friedrich Kittler: Signal-Rausch-Abstand
Inge Baxmann: "Die Gesinnung ins Schwingen bringen". Tanz als Metasprache und Gesellschaftsutopie in der Kulturder zwanziger Jahre

III Gegenwartssymptomatologie

Klaus Dirscherl Cent pour-cent parlant" oder wie der französische Tonfilm der 30er Jahre die Wirklichkeit suchte und das Theater fand
Monika Elsner/Thomas Müller: Der angewachese Fernseher
Vivian Sobchack: The Scene of the Screen. Beitrag zu einer Phänomenologie der "Gegwärtigkeit" im Film und in den elektronischen Medien
Jochen Schulte-Sasse: Von der schriftlichen zur elektronischen Kultur: Über neuere Wechselbeziehungen zwischen Mediengeschichte und Kulturgeschichte
Manfred Pfister: Meta-Theater und Materialität. Zu Robert Wilsons "the CIVIL warS"
Reinhard Paczesny: Was ist geheim an der Verführung? Strategien, Techniken und Materialität der Werbung
Jörg Drews: Bücher und Zahlen, Kritiker und Kohlen
Wolfgang Ernst: (In)Differenz: Zur Ekstase der Originaliltät im Zeitalter der Fotokopie
Hans-Georg Soeffner: Rituale des Antiritualismus - Materialien für Außeralltägliches
Glen Burns: Die Imagination von Gewalt. Die verlorene Sprache des Körpers
Dietrich Schwanitz: Der weibliche Körper zwischen Schicksal und Handlung: Die Diät und die Paradoxie des Feminismus
Guy Maruani: Mind Your Brain, Tex-Tube Baby!
'Körper/Geist'-Schema und imaginäres Geschlecht
Kathleen Woodward: Der alternde Körper: Argumetne und Szenen
Charles Grivel: Reise-Schreiben

IV. Semantische Umverteilungen/ Systematisch

Irenäus Eibl-Eibesfeldt:: Zur Biologie des menschlichen Verhaltens
Jerzy Faryno: Die Sinne und die Textur der Dinge
Alois Hahn: Kann der Körper ehrlich sein?
Andreas Bahr: Imagination undKörpererleben
Paul Zumthor: Körper und Performanz
Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht: Rhythmus und Sinn
K. Ludwig Pfeiffer: Dimensionen der 'Literatur'. Ein spekulativerVersuch
Luiz Costa Lima: Gnosis und Antiphysis bei Borges
Peter M. Spangenberg: TV, Hören und Sehen
Stephen Bann: Kunst und Materialität. Die Skulpturen von Stephen Cox

V Theorie-Zukunft

Jean-Francois Lyotard: Ob man ohne Körper denken kan
Humberto R. Maturana: Elemente einer Ontologie des Beobachtens
Viktor Udwin: Der materiale Signifikant
Paul Watzlawick: Verschreiben statt Verstehen als Technik von Problemlösungen
Niklas Luhmann: Wie ist Bewußtsein and Kommunikation beteiligt?

Post-Scripta

Miklós Szabolci: Neue Ernsthaftigkeit
Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht: Flache Diskurse



NIKLAS LUHMANN: SOZIALE SYSTEME

Frankfurt/M 1984/1987

INHALT

Vorwort

Zur Einführung: Paradigmenwechsel in der Systemtheorie

1 System und Funktion
2 Sinn
3 Doppelte Kontingenz
4 Kommunikation und Handlung
5 System und Umwelt
6 Interpenetration
7 Die Individualität psychischer Systeme
8 Struktur und Zeit
9 Widerspruch und Konflikt
10 Gesellschaft und Interaktion
11 Konsequenzen für Erkenntnistheorie

 

1 System und Funktion

[...] 12.  Auf der Grundlage selbstreferentieller Systeme kann eine immense Ausweitung der Grenzen struktureller Anpassungsfähigkeit und entsprechender Reichweite systeminterner Kommunikation in Gang gebracht werden. Das Prinzip dieser Ausweitung läßt sich am besten begreifen, wenn man vom Informationsbegriff ausgeht. Eine Information kommt immer dann zustande, wenn ein selektives Ereignis (externer oder interner Art) im System selektiv wirken, das heißt Systemzustände auswählen kann. Das setzt die Fähigkeit zur Orientierung an Differenzen (im Zugleich oder im Nacheinander) voraus, die ihrerseits an einen selbsreferentiellen Operationsmodus des Systems gebunden zu sein scheint. "A 'bit' of information", heißt es bei Bateson [82], "is definable as a difference which makes a difference". Das bedeutet, daß die Differenzen als solche zu wirken beginnen, wenn und soweit sie in selbstrerentiellen Systemen als Informationen behandelt werden können.
[...]
Mit all dem geht der Operationsmodus selbstreferentieller Systemen zu Formen der Kausalität über, die ihn selbst einer zugriffssicheren Außensteuerung weitgehend entziehen. Alle Wirkungen, die man von außen im System oder mit dem System erzielen will, setzen voraus, daß das System auch den Anstoß von außen als Information, das heißt als Differenzerfahrung wahrnehmen und in sich in dieser Weise zur Wirkung bringen kann. Solche Systeme, die sich selbst Kausalität beschaffen, lassen sich dann auch  nicht mehr "kausal erklären" (es sei denn: im Reduktionsschema eines Beobachters), und dies nicht nur aus Gründern der Undurchsichtigkeit ihrer Komplexität, sondern aus Gründen der Logik. Sie setzen sich selbst als Produktion ihrer Selbstproduktion voraus. [85]

82 Gregory Bateson, Steps to an Ecology of Mind, San Francisco 1972, S. 315. Vgl. auch S. 271  f., 189 f.
85 Diese These steht an der Stelle, wo man früher das Bedürfnis empfand, zwischen "mechanistischen" und "geisteswissenschaftlichen" Theorien und Methoden zu unterscheiden. Die erkenntnistheoretischen Konsequenzen sind zur Zeit noch unausgelotet, werden aber diskutiert.
 Siehe z.B. Magaroh Maruyama, Heterogenistics and Morphogenetics; Toward a New Concept of the Scientifi, Theory and Society [sic] 5, (1978), S. 75-96.

 (S. 68-70)

 4 Kommunikation und Handlung

 [...] Der elementare, Soziales als besondere Realität konstituierende Prozeß ist ein Kommunikationsprozeß. Dieser Prozeß muß aber, um sich selbst steuern zu können, auf Handlungen reduziert, in Handlungen dekomponiert werden. Soziale Systeme werden demnach nicht aus Handlungen aufgebaut, so als ob diese Handlungen auf Grund der organisch-psychischen Konstitution des Menschen produziert werden und für sich bestehen könnten; sie werden in Handlungen zerlegt und gewinnen durch diese Reduktion Anschlußgrundlagen für weiter Kommunikationsverläufe.

II
Voraussetzung für alles Weitere ist demnach eine Klärung des Kommunikationsbegriffs. Üblicherweise bedient man sich hierbei der Metapher der "Übertragung". Man sagt, die Kommunikation übertrage Nachrichten oder Informationen vom Absender auf den Empfänger. Wir werden versuchen, ohne diese Metapher auszukommen, denn sie würde uns mit problematischen Vorentscheidungen belasten.
Die Übertragungsmetapher ist unbrauchbar, weil sie zu viel Ontologie impliziert. Sie suggeriert, daß der Absender etwas übergibt, was der Empfänger erhält. Das trifft schon deshalb nicht zu, weil der Absender nichts weggibt in dem Sinne, daß er selbst es verliert. Die gesamte Metaphorik des Besitzens, Habens, Gebens und Erhaltens, die gesamte Dingmetaphorik ist ungeeignet für ein Verständnis von Kommunikation.
Die  Übertragungsmetapher legt das Wesentliche der Kommunikation in der Akt der Übertragung, in der Mitteilung. Sie lenkt die Aufmerksamkeit und die Geschicklichkeitsanforderungen auf den Mitteilenden. Die Mitteilung ist aber nichts weiter als ein Selektionsvorschlag, eine Anregung [4]. Erst dadurch, daß diese Anregung aufgegriffen, daß die Erregung prozessiert wird, kommt Kommunikation zustande.
[...]
Die Selektion, die in der Kommunikation aktualisiert wird, konstituiert ihren eigenen Horizont; sie konstituiert das, was sie wählt, schon als Selektion, nämlich als Information. Das, was sie mitteilt, wird nicht nur ausgewählt, es ist selbst schon Auswahl und wird deshalb mitgeteilt. Kommunikation muß deshalb nicht als zweistelliger, sondern als dreistelliger Selektionsprozeß gesehen werden. Es geht nicht nur um Absendung und Empfang mit jeweils selektiver Aufmerksamkeit; vielmehr ist die Selektivität der Information selbst ein Moment des Kommunikationsprozesses, weil nur im Hinblick auf sie selektive Aufmerksamkeit aktiviert werden kann.
Der seit Shannon und Weaver [5] übliche Informationsbegriff macht es leicht, dies zu formulieren. Information ist nach heute geläufigen Verständnis eine Selektion aus einem (bekannten oder unbekannten) Repertoire von Möglichkeiten. Ohne diese Selektivität der Information kommt kein Kommunikationsprozeß zustande (wie immer minimal der Neuigkeitswert des Mitteilungsaustausches gehalten werden kann, wenn Kommunikation um ihrer selbst willen oder zur bloßen Ausfüllung von Leerräumen im Zusammensein durchgeführt wird). Ferner muß jemand ein Verhalten wählen, das diese Information mitteilt. Das kann absichtlich oder unabsichtlich geschehen. Entscheidend ist, daß die dritte Selektion sich auf eine Unterscheidung stützen kann, nämlich auf die Unterscheidung der Information von ihrer Mitteilung. Da dies entscheidend ist und Kommunikation nur von hier aus verstanden werden kann, nennen wir (etwas ungewöhnlich) den Adressaten Ego und den Mitteilenden Alter.
Schon die Differenz von Information und Mitteilungsverhalten eröffnet weitreichende Möglichkeiten der Analyse. Da beides sinnhafte Deutungen verlangt, gerät der Kommunikant Alter dadurch in einen Zwiespalt. Seinem Selbstverständnis bieten sich zwei Anknüpfungen, die nicht miteinander in Übereinstimmung zu bringen sind. Was Information betrifft, so muß er sich selbst als Teil der Sinnwelt begreifen, in der die Information richtig oder falsch ist, relevant ist, eine Mitteilung lohnt, verstanden werden kann. Als jemand, der sie mitteilt, muß er sich selbst die Reinheit zusprechen, dies zu tun oder nicht zu tun. In der einen Hinsicht muß er sich selbst als Teil des wißbaren Weltwissens auffassen, denn die Information (sonst könnten er sie gar nicht handhaben) weist auf ihn zurück. In der anderen Hinsicht verfügt er über sich als selbstreferentielles System. Dieter Henrich nennt dies "Distanz zwischen seiner Subjektstellung und seiner Weltzugehörigkeit" und sieht in dieser Distanz die Notwendigkeit Lebensdeutungen begründet.
Soziologisch gesehen, ist diese Distanz aber nichts ursprüngliches, und auch die Philosophie wußte nichts von ihr vor Kant. Wir sehen sie nicht als Faktizität der transzendentalen Situierung, sondern als Effekt der Tatsache, daß Ego das Verhalten Alter als Kommunikation auffaßt und ihm dadurch zumutet, diese Distanz anzunehmen. Es geht hier natürlich nicht um die Frage, wer zuerst  auf den Gedanken kam. die Situation so zu sehen: Ego oder Alter. Entscheidend ist, daß erst die Sozialität der Situationsauslegung diese Aporie erzeugt. Dies erklärt auch, daß erst eine stärkere Ausdifferenzierung des Kommunikationssystems Gesellschaft das Bewußtsein dieser Aporie und entsprechende Bemühungen in der kultuellen Semantik hervorbringt. Auch diese Überlegung lehrt, daß es bei Kommunikation nie um ein Geschehen mit zwei Selektionspunkten geht - weder im Sinne der Übertragungsmetapher als Geben und Annehmen, noch im Sinne der Differenz von Information und Mitteilungsverhalten. Kommunikation kommt nur zustande, wenn diese zuletzt genannte Differenz beobachtet, zugemutet, verstanden und der Wahl des Anschlußverhaltens zu Grunde gelegt wird. Dabei schließ Verstehen mehr oder weniger weitgehende Mißverständnisse als normal ein; aber es wird sich, wie wir sehen werden, um kontrollierbare und korrigierbare Mißverständnisse handeln. [...]
Daß Verstehen ein unerläßliches Moment des Zustandekommens von Kommunikation ist, hat für das Gesamtverständnis von Kommunikation eine sehr weitreichende Bedeutung. Daraus folgt nämlich, daß Kommunikation nur als selbstreferentieller Prozeß möglich ist.
[...]
Auch in anderer Hinsicht beleuchtet diese Theorie kommunikativer Synthesen System/Umwelt-Beziehungen eigener Art. Ein System kann nicht nur über sich selbst kommunizieren, sondern ebenso leicht,  ja vielleicht besser, über anders. Man kann sich dies wie ein ständiges Pulsieren vorstellen: mit jeder Themenwahl expandiert und retrahiert das System, nimmt Sinngehalte auf und läßt andere fallen.

IV

Begreift man Kommunikation als Synthese dreier Selektionen als Einheit aus Information, Mitteilung und Verstehen, so ist die Kommunikation realisiert, wenn und soweit das Verstehen zustandekommt. Alles weitere geschieht "außerhalb" der Einheit einer elementaren Kommunikation und setzt sie voraus. Das gilt besonders für eine weitere Art von Selektion: für die Annahme bzw. Ablehnung der mittegeteilten Sinnreduktion.. Man muß beim Adressaten der Kommunikation das Verstehen ihres Selektionssinnes unterscheiden vom Annehmen bzw. Ablehnung der Selektion als Prämisse eigenen Verhaltens.

V 

Der differenz- und selektionsorientierte Kommunikationsbegriff macht Probleme und Schranken kommunikativen Verhaltens verständlich, die man seit Jahrhunderten beobachtet und beschreibt. Einmal in Kommunikation verstrickt, kommt man nie wieder ins Paradies der einfachen Seelen zurück (auch nicht, wie Kleist hoffte, durch die Hintertür). Dies wird typisch am (erst für die Neuzeit aktuellen) Thema der Aufrichtigkeit vorgeführt [22]. Aufrichtigkeit ist inkommunikabel, weil sie durch Kommunikation unaufrichtig wird. Denn Kommunikation setzt die Differenz von Information und Mitteilung und setzt beide als kontingent voraus. Man kann dann sehr wohl auch über sich selbst etwas mitteilen, über eigene Zustände, Stimmungen, Einstellungen, Absichten; dies aber nur so, daß man sich selbst als Kontext von Informationen vorführt, die auch anders ausfallen könnten. Daher setzt Kommunikation einen alles untergreifenden, universellen, unbehebbaren Verdacht frei, und alles Beteuern und Beschwichtigen regeneriert nur den Verdacht. So erklärt sich auf, daß dies Thema relevant wird im Zuge einer gesteigerten Ausdifferenzierung des Gesellschaftssystems, dass dann mehr und mehr auf die Eigenart von Kommunikation reflektiert. Die Unaufrichtigkeit der Aufrichtigkeit wird zum Thema, sobald man die Gesellschaft erfährt als etwas, was nicht durch Naturordnung, sondern durch Kommunikation zusammengehalten wird [23].

Dies Problem ist zunächst als ein anthropologisches registriert worden; es geht aber auf ein allgemeines kommunikationstheoretisches Paradoxon zurück. Man braucht nicht zu meinen, was man sagt (zum Beispiel, wenn man "guten Morgen" sagt). Man kann gleichwohl nicht sagen, daß man meint, was man sagt. Man kann es zwar sprachlich ausführen, aber die Beteuerung erweckt Zweifel, wirkt also gegen die Absicht. Außerdem müßte man dabei voraussetzen, daß man auch sagen könnte, daß man nicht meint, was man sagt. Wenn man aber dies sagt, kann der Partner nicht wissen, was man meint, wenn man sagt, daß man nicht meint, was man sagt.Er landet beim Paradox des Epimenides. Er kann nicht wissen, selbst wenn er sich Mühe gäbe, den Sprecher zu verstehen; also verliert die Kommunikation ihren Sinn.

Die Gründe für dieses Paradox der Inkommunikabilität liegen darin, daß der Verstehende auf Seiten des Kommunizierenden Selbstreferenz voraussetzen muß, um an ihr Information und Mitteilung scheiden zu können. Deshalb wird in jeder Kommunikation die Möglichkeit mitgeteilt, daß Selbstreferenz und Miteilung divergiern. Ohne diesen Hintergrund wäre die Kommunikation nicht zu verstehen, und ohne Aussicht auf Verständnis würde sie gar nicht stattfinden. Man kann sich irren, man kann den anderen täuschen; aber man kann nicht davon ausgehen, daß es diese Möglichkeit nicht gäbe.

[...] Sprachliche Kommunikation bedarf also im Hinblick auf soziale Konvenienz verstärkter Kontrolle, und kontrollieren kann sein Sprachverhalten nur, wer auch schweigen kann [26].

4. Dieser Begriffsvorschlag bei Johann Jakob Wagner, Philosophie der Erziehungskunst, Leipzig 1803 (z.B. S. 55: "Alle Mitteilung ist Erregung"). Es ist kein Zufall, daß solche Vorstellungen aufgetaucht sind in einem transzendentaltheoretisch erweiterten und relationstheoretisch ausgebreiteten Kontext, in dem man sich zugleich polemisch gegen das direkte Anstreben humaner Perfektion mit technischen Mitteln wendet und die Frage nach "Bedingungen der Möglichkeit" vorschaltet.
5 Vgl. Claude E. Shannon / Warren Weaver, The Mathematical Theory of Communication, Urbana Ill. 1949. Daß der hier vorgestellte Informationsbegriff nur technischen Berechnungen dienen sollte und Sinnbezüge gänzlich außer Acht läßt, ist hinlänglich bekannt; aber daraus kann natürlich nicht geschlossen werden, daß es in Sinnkontexten auf Selektivität nicht ankäme.
6 Vgl. Fluchtlinien: Philosophische Essays, Frankfurt 1982, insbes. S. 92.

22 Vgl. z.B. Lionel Trilling, Sincerity and Authenticity, Cambridge Mass. 1972
23 "J'appelle société les communications des hommes entre eux...", heißt es beim Physiokraten Nicolaus Baudau, Première Introduction à la philosophie économique ou analyse des états policés (1771), zit. nach der Ausgabe in: Eugène Daire (Hrsg.), Physiocrates, Paris 1846, Nachdruck Genf 1971, S. 657-821 (663).

26 Ein Thema, das im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert viel diskutiert wurde. Siehe z.B. Nicolas Faret, L'honeste homme, ou l'art de plaire à la Cour, Paris 1630, zit. nach der Ausgabe Paris 1925, S. 73 ff.; Jacques du Bosq, L'honneste femme, Neuauflage Rouen 1639, S. 56 ff.: Madeleine de Scuderi, De parler trop ou trop peu, comment il faut parler, in dies., Conversations sur divers sujets Bd. I, Lyon 1680, S. 159-204; Jean-Baptise Morvan de Bellegarde, Conduite pour se taire et pour parler, principalement en matière de religion, Paris 1696.

(S193-209)

Diejenigen evolutionären Errungenschaften, die jenen Bruchstellen der Kommunikation ansetzen und funktionsgenau dazu dienen, Unwahrscheinliches in Wahrscheinliches zu transformieren, wollen wir Medien nennen [43] In Entsprechung zu den drei Arten der Unwahrscheinlichkeit von Kommunikation muß man drei verschiedene Medien unterscheiden, die einander wechselseitig ermöglichen, limitieren und mit Folgeproblemen belasten. Das Medium, das das Verstehen von Kommunikation weit über das Wahrnehmbare hinaus steigert, ist die Sprache [43a]. Das führt in Komplexitätsprobleme, die durch Regeln für den Zeichengebrauch, durch Reduktion der Komplexität, durch Eingewöhnung einer begrenzten Kombinatorik gelöst werden. Der Grundvorschlag bleibt jedoch die Regulierung der Differenz von Mitteilungsverhalten und Information. Als Zeichen gefaßt, kann diese Differenz der Kommunikation von Alter und Ego zu Grunde gelegt werden, und beide können durch gleichsinnigen Zeichengebrauch in der Meinung bestärkt werden, dasselbe zu meinen. Es handelt sich demnach um eine ganz spezielle Technik mit der Funktion, das Repertoire verständlicher Kommunikation ins praktisch Unendliche auszuweiten und damit sicherzustellen, daß nahezu beliebige Ereignisse als Information erscheinen und bearbeitet werden können. Die Bedeutung dieser Zeichentechnik ist kaum zu überschätzen. Sie beruht jedoch auf funktionaler Spezifikation. Man muß deshalb auch ihre Grenzen sehen. Weder ist Sinn als solcher ein Zeichen noch erklärt die Zeichentechnik der Sprache, welche Selektion von Zeichen im Kommunikationsprozeß Erfolg hat.

Auf Grund von Sprache haben sich Verbreitungsmedien, nämlich Schrift, Druck und Funk entwickeln lassen. Sie beruhen auf einer inkongruenten Dekomposition und Rekombination von sprachlich nicht weiter auflösbaren Einheiten [44]. Erreicht wird damit eine immense Ausdehnung der Reichweite des Kommunikationsprozesses, die ihrerseits zurückwirkt auf das, was sich als Inhalt der Kommunikation bewährt [45]. Die Verbreitungsmedien seligieren durch ihre eigene Technik, sie schaffen eigene Erhaltungs- , Vergleichs- und Verbesserungsmöglichkeiten, die aber jeweils nur auf Grund von Standardisierungen benutzt werden können. Dadurch wird, verglichen mit mündlicher, interaktions- und gedächtnisgebundener Überlieferung, immens ausgeweitet und zugleich eingeschränkt, welche Kommunikation als Grundlage für weitere Kommunikationen dienen kann.

Mit all diesen Entwicklungen von Sprach- und Verbreitungstechnik wird erst recht zweifelhaft, welche Kommunikation überhaupt Erfolg haben, das heißt zur Annahme motivieren kann. Bis weit in die Neuzeit hinein hat man auf gesteigerte Unwahrscheinlichkeit mit forcierten Bemühungen um eine Art Persuasivtechnik reagiert, so um Eloquenz als Erziehungsziel, um Rhetorik als besondere Kunstlehre, um Disputation als Konflikt- und Durchsetzungskunst. Selbst die Erfindung des Buchdruck hat diese Bemühungen nicht obsolet werden lassen, sondern eher noch verstärkt [46] Der Erfolg lag jedoch nicht in dieser eher konservativen Richtung, sondern in der Entwicklung von symbolisch generalisierten Kommunikationsmedien, die funktionsgenau auf dieses Problem bezogen sind [47].
[...]
Die Entwicklung dieser Medien betrifft nicht nur ein äußeres "Mehr" an Kommunikation, sie verändert auch die Art und Weise der Kommunikation selbst. Man kann den Ansatzpunkt der Veränderung fassen, wenn man bedenkt, daß Kommunikation die Erfahrung der Differenz von Mitteilung und Information voraussetzt. Diese Differenzerfahrung ist nicht unbedingt als eindeutiges Faktum gegeben, sie kann mehr oder weniger deutlich vorliegen. Nur so ist eine allmähliche Evolution in Richtung auf Ausdifferenzierung spezifischer kommunikativer (sozialer) Systeme möglich. An diesem Ansatzpunkt wirken die Medien auf die sozio-kulturelle Evolution ein. Mündliches Sprechen in Interaktion unter Anwesenden und die spätere Hochstilisierung dieses Sprechen zum oratorisch gewandten Reden setzen zwar einen Gegenstand der Rede voraus (und, wie man in der Rhetorik-Schulen lehrt: Sachkunde in Bezug auf diesen Gegenstand), aber sie können Mitteilung und Rede zur Wirkungseinheit verschmelzen, können Sprechen und Hören und Annehmen rhythmisch-rhapsodisch synchronisierten buchstäblich keine Zeit lassend für Zweifel. Erst die Schrift erzwingt eine eindeutige Differenz von Mitteilung und Information, und der Buchdruck verstärkt dann nochmals den Verdacht, der sich aus der Sonderanfertigung der Mitteilung ergibt: daß sie eigenen Motiven folgt und nicht nur Dienerin der Information ist. Erst Schrift und Buchdruck legen es nahe, Kommunikationsprozesse anzuschließen, die nicht auf die Einheit von Mitteilung und Information, sondern gerade auf ihre Differenz reagieren: Prozesse der Wahrheitskontrolle, Prozesse der Artikulation eines Verdachtes mit anschließender Universalisierung des Verdachts in psychoanalytischer und/oder ideologischer Richtung.
Schrift und Buchdruck erzwingen also die Erfahrung der Differenz, die Kommunikation konstituiert: Sie sind in diesem Sinne kommunikativere Formen der Kommunikation, und sie veranlassen damit Reaktion von Kommunikation auf Kommunikation in einem sehr viel spezifischeren Sinne, als dies in der Form mündlicher Wechselrede möglich ist [48].


43 Wie häufig, wenn eine umfassendere Theorie Teilstücke aus der bisherigen Forschung zusammenschließt, treten auch hier Terminologieprobleme auf. Der Ausdruck "Medien" ist vor allen in der Forschung über Massenkommunikation geläufig und in dieser Verwendung popularisiert worden. Daneben gibt es den spiritualistischen Gebrauch, bezogen auf Kommunikation mit ungewöhnlichen Partnern, ferner den Gebrauch innerhalb der Parsons'schen Theorie, bezogen auf Tauschvermittlung. Wir schlagen im Text eine eigenwillige, rein funktionale Neufassung vor.
43a  Hiervon ist die oben S. 137 behandelte Funktion der Sprache für die Generalisierung der Selbstreferenz von Sinn zu unterscheiden, wenngleich in der Evolution beides nur zusammen entstehen kann.
44 Dies gilt ganz besonders für die Perfektion der Schrift durch das Alphabet. Vgl. dazu Eric A. Havelock, Origins of Western Literacy, Toronto 1976.
45 Ein neuerdings viel beachtetes Thema. Siehe neben den bereits genannten Arbeiten von Havelock auch Jack Goody / Ian Watt, The Consequences of Literacy, Comparative Studies in Society and History 5 (1963), S. 304-345; Walter J. Ong, The Presence of the Word, New Haven 1967; Elisabeth L. Eisenstein, The Printing Press as an Agent of Social Change: Communications and Cultural Transformations in Early-modern Europe, 2 Bde., Cambridge Engl. 1979; Michael Giesecke, Schriftsprache als Entwicklungsfaktor in Sprach- und Begriffsgeschichte, in: REinhart Koselleck (Hrsg.), Historische Semantik und Begriffsgeschichte, Stuttgart 1979, S. 262-302; ders., 'Volkssprachen' und 'Verschriftlichung' des Lebens im Spätmittelalter - am Beispiel der Genese der gedruckten Fachprosa in Deutschland, in: Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht (Hrsg.), Literatur in der Gesellschaft dese Spätmittelalters, Heidelberg 1980, S. 39-70.
46 Siehe für den Bereich der katholischen Theologie etwa Walter J. Ong (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Walter_J._Ong), Communications media and the State of Theology, Cross Currents 19 (1969), S. 462-480. Zur Rhetorik z.B. Volker Kapp, Rhetorische Theoriebildung im Frankreich des 17. und frühen 18. Jahrhunderts, Zeitschrift für französische Sprache und Literatur 89 (1979) mit weiteren Hinweisen.
47 Begriff und Theorieentwicklung sind vor allem durch Talcott Parsons angeregt worden. Vgl. in deutscher Übersetzung Talcott Parsons, Zur Theorie der sozialen Interaktionsmedien, herausgegeben und eingeleitet von Stefan Jensen, Opladen 1980. Im Rahmen der Parsons'schen Theorie ist das Bezugsproblem der Medienbildung jedoch ein Tauschverhältnis zwischen (analytischen) Subsystemen des allgemeinen Handlungssystem. Zur Überführung in einen kommunikationstheoretischen Rahmen vgl. Niklas Luhmann, Einführende Bemerkungen zu einer Theorie symbolisch generalisierter Kommunikationsmedien, in ders., Soziologische Aufklärung Bd. 2 Opladen 1975, S. 170-192; ders. Macht, Stuttgart 1975; ders. Liebe als Passion: zur Kodierung von Intimität, Frankfurt 1982.
[48] Die übliche Auffassung denkt genau umgekehrt, weil sie Kommunikation teleologisch interpretiert als angelegt auf Übereinstimmung. Dann muß natürlich mündliche Wechselrede (Dialog, Diskurs) als Idealform erscheinen und alle Technisierung der Kommunikation durch Schrift und Druck als Verfallserscheinung oder als Notbehelf.

(S. 220-224) [meine Hervorhebungen, RC]



VILEM FLUSSER: KOMMUNIKOLOGIE

Mannheim 1996

Inhalt

Umbruch der menschlichen Beziehungen?

Was ist Kommunikation?


1. Kapitel

1. Einige Kommunikationstrukturen
(a) Theaterdiskurse
(b) Pyramidendiskurse
(c) Baumdiskurse
(d) Amphitheaterdiskurse
(e) Kreisdialogue
(f) Netzsdialoge

2. Wie diese Strukturen funktionieren
(a) Theater und Kreis
(b) Pyramide und Baum
(c) Amphitheater und Netz

3. Drei charakteristische Situationen
(a) Gedruckte Bücher
(b) Manuskripte
(c) Technobilder

2. Kapitel

1. Was sind Codes?

2. Wie drei characteristische Codes entstanden
(a) Vor-Alphabet
(b) Alphabet
(c) Nach-Alphabet

3. Wie dieses Codes funktionieren
(a) Bilder
(b) Texte
(c) Technobilder
(d) Apparat-Operator

4. Synchronisation der drei Codes
(a) Bild-Text
(b) Bild-Technobild
(c) Text-Technobild

3 Kapitel

Was sind Technobilder?
1. Entzifferung einiger Technobilder
(a) Fotografien 
(b) Filme
(c) Video
(d) Fernsehen

2. Technoimagination

(a) Standpunkte
(b) Zeiterlebnis
(c) Raumerlebnis

3. Die gegenwärtige Situation



Vorlesungen zur Kommunikologie

Absichtserklärung
Einleitung
Der Vorgang der menschlichen Kommunikation
Motive und Grenzen der Kommunikation
Der Einbruch des Technoimaginären
Diskursive Medien
Dialogische Medien
Telefon
Paideia
Imperative
Spiele
Übersetzung
Veröffentlichung


Der Vorgang der menschlichen Kommunikation

[...] Nimmt man als das Kompetenzfeld der Kommunikationstheorie alle Phänomene, durch welche Botschaften symbolisch übertragen werden (zum Beispiel Gesten, Laute, Zeichen, Farben), dann hat man, selbst nach Ausklammeruong des Tierischen und des - sagen wir - "Instinktiven" im Menschen, ein so unüberblickbares Feld vor sich, daß jeder Versuch, sich darin zu orientieren, geradezu lächerlich erscheint. Das Feld reicht vom Kopfnicken bis zur Literatur, vom Morsecode zur symbolischen Logik, von der Kriegstrommel bis zum Urbanismus, von der Maske bis zum Universitätscampus. Und es hat wenig Sinn, dies alles unter dem Sammelnamen "Kultur" fassen zu wollen, um es zugänglicher zu machen. Die Kompoetenz der Kommunikationstheorie erstreckt sich zwar auf alles Kulturelle, also auf Wissenschaft, Kunst, Politik, Wirtschaft, Religion, Recht und Gesellschaftsformen, denn all dies sind ja Phänomene, bei denen Botschaften symbolisch übertragen werden. Aber eine solche Formulierung trägt zur Erkenntnis des Problems der Kommunikationstheorei und also zur Ausarabeitung einer Strategie für die Erforschung dieses Problems nicht viel bei. Weiter führt die Erkenntnis, daß die Kommunikationstheorie zwar das ganze Feld der Kultur ins Auge faßt (und in diesem Sinn also eine "allgemeine Theorie" ist), aber nur von einem begrenzten, spezifischen Windel aus, nämlich dem Standpunkt der symbolischen Übertragung von Botschaft. Die Absicht der Theorie besteht demnach nicht darin, die verschiedenen bestehenden Geisteswissenschaften durch irgendeine ihnen allen gemeinsame "Mathesis" erklären zu wollen, sondern zu zeigen, daß sich alle diese spezialisierten und scheinbar ganz voneinander unabhängigen Disziplinen (wie etwa Musik und Administration, oder Epistemologie und Plakatentwurf) vom Standpunkt der Kommunikation aus synoptisch erfassen lassen. Die Absicht ist nciht, die Kultur (oder den "Geist") theoretisch zu erklären, sondern einen interdisziplinären Einblick in das Gewebe der Kultur zu gewinnen und damit eine neue Perspektive auf sie. So gesehen wird das scheinbar unübersichtliche Komptenzfeld der Theorie doch etwas zugänglicher.
Die erste Frage, die in diesem Sinn zu stellen ist, lautet: Was meint "symbolische Übertragung von Botschaft" genau? Es ist klar, daß es sich bei dieser  Frage um ein Definieren der Kompetenz handelt, denn sie fragt: (a) Was ist Übertragung, (b) was ist, spezifischer, Übertragung von Botschaft, und (c) was ist, ganz spezifisch für die Kommunikationstheorie, symbolische Übertragung von Botschaft? Definitionen sind Vorschläge für den künftigen Gebrauch von Begriffen. Hier werden, bis auf Widerrufm folgende vorgeschlagen:
(a) Übertragung" ist jeder Proezß, bei dem verschiedene Systeme gekoppelt wrden;
(b) "Übertragung von Botschaft" ist eine solche Koppelung von verschiedenen Systemen, bei der sich die Form eir aller Systeme verändert;
(c) "symbolische Übertragung von Botschaft" ist eine solche Formveränderung, bei der die Koppelung der Systeme durch Konvention hergestellt wurde.


(S. 245-246)



Finally it can be said that an empirical science called angeletics should be distinguished from a philosophic angeletics as well as from an angeletic philosophy. This is a similar distinction as the one made between hermeneutic as a methodology, philosophic hermeneutics as developed by Gadamer, and Heidegger's hermeneutic philosophy. In my opinion, Heidegger's phenomenology is in fact an angeletic thinking (Heidegger 1975).




Published in Rafael Capurro & John Holgate (eds.): Messages and Messengers Angeletics as an Approach to the Phenomenology of Communication. Munich: Fink Verlag 2011, pp. 67-84.


ON WESTERN ANGELETIC CONCEPTIONS


RC
 As you know, Jakobson’s “communication model” distinguishes between the phatic function, the message, the context and the code. These distinctions go back to Karl Bühler’s “organon model” in which the triadic relation between sender, reference and receiver can be of a different nature depending upon whether the signs represent something (“Darstellung”), or express something about the sender (“Ausdruck”) or make an impact on the receiver (“Apell”) (Bühler 1978/1934). Since Niklas Luhmann we know that the message (“Mitteilung”) is a meaning-offer and has no definite content until the receiver makes his/her choices. Cybernetics has taught us that every receiver can turn into a sender. Lacanian psychoanalysis underlines the indefinite and indefinable nature of “the object” addressed in the long run by human desire. No less important is the role of the psychoanalyst as “the other” that enables the analysand to take a detour to himself/herself. This relationship, called the transference phenomenon, takes place from both sides. In other words, I am suggesting that the psychoanalytic experience is not only centred on the indefinite object of desire, as Lacan stressed, but also on the angeletic experience of the analyst as a messenger who passes on the message coming from the analysand or, more precisely, from his/her already understood (i.e. pre-conceived) being-in-the-world that Freud called ‘the unconscious.’ The original messenger or medium is not something (!) in-between a sender and a receiver, but it is Ba or being-in-the-world itself, although seen or experienced differently in Japan and the West, if I may simplify this complex intercultural issue. We can distinguish roughly the following conceptions:

1) metaphysical (theocentric) angeletics: God as sender - angels/poets as messengers - humans as receivers;

2) anthropocentric and technocentric angeletics: humans as senders - technical media as messengers - humans as receivers technical (artificial) and/or human senders - technical (digital) media as messengers - technical (artificial) and/or human receivers;

3) ontological angeletics: Being as sender - ‘here’ of Being as ontic-ontological messenger, sender and/or receiver - Being as receiver.

The ontological conception is the only one that thinks the original relation or encounter (“Ereignis”) between Being and “being here” or Ba. To speak about Being as ‘sender’ and ‘receiver’ could be misunderstood as a kind of ontic phenomenon separated from the “here” or Ba. I shall try to explain this issue later.

As you know, in Being and Time (Heidegger 1976), Heidegger called the original relation between understanding and pre-understanding of the “here” of Being the “hermeneutic circle” (Heidegger 1976). But given the fact that existential understanding is not primarily a theoretical, but a practical activity concerning all kinds of relations happening in the shared world-openness, it would be better to speak of an ‘angeletic circle’ or a relation between message and messenger, as Heidegger proposed in one of his late writings (Heidegger 1975). Each interpretation is based on a process of message transmission. Which means that hermeneutics presupposes angeletics. Hermes is first and foremost a messenger, no less than an interpreter and translator. Of course, a philosophical angeletics is no less ambitious than twentieth century hermeneutic philosophy. We should also make a distinction between an ontic or empirical science of messages and messengers, and a philosophical angeletics. As an empirical science, angeletics is not necessarily reduced to the phenomenon of human communication but can include also all kinds of messages and messengers in the natural sciences.

Let me further explain what I understand by angeletic philosophy and, correspondingly, by a philosophical angeletics, using other Heideggerian themes, without going into a detailed textual analysis or exegesis of Heidegger. But perhaps I should use the term ‘angeletic thinking’ instead of ‘angeletic philosophy’ insofar as thinking is a possible historical response to the call of Being (Heidegger 1971), whereas philosophy in the Greek tradition is a doctrine or teaching about the forms (idea, eidos) of beings qua beings. From this perspective, thinking is originally angeletic, whereas philosophy is ‘in-formational’ (Capurro 1978). Heidegger explains this inversion and transformation of the relationship between subject and object into Being and Dasein by saying that, while modern subjectivity has a “representation” (“Vorstellung”, ‘idea’, ‘image’) of a tree, thinking exposes itself to the “call” (“Ruf”) of a tree itself that, so to speak, “introduces itself” (“der Baum stellt sich uns vor”) (Heidegger 1971, 16-17). This second experience is possible because we and the tree have a common ground, namely the earth (“die Erde”) which is not in our heads but in the world (ibid.). As Jean-Luc Nancy, following Heidegger, remarks, philosophy and particularly hermeneutics can be understood as the presentation of a message. The task of thinking is of the kind of being a messenger (Nancy 2001, 94-95; Capurro 2002).

As you know, Heidegger’s so-called ‘turn’ (“Kehre”) has to do with the view that (human) existence (Dasein) is addressed by Being instead of conceiving Dasein as ‘projecting’ or casting his/her being. Of course, both perspectives are closely related and already addressed in Being and Time (Heidegger 1976). But for Heidegger, human existence or, to put it in more neutral terms, the structure he calls Dasein or the Here of “Being” that seems to be characteristic only of a particular kind of beings, namely ourselves, is derivative not only with regard to knowledge but also in its very possibility of being. This can be expressed in simple terms by saying that we human beings are finite beings and are aware of our givenness as well. We know that we were born and that we will die, as well as of the “in-between” (“Zwischen”) of our lives (Heidegger 1976, 374).

Heidegger uses the term “Es gibt” (‘there is,’ ‘it gives’) in order to express what we can call the ontological angeletic phenomenon (Heidegger 1976a). Being is the original sender and receiver whose encounter (Ereignis) with Da-sein or ‘Ba’as messenger enables a world, that is to say, an ethos or cast of living to emerge. But the expression ‘there is’ or ‘it gives’ makes it clear that Being is not any kind of subject, especially not a divine one, sending and receiving messages. (Sheehan 2001) It is in original unity and difference with its Here. And vice versa: the messenger that receives the message of/from Being is in itself – or as him/herself in the case of human Dasein, the only one we know about – a ‘disclosure’ (aletheia = truth) or messenger of Being. The message is the world.

Dasein announces its facticity with the phatic dialogical (!) function: ‘You see, I’m here’ (Boku ha koko ni iruyo). In his late writings, on several occasions Heidegger uses a tautological style such as “language speaks” (“die Sprache spricht”) to underscore the self-referential phenomenon of Being that cuts off, so to speak, the monologue of the (human) subject, especially when such monologue is conceived entirely as an inter-subjective dialogue, leaving aside its ontological dimension. In the ‘Dialogue with a Japanese’ he makes a distinction between “speaking about” (“Sprechen über”) and “speaking from” (“Sprechen von”), that is to say, between language as a tool for conversation vs. language as the messenger of Being. In the last sentence of the Tractatus Wittgenstein uses this distinction but he seems not to be aware of it: “What we cannot speak about, we must pass over in silence” (“7 Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muß man schweigen.”) (Wittgenstein 1975, 85). Wittgenstein is phatically speaking “from” Being – the standard English translation says “about” instead of ‘from’ – by saying that it is not possible to speak “about” – literally “over” it – because Being is not an object (and of course it is not a subject), or it is an ‘object’ or “la Chose” (or “l’a-chose”) in the Lacanian sense (Lacan 1986). It ‘is’ or ‘it sends itself’ as the in-between of Da-sein letting messages pass through. In contrast to language as a tool, poetic language allows us to speak “from” Being in a kind of relation where the messenger hears what language ‘dictates’ (Latin dictare, German dichten) or sends to him/her. Humans as the Here of Being are messengers of Being, letting beings be what they are. Heidegger calls humans “messengers” (“Botengänger”) (Heidegger 1975, 155). He writes:

The messenger must already come from the message. But he must also already have gone toward it. (“Der Botengänger muß schon von der Botschaft herkommen. Er muß aber auch schon auf sie zugegangen sein.”). (Heidegger 1975, 150, my translation RC)

The usual German term for messenger being Bote, “Botengänger” seems to underline the pure dynamic fact of bringing the message. It is the opposite of the kind of messengers we call ambassadors (Botschafter). There is an original unity and difference between Being and Dasein beyond or prior to any ontic separation of sender, message, messenger and receiver. Unity and difference between Being and Dasein mean nothing more and nothing less than that we cannot not interpret or ‘cast’ the meaning of Being by casting or projecting – Heidegger calls it “Entwurf” – not only what beings are, but primordially and practically our own existence. I think that today this double-bind casting of Being is done from a perspective of the digital. I call it therefore digital ontology (Capurro 2010) following basic insights of the Australian philosopher, Michael Eldred (Eldred 2009/2011).

Humans as messengers are then not primarily, as we believe especially since modernity, senders and/or (digital) receivers of messages, but are originally messengers of Being, the message itself being the world as a casting of Being arising from the encounter between Being and Dasein. This inverted relationship with regard to anthropocentric modernity allows us a heteronomous relation to Being, becoming who we are, that is to say, in Lacanian terms, a divided or “crossed-out” (“barré”) subject (Lacan 1971, II, 168) or a subject characterized by the finitude of its being addressed by the Other (Lacan 1971, 108) that can annihilate him/her. Loneliness and anxiety are moods through which, as Heidegger taught us, we discover the truth, that is to say, the finitude of being-in-the-world-with-others. We receive and pass on – and sometimes try to bypass – the message of Being because we are originally the Here of its disclosure.

Although we mostly live immersed in the given openness of everyday existence, exchanging messages and maintaining communication through the phatic function, we have the potentiality to grasp a given (historical) disclosure of Being as a possible one, that is to say, to change its truth. For this it is necessary that the message of Being is perceived as such — as a gift of the ‘it gives’. An example of this at the level of an ontic region is the so-called paradigm change in science where the pre-ontological messages (facts) that are supposed to prove or falsify a theory are re-interpreted when the theory, with all its biases, pre-conceptions and pre-suppositions, its instruments, institutions, traditions, etc., is put into question (Kuhn 1970). The radical questioning of a given world-openness by a messenger of Being that makes explicit this ontological or structural relation between Being and messenger, can lead to strong opposition from the defenders of the status quo and – to condemnation of the messenger, as in the case of Socrates. This opens the debate as to which are the ethical criteria for making a distinction between a messenger of Being and its opposite (a charlatan), with all degrees in between. One important criterion for this difficult ethical task that is always endangered by manipulation and self-deception is whether the messenger maintains critically the openness of Being or proclaims an absolute truth. Another criterion is whether other messengers also remain critical with regard to the alternative casting of Being as passed on to them, or whether they develop from there, say, a political ideology, a mere worldview or a theoretical dogma (I thank Michael Eldred for an enlightening e-mail exchange on this issue).


RAFAEL CAPURRO: ON THE GENEALOGY OF INFORMATION

Paper presented at the international conference: Information. New Questions to a Multidisciplinary Concept organized by the Chair for Philosophy of Technology at the Technical University of Cottbus held from March 1st to 3rd, 1994. In: K. Kornwachs, K. Jacoby Eds.: Information. New Questions to a Multidisciplinary Concept. Akademie Verlag Berlin 1996, pp. 259-270.

IV. INFORMATION IN THE CONTEXT OF PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE 
AND PRINTING TECHNOLOGY


From the very beginning of Socratic philosophy one information mood symbolized by the term angelía, namely the poetic activity, is the object of criticism. The concept of lógos begins its splendid career and angelía disappears.  
 

In Plato's dialogue Ion Socrates analyzes the 'hermeneutical' activity of the Homeric rhapsode who is supposed to transmit to the listeners a thought (diánoia). But he cannot fulfil such a task as he does not know what he is talking about (légei) (Platon 1967, Ion 530c). Ion has indeed the divine power to fill his listeners with enthusiasm. It is the god himself who speaks (légon) to the poet and it is the rhapsode who brings the message (hermenés) to the people. This double vertical structure is compared by Plato to a magnet, not only as far as a magnet caused to hang the rings down but also because it communicates to them its force which causes the 'hanging down'.   

This vertical structure is not completely abolished but relativated by the horizontal philosophical dialogue. The 'erotic' force leading and sustaining the 'logical' search for truth has the Divine as its aim and origin. This means, on the one hand, an inversion of the transmission movement of the mythical and poetical angelía but, on the other hand, this inversion causes also the content of the message not in some way already to have been given from the 'top' but must it be defined from the 'bottom'. In order to get to the 'top' one must be able to know in a particular way what we are talking about in each case so that we can transfer it into a higher level. The content of the message is a lógos to be found and the method of communication is one of exchanging it in a dia-logue. But the philosophic lógoshas something special with regard to other horizontal lógoi. Socrates criticizes the lógoi of the artisans and politicians as they believe they know what they are talking about, but then forgetting the limits of their knowledge i.e. not being guided by an 'erotic' self-transcendent or vertical force which relativizes all positive contents giving the possibility of looking through them into their divine origin. Whether or not this vertical tendency of the horizontal philosophical dialogue was more intense in Plato than in Socrates, it is nevertheless clear that Socrates' symmetrical attitude was highly ironical. He considered himself as a mediator, doing the work of a midwife. He was a 'daimonic man'.   

The change from mythical-poetical angelía to philosophic lógos brings about new practices and institutions i.e. new forms of power. Instead of the palace, the war places and the Olympic games we are now at the agorá and in the schools. New conflicts arise between the philosophic communities and the religious and political powers. The horizontal liberalization of philosophic dialogue accentuates the tension with the vertical structures of the pólis. Socrates's death is a clear example of this tension. Plato tried to integrate both poles in his state philosophy by giving the political leader something of the 'higher' but philosophical knowledge of the Divine. This structure determines in a very detailed form all kinds of rites, duties and techniques including the arts of the ideal pólis. This is a substitute of the old information utopia as represented by the mythical and poetic angelía. 

It is a 'logical' information utopia where all the partial or 'technical' lógoi are superseded by a divine techné which is transmitted by a long 'dialectical' education aiming at a knowledge of the mathematical and the 'ideal' structures and their imperfect representations in the cosmic and political order. The mythical experience of the divine is integrated into the platonic 'infological' structure as a 'sudden' (exáiphnes) encounter with an 'unspoken' dimension (árrheton) after a long journey of searching for the truth under the guidance of a philosophy master. This 'searching together' is therefore not symmetrical. Socrates and Plato in their roles as masters are mediators of the god in a similar but not identical way as the poet was. Although Plato, following Socrates, definitely gave the priority to orality as the adaequate medium in which the philosophic éros fertilizes the souls, he belonged to a culture where writing was already a generalized communication medium particularly in the sciences. His dialogues are somehow a transition between the way writing was used by the poets to preserve and transmit a message which was intended to produce enthusiasm and its uses through scientific and 'technical' communities.   

The allegory of the cave (Plato 1967, Rep. 514-518) can be seen as an inverted information utopia of what a philosophical view of the 'unchanging' and 'supra-sensible' world brings about. Instead of the multiplicity of forms or messages reproduced in front of the cave, of which the prisoners can only see the shadows and talk about them, the platonic dialectic presents a world where there is no more need for information because the forms themselves are the permanent subject of an eternal communication structure. The ideal world is a world of pure form and therefore of pure communication. It is an 'un-human' world. Writing is for Plato a shadow of the oral lógos which itself is again an image of the 'mathematical' structures and these again of the 'ideas' or forms. Learning to see the sensible world under the perspective of the 'world' of mathematical structures and of the 'ideal forms' means nothing more and nothing less than finding the 'utopian' place, i.e. the place or the perspective from where it is possible to see it as forever 'in-formed'. Plato's information utopia is a communication utopia. From this 'ideal' perspective our 'global village' or "télécité" (Virilio 1992), is like a networked cave, a surrogate of the 'hyper reality' of the divine 'intellectual place' (tópos noetós) of pure 'in-formation' or pure communication.  

Plato's utopia differs in many ways from that developed by Aristoteles. One key aspect is the question of the kind of legitimation to be given to knowledge mediation through rhetoric or oral communication and writing. Aristotle was more liberal in his conception of the role of media in the 'pólis' (Aristotle 1950, Pol. viii). He was not oriented towards a mythical idea from which to 'in-form' reality but asked for a 'human measure' of living. In his "Rhetoric" he legitimates different kinds of communication forms, such as deliberative, juridical and laudatory speech, whose aim is to teach or to inform (!), to influence and to please. Aristotelian rhetoric offers a framework for the foundation of information science (Capurro 1992). But also with regard to writing, Aristotle is no longer 'ideo-logically' biased as Plato was. He differentiates between writing for the school (esoteric) and writing for the general public (exoteric) in a different manner as probably Plato did as he transmitted some knowledge through writing but retained some basic insights which were supposed to pertain to oral tradition only (Platon 1967, Epist. vii). Aristotle has a basic confidence in writing as an adequate medium for the communication of philosophic investigations. Aristotle collects and discusses the writings of other philosophers and scientists. His nickname is 'the reader' (anagnóstes). An anagnóstes was usually a servant who read a book out aloud publicly, while the academicians normally heard what was being read. When a book was publicly read out loud it was considered as 'published'.   

The information paradigm of the Greek lógos has many other shapes. It looks like a servant of economic and political power as in the case of the sophists, and it can be seen as a completely free form of communication (parrhesía), particularly of taboo subjects, as in the cynical school - similarly, the relation of the philosophic lógos to poetry and religion as well as to tragedy and comedy changes. The freedom to say anything, at any time, to anybody is based on limited conditions as, for instance, to be a (male) citizen of the pólis and to respect the laws.  

After the encounter of the Greek lógos with the Judeo-Christian angelía the relation between the vertical and the horizontal dimensions of information changed in favor of the vertical angelía whereas philosophy became a servant of theology (ancilla theologiae). Renaissance and the Enlightenment looked for a liberation of the horizontal information structure from its vertical mood, at least in the field of science. The model of a rational discussion of arguments open to public discussion through writing seems really to have been achieved with printing. Modernity raises the question whether printing can be conceived as a neutral communication medium where messages can be passed without the censorship of the government, the church or the military.   

This ideal was stated for instance by Immanuel Kant in Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung? as well as in Was heisst: Sich im denken orientieren? (Kant 1900). According to Kant the freedom of thought depends on the freedom of communicating our thoughts. To think by ourselves does not mean thinking in isolation within our own 'spirit'. This leads either to the kind of intellectual imagination Kant calls 'metaphysics', i.e. to pure speculation, or to madness, as in the case of Emanuel Swedenborg (Kant 1990, Träume eines Geistersehers). True thinking is 'common' thinking in the sense that it is the product of receiving the messages of others and of communicating what according to one's own judgement, is held to be the truth, without censorship. Thinking has therefore for Kant a communicative and an informative dimension. The price for the freedom of autonomous thinking is its lack of immediate practical influence or power. Kants free agorá of thought is the Gutenberg marketplace. This is the modern information utopia. But censorship of all kinds continues, of course, influencing the communication of printed ideas. Altough public libraries create free spaces of accessibility, the capability to read and write are constrained by cultural, economic and political factors. Finally we should not forget that the lógos of modernity in many cases does not eliminate the vertical structure. The moral experience, as Kant clearly shows, has a vertical or 'imperative' mood which can be experienced as a source of liberation from economic and political power, as can be seen through the political revolutions over the last two centuries, but without no guaranty of success.  


RAFAEL CAPURRO: GENEALOGIE DER INFORMATION


In: 
R. Capurro: Leben im Informationszeitalter. Berlin: Akademieverlag 1995, S. 97-114.

[...] In verkürzter Form läßt sich vorweg sagen, daß die dichterische Gestaltung des Mitteilungsprozesses eine Abschwächung der Machtstrukturen des Mythos bedeutete, so wie wiederum die Geburt der Philosophie in der athenischen Agora zu einer Infragestellung des mythisch-dichterischen Botschaftsbegriffs (angelia) führte, indem die heteronome Dimension dieses Mitteilungsmodus  die Verkündung der göttlichen Weisheit (sophia) durch die Vorstellung einer autonomen Erkenntnissuche (philosophia) , wenn nicht ersetzt, doch zumindest verdrängt wurde. Die Herrschaft des philosophischen logos mit ihren spezifischen Machtstrukturen trat an. 

Die christliche Botschaft bedeutete wiederum eine erneute Verstärkung des heteronomen Mitteilungsmodus, der erst in der Neuzeit auf der Basis der Autonomie der Subjektivität und des vor ihr vorgestellten zensurfreien Raumes des freien, wissenschaftlichen Mitteilens auf der Basis des gedruckten Wortes in Frage gestellt wurde Dieser Raum ist heute nicht mehr primär durch das gedruckte Wort, sondern durch die elektronische Vernetzung multimedial gestaltet. Die ihn bestimmenden Machtstrukturen sind vorwiegend wirtschaftlicher Natur. Der Sinn des dichterisch- philosophischen Mitteilens und die neuzeitliche Idee der Denk- und Mitteilungsfreiheit als jeweils unterschiedliche menschenformende Kräfte scheinen, wie wir sahen, in der rastlosen Informationszirkulation beinah aufgelöst zu sein. Um die Kontingenz und somit Veränderbarkeit der heutigen Machtstrukturen wahrzunehmen, brauchen wir, so meine These, den Blick in die Genealogie der Information.

Die jetzt zu erörternden Kontexte, in denen sich zwischenmenschliches Mitteilen ausformt, nämlich der mythisch-dichterische, der philosophische, der christliche und der informationstechnische, sollten aber nicht in das lineare Schema einer fortschreitenden Entwicklung hinein konstruiert, sondern als wechselnde Spannungsfelder menschlicher Selbstgestaltungsmöglichkeiten aufgefaßt werden. Das Sichtbarwerden von verschütteten Möglichkeiten soll uns die scheinbar selbstverständliche Dominanz der heutigen Machtstrukturen in Frage stellen lassen.


VERENA HUBER: DIE ROLLE DES BOTEN IM MINNESANG

Studienarbeit, Germanistik, Universität Wien, 1996

https://www.grin.com/document/28369

I. Vorausblick
Der Bote hat in der Geschichte des deutschen Minnesangs eine bedeutende Rolle eingenommen. Wir werden sehen, welche Arten von Botenliedern es gibt und welche Rolle der Bote in einzelnen ausgewählten Liedern hat. Die Arbeit beruht nicht auf Vollständigkeit, sondern sie soll einen kurzen Einblick in die Lyrik des Minnesangs vom Kürenberger bis zu Walther von der Vogelweide liefern, immer mit dem Hauptaugenmerk auf der Rolle des Boten. Inwiefern Mann und Frau im Lied eine Rolle spielen, deren Wechsel und die Einbeziehung des Boten werde ich versuchen zu erläutern. Ich bin bei den Untersuchungen immer von Textbeispielen ausgegangen, da in diesem Fall die Primärtexte meiner Meinung nach nicht weglassbar sind.

II. Die Rolle des Boten im deutschen Minnesang

Eine Sonderform des Werbeliedes, in der als dritte fiktive Gestalt ein Bote zur Vermittlung von Liebesgrüßen, Werbungen, Minneermahnungen eingesetzt wird, ist das Botenlied. Es kommt im deutschen Minnesang schon sehr früh vor und kann verschiedene Funktionen haben. Generell unterscheidet Schweikle zwei Arten von Botenliedern:
-Lieder, in denen ein Bote selbst spricht
-Lieder, in denen einer der Liebenden einem Boten Aufträge, Grüße, Wünsche an den anderen aufträgt.[1]
Bezüglich dieser beiden Gruppen ist es nun vielleicht angebracht, einzelne Beispiele anzuführen, die die Rolle des Boten in diesen Liedern weiter verdeutlichen.

            1) Textbeispiele, in denen ein Bote selbst spricht:

            a) Dietmar von Aist:

Folgendes Lied des Dietmar von Aist wurde von Carl von Kraus zwar als unecht bezeichnet, jedoch ist dies für unsere Untersuchungen irrelevant. Zu beachten ist aber der sog. „Wechsel“, eine Kompositionsform, und die Erweiterung von zwei auf drei Strophen des Liedes, wobei hier sogar eine eigene Botenstrophe eingeführt wurde:

 MF 37,30

Sich hât verwándelt diu zît, daz verstên ich bî der vogel singen:
geswigen sint die nahtegal, si hânt gelân ir süezez klingen.
unde valwet oben der walt.
ienoch stêt daz herze mîn in ir gewalt,
der ich den sumer gedienet hân.
diu ist mîn vröide und al mîn liep, ich wil irs niemer abe gegân.
‘Ich muoz von rehten schulden hôch tragen daz herze
und alle die sinne,
sît mich der aller beste man verholn in sîme herzen minne.
er tuot mir grôzer sorgen rât.
wie selten mich diu sicherheit gerûwen hat.
ich wil im iemer staete sîn.
er kan wol grôzer arbeit gelônen nach dem willen mîn.’
Ich bin ein bote her gesant, vrouwe, ûf mange dîne güete.
ein ritter, der dich hât erwelt ûz al der werlte in sîn gemüete,
er hiez dir klagen sîn ungemach,
daz er ein senendez herze treit, sît er dich sach.
im tuot sîn langez beiten wê,
nu reden wirz an ein ende enzît, ê im sîn vröide gar zergê.[2]

Der Wechsel:

Bevor ich näher auf das Botenlied eingehe, möchte ich kurz den „Wechsel“ ansprechen, der immer wieder in Bezug auf den Minnesang genannt wird, und der, meiner Meinung nach, grundlegend für dessen Verstehen ist.
Ich halte mich dabei an die Formulierungen Rolf Grimmingers, der Wechsel als Monologe zwischen Mann und Frau definiert, die durch den Bezug zwischen beiden bestimmt und verändert werden können. Dabei ist die Grenze der Monologe jeweils durch den Beginn einer neuen Strophe gekennzeichnet. Daraus folgt, daß es mindestens zwei Strophen, also zwei eigenständige Teile geben muß, die eine Beziehung untereinander erkennen lassen und ebenso die Sprechenden identifizieren.[3]

Es gibt zwei Formen des Monologs:
1.ein statischer Typ (isolierte Monologe mit gleicher Thematik)
2.ein dynamischer Typ (abgestufte Monologe mit Entwicklung)[4]
Angermann stellt diesen beiden Typen noch eine dritte Variante gegenüber, die für Grimminger als zusätzliche Kategorie jedoch nicht zu werten ist. Angermann sieht das Botenlied nämlich als eine Kombination des dynamischenTyps mit dem Botenmotiv, welches in der Forschung des 19. Jhds. auf folgende Theorie aufgebaut wurde:[5]
Ritter oder Dame geben dem Boten eine mündliche oder schriftliche Nachricht an den Partner, weshalb dieser, trotz seiner Isolation im Monolog, informiert ist und nun seinerseits Stellung nehmen kann; ein Versuch, die irreale Sprechsituation des Wechsels als Nachahmung einer besonderen Wirklichkeit erklärbar zu machen.[6]
Um nun den Bezug zum Lied herzustellen, kann man sagen, daß die drei Strophen einen Wechsel darstellen, in dem das Motiv des Boten in der dritten Strophe eingeführt wird. Das Botenlied hebt jedoch das Wesen des Wechsels auf, indem es einen neuen Mitspieler, nämlich den Boten, einführt. Dieser steht jedoch außerhalb und stellt eine unmittelbare Beziehung der Liebenden her. Um die Dreistrophigkeit zu erreichen, erweitert Dietmar also den Wechsel.[7]

Der Bote hat in diesem Lied die Aufgabe, der Dame von dem Mann zu berichten, der, seit er sie gesehen hat, sie als seine Frau erwählt hat und seither in ungemach ist, also voller Verdruß ist. Der Bote soll nun mit der Dame reden und ihr erklären, daß der Ritter ein sendez herze trägt und nicht mehr lange warten kann, weil es ihm so wê tuot. Der Bote wird sehr selbstbewußt dargestellt, was in der letzten Zeile deutlich zu erkennen ist, denn die Dame soll in Bälde alles mit ihm besprechen, dem Boten des Ritters.[8]
Alles in allem kann man sagen, daß der Bote eine recht bedeutende Rolle hat.

b) Walther von der Vogelweide
Ein anderes Lied, in dem der Bote selbst spricht, und sogar drei Botenstrophen bloß einer Frauenstrophe gegenüber stehen, ist das Lied 112,35 von Walther von der Vogelweide

Vrouwe, vernemet dur got [von] mir diz maere:
ich bin ein bote und sol iu sagen,
Ir sült wenden einem ritter swaere, der si lange hât getragen.
Daz sol ich iu künden sô:
ob ir in welt fröiden rîchen,
sicherlîchen
des wirt manic herze frô.
Vrouwe, enlât iuch des sô niht verdriezen,
ir engebt im hôhen muot.
Des mugt ir und alle wol geniezen,
den ouch fröide sanfte tuot.
dâ von wirt sîn sin bereit,
ob ir in ze fröiden bringet,
daz er singet
iuwer êre und werdekeit.
Vrouwe, sendet im ein hôhgemüete,
sît an iu sîn fröide stât.
Er mac wol geniezen iuwer güete,
sît diu tugent und êre hât.
Vrouwe, gebt im hôhen muot.
welt ir, sîn trûren ist verkêret,
daz in lêret
daz er daz beste gerne tuot.
[...]

[1] Günther Schweikle: Minnesang. Stuttgart; Weimar: Metzler 1995. S.134.
[2] Des Minnesangs Frühling. Unter Benutzung der Ausgaben von Karl Lachmann und Moritz Haupt, Friedrich Vogt und Carl von Kraus; bearbeitet von Hugo Moser und Helmut Tervooren. Stuttgart: Hirzel 1982. S.64.
[3] Vgl. Rolf Grimminger: Poetik des frühen Minnesangs. München 1969. S.11.
[4] Grimminger S.13.
[5] Vgl. Angermann: Der Wechsel in der mittelhochdeutschen Lyrik. Marburg 1910. Zitiert nach: Grimminger. S.13.
[6] Ebd.
[7] Vgl. Helmut de Boor: Die höfische Literatur. Vorbereitung, Blüte, Ausklang (1170.1250). München ³1957 (Geschichte der deutschen Literatur von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart von Helmut de Boor und Richard Newald, Bd.2). S.233.
[8] Franz Viktor Spechtler: Die Stilisierung der Distanz. Zur Rolle des Boten im Minnesang bis Walther und bei Ulrich von Liechtenstein. In: Peripherie und Zentrum. Studien zur österreichischen Literatur. Fs. Adalbert Schmidt. Hrsg. v. Gerlinde Weiß und Klaus Zelewitz. Salzburg, Stuttgart, Zürich
1971. S. 292.


HORST WENZEL u.a. Hg.

GESPRÄCHE - BOTEN - BRIEFE.
KÖRPERGEDÄCHTNIS UND SCHRIFTGEDÄCHTNIS IM MITTELALTER


Berlin 1997



Horst Wenzel: Einleitung 

Walther Haug: Das Geständnis. Liebe und Risiko in Rede und Schrift

I. Boten und Botschaften
Bernhard Siegert: Vögel, Engel und Gesandte. Alteuropas Übertragungsmedien
Henning Wuth: was, str
âle unde permint. Mediengeschichtliches zum Eneasroman Heinrichs von Veldeke
Peter Göhler: Zum Boten in der Liebeslyrik um 1200
Horst Wenzel: Boten und Briefe. Zum Verhältnis körperlicher und nicht-körperlicher Nachrichtenträger
Judith Klinger: Ich: Körper: Schrift. Potentiale und Grenzen der Kommunikation im "Frauendienst"
Peter Strohschneider: Ur-sprünge. Körper, Gewalt und Schrift im "Schwanritter" Konrads von Würzburg
Beate Kellner: 'Wort' - 'Wortzeichen' - 'Schrift'. Formen der Herrschaftssicherung, Sicherleistung und Rechtsbindung im "Friedrich von Schwaben"

II. Briefe und Botschaften

C. Stephen Jaeger: Ironie und Subtext in lateinischen Briefen des 11. und 12. Jahrhunderts
Gerhild Scholz Williams: Konstruierte Männlichkeit. Genealogie, Geschlecht und Briefwechsel in Heldris von Cornwalls "Forman de Silence"
Werner Rücke: Schriftliches "gedencken" und paradoxe Verneinung. Aspekte von Verschriftlichung und Affektkultur in der Novellistik des Spätmittelalters
Esther-Beate Körber: Der soziale Ort des Briefs im 16. Jahrhundert

III. Literarische Gespräche

Heike Sievert: Wenn Heldentum zerredet wird. Funktionen des Gesprächs in "Morgant der Riese"
Hannes Kästner: Das Gespräch des Orientreisenden mit dem heidnischen Herrscher. Zur Typik und zu den Funktionen einer interkulturellen Dialogszene in der Reiseliteratur des Spätmittelalters und der frühen Neuzeit
Wulf Oesterreicher: Das Gespräch als Kriegserklärung. Pizarro, Atahualpa und das Gold von Peru
Christian Kiening: Humanistische Trostdialoge des 15. Jahrhunderts
Hans-Jürgen Bachorski: Lügende Wörter, versteckte Körper, falsche Schrift. Miß/gelingende Kommunikation

Auswahlbibliographie
[....]
Hans-Jochen Bräuer: Die Entwicklung des Nachrichtenverkehrs. Eigenarten, Mittel und Organisation der Nachrichtenförderung. Diss. Nürnberg 1957.
[...]
Martin Dallmeier (Hg.): Quellen zur Geschichte des europäischen Postwesens 1501-1806 (Thurn und Taxis-Studien. Hg. von Fürst Thurn und Taxis Zentralarchiv und Hofbibliothek 9). Teil I: Quellen - Literatur - Einleitung. Kallmünz. 1977.
Johannes Egberts: Das Schema Botensendung, Botenfahrt, Fahrt, Reckenfahrt und Heerfahrt in der Kaiserchronik und in den Epen König Rogher, Rolandslied, Münchner Oswald, Salman und Morolf, Orendel, Kudrun, Wolfdietrich A, B, D. München 1972.
Konrad Ehlich: Text und sprachliches Handeln. Die Entstehung von Texten aus dem Bedürfnis nach Überlieferung. In: Aleida und Jan Assmann/Christoph Hardmeier (Hg.): Schrift und Gedächtnis. Archäologie der literarischen Kommunikation I. München 1983, S. 24-43.
Reinhard Elze: Über die Leistungsfähigkeit von Gesandschaften und boten im 11. Jahrhundert. Aus der Vorgeschichte von Canossa 1075-1077. In: Histoire comparée der l'administration (IV-XVIII siècles). Pub. par Werner Paravicini / Karl Ferdinand Werner. München 1980, S. 3-10.
[...]
Martin Fontius: Post und Brief. In: Materialität der Kommunikation. Hg. von Hans ULrich Gumbrecht / K. Ludwig Pfeiffer. Frankfurt a.M. 1988, S. 267-279
[...]
Otto Lauffer: Der laufende Bote im Nachrichtenwesen der früheren Jahrhunderte. Sein Amt, seine Ausstattung und seine Dienstleistungen. In: Beiträge zur deutschen Volks- und Altertumskunde 1 (1954), S. 19-60.
[...]
Wolfgang Lotz (Hg.): Deutsche Postgeschichte.  Essays und bilder. Berlin 1989.
[...]
Gert Melville: 'Un bel office'. Zum Heroldwesen in der spätmittelalterlichen Welt des Adel, der Höfe und Fürsten. In: Peter Moraw (Hg.): Deutscher Königshof, Hoftag und Reichstag. Sigmaringen (Voträge und Vorschungen)
Viktor Menzel: Deutsches Gesandtschaftswesen im Mittelalter. Hannofer 1982.
[...]
Wolfgang G. Müller: Artikel 'Brief'. In: Historisches Wörterbuch der Rhetorik. Hg. von Gert Ueding, Bd. 1, Tübingen 1994, S. 60-76.
[...]
Donald E. Queller: The Office of Ambassador in the Middle Ages. Princeton 1967
[...]
Lutz Roemheld: Die diplomatische Funktion der Herolde im späten Mittelalter. Diss. Heidelberg 1964.
[...]
Thomas Szabo: Artikel 'Botenwesen'. In: Lexikon des Mittelalters. Bd. 2. München/Zürich 1983, Sp 484-487.
Fritz Trautz: Artikel 'Gesandte' (Mittel- und Westeuropa). In: Lexikon des Mittalalters. Bd. 4. München/Zürich 1989, Sp. 1367f.
[...]
Franz Josef Worstbrock (Hg.): Der Brief im Zeitalter der Renaissance. Weinheim 1983 (Kommission für Humanismusforschung 9).
Franz Josef Worstbrock / Monika Klaes / Jutta Lutten: Repertorium der Artes Dictandi des Mittalalters. München 1992 (Münsterschen Mittelalter-Schriften 66).
Henning Wuth: Boten und Botschaften in mittelalterlicher Literatur. Eine Fallstudie zur Kommunikationsgeschichte, dargestellt an Beispilen höfischer Epik. Examensarbeit Essen 1994.


Horst Wenzel: Einleitung, 13-14

Das schriftlich geführte Gespräch, das die unmittelbare Rede-Situation durch die Überbrückung von Raum und Zeit transzendiert, wird in der Literatur der Höfe vielfältig thematisiert. Die wechselseitige Austauschbarkeit der mittelhochdeutschen Begriffe briefe und bote(schaft) verweist auf einen gleitenden Übergang von der mündlich übertragenen zur schriftlich vorgetragenen Botschaft, [17] die auf eine faszinierende Nähe des Boteninstituts zum Medium des Briefes hinweist. Im Ensemble unterschiedlichster Typen literarischer Kommunikation des Mittelalters wollten wir uns deshalb auf drei miteinander verbundene Formen und ihre spezifische Leistung konzentrieren: Gespräche - Boten - Briefe.

Zu fragen war nach den sozialen, medialen und literarischen Implikatioonen der Literarisierung von Gesprächen, Boten und von Briefen im hohen und in späten Mittelalter. Folgende Problemfelder und Arbeitsbereiche sollten im Mittelpunkt unserer Fragestellung stehen:

a) Der Übergang von einer personalen oder face-to-face-Kommunikation zu einer vermittelten Kommunikation steht für das komplexe Spannungsverhältnis von Mündlichkeit und Schriftlichkeit. Hier sollte insbesondere über die unterschiedlichen Möglichkeiten einer personalen und einer über Formen der Verschriftlichung vermittelten Kommunikation gearbeitet werden. Dazu gehören Probleme der persönlichen Repräsentanz im Institut des Boten (des Gesandten) und im Medium des Briefes, der Sicherung von Boten und Briefen durch materielle und personellel Bestätigungsformen, wie z.B. Wahrzeichen (Handschuh, Ring, Stab, Siegel), Botenreden und Briefformeln, Fragen nach dem Zusammenhang von Sprachtransport und Affektübertragung, affektiver Nähe und literarischer Distanz.

b) In der literarischen Briefkultur des Mittelalters sind Brieflehren, tatsächliche Briefe und 'literarische Briefe' zu unterscheiden. Für das Colloquium sollten Briefe im Mittelpunkt stehen, die in literarischen Texten entworfen werden. Besonders interessant erschien dabei die Frage, inwiefern die unterschiedlichen Formen literarische Kommunikation auf die mémoire collective, auf die Erfahrung des Vergessens und auf die Technik der Erinnerung einwirken bzw. ihrerseits davon geprägt werden.

c) Die Literarisierung des Gespächs als 'Aufführung', d.h. unter Berücksichtigung körpergebundener Ausdrucksformen wie Gestik, Mimik, Habitus, Rhetorik überbrückt die mediale Differenzierung von Mündlichkeit und Schriftlichkeit. Die semantische Dimension der dargestellten Wahrnehmungsleistungen und aller damit verbundenen Zeichen bis hin zur räumlichen und zeitlichen (dynamischen) Zuordnung der Sprechenden in ihrerm jeweiligen Umfeld läßt sich aus mediengeschichtlicher Perspektive beschreiben als Beobachtung und Darstellung von Mündlichkeit auf der Grundlage der Schriftlichkeit. Wie unterscheiden sich daraufhin die unterschiedlichen Formen des Gespächs, vom Liebesgespräch bis zum Lehrgespräch? Wie verhält sich das literarische Gespräch zum Alltagsgespräch: Worin stimmen sie überein, worin unterscheiden sie sich, wie verschieben sich die Grenzlinien?

Schriftlichkeit reduziert die multisensorielle Wahrnehmung der körpergebundene Rede auf das Augeund sekundär auf das Ohr, gewinnt aber einen Zuwachs an Komplexität, an Speicherkapazität und -dauer, kann derart die Verluste gegenüber der face-to-face Kommunikation kompensieren und eine eigene Poetik entwickeln.


[17] Grundlgend dazu Konrad Ehlich: Text und sprachliches handeln. Die Entstehung von Texten aus dem Bedürfnis nach Überlieferung. In: Aleida und Jan Assmann, Christof Hardmeier (Hg.): Schrift und Gedächtnis. Archäologie der literarischen Kommunikation. I. München 1983, s. 29-43


Horst Wenzel: Boten und Briefe, S. 86-87

Die Verbindung durch einen Boten ist Archetypus der Fernkommunikation bei unentwickelten politischen Verhältnissen. [2] Die Vermittlung von zwei getrennten Sprechern fordert den Einsatz von Mittelsmännern, geschieht ursprünglich mündlich, fungiert aber auch auf der Grundlage der Schriftlichkeit als Brücke zwischen dem Absender und dem Addressaten einer Botschaft. Ist die Botschaft mündlich vorzubringen, wird sie von Boten als dem Medium der Übertratung körperlich aufgenommen und aus der Erinnerung vermittelt. Die schriftliche Botschaft bleibt dem Boten äußerlich, wird jedoch lange Zeit durch die Stimme des Boten ergänzt und interpretiert, 'Vortragen', 'übertragen', 'beauftragen'verweisen auf den Nachrichtenträger, setzen die Schrift jedoch voraus.
Der Brief als Ersatz mündlicher Mitteilung bleibt zunächst sekundär gegenüber dem mündlichen Botenbericht. Hoffmann formuliert deshalb ganz unumwunden: "Das Wichtigste am Brief war im Mittelalter der Bote[...]. Oft genug stand indem Brief bloß Nebensächliches, während die Hauptsache dem Überbringer mündlich anvertraut worden war." [3] Lange Zeit wird trotz der Vorzüge der Schrift die mündliche Botschaft für die Fernkommunikation hochgestellter Funktionsträger vorgezogen, wird in der medialen Repräsentation des Herrn durch einen boten die Vergegenwärtigung des Wortes noch nicht ausschließlich auf den Schriftkanal verkürzt; die Interaktion bewahrt den Reichtum der Beziehungsaspekt
e, das ganze Spektrum nonverbaler Kommunikation, die das Gespräch auszeichnen."

[2] Der nhd. Begriff 'Bote' nimmt begriffsgeschichtlich zwei Bedeutungsfelder insich auf: die lateinische Tradition mit missus, nuntius, legatus, cursor und die deutsche Tradition mit ahd. bodo, poto, mhd. bote (zum stv. enbieten). [...] Im neuhochdeutschen und schon im mittelhochdeutschen Begriff ist der Unterschied zwischen dem hochgestellten Gesandten und dem einfachen Kurier sprachlich relativiert. Für die Interpretation einzelner Textzeugnisse ist der gesellschaftliche Stand des 'Boten' jedoch wichtig. Vgl. Thomas Szábo: Artikel 'Botenwesen', In: Lexikon des Mittelalters. München/Zürich 1980ff. Bd. 2, Sp. 484-487.- Fritz Trautz: Artikel 'Gesandte (Mittel- und Westeuropa). In: Ebd. Bd. 4, Sp. 1367f. Dazu Henning Wuth: Boten  und Botschaften in mittelalterlichen Literatur. Eine Fallstudie zur Kommunikationsgeschichte, dargestellt an Beispielen höfischer Epik. Examensarbeit Essen 1994, S. 39ff.
 


PETER SLOTERDIJK:  SEELENRAUMTEILER ENGEL –  ZWILLINGEDOPPELGÄNGER

Exkurs: Über den Unterschied zwischen einem Idioten und einem Engel

Sphären I, 6, Frankfurt a.M., 1998, 479-85 




Es ist das gemeinsame Verdienst von Dostojewskij und Nietzsche, in den modernen Religionsdiskurs den Begriff des Idioten eingeführt zu haben. Was mit diesem Ausdruck geleistet ist, wird begreiflich, sobald man ihn gegen den des Engels abhebt, als dessen Gegensatz und Kontrastmittel er seinen Wert gewinnt. Was eine Engel-Erscheinung sei, und wie sie ins profane Leben eingreife: dies hat die alteuropäische religiöse Tradition in tausendfältigen Wendungen ihrer Neugier und Bildgier ausgearbeitet; daß es aber auch eine Idioten-Erscheinung gibt, die das Menschenleben affiziert, dies zu begreifen blieb dem größten Romanpsychologen des 19. Jahrhunderts und dem Autor des Antichrist vorbehalten. Für beide trägt das Wort Idiot eine christologische Ladung, denn beide gehen das Wagnis ein, mit dem Prädikat idiotisch  auch wenn die Vorzeichen gegensätzliche sind – an das typologishe Geheimnis des Erlösertums zu rühren. Darin liegt religionspsychologischer Explosivstoff, denn alle überlieferten Versuche, das Auftreten von Erlöserfiguren herzuleiten, hatten sich unvermeidlich am Engel- oder Boten-Modell orientiert, also an der Vorstellung, daß ein Gesandter mit einer transzendenten Botschaft bei den Sterblichen vorstellig wird und diese als Retter-Heros aus physischer Not und moralischer Verlorenheit befreit. Der Erlöser ist folglich zunächst nur eine potenzierte Form des Boten  wobei erst die hellenisierte Christologie den Kategoriensprung einführte, nach dem der Bote nicht mehr nur die Nachricht bringt, sondern die Nachricht ist. Das Boten- oder Engel-Schema war in seiner Blütezeit offenkundig mächtig genug, um die Erlöserlehre mitzutragen. Immerhin, um den Erlöser als Boten aller Boten durchzusetzen, mußten die christlichen Theologen diesen zum Sohn der Substanz machen und ihn als einziges volladäquates Zeichen des Seins [206] ausrufen. Es spricht für die Leistungsfähigkeit des angeletischen Modells, daß es dieser Beanspruchung gewachsen war. Die klassische Christologie zeigt die Gesandten- und Botschaftsmetaphysik auf dem Höhepunkt ihrer Macht. Sie gehört einer Welt- und Theoriesituation an, die durch das Dogma des starken Absenders charakterisiert ist. ja vielleicht ist die diskursive Struktur, die wir Metaphysik zu nennen gewohnt waren, nur ein Reflex der Unterwerfung des Denkens unter die Vorstellung von einem Sein, das als absoluter Absender alle Throne, Mächte und Gewalten mitsamt ihren Ausflüssen an Zeichen und Vermittlern monopolisiert. In diesem unbedingten Absender-Sein konnte der Gott der Bibel und der Gott der Philosophen konvergieren.

Verständigt man sich für das weitere auf die Formel, daß die Neuzeit ein Informationsprozeß ist, der die Krise der Absender-Metaphysik erzwingt, so hält man auch schon das Mittel in der Hand, zu begreifen, wieso eine zeitsensible Theologie nach Gutenberg mit einer angeletischen [207] Lehre vom Erlöser als Gesandten nicht mehr durchkommt. In der neuzeitlichen Vermehrung der Absender-Mächte und in der Boteninflation auf dem freien Nachrichtenmarkt kann ein Hyperbote vom Typus Erlösergott, vergegenwärtigt durch apostolische Vertreter, seine feudale Vorranstellung nicht behaupten. Wer auf die Menschen in einem spezifischen Sinn befreiend einwirken möchte, darf in Zukunft nicht mehr so sehr ein Bote mit einer transzendenten message sein, sondern muß als ein menschliches Wesen erscheinen, dessen unmittelbar auffällige Andersheit in realer Gegenwart den Überbringer einer Botschaft von drüben vollständig ersetzt. Es bezeichnet Dostojewskijs religionsphilosophische Genialität, daß er die Chance, die Christologie von der Angeletik auf die Idiotik umzustellen, als erster erkannt und bis zum äußersten durchdacht hat.[208] Gerade weil die moderne Welt überfüllt ist vom Lärm der Machtpartei-Boten und vom Kunstgetöse der Genies, die auf ihre Werke und Wahnsysteme aufmerksam machen, läßt sich die religiöse Differenz nicht länger im Modus des Botschafterwesens überzeugend markieren. Nicht als Bote kann der präsente Gottmensch die Sterblichen erreichen, sondern nur noch als Idiot. Der Idiot ist ein Engel ohne Botschaft 
ein distanzloser intimer Ergänzer aller zufällig begegnenden Wesen. Auch sein Auftritt ist erscheinungshaft, aber nicht, weil er im Diesseits einen transzendenten Gott vergegenwärtigte, sondern weil er inmitten einer Gesellschaft von Rollenspielern und Ego-Strategen eine unerwartbare Naivität und ein entwaffnendes Wohlwollen verkörpert. Wenn er redet, dann niemals mit Autorität, sondern immer nur mit der Kraft seiner Offenheit. Obwohl ein Fürst der Abstammung nach, ist er ein Mensch ohne Statuszeichen –  er gehört hierin vorbehaltlos der modernen Welt an, denn wenn zum Engel die Hierarchie gehört, dann zu Idioten der egalitäre Zug. (Engelhierarchien verstehen sich von selbst, während Idiotenhierarchien verblüffen.) Er bewegt sich zwischen den Menschen der hohen und niederen Gesellschaft wie ein großes Kind, das es nie gelernt hat, den eigenen Vorteil zu berechnen.

Von diesem modernen religions-ästhetischen Befund aus 
 man vergesse nicht, daß Dostojewskij die Figur des Idioten als einen Versuch angelegt hatte, den "vollkommen schönen Menschen" und sein unumgängliches Scheitern an der Menschenhäßlichkeit darzustellen –  zog Nietzsche in seiner Kampfschrift Der Antichrist  von 1888 die religions-psychologischen Konsequenzen. Für ihn ist schon der historische Jesus selbst typologisch auf einen dostojewskijschen Nenner zu bringen  er ist, in Nietzsches Terminologie, die Inkarnation eines décadent ante litteram.
"Man hätte zu bedauern, dass nicht ein Dostoiewsky in der Nähe dieses interessanten décadant gelebt hat, ich meine Jemand, der gerade den ergreifenden Reiz einer solchen Mischung von Sublimen, Krankem und Kindlichem zu empfinden wusste..." (Der Antichrist, § 29)
Ungeeignet sind folglich alle Charakterisierungen, die auf den historischen Jesus die Sprache des Heroismus und der Geniekultur projizieren wollten – ebenso wie die Sprache des Fanatismus und der apostolisch-apologetischen Arroganz. In all dem drücken sich nur Vertreterwut und Nachfolgerambitionen aus. Was den konkreten Typus des evangelischen Erlösers angeht, so sollte endlich mit der einzig zuständigen medizinischen Kategorie an ihn herangetreten werden. "Mit der Strenge des Physiologen gesprochen, wäre hier ein ganz anderes Wort eher noch am Platz: das Wort Idiot." (Der Antichrist, § 29)
Das Sublime, das Kindliche, das Kranke 
– wie es möglich wäre, daß diese Aspekte in einem einzigen Qualifikativ  idiotisch zusammenfielen 
, dieses Rätsel zu entwirren nimmt sich Nietzsche in seiner turbulenten Polemik gegen das Christentum keine Zeit, zum großen Nachteil für die Religionswissenschaft und die allgemeine Psychologie. Wollte man die Intuitionen Dostojewskijs und Nietzsches über die Gleichung von Idiotologie und Erlöserlehre geduldig zusammensetzen, so ergäbe sich eine tiefreichende Revision der tradierten Auffassungen vom religiösen Prozeß.

In den üblichen angeletischen Systemen tritt der Erlöser den Menschen als metaphysischer Informant gegenüber und bewegt sie, aus der Haltung absendergedeckter Stärke, durch seine penetrierende Botschaft. Im idiotische System hingegen ist der Erlöser ein Niemand, der keinen hohen Mandanten hinter sich hat. Seine Äußerungen werden von den Anwesenden als kindliche Nichtigkeiten und seine Gegenwart als eine nicht-verpflichtende Beiläufigkeit wahrgenommen. Dostojewskij läßt gerade an diesem Zug keinen Zweifel; von einer der Figuren des Romans, Ganja, heißt es: "Vor dem Fürsten genierte er sich nicht im mindesten, als wäre er allein in seinem Zimmer, denn er achtete ihn glattweg für nichts." [209] Nichtsdestoweniger ist die Präsenz des Fürsten Myschkin für alle Vorgänge, die in seiner Nähe geschehen, eine auslösende Bedingung; er katalysiert auf entscheidende Weise die Charaktere und Schicksale derer, die ihm begegnen. Gerade als Nicht-Bote löst er mit einer undurchschauten Methode ds Problem des Zugangs zum Inneren seiner Gegenspieler. Weder Sirene noch Engel, schließt er die Ohren und psychischen Regungszentren seiner Gesprächspartner auf. Es ist auch nicht seine Kindlichkeit im durchschnittlichen Wortsinn,die ihm seinen besonderen Zugang zu den Menschen eröffnet, es sei denn, man gäbe dem Ausdruck kindlich einen heterodoxen Sinn: kindlich könnte die Bereitschaft heißen, im Umgang mit anderen nicht das eigene Selbst auszuspielen, sondern sich als Ergänzer des andere zur Verfügung zu halten. Wenn eine so verstandene Möglichkeit von Kindlichkeit zur Haltung gerinnt, liegt vor, was Dostojewskij mit dem Wort Idiotie artikuliert hat 
ein Ausdruck, der offenkundig nur im oberflächlichsten Gebrauch denunziatorisch klingen sollte. Mit dem Titel Idiot markiert Dostojewskij als Religionsphilosoph und Subjektivitätskritiker eine Ich-Position, die ihm nobel und zumindest in bezug auf andere heilswirksam erscheint, obwohl sie in keiner Weise auf eine angeletische Potenz zurückgeführt werden kann. Das idiotische Subjekt ist offenbar jenes, das sich verhalten kann, als sei es nicht so sehr es selber als vielmehr der Doppelgänger seiner selbst und potentiell der intime Ergänzer jedes begegenenden Anderen. Es gibt in einigen Schweizer Kantonen die unzarte Redensart: bei dir haben sie wohl statt Kind die Nachgeburt aufgezogen –, und es spricht manches dafür, dies für eine psychologische Entdeckung zu nehmen. Der Idiot plazentalisiert sich selber, indem er jedem, der seinen Weg kreuzt, wie ein intrauterines Kissen eine unerklärliche Nähe-Erfahrung anbietet eine Art von unvordenklicher Verbundenheit, die zwischen Personen, die sich zum ersten Mal sehen, eine Offenheit stiftet, wie sie nur beim Jüngsten Gericht oder im wortlosen Austausch zwischen Fötus und Plazenta gegeben sein mag. In der Gegenwart des Idioten wird harmlose Gutmütigkeit zu verwandelnden Intensität; seine Mission scheint es zu sein, keine Botschaft zu haben, sondern eine Nähe zu stiften, in der sich konturierte Subjekte entgrenzen und neu fassen können. Seine Moral ist seine Unfähigkeit, zurückzuschlagen. Dieser Zug ist es, der Nietzsche an der vermuteten jesuanischen Idiotie interessieren mußte, weil er auf eine infantile Weise das Ideal des vornehmen, ressentimentfreien Lebens inkarniert freilich nicht von der Seite des aktiven Selbst her, sondern von der des Begleiters, des Förderers, des Ergänzers. Es gäbe demnach eine vornehme Idiotie, die sich in einer vormenschlich-übermenschlichen Verfügbarkeit und Dienstbereitschaft äußerte. Der idiotische Erlöser wäre jener, der nicht als Hauptperson der eigenen Geschichte sein Leben führte, sondern der mit seiner Nachgeburt den Platz getauscht hätte, um für sie, als sie selbst, ein In-der-Welt-Sein- einzuräumen. Handelt es sich um einen krankhaften Exzeß an Loyalität? Um einen Fall von vorgeburtlicher Nibelungentreue? Um einen Dotter- und Kissenwahn,  in dem das Subjekt sich mit dem archaischen Förderer und Nähe-Geist verwechselt? Vielleicht ist es die Weisheit des Idioten, daß er zu seinem intimen Abfall, der plazentalen Schwester, in ihre Verlorenheit hinabsteigt? Zieht er es vor, eher ihr Leben weiterzuleben, als die gemeinsamen Anfänge im ergänzten Zusammenschweben zu verraten? "Wenn ihr nicht werdet wie die Kinder..."" Möglicherweise hätte es heißen sollen: Wenn ihr nicht werdet wie dieses idiotisch freundliche Ding...?


[206] Über Zeichen des Seins vgl. Sphären II, 7. Kapitel, Wie durch reine Medien die Sphärenmitte in die Ferne wirkt. Zur Metaphysik der Telekommunikation.
[207] Den Ausdruck "angeletisch" verdanken wir Rafael Capurro; zur Begriffsgeschichte von angelia vgl. dessen Buch, Leben im Informationszeitalter, Berlin 1995, siebtes Kapitel "Genealogie der Information", S. 97-114.
[208] Allenfalls Herman Melville könnte den Anspruch erheben, in seiner Erzählung Bartleby, publiziert 1856, die Wende vonder Angeletik zur Idiotik antizipiert zu haben, die Dostojewskij Roman 1868/69 dann spektakulär volllzieht.
[209] Fjodor M. Dostojewskij, Der Idiot. Übertragen von Arthur Luther, München 1976/1990, S. 115.




PETER SLOTERDIJK: WIE DURCH DAS REINE MEDIUM
DIE SPHÄRENMITTE IN DIE FERNE WIRKT

Zur Metaphysik der Telekommunikation

Sphären II, 7
. Frankfurt a.M., 1999


Souverän ist, wer sich so vertreten lassen kann, als ob er in seinem Vertreter anwesend wäre. Darum sind große einschließende Sphären  seien sie als politische Reiche oder als Ausstrahlungsräume der Wahrheit nach dem Modell von ekklesia oder academia verfaßt auf die Entfaltung der Möglichkeit von Vertretung angewiesen. Vertretung ist der Ernstfall und Normalfall von Telekommunikation der Macht. In idealtypischer Sicht geht es bei der Vertretung stets um die Vergegenwärtigung der Machtmitte in einem distanten Punkt, als besäße das Sphärenzentrum die Fähigkeit, durch Vertreter oder Emissäre mit jedem Punkt innerhalb seines Kreisumfangs wie in realer Gegenwart zu kommunizieren. In diesem "Wie realer Gegenwart" drückt sich der Vorzug der souveränen Mitte aus, bei sich zu bleiben [280] und doch an entfernter Stelle auf den Radien ringsum sich Geltung zu verschaffen. Die Möglichkeit von Vertretung hängt also ganz an diesem Wie. Daß Vertretung stattfindet, entscheidet sich an der Frage, ob und wie ein Vertreter die Gegenwart des herrschenden Prinzips zustandekommt – und zwar zugleich als mittelbare und unmittelbare. Souveränität ist untrennbar von ihrer Wirkung in der Ferne.
Ist von realer Gegenwart die Rede, in diesem Ton und in dieser Perspektive, so ist ein zweifaches Verhältnis gemeint. Real ist eine Gegenwart naturgemäß zunächst nur dann, wenn die Machtmitte oder -quelle selbst am Ort ihrer Wirkung unmittelbar anwesend ist. Ziehen die Könige in Städte ein 
– eine Urszene der Machtdarstellung im Weltalter vor den festen Residenzen –, geben sie den Völkern Gelegenheit, offenen Mundes oder mit geballten Fäusten Machtgegenwart, vielleicht auch Heilsnähe zu verspüren. Von dem Pharao der Frühzeit hieß es, er müsse alle zwei Jahre in jedem der 42 Nil-Gaue, von denen jeder ein Glied des zerstückelten Osiris barg, physisch auftreten.[281] In seiner Barke, von den Großen des Reichs und den Horusgottheiten begleitet, vollzog er die Prozession als Epiphanie vor dem Volk. Die Prozession ist der Archetypus der Macht auf Reisen; in Prozessionen bewegen sich nicht nur die Monarchen selber fort, auch ihre stellvertretenden Bilder werden im gleichen feierlichen Modus herumgeführt. Kaiserzeitliche Römer, Inder und Katholiken haben es bei solchen Bildumzügen zum höchsten Prunk gebracht. Goethe hat als Kind zu Frankfurt 1763 noch den, wenn auch ironisch gebrochenen, Glanz einer Königskrönung in praesentia erfahren.[282] Als der Sieger über das preußische Heer, Napoleon Bonaparte, im Herbst 1806 sich in der Nähe Jenas aufhielt, konnte Hegel von dieser Gegenwart den Begriff bilden, indem er von der Weltseele sprach, die zu Pferd sich habe blicken lassen.


[280] Man darf bei diesem Bleiben sowohl an die festen Residenzen der persischen Großkönige denken als auch an das Verweilen (mone des Einen bei sich selbst (bei gleichzeitigem Aus-sich-Herausgehen und In-sich-Zurückkehren) im Schema der proklischen Triadik.
[281] Vgl. Jan Assmann, Das ägyptische Prozessionsfest, in: Das Fest und das Heilige, hg. von Jan Assmann und Theo Sundermeier, Gütersloh 1991, S. 120.
[282] Goethe erinnert daran (Dichtung und Wahrheit I, 5), daß der junge König in den Prunkgewändern recht verloren ausgesehen habe und über die eigene Verkleidung lächeln mußte; von Maria Theresia erzählt man, daß sie zwei Jahrzehnte zuvor, anläßlich der gleichen Zeremonie, beim Anblick ihres vermummten Gemahls, der ihr beim Verlassen des Doms die Reichsinsignien hinhielt, in einen Lachkrampf verfallen sei – für die Verteidiger der Realpräsenz kein gutes Omen.

(S. 667-669)


Nur dank dieser realen Teilhabe der vollen Zeichen und der bevollmächtigten Boten am überfließenden Reservoir des Absender-Seins erweist sich die Machtmitte als expansionsfähig und transportabel, ja, nur durch Boten- und Zeichenmission kann sie zur effektiven Raumbildung in großformatigen Einheiten gelangen. Wo Sein und Zeichen eine gemeinsame Menge bilden, dort geht es um die Macht des Ganzen, in Zeichen imposant da zu sein. Seinszeichen sind Machtzeichen, weil sie nicht nur meinen, was sie vertreten, sondern sind, was sie darstellen; A real sign must not mean but be. Aber wie kann etwas, was vertritt, zugleich das sein, wofür er steht? Ist die reale Gegenwart des Bezeichneten im Zeichen selber überhaupt möglich?
Das Beispiel der frühchristlichen apostolischen Sendung läßt erkennen, wie auf diese Fragen in einem folgenschweren Fall eine vorbehaltlos bejahende, wenn auch von Grund auf problematische Antwort gegeben wurde. Man könnte so weit gehen, in dem Apostel Paulus den maßgeblichen Entdecker des Prinzips realer Gegenwart in seiner bis heute nachwirkenden Sinnabschattung zu sehen. Darum ist der Streit um die Möglichkeit in Kunstwerken oder heiligen Schriften seiner Tiefenstruktur nach ein Streit um Pauls.
Der wahre Abgesandte kann den souveränen Herrn evidentermaßen nur darstellen, wenn er als Zeichenbringer zugleich an der Substanz des Herrn teilhat und diese in realer Präsenz vergegenwärtigt 
–  ganz so wie Kierkegaard es den Apostel Paulus in einem untergeschobenen inneren Dialog mit einem Skeptiker ausdrücken läßt:
"du sollst daran denken, daß das, was ich sage, mir durch eine Offenbarung anvertraut ist, sodaß da Gott selber oder der Herr Jesus Christus der Sprechende ist..." [285]
Der Ausdruck Offenbarung bezeichnet also einen Tatbestand, der für alle metaphysischen Telekommunikationen das Grundverhältnis liefert: Indem die zugleich ferne und diskrete Mitte sich einem auserwählten Boten in besonderer Weise anvertraut hat, setzt sie diesen zu ihrem Bevollmächtigten ein. Dieser Vertreter soll, insofern er Vollmacht hat, die Empfänger der Botschaft binden und für ihre Reaktionen gegenüber der Botschaft verantwortlich machen können, als wäre die göttliche Mitte hier unmittelbar gegenwärtig. Den Boten hören soll so viel bedeuten, wie den Herrn selbst hören, und dem Boten sich verweigern soll gleichbedeutend sein mit dem Entschluß, dem Herren eine Absage zu erteilen. 
Die paulinische Vollmacht kann also 
– in erster Lesung – nur kraft der vorbehaltlosen Aufladung des Boten durch seine Botschaft zustande kommen; ihre Praxis wird des weiteren in nichts anderem als in der klaren und ungetrübten Weitergabe derselben an die Empfänger bestehen. Sie bewirkt bei dem Medium einen Zustand, der sich, vor aller Vermittlungsarbeit, als reale Gegenwart des Herrn im ergriffenen Boten manifestiert. Allein kraft dieser unterstellten Gegenwart des Absenders in ihm kann der Bote die Botschaft selbstlos und unverzerrt weitergeben, als wäre er völlig durchscheinend und als wären seine eigenen Zusätze oder Hemmungen für den Durchgang der Botschaft bedeutungslos. Also nur wenn der Bote ein klares Medium ist, so kann, dem idealisierten Modell zufolge, die Botschaft durch ihn hindurchgehen, ohne daß von seiner Seite ein für den Sinn wesentlicher Zusatz oder gar eine Mitautorschaft ins Spiel käme; der Botschafter muß gewissermaßen zu einem Neutrum werden, als wäre er nur ein reiner Kanal; Kanalbau ist seit jeher Herrensache, Kanalreinigung die erste Dienerpflicht –  bei der Selbstreinigung beginnend. Es ist in diesem Kontext unvermeidlich, an die marianische Ergebung zu erinnern, die für die katholische Gehorsams- und Mittlerschaftsidee paradigmatisch ist: Marias Schoß, heißt es in einschlägigen Dokumenten, sei ein reiner Kanal gewesen, durch den der Gottmensch hindurchgegangen sie "wie Wasser durch eine Röhre" –  tamquam aqua per tubam.


[285] Kierkegaard, Kleine Schriften (S. Anm. 279) S. 121

(S. 673-677)


Die Modernität  auch wo sie noch scheinbar monozentrische Ausdrücke wie "Rund"funk gebraucht – hat einen nach-metaphysischen Raumbildungsmodus kreiert, der aufgrund seines ununterdrückbaren Polyzentrismus allen zentristischen und hierarchistischen Phantasmen den Boten entzogen hat. – von deer Enklave der Päpfste abgesehen, (wir meinen Rom, nicht Valréas). Eben darum konnte die Neuzeit von den Konservativen als Revolte gegen den heiligen Kreis der Monopolkommunikatoren und als Verlust der Mitte angeklagt werden.
In Wahrheit bedeuten diese Kampf- und Klageformeln nur, daß die Geschichte der Sphärenschöpfungen 
 mit ihren jeweils eigenen Sprachspielen, ihren border politics und ihren Wahrheitsfunktionen  – über ihr metaphysisches Mittelalter, das heißt über das Stadium der totalistischen Monosphären hinweggeschritten ist. Seit der Kolumbusfahrt hat die Geschichte der "Welt" zu der langgezogenen Weltkriegssequenz geraten müssen, die sie offenkundig war, aus dem einfachen Grund, weil sie die Kollision der regionalen, jeweils auf ihre Weise metaphysisierten Monosphären zum Inhalt hat – um für den Augenblick von den zahlreichen wehrlosen unterworfenen und zerstörten kleineren Gesellschaften, Sprachen, Welten nicht zu reden.
Wenn die Europäer in der ersten Runde dieser Welttenkollisionen wie die Sieger aussahen, so vor allem deswegen, weil sie als erste ihr makrosphärisches Immunsystem, ihre Bergung unter einem homogenen katholischen Himmel, zerstört oder verloren hatte und nolens volens zum Pluralismus der Konfessionen und der Imperalismen durchgebrochen waren. Dies gab ihnen ihre furchterregende Durchschlagskraft in der ersten Runde der terrestrischen Globalisierung, die man mit den Jahreszahlen 1492 und 1945 plausibel markiert.
Für die Europäer dieser Zeit ist ihr alter Traum voom außenlosen All-Behälter an der eigenenschismatischen Geschichte zerbrochen. Dies gilt zumindest seit der Reformation und dem folgenden Zeitalter der Konfessionskriege, das zugleich das des Wettlaufs zwischen jenen aufsteigenden nationalimperien war, die den Erdglobus unter sich in Interessen- und Missionsgebiete aufteilten. Nicht zufällig hat die europäische Kosmologie zu dieser Zeit den Durchbruch aus den aristotelisch-katholischen Himmelsschalen in das unendliche Universum vollzogen. Die Europäer haben von da an ein Außen zur Kenntnis genommen, das sich nur noch mit hohem Leugnungsaufwand um eine römische oder jerusalemische Mitte gruppieren ließ. Seit den Anfängen des Kolonialismus hätten die europäischen Herren wissen müssen und begreifen können, daß die sogenannte Peripherie etwas ganz anderes warals nur der Rand einer Mitte, die im Mutterland residierte. Den holistischen Restaurationen und den Romantiken gelang es immerhin, die Wahrnehmung der Lage noch einmal ein Beinahe-Weltalter lang zu verzögern, bis schließlich umdie Mitte des 20. Jahrhunderts die alteuropäische Mittelpunkttraumzeit ein überdeutlich brutales Ende fand. Was man die heroischen Jahre dere Philosophie genannt hat, insbesondere der Deutsche Idealismus mitsam seinem marxistischen Nachspiel, lieferte einen dere größten Beiträge zur Abdichtung der europäischen Provinz gegen die sogenannten Peripherien, die von Enzyklopädisten und Kolonisatoren schon so nahegegrückt waren.
Erst seit die aktuelle postsozialistische Globalisierungsdebatte in Gang gesetzt wurde, haben die Kontinentaleuropäer ihre Trumbrillen abnehmen müssen. Allmählich beginnen sie zu verstehen, was es bedeutet, daß europäische Selbstverständlichkeiten mitsamt ihren philosophischen und anthropologischen Sprachregelungen nur regionale Geltung besitzen und nicht von vorneherein den common sense einer hypothetischen Gesamtmenschheit reflektieren.
Es war vor allem die neuzeitliche europäische Literatur, die sich zuerst vom katnolisch-philosophichen Traum einer wahren Einheitssendung und einer letzten Weltsprache losgerissen und sich auf den Weg gemacht hat zu einer wesenhaften Mehrsprachigkeit. In mediohistorischer Sicht hängt dieser Aufbruch mit dem Übergang von der kirchlich-staatlichen Palastwirtschaft der Botschaften zur literarischen und journalistischen Markwirtschaft.
Die letztere präsentiert sich seit ihren Anfängen im 14. Jahrhundert unter zweifacher Gestalt, zum einen als Markt der Trivialliteratur, der Novellen und Neuigkeiten, auf dem die Botschaften nicht mehr absender-, sondern empfängerzentriert, in Anpassung an die Unterhaltungs- und Erbauungserwartungen des Publikums verfaßt werden; zum anderen als Markt der Genie-Literatur, die ein zwar hohes Maß an Absenderzentrierung bewahrt, weil der Autor noch immer als lokale Offenbarung einer transzendenten Sendequelle fungiert, aber damit den Übergang zu nicht-monopolistischen und neu-polytheistischen Verhältnissen bezeichnet. Novalis hat den Gedanken ausgesprochen, daß künftig sogar der Name Christus in den Plural gesetzt werden müsse. Die Kunstgeschichte hat diesen Impuls trivialisiert und die produzierenden Messiasse in chronologischen Prozessionen defilieren lassen. Auf dem Geniemarkt löst sich die vormalige Monopolreligion in einen deregulierten Offenbarungsprozeß auf, in dem sich so viele Götter wie große Künstler enthüllen. Man könnte geradewegs sagen, der religiöse Zentralismus sei untergegangen durch die Legalisierung der Genialität (so wie die Agonie Gottes in morphologischer Hinsicht mit der Überall-Setzung der Mitte und der Entwirklichung des Umfangs begonnen hatte. [348] Annuliert man darüber hinaus die Bedingung, daß Kunst groß sein müsse, um publiziert werden zu dürfen, so ist die moderne Massenkultur im Umriß etabliert. In ihr kann die dauernde Offenbarung der Trivialität gefeiert werden; aber weil es dabei nicht wirklich etwas zu feiern gibt, bleibt den Teilnehmern nichts anderesr übrig, als unentwegt die Selbstapplaus-Mühle für das Auch-nicht-so-Besondere zu drehen.
Die Option für die Trivialkultur ist selbst nicht trivial; so wie in der Spätantike die Entscheidung fiel für den Vorrgang des Evangeliums vor den Musen, so votiert die postmodernisierte Moderne (wenn nicht alles trügt) für den Vorrang der Demokratie vor der Kusnt und der Philosophie. Die eher angenehmen Konsequenzen hieraus: Friedliche Koexistenz aller Botschaften ohne Gewalt und ohne Gehalt; die Kultur der Bestsellerlisten als ewige Wiederkehr des geringfügig Anderen; Selbstbeschallung der Mediengesellschaften mit dem immergleichen immerneuen Gemisch aus Nonsense und No-Nonsense; Freiheit der Wahl zwischen verschiedenen Handelsformen derselben Dekadenz; Emanzipation der Sprecher von der Zumutung, etwas zu sagen zu haben. Was die eher unangenehmen Konsequenzen angeht, so sind sie hier nicht unser Thema.

Den aktuellen Zusant des freien Botschaftsmarktes, der, soweit man sieht, sein Endzustand bleiben wird, hat Franz Kafka um 1914 in einer kleinen Parabel exemplarisch beschworen:

"Sie wurden vor die Wahl gestellt, Könige oder Kuriere zu sein. Nach Art der Kinder wollten sie alle Kuriere sein, deshalb gibt es lauter Kuriere. Und so jagen sie, weil es keine Könige gibt, durcheinander und rufen einander selbst ihre sinnlos gewordenen Meldungen zu. Gerne würde sie ihren elenden Leben ein Ende machen, aber sie wagen es nicht wegen des Diensteides."

[348] Vgl. oben Kapitel 5, "Deus sive sphaera", S. 551 f.

(S. 784-787)





Hauptziele der massenmedialen Botschaftsverbreitung, der Fernseh- und Rundfunksendungen also waren und sind Nachrichten und Unterhaltung. Das hat u.a. auch zum infotainment geführt. Peter Sloterdijk hat darauf hingewiesen, dass wir in einer "Epoche der leeren Engel" oder in einem "mediatischen Nihilismus" leben, in der wir, bei einer Vervielfältigung der Übertragungsmedien, die zu vermittelnde Botschaft vergessen haben: "Das ist das eigentliche Dysangelion der Gegenwart" (Sloterdijk 1997, 75). Nietzsches Wort "Dysangelion" hebt, gegenüber Evangelium, die Eigenschaft der Leere jener Botschaften hervor, die durch die Massenmedien verbreitet werden. Bei Nietzsche ist dies der Gegensatz zwischen der einen lebendigen Botschaft und ihrer theoretischen Entleerung: 

"Das Wort schon "Christentum" ist ein Mißverständnis -, im Grunde gab es nur einen Christen, und der starb am Kreuz. Das "Evangelium" starb am Kreuz. Was von diesem Augenblick an "Evangelium" heißt, war bereits der Gegensatz dessen, was er gelebt: eine "schlimme Botschaft", ein Dysangelium. Es ist falsch bis zum Unsinn, wenn man in einem "Glauben", etwa im Glauben an die Erlösung durch Christus das Abzeichen des Christen sieht: bloß die christliche Praktik, ein Leben so wie der, der am Kreuze starb, es lebte, ist christlich..." (Nietzsche 1976, III, 646)

Sloterdijk hat Nietzsches "Verbesserung der guten Nachricht", sein fünftes "Evangelium", unter diesem Vorzeichen thematisiert (Sloterdijk 2001). Es ist die Frage, inwiefern das Internet einen gegenüber den dysangeletischen Massenmedien neuen angeletischen Raum schafft, der in der Lage ist, neue Botschaftssynergien zu erzeugen und uns erlaubt, die Vernetzung als Chance für unterschiedliche Formen der Lebensgestaltung wahrzunehmen (Capurro 1999). Denn wir sind selbst Medien und Boten zugleich. Wir lösen uns allmählich von den Oligopolen vertikaler one-to-many-Strukturen der Botschaftsverbreitung, indem wir sie in einem nur scheinbar anarchischen Netz von Boten und Botschaften auflösen. Dieses Netz verbindet und teilt auf neue Weise die Welt auf (digital divide). Die Herausforderungen dieser angeletischen Situation für das Leben ganzer Gesellschaften sind noch nicht übersehbar. Die message society, wie sie in diesem globalen Ausmaß nicht einmal die Aufklärung zu träumen wagte, ist gerade dabei, die Koordinaten für eine neue Botschaftskultur auszuloten. 


Sloterdijk, P. (1997): Kantilenen der Zeit. In: Lettre International, 36, p. 71-77. 
- (2001): Über die Verbesserung der guten Nachricht. Nietzsches fünftes "Evangelium". Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp.








Dieser Beitrag wurde in: R. Haub, J. Oswald (Hrsg.): Franz Xaver - Patron der Missionen. Festschrift zum 450 Todestag, Regensburg: Schnell & Steiner (2002) S. 103-121 veröffentlicht (alle Bilder im folgenden Beitrag erschienen in diesem Band). Eine kürzere Fassung erschien in: Geist und Leben, Juli/August 2002 (4), S. 252-264. Der Online-Version sind Bilder und im Anhang Auszüge aus verschiedenen Quellen hinzugefügt.

I. ANGELETIK IM UMRISS

Die Möglichkeit, andere Menschen in ihrem Denken und Handeln zu beeinflussen oder gar über sie zu herrschen, hängt unter anderem damit zusammen, inwieweit der Sender einer Botschaft für sich beanspruchen kann, sie zu bloßen (Befehls-)Empfängern zu machen. Diese Verteilungs- und Herrschaftsstruktur Eins-zu-Vielen kennzeichnet weitgehend nicht nur die Sendungen der Massenmedien im 20. Jahrhundert, sondern auch die angeletische Struktur früherer Kulturen, in denen die Hegemonie eines Herrschers durch das von ihm beanspruchte Botschaftsmonopol sanktioniert wurde. 

Diese Struktur wurde, zumindest teilweise, in der abendländischen Tradition durch die Entstehung der Philosophie in Frage gestellt. Ich bezeichne diesen Vorgang als die Geburt der Philosophie aus dem Geiste der angelía /4/. Nicht die Götter dürfen Botschaften (mit einem allgemeinen und imperativen Charakter) senden, sondern jeder (männliche Bürger Athens) kann und soll sich fragen, was und wem er (selten: sie) zu sagen hat und welche Begründung (lógos) er für eine einem anderen mitgeteilten Meinung (doxa) aufweisen kann. Das Medium dieser doxologischen Kultur im antiken Griechenland war die Oralität (lógos). Der philosophische Dialog versuchte in Auseinandersetzung mit der vertikal-hierarchischen Struktur mythischer Verkündung, menschliche Botschaften horizontal-dialogisch auszutauschen. Die Geburt der Philosophie hängt mit der Infragestellung des hierarchischen Mitteilungsmodus zusammen, ohne aber aufzuhören sich angeletisch zu verstehen. Sie tut dies missionarisch in Form philosophischer Schulen. An der Stelle der göttlichen und dichterischen Sendung (angelía) tritt, in unterschiedlichem Maße, die philosophische Sendung (lógos) ein. Die Möglichkeit, durch philosophische Schriften eine Botschaft zu senden, die wiederum vom Empfänger zum Gegenstand einer eigenen Sendung gemacht werden kann, blieb bis zur Erfindung des Buchdrucks sehr beschränkt. Was aber wie eine Substitution aussieht, ist in Wahrheit die Transformation der dogmatischen in die doxologische Angeletik. 

Die philosophía bleibt, contre-coeur (?), philangelía. Woher bekommen die philosophischen messages ihre Legitimität? Nicht mehr von der Autorität von Göttern und ihren Boten - allen voran Hermes und den Dichtern, worauf Platon in seinem Dialog "Ion" eingeht - oder von den Herrschern und ihren Vermittlern, sondern vom gemeinsamen mit-den-anderen-geteiltenLogos. Die Frage der Legitimation der horizontal ausgetauschten Botschaften, die Wahrheitsfrage also, ist der angeletische Stachel der Philosophie. Zu Beginn rekurriert der philosophische lógos noch auf die mythische hierarchische Struktur im Sinne der Autorität des Senders: autós éphas, 'Er hat das gesagt', so pflegten die Schüler des Pythagoras, des Namengebers der Philosophie, auf denjenigen zu antworten, die wagten, die Meinung des Meisters in Frage zu stellen, wie Cicero in De natura deorum (I, 10) berichtet. Paradoxerweise wird sich das Christentum der Logos-Begrifflichkeit bedienen, indem es aber zugleich den Botschaftgedanken in den Mittelpunkt rückt. Seit der Neuzeit sind vor allem wissenschaftlicheAutoritäten, in deren Namen die prognostische Wahrheit einer Mitteilung bekräftigt wird. 

Die Antike kennt keine ausdrückliche téchne angeletiké oder ars nuntiandi, wenn man die Philosophie selbst nicht als eine solche verstehen will. Es gibt aber eine ausgebildete philosophische und theologische Engellehre sowie eine sowohl im Christentum als auch in anderen Religionen unterschiedlich aufgefaßte und gepflegte Praxis und Reflexion der missionarischen Verkündung der göttlichen Offenbarung und der dazugehörigen Religionspädagogik /5/.  Die Engellehre wurde besonders durch die Aufklärung diskreditiert /6/.  Über den säkularen Kern dieses Mythos haben wir aber heute keinen Grund mehr zu Lachen, denn sie macht die Realität unseres Informationszeitalters aus. Die Vorläufer einer anthropotechnischen Botschaftstheorie finden sich seit Beginn des 20. Jahrhunderts in Kybernetik und Informationstheorie sowie im Zusammenhang mit der Entwicklung militärischer Aufklärungstechnik im Zweiten Weltkrieg /7/.  Das Botschaftsphänomen gewann an gesellschaftlicher Bedeutung in der Neuzeit durch die terrestrische Globalisierung des Briefsverkehrs und in der Gegenwart durch individuelle Kommunikationsmedien wie Fax und Telefon sowie zuletzt durch die elektronische Vernetzung. Die electronic messages haben eine paradigmatische Bedeutung für die entstehende Cyberkultur des 21. Jahrhunderts.  

Die Kommunikationswissenschaften haben in Anschluß an Marshall McLuhans berühmten Spruch: „The medium is the message“  die Frage des Mediums thematisiert /8/. Ich möchte die von Mihai Nadin vorgeschlagene Umkehrung dieses Satzes, nämlich: "Die Botschaft ist das Medium" /9/ , aufgreifen, um den Blick auf das Phänomen der Botschaft zu richten, worauf eigentlich McLuhans Spruch selbst hinweist. Die Medientheorie übersieht den Botschaftscharakter eines jeden Mediums. Weder sind aber Medien nur Botschaften noch reduziert sich der Sinn von Botschaft auf das Medium. Die hier anvisierte Angeletik versteht sich als eine interdisziplinäre Wissenschaft, die sowohl an technische als auch an  kulturgeschichtliche Problemstellungen anknüpft /10/  und sich an der Schnittstelle von Hermeneutik, Rhetorik, Pädagogik, Informationstechnik, Medienwissenschaft und –  Theologie befindet. 

Die Drucktechnik und die modernen Kommunikationsmedien haben wesentliche angeletische Veränderungen bewirkt. Das Privileg der Wenigen eine Botschaft zu senden, wurde allmählich zur Möglichkeit der Vielen und sogar zu einem Menschenrecht aller. Zum antiken freedom of speech und neuzeitlichen freedom of the press stellt sich heute als Herausforderung das freedom of access, d.h. die Freiheit Informationen im globalen Maßstab zu senden und zu empfangen. Paradoxerweise zeichnen sich die Massenmedien des 20. Jahrhunderts durch jene Eins-zu-Vielen-Struktur aus, die durch die Buchkultur aufgelockert worden war. Ein Schriftsteller zu werden, das Ideal der bürgerlichen europäischen Buchkultur, war zwar nicht für jedermann, aber auch nicht prinzipiell nur für die Wenigen offen. Nach der Französischen Revolution setzt sich in Europa mit der Verstaatlichung  der Büchersammlungen von Kirche und Adel die Idee des öffentlichen Bibliothekswesens durch. Die Telefonie und zuletzt die elektronische Weltvernetzung bringen uns dem Zustand einer allgemeinen Botschaftskultur näher, wo im Prinzip jeder – one-to-one, one-to-many, many-to-one, many-to-many – eine Botschaft senden und empfangen kann. Das Internet ist kein Massenmedium, wohl aber ein Medium für die Massen. Es hat bereits eine grundlegende angeletische Veränderung im Leben von Millionen von Menschen bewirkt. Eine Überbietung des Internet durch eine ubiquitäre Computertechnik (ubiquitous computing) steht unmittelbar bevor. Die Frage des Vernetzt- oder Nicht-vernetzt seins (digital divide) wird dabei immer mehr zum sozialen Sprengstoff künftiger Gesellschaften und ihres Zusammenlebens. Kommunikation und Macht sind zwei Seiten der einen Welt. 

Der Ausdruck Angeletik als Kennzeichnung für eine nur in Ansätzen vorhandene Theorie der Botschaft /11/,  bezeichnet demnach keine Lehre über heilige Boten und deren Botschaften. Aber die Analyse religiöser Missionserfahrungen kann mehr als eine Inspirationsquelle dafür sein, sofern sie nämlich eine theoretische und praktische Quelle der Reflexion über die Phänomene des Meldens, Verkündens, Mitteilens, Informierens, Bekanntmachens, Kundtuns und Dolmetschens darstellen. Die Angeletik will aber nicht nur an das Moment des Kundtuns oder Offenbarens in Mythos, Theologie und Philosophie erinnern, sondern ebensosehr – um das andere Ende der Skala anzudeuen – jene Boten und Botschaften analysieren, die mit Absicht auf Profit alle möglichen Waren und Dienstleistungen verkünden, ja den realen und/oder digital-vermittelten Weltmarkt selbst als die wahre Botschaft preisen. Die Botschaftstheorie ist aber wiederum selbst weder ein euangelion noch ein dysangelium. Ihre Sache geht als Tatsache der hermeneutischen Arbeit des Erklärens und Auslegens voraus. Als Botschaftstheorie will sie der Tatsache der Mitteilens Rechnung tragen, indem sie diese zur Kenntnis bringt. Hermeneutik und Angeletik bleiben sowohl theoretisch als auch praktisch aufeinander angewiesen: Die Mitteilung einer Botschaft setzt ein Vorverständnis als Grundlage einer Deutung voraus und umgekehrt, nur durch die Mitteilung kann sich ein Vorverständnis (weiter) ausbilden. 

Während die Medienwissenschaft fragt: 'Was sind Medien?' geht die Angeletik von der Frage aus: 'Was sind Botschaften?'. Wann genau sprechen wir von Botschaften in Zusammenhang menschlicher Kommunikation? In Anschluß an Niklas Luhmanns Unterscheidung zwischen "Mitteilung", "Information" und "Verstehen" /12/,  möchte ich den Botschaftsbegriff auf "Mitteilung", d.h. auf das "Sinnangebot" beziehen. Botschaft im Sinne von "Mitteilung" ist ein heteronomer Begriff. Sender und Empfänger können zwar ihre Stellung wechseln, aber nicht den Modus ihres Bezugs: Der Empfänger kann als Empfänger keine Botschaft anfordern. Er kann aber selber zum Sender werden und damit die Heteronomie umkehren. Ferner schließt dieses Phänomen das Moment der Neuheit ein. Eine Botschaft verursacht Überraschung oder zumindest Ungewißheit. Sie bewirkt eine Differenz, was wiederum mit Gregory Batesons bekannter Definition von Information als "ein Unterschied, der einen Unterschied ausmacht" übereinstimmt /13/. Sie ist, zumindest aus der Sicht des Senders, immer relevant für den Empfänger. Sie kann durch verschiedene Medien oder Boten übertragen d.h. angebotenwerden. Sie hat einen, im umfassenden Sinne, sprachlichen Charakter und schließt somit z.B. Bilder, Töne und Gestik ein. Botschaften lösen beim Empfänger einen Verstehensprozeß aus, und zwar auch dann, wenn dieser das Sinnangebot ablehnt. Der Heteronomie der Botschaft steht die Autonomie des Deuters gegenüber.  

Botschaften sind also, so können wir diese vorläufige Wesensdeutung zusammenfassen, eine besondere Art von Sprechhandlungen, die auf eine bestimmte Wirkung auf den Empfänger zielen. Sie sind pragmatische Mitteilungen. Anstelle einer Sprechhandlung können auch Gegenstände als Botschaften aufgefaßt werden. Die Sprechhandlung bleibt dabei implizit. Wir können uns zwei extreme Formen seitens des Senders bzw. des Empfängers einer Botschaft vorstellen: Auf der einen Seite der Glaube eines Senders und/oder eines Boten, eine Botschaft für alle Menschen aller Zeiten zu besitzen und, auf der anderen Seite, der umgekehrte Glaube eines Empfängers, der alles als eine auf ihn gerichtete Botschaft auffaßt. Beide Fälle sind als Verfallsformen vorstellbar, die sich dann einstellen, wenn die Kluft zwischen dem Kategorialen und dem Transzendentalen, um es Kantisch auszudrücken, nicht wahrgenommen wird. Universale heilige Botschaften, wie im Falle der Religionen, befinden sich auch im Grenzbereich, sofern sie nämlich den Unterschied zwischen Glauben und Wissen nicht aufheben und ihre Glaubensverkündung als Sinnangebot verstehen. Wir können Botschaften auch in bezug auf ihr Ziel, ihre Form, ihren Inhalt und ihren Produzenten bestimmen, was aber hier nicht weiter ausgeführt werden kann /14/. Franz Xaver hatte eine starke, d.h. universell ausgerichtete heilige Botschaft. Zugleich bemerkte er am 29. Januar 1552, dass er "niemals schreiben könnte, wieviel er denen in Japan verdankt" /15/.  Der Überbringer der christlichen Botschaft empfand sich nach zwei Jahren auch als dankbarer Empfänger der Lehre Japans.  

4. Vgl. v. Vf.: On the Genealogy of Information. In: Klaus Kornwachs/Konstantin Jacoby (Hg.): Information. New Questions to a Multidisciplinary Concept. Berlin: Akademie Verlag 1996. Hier S. 259-270 sowie: v. Vf.: Leben im Informationszeitalter. Berlin: Akademie Verlag 1995. Hier S. 103-114.  
5. Vgl. Rüdiger Funiok/Harald Schöndorf (Hg.): Ignatius von Loyola und die Pädagogik der Jesuiten. Donauwörth: Auer Verlag 2000.  
6. Vgl. v. Vf.: Ein Grinsen ohne Katze. Von der Vergleichbarkeit zwischen 'künstlicher Intelligenz' und 'getrennten Intelligenzen' . In: Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 47 (1993) 1, 93-102.  
7. Vgl. Fernando Elichirigoity: Planet Management. Limits to Growth, Computer Simulation and the Emergence of Global Space. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press 1999.  
8. Marshall McLuhan: Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man, New York:  The New American Library 1964. Hier S. 23.
9. Mihai Nadin: Jenseits der Schriftkultur. Dresden, München: Dresden University Press 1999. Hier S. 349-350. 
10. Vgl. zum Beispiel Horst Wenzel (Hg.): Gespräche - Boten - Briefe. Körpergedächtnis und Schriftgedächtnis im Mittelalter. Berlin: Erich Schmidt Verlag  1997. 
11. Vgl. v. Vf.: Theorie der Botschaft. Beitrag zur Tagung "Transdisziplinäre Kommunikation", Universität Salzburg, 25.-26. April 2001. Erschienen in: Erich Hamberger, Kurt Luger (Hrsg.): Transdisziplinäre Kommunikation. Wien: Österreichische  Kunst- und Kulturverlag 2008, 65-89. 
12. Niklas Luhmann: Soziale Systeme. Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp 1987. Hier S. 196. 
13. Gregory Bateson: Ökologie des Geistes. Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp 1985. Hier S. 582.  
14. In seiner "Kommunikologie" (Mannheim: Bollmann 1996) unterscheidet Vilém Flusser zwischen einem dialogischen und einem diskursiven Kommunikationsziel, je nachdem ob eine Botschaft erzeugt, oder verbreitet werden soll. 
15. Cartas y Escritos de San Francisco Javier anotadas por el P. Felix Zubillaga S.I.  Madrid: La Editorial Católica 1953, Doc. 97. Hier S. 421 (Übers. des Vf.). Alle Zitate, in der Übersetzung des Verfassers, aus den Briefen Franz Xavers beziehen sich, wenn nicht anders vermerkt, auf diese Ausgabe. Im Text wird lediglich auf die Nummer des jeweiligen Briefes und auf die Seite verwiesen. Xavers Briefe sind öfter in einer Mischung aus Portugiesisch, Spanisch und Latein geschrieben. 








Beitrag zum Symposion: "Transdisziplinäre Kommunikation. Aktuelle Be-Deutungen des Phänomens Kommunikation im fächerübergreifenden Dialog", Universität Salzburg, Österreich, 25.-26. April 2001. Erschienen in: Erich Hamberger, Kurt Luger (Hrsg.): Transdisziplinäre Kommunikation. Wien: Österreichischer Kunst- und Kulturverlag 2008, 65-89. Erschienen auch in: R. Capurro: Ethik im Netz. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag 2003, 105-122. Eine ursprüngliche Fassung dieses Ansatzes siehe: Hermeneutik im Vorblick. Erschienen auch in: Rafael Capurro - John Holgate (eds.). Messages and Messengers. Angeletics as an Approach to the Phenomenology of Communication. Von Boten und Botschaften. Die Angeletik als Weg zur Phänomenologie der Kommunikation, ICIE Schrifenreihe 5, München: Fink 2011, 43-66.



INHALT

1. Begriffliche Grundlagen
2. Zum semantischen Feld des Botschaftsbegriffs
3. Die Geburt des philosophischen logos aus dem Geiste der angelia
4. Verkündigung und Mission
5. Von der Aufklärung zur message society

Literatur

1. BEGRIFFLICHE GRUNDLAGEN

Eines der auffälligsten Phänomene unserer Zeit ist die weltweite Verbreitung von Botschaften aller Art vor allem im Medium Internet. Wir leben in einer message society. Das war nicht immer so, auch wenn es wahr ist, dass in jeder menschlichen Gesellschaft, und davon soll in diesem Beitrag zu einer Theorie der Botschaft die Rede sein, Botschaften mit unterschiedlichem Inhalt, auf der Basis unterschiedlicher Medien und im Kontext unterschiedlicher Machtstrukturen vermittelt wurden. Warum aber von Botschaft sprechen und nicht zum Beispiel einfach von Information? Der Ausdruck Informations- und neuerdings auch Wissensgesellschaft ist in aller Munde. Wir haben außerdem sozusagen den kanonischen Text einer Theorie der Information, nämlich den vom Mathematiker und Elektrotechniker Claude Elwood Shannon (1916-2001) 1948 veröffentlichten Aufsatz "A Mathematical Theory of Communication" (Shannon 1948). Shannon arbeitete damals bei den Bell Telephone Laboratories. Ein Jahr später erschien dieser Aufsatz als Buch mit einem fast gleich lautenden Titel zusammen mit einem Aufsatz des Mathematikers Warren Weaver (1894-1978), der von 1932 bis 1955 Direktor der Natural Sciences Division der Rockefeller Foundation und später deren Vizepräsident war (Shannon/Weaver 1972). Die hier erörterten Probleme, die Terminologie und die Lösungsansätze bestimmten die Diskussion über den Informationsbegriff in der zweiten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts (Capurro/Hjørland 2003). Eine Theorie der Botschaft scheint also überflüssig. 

Liest man aber diese Aufsätze nicht primär in der Absicht eine Antwort auf die Frage: Was ist Information? zu bekommen, sondern um zunächst festzustellen, welche leitenden Termini außer communication und information im Kontext dieser "mathematischen Theorie der Kommunikation" verwendet werden, dann stellt man fest, dass auch von symbols, messages und signals die Rede ist. Im berühmten Schema eines "allgemeinen Kommunikationssystems" kommt das Wort Information lediglich als information source vor. Man darf in diesem Zusammenhang nicht vergessen, dass es im heutigen Englisch keine Pluralform von information gibt (Capurro/Hjørland 2003). Das, was übertragen werden soll, ist keine information, sondern es sind messages. 

 

Shannon 

Quelle: http://www.cultsock.ndirect.co.uk/MUHome/cshtml/index.html 

Das Schema unterscheidet zwischen einer von der Informationsquelle hervorgebrachten Botschaft (message), die von einem Übertragungssystem (transmitter) in übertragungsfähige Signale (signal) umgewandelt wird. Diese Signale werden über einen Kanal (channel) an einen Empfänger (receiver) übertragen, der sie wiederum in die ursprüngliche Botschaft (message) zurückverwandelt. Bei der Signalübertragung können aber Störungen (noise source) auftreten. Die Botschaft soll schließlich ihre Bestimmung (destination) erreichen, die, so Shannon, eine Person oder ein Ding sein kann (Shannon/Weaver 1972, 33-34).

Diese Theorie behandelt das Problem der Übertragung von Signalen mittels eines technischen Mediums, nämlich des Telefons, Telegraphen oder Fernsehers. Bereits 1928 gelingt den Bell Laboratories die erste Live-Übertragung mit Bildern von Tennisspielenden Männern (Hiebel 1997, 106). Die Theorie macht dabei einen wichtigen Unterschied, nämlich den zwischen message und signalbzw. zwischen information source und destination auf der einen und transmitter,channel, noise source und receiver auf der anderen Seite. Zwei Geräte (transmitter und receiver) tauschen Signale aus. Sie sind aber nicht identisch mit dem Erzeuger und Endempfänger der messages. Was übertragen werden soll ist message, nicht information, auch wenn Shannon diese terminologische Unterscheidung nicht stringent durchführt. So nennt er die Botschaftsquelle information source und nicht etwa message source und die Telegraphie nennt er einen Kanal für die Übertragung von information (Shannon/Weaver 1972, 36). Messages haben, so Shannon, "öfter" eine Bedeutung (meaning), und er fügt hinzu: "These semantic aspects of communication are irrelevant to the engineering problem." (Shannon/Weaver 1972, 31). Somit trifft er einen zweiten wichtigen Unterschied, nämlich den zwischen message und meaning, Botschaft und Bedeutung. Das Maß an Information bei der Übertragung bezieht sich auf die Anzahl möglicher Ja/Nein-Entscheidungen aus einer Anzahl von, aus der Sicht des Ingenieurs, bedeutungslosen Botschaften (messages), wofür der Logarithmus mit Basis 2 (daher auch binary digits bzw. bits) gilt, d.h. gemessen wird die Anzahl möglicher Wahlvorgänge. 

Shannon unterscheidet zwischen verschiedenen Arten solcher bedeutungs- loser Botschaften, darunter z.B. eine Buchstabensequenz im Falle eines Telegraphen, oder eine Funktion von Zeit (t) im Falle des Rundfunks oder Fernsehens. Im Falle des Telegraphen besteht die Verwandlung der Botschaft in ein Signal darin, dass Buchstaben, also Symbole, in eine Sequenz von Punkten und Strichen codiert werden (Shannon/Weaver 1972, 33). Mit anderen Worten, das Problem bei der Übertragung von Botschaften mit Hilfe eines technischen Mediums besteht in einer dem Medium angemessenen Wahl eines Codes für die einzelnen Symbole, die zum möglichen Bestandteil einer message gehören, sowie in den Störungen, die während der Signalübertragung auftreten können. Letztere verursachen beim (End-)Empfänger eine Ungewißheit bezüglich der ursprünglichen Botschaft (original message) anhand der empfangenen gestörten Signale. Ein externer Beobachter (observer), der die jeweiligen messages an der Quelle und beim Empfänger kennt, würde über einen correction channel diese Störungen dem Empfänger mitteilen, der sie dann korrigieren könnte. In der Praxis übernimmt diese Aufgabe die Redundanz (Shannon/Weaver 1972, 68). 

Sofern mit Information innerhalb dieser Theorie die Anzahl der Wahl- möglichkeiten gemeint ist, bedeutet die Verringerung dieser Möglichkeiten und somit die Gewißheit auf der Seite des Empfängers eine Verringerung der Information. Information bedeutet also, kontraintuitiv, die Zunahme von Ungewißheit. Weaver schreibt plakativ: "no uncertainty at all - no freedom of choice - no information" (Shannon/Weaver 1972, 15). Wenn die Botschaft bekannt ist und es gibt keine Störung, dann ist die Information gleich Null. Information nennt das Maß der Ungewißheit bei der gestörten Übertragung einer Botschaft. Die nützliche Information (useful information) ist das, was übrig bleibt an Ungewißheit, wenn von der totalen Ungewißheit die Rauschungewißheit abgezogen werden kann (Shannon/Weaver 1972, 21). In diesem Sinne, und nur in diesem Sinne, läßt sich sagen, dass im Rahmen dieser Theorie Information als Reduktion von Ungewißheit bestimmt wird. Der Begriff von Information als Synonym für Ungewißheit ist in der Tat, wie Weaver betont, "enttäuschend", da er nichts mit Bedeutung zu tun hat, und "bizarr", da er mit einem Begriff synonym gebraucht wird, der das Gegenteil des alltäglichen Informationsbegriffs bedeutet (Shannon/Weaver 1972, 27). 

Dieser Befremdung seitens des alltäglichen Gebrauchs von Information kommt Weaver mit einer Erörterung dieser Theorie in einem größeren Rahmen entgegen. Für Weaver stellt sich das Problem der Kommunikation auf drei Ebenen dar, nämlich: 

A. Wie genau (accurately) können Symbole (symbols) übertragen werden? Das ist das technische Problem.

B. Wie exakt (precisely) können die übertragenen Symbole die gewünschte Bedeutung vermitteln? Das ist das semantische Problem.

C. Wie effektiv (effectively) wirkt die Bedeutung auf das Verhalten in der gewünschten Weise? Das ist das Wirkungsproblem. (Shannon/Weaver 1972, 4)

Es ist leicht einzusehen, dass diese drei Ebenen in etwa der sprachwissenschaftlichen Unterscheidung zwischen Syntax, Semantik und Pragmatik entsprechen. Shannons Theorie schließt ausdrücklich die Ebenen B und C aus. Weaver zitiert Shannons Diktum, dass die semantischen Aspekte irrelevant sind für den Ingenieur (Shannon/Weaver 1972, 8). Die Informationsquelle wird nur aus statistischen Gesichtspunkten betrachtet. Das bedeutet, dass Botschaften (messages) nicht nur ihre Bedeutung, sondern sogar ihre Individualität einbüßen (Shannon/Weaver 1972, 14). Sowohl Shannon als auch Weaver geben sich große Mühe, den alltäglichen durch Semantik und Pragmatik geprägten Informationsbegriff vom statistischen Informationsbegriff zu unterscheiden. Was aber gewissermaßen unthematisch und dennoch zentral bleibt, ist der Begriff der Botschaft (message). Kurz, die Shannonsche Kommunikationstheorie ist eine Theorie der elektrotechnischen Übertragung von als Signale kodierten Botschaften, nicht mehr und nicht weniger. 

Ich möchte im Folgenden den Versuch unternehmen, eine Theorie der Botschaft zu skizzieren, die genau die Aspekte berücksichtigt, die die Shannonsche Theorie ausschließt. Es kommt also auf Semantik und Pragmatik sowie auf die Individualanalyse von messages in jeweiligen paradigmatischen Situationen sowie in konkreten historischen Kontexten an. Meine Fragen betreffen Ursprung, Ziel und Inhalt von Botschaften, Machtstrukturen, Techniken und Medien ihrer Kodifizierung, Auslegung und Verbreitung, Lebensformen sowie Geschichte(n) von Botschaften und Boten, psychologische, politische, ökonomische, ästhetische, ethische und religiöse Aspekte. Ein wissenschaftlicher Kosmos sozusagen. Eine solche Theorie ist wesensmäßig interdisziplinär. Sie bezieht Erkenntnisse und Methoden aus Medien- und Kommunikationswissenschaft, Geschichts- und Kulturwissenschaft, Literatur- und Sprachwissenschaft, Informatik, Betriebs- und Volkswirtschaft, Philosophie und Theologie, um nur einige vorwiegend humanwissenschaftliche Disziplinen zu nennen, ohne aber die Naturwissenschaften zu vergessen. Denn auch wenn wir jetzt von einer Theorie der Botschaft im anthropologischen Kontext sprechen, ist das, was ich das postalische Paradigma nenne, als methodische Grundlage der Naturwissenschaften heute vorherrschend. Dieses Paradigma verdankt sich unterschiedlichen Einflüssen, nicht zuletzt der Shannonschen Kommunikationstheorie sowie der Entwicklung des Computers. Die Rede von Erbinformation in der Biologie übt in Zusammenhang mit der Entzifferung des menschlichen Genoms eine wohl dramatische und zum Teil auch traumatisierende Wirkung auf das Selbstverständnis des Menschen im beginnenden 21. Jahrhundert aus.  

Als ich vor schon mehr als zwanzig Jahren eine etymologische und ideengeschichtliche Untersuchung des Informationsbegriffs unternahm (Capurro 1976), entdeckte ich u.a. den Zusammenhang des lateinischen Terminus informatio mit den bedeutungsschweren, von Platon und Aristoteles geprägten Begriffen idea, eidos, morphe und typos. Dieser griechische Ursprung des Informationsbegriffs ist bis heute wirksam (Capurro/Hjørland 2003). Ich suchte damals auch nach einer begrifflichen Entsprechung unseres heutigen alltäglichen Informationsbegriffs im Sinne von Nachricht oder Mitteilung. Das ist prima facie der nicht weniger bedeutungsschwere Begriff logos, vor allem in Zusammenhang mit den schon erwähnten Grundbegriffen. Doch meine Recherchen führten mich auch zu einem außer in der Theologie wenig beachteten griechischen Begriff, nämlich angelia (Capurro 1978, 46-49). Ich möchte in Anlehnung an Wortbildungen wie Logik, Semiotik oder Physik, die Bezeichnung Angeletik für eine künftige Theorie der Botschaft vorschlagen. Das Wort angelia liegt dem Wort Engel, der Götterbote, zugrunde. Dazu gibt es eine lange theologische Denktradition, die Engellehre, und zwar sowohl in der christlichen Theologie als auch in anderen Religionen. Angeletik bedeutet im Unterschied dazu die Untersuchung des Botschaftsphänomens in den Grenzen der condition humaine, ohne aber die vielfältigen Überschneidungen und Berührungspunkte mit Theologie und Mythos außer Acht zu lassen (Capurro 1995, 1996). 

Wodurch unterscheidet sich aber eine Theorie der Botschaft von einer Informationstheorie? Oder, anders gefragt, wodurch unterscheidet sich Botschaft von Information oder message von information? Auf diese Frage kann ich hier nur eine vorläufige Antwort im Sinne eines Vorbegriffs geben. Ich möchte mich dafür an die von der Theorie sozialer Systeme eingeführte Unterscheidung zwischen "Mitteilung" und "Information" anlehnen (Luhmann 1987, 191ff). Mitteilung bedeutet die Außenwirkung auf ein System im Sinne eines Sinnangebots, während Information diejenige Differenz meint, die im System eine Differenz bewirkt, "a difference which makes a difference", nach der bekannten Definition von Gregory Bateson (Bateson 1972, 453). Botschaft im Sinne von Mitteilung ist Sender-abhängig und somit ein heteronomer Begriff. Wir empfangen eine Botschaft, aber wir suchen nach Information. Letzteres können wir aber nur tun, wenn ein Sinnangebot überhaupt da ist. Eine Botschaft bringt dem Empfänger etwas Neues oder Überraschendes, verursacht also Ungewißheit. Sie ist, aus der Sicht des Senders, relevant für den Empfänger. Und sie kann durch, metaphorisch gesprochen, soziales Rauschen, gestört sein. Sie kann unterschiedlich verschlüsselt und durch verschiedene Medien oder Boten übertragen, d.h. angeboten werden. Sie hat meistens, aber nicht ausschließlich, einen sprachlichen Charakter und sie löst beim Empfänger einen Informations- sowie einen Verstehensprozeß aus. Letzteres heißt, dass die Wahl aus dem Sinnangebot einer Botschaft immer vor dem Hintergrund eines systemimmanenten Vorverständnisses stattfindet. Der Empfänger versteht eine Botschaft, indem er einen Unterschied zwischen Mitteilung und Information macht. Er kann die Botschaft anzweifeln oder ablehnen, indem er sie so oder so deutet. Der Heteronomie der Botschaft steht also die Autonomie des Deutenden gegenüber. Kommunikation ist dann die Einheit von Mitteilung, Information und Verstehen (Luhmann 1987, 196). 

Dieser Vorbegriff läßt sich genauer ausformulieren. Botschaften sind eine besondere Art von Sprechhandlungen, die auf eine bestimmte Auswirkung auf den Empfänger abzielen. Sie sind also pragmatische Mitteilungen. Anstelle einer Sprechhandlung können auch Gegenstände als Botschaften aufgefaßt werden. Die Sprechhandlung bleibt in diesem Falle implizit. Die Handlungsaufforderung kann, muss aber nicht die Form eines Imperativs haben. Es gibt auch indikative und optative Varianten. Eine Botschaft findet also dann und nur dann statt, wenn das Verhältnis zwischen Sender und Empfänger so ist, dass der Sender in der Absicht handelt, den Empfänger in seinem oder ihrem Handeln und/oder Denken mitzubestimmen. Man kann sich zwei extreme Formen dieser Struktur vorstellen, nämlich den Glauben eines Senders, eine imperative Botschaft für alle Menschen aller Zeiten zu besitzen und den umgekehrten Glauben eines Empfängers, der alles als eine auf ihn gerichtete Botschaft auffaßt. Der erste Glaube trifft zum Beispiel auf die universal gerichteten Religionen zu. Es kann sich aber auch um eine Verfallsform handeln, wie am Beispiel psychischer Krankheiten ersichtlich, was auch für die zweite Glaubensform zutrifft. Zwischen diesen beiden Extremen lassen sich unterschiedliche Abstufungen finden, die von den jeweiligen Situationen mit ihren Machtkonstellationen und technischen Mitteln abhängen. 

Was eine Botschaft ist, läßt sich, aristotelisch formuliert, im Hinblick auf ihr Ziel, ihre Form, ihren Inhalt und ihren Produzenten bestimmen. In Anschluß an Vilem Flussers "Kommunikologie" können wir zwischen dialogischen und diskursiven Zielen der Kommunikation unterscheiden (Flusser 1996). Dialoge zielen auf die Erzeugung neuer Information, während Diskurse auf ihre Verbreitung ausgerichet sind. Man kann dazu das bewahrende Ziel nennen. Ich denke dabei z.B. an Jan Assmans Theorie des kulturellen Gedächtnisses (Assmann 2000), aber auch an bibliothekarische und archivarische Tätigkeiten. Nach der Form lassen sich Botschaften, wie gesagt, in imperative, indikative und optative unterscheiden. Schließlich sind Inhalte und Produzenten von Botschaften zu nennen. Hier spielen Machtkonstellationen eine entscheidende Rolle: Wer darf welche messages an wen unter welchen (technischen) Bedingungen und mit welchen Zielen senden und bewahren? Während in der Antike die Verbreitung universeller Botschaften eine Auszeichnung von Göttern und Herrschern war, stellt sich vor allem in Zusammenhang mit der Entstehung der Philosophie die Frage der Legitimation eines solchen Anspruchs. Ich spreche vom Übergang einer vertikalen zu einer horizontalen Botschaftsstruktur. Diese Begriffe sollen aber nur dazu dienen, eine bleibende Spannung zu thematisieren. Die heteronome Bestimmung von Botschaft steht hierzu nur prima facie auf der Seite der Vertikalität. Der philosophische sowie der wissenschaftliche Diskurs sind Beispiele dafür, wie eine heteronome Botschaft in eine horizontale, d.h. "dialogische" (Flusser) Struktur eingebettet ist, deren Ziel gerade die autonome Eigenbestimmung durch den Empfänger ist. Mit anderen Worten, welches Kriterium jeweils anzuwenden ist, um über den gelungenen oder mißlungenen Zweck einer Botschaft zu urteilen, hängt von der unterschiedlichen Konstellation dieser Bestimmungen ab.

Die folgenden Analysen bieten einen zugleich theoretischen und historischen Zugang zu einer Theorie der Botschaft dar. Sie suchen den Botschaftsbegriff situationsabhängig zu erörtern. Die Beispiele sind paradigmatisch für ein Theorieverständnis, das keinen atemporalen Beobachterstatus beansprucht, sondern bemüht ist, die eigenen thematischen und unthematischen Brüche zu reflektieren. Die Wahl der Beispiele folgt zwar dem historischen Ablauf ohne aber damit die Idee eines wie auch immer gemeinten Fortschritts zu verknüpfen. Schließlich sind diese Analysen in vieler Hinsicht umrißhaft und auf die europäische Tradition eingeschränkt. Der vorgeschlagene Vorbegriff von Botschaft soll dabei anhand konkreter historischer Situationen auf seine Tauglichkeit hin getestet werden.

Eine Theorie der Botschaft ist selbst eine Botschaft in einem bestimmten Sinne, nämlich in einem philosophischen. Auf den Sinn einer philosophischen Botschaft kommen wir später zu sprechen ohne aber dieses Thema hier ausführlich behandeln zu können. Eine ausdrückliche angeletike techne oder eine ars nuntiandi scheint es dem Wort nach bisher nicht gegeben zu haben, wohl aber der Sache nach, von den verschiedenen Lehren und Techniken - von den Persischen Boten, über Briefe und die neuzeitliche Post bis hin zum Telegrafen und Telefon sowie zu den heutigen Mails - Botschaften zu senden und zu verbreiten, vor allem im politischen, ökonomischen und religiösen Kontext. Sicherlich gehören die rhetorische Tradition, die Tradition der Ausbildung politischer Botschafter sowie die heutigen Marketingtheorien vor allem in Zusammenhang mit den Massenmedien und dem Internet zum Bestandteil einer Angeletik. Man könnte sagen: die paradigmatische Revolution der New Economy besteht nicht zuletzt darin, dass Waren als digitalisierte Botschaften weltweit vermarktet werden können. Ohne (digitalisierte und weltvernetzte) Werbung gibt es keinen (neuen) Markt. 

Ich deute kurz auf die vor uns liegenden Stationen hin. Wir beginnen mit einem kurzen Überblick über das semantische Feld des Botschaftsbegriffs. Sodann wenden wir uns dem Verhältnis von logos und angelia zu Beginn der abendländischen Tradition zu. Dabei zeigt sich der Botschaftsbegriff vor allem eingebettet im Kontext von Dichtung und Politik. Die heteronome oder vertikale Ausrichtung stößt auf Kritik seitens des sich vom Mythos emanzipierenden horizontalen philosophischen Denkens. Die Spannung zwischen einer horizontalen und einer vertikalen Botschafts- bestimmung ist historisch maßgeblich. Das zeigen Situationen im Kontext der Verbreitung der christlichen Botschaft im Gegensatz zur Frage von Freiheit und Zensur im Zeitalter der Aufklärung. Schließlich wenden wir uns der heutigen durch Massenmedien und Internet geprägten message society zu, in der jeder, der zu dieser Gesellschaft gehört also, vernetzt ist (Stichwort: digital divide), jedem eine Botschaft schicken kann, und zwar jederzeit, ort- und zeitunabhängig, an einen oder viele Empfänger sowie umgekehrt, viele an einen, oder viele an viele. Das Medium ist, nach dem bekannten Diktum McLuhans, selbst die Botschaft ("The medium is the message") (McLuhan 1964). Was aber ist eine Botschaft? Die Medienwissenschaft bedarf einer Theorie der Botschaft. Oder, anders ausgedrückt, Medientheorien lassen sich als Botschaftstheorien auslegen, denn Medien sind auch Botschaften, aber nicht alle Botschaften sind bloß Medien.


2. ZUM SEMANTISCHEN FELD DES BOTSCHAFTSBEGRIFFS


Ich möchte kurz auf das semantische Feld des Botschaftsbegriffs hinweisen, ohne aber auf einzelne Belege näher eingehen zu können. Die Worte Botschaftund Bote hängen mit dem Wort bieten zusammen. Über die Etymologie von bieten heißt es im Duden: 

"Das gemeingerm. Verb mhd. bieten "[an]bieten, darreichen; gebieten", ahd. biotan "bekannt machen; entgegenhalten, darreichen; erzeigen, erweisen", got. (ana-, faúr)biudan "(ent-, ver)bieten", aengl. beodan, bieten, darbieten, ankündigen, zeigen", schwed. bjuda [an]bieten, antragen; gewähren" beruht mit verwandten Wörtern in anderen idg. Sprachen auf der idg. Wurzel *bheudh- "erwachen, bemerken, geistig rege sein, aufmerksam machen, warnen, gebieten." Außergerm. sind z.B. verwandt bodhati, "er erwacht" (dazu der Name Buddhas, des "Erweckten"), griech. pynthánesthai "erfahren, wahrnehmen", lit. bùdinti "erwecken"." (Duden 1997, 81)

Bote, der Verkünder oder Herold, leitet sich von bieten im Sinne von wissen lassen oder befehlen ab. Einige Zusammensetzungen lauten: anbieten, aufbieten, Aufgebot, entbieten, erbieten, ehrerbietig, gebieten, verbieten, Gebot, Verbot.Das "Grimmsche Wörterbuch" verweist auf das Lateinische nuntius und legt folgende Bedeutungen dar: 

"1) verkündigung, meldung: eine botschaft bringen, ausrichten, werben, thun, schicken, senden, erhalten, empfangen" 
"2) wie das lat. nuntius sowohl den boten als seine meldung ausdrückt und in den angezognen goth. stellen 
"3) botschaft hiesz ehmals auch ein nachfolgendes gericht, das dem hautpgericht angehängt wurde." (Grimm 1999)

Einige Beispiele aus den Belegen zur ersten Bedeutung lauten: "und Mose sandte botschaft aus Kades zu dem könige." (4 Mos. 20, 14); "don Cesar! Gute botschaft harret dein." (Schiller 494a); "die botschaft höre ich wol, allein mir fehlt der glaube." (Göthe, 12, 45). "Die holde Nachricht", die Faust in der Nacht hört, ist, bekanntlich, die Osterbotschaft (Faust I, 765). 

Der Duden belehrt uns über die Bedeutung von Botschaft folgendermaßen: 

"1.a) (geh.) wichtige, für den Empfänger bedeutungsvolle Nachricht [die durch einen Boten überbracht wird]: eine willkommene, traurige, schlimme, geheime B.; jmdm. eine B. bringen, senden, schicken, hinterlassen; Es war ganz unverständlich, warum nicht wenigstens eine B. für mich hier im Hotel bereitlag (Fallada, Herr 33); die [christliche] B. (das Evangelium) verkündigen; *die Frohe B. (christl. Rel.; das Evangelium); b) feierliche amtliche Verlautbarung o.Ä.: eine B. des Präsidenten verlesen; 2. a) von einem Botschafter geleitete diplomatische Vertretung eines Staates im Ausland (...) b) Gebäude, in dem sich eine Botschaft (2a) befindet". (Duden 1999)

Ich möchte bei dieser Bestimmung drei Kontexte hervorheben, die uns im Folgenden besonders beschäftigen werden, nämlich den alltäglichen, den (christlich-) theologischen und den politischen. Außerdem tritt in allen Fällen die schon angesprochene heteronome Dimension der Botschaft gegenüber dem mit Recht so genannten Empfänger deutlich hervor, auch und gerade, wenn er eine Botschaft erwartet und somit das Überraschungsmoment abgeschwächt ist. 

In den sich aus dem Lateinischen ableitenden Sprachen, wie z.B. im Spanischen, sprechen wir von mensaje und mensajero. Beide Worte leiten sich vom Lateinischen mittere, d.h. senden, ab. Daher auch das sowohl im religiösen aber auch im politischen und wirtschaftlichen Kontext gebrauchten Wort misión.Ferner wird das Wort anunciar im Sinne von verkünden gebraucht, das sich aus dem schon erwähnten nuntiare bzw. nuntius ableitet. Zu diesem semantischen Kontext gehören notitia und communicatio, doctrina und documentum, loqui und dicere, publicare, inquisitio und eruditio. Ferner gehört auch die Tradition der antiken Orakel und der Mantik in diesen Zusammenhang. 

Schließlich möchte ich auf Spanisch embajada oder Englisch embassy - dieses Wort wird erst im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert im Englischen gebräuchlich - hinweisen, deren Herkunft aus dem mittelalterlichen Latein und dem Altfranzösischen ungewiß ist: ambactus bedeutet soviel wie pflügender Bauer (servus arans) oder, allgemeiner, jemand, der ein Amt ausübt und dabei (herum-) geführt wird.


3. DIE GEBURT DES PHILOSOPHISCHEN LOGOS AUS DEM GEISTE DER ANGELIA

Der vertikale Charakter der Übertragung von heiligen Botschaften in der feudalen Gesellschaft des antiken Griechenland wurde durch eine horizontale Form der Botschaftsverbreitung in Frage gestellt, die mit zwei gegensätzlichen, aber verwandten Namen getauft wurde, nämlich Sophistik und Philosophie (Capurro 1995, 1996). Um diese These plausibel zu machen, wenden wir uns zunächst einer Situation zu, die einen zugleich alltäglichen und mythischen Kontext von Botschaft aufweist. Im ersten Gesang der "Odyssee" fragt der Freier Eurymachos den Telemachos, wer der Mann war, der ihm, Telemachos, Botschaft über die Rückkehr seines Vaters brachte. Dieser Bote war nämlich Athene in Gestalt eines Hausfreundes, des Heroldes Medon. Telemachos antwortet:

"Hin, Eurymachos, ist auf immer des Vaters Zurückkunft!   
Darum trau' ich nicht mehr Botschaften (angelies), woher sie auch kommen,   
Kümmere mich nicht um Deutungen mehr, wen auch immer die Mutter  
Zu sich ins Haus berufe, um unser Verhängnis zu forschen!" 
(Od. I, 413-416)

Telemachos will sich nicht mehr um göttliche Weissagungen (theopropies) kümmern. Als der Herold (kerux) Peisenor am nächsten Tag zur Versammlung ruft, erklärt Telemachos, dass er keine Botschaft (angelien) von einem nahenden Kriegsheer mit Gewißheit mitzuteilen hat (sapha eipo) oder gar weissagen kann zum Wohle des Landes, sondern über seinen Schmerz sprechen will (Od. II, 40 ff). Die Freier sind verärgert, weil Penelope sie mit "schmeichelnden Botschaften" (angelias proieisa) tröstet, im Herzen aber anders denkt (Od. II, 92). Man beachte hier den Unterschied zwischen Mitteilung und Information, der sowohl für den Sender als auch für den Empfänger zutrifft. Im fünften Gesang schickt Zeus seinen Boten (angelos) Hermes, um Kalypso seinen "unfehlbaren Entschluß" (nemertea boulen) mitzuteilen (eipein) (Od. V, 29-30). Bei Kalypso angekommen, erzählt Hermes, dass er ohne seinen Willen gekommen ist, um Zeus' Worte (mython) "untrüglich" zu verkünden (Od. V, 98). Im Klartext: Die Handlung des Mitteilens kann eine alltägliche oder auch eine mit politischer oder religiöser Autorität, im Sinne von verkünd(ig)en, beladene sein. In beiden Fällen ist sie heteronom: Eine Botschaft bringen heißt In-Kenntnis-Setzen, freilich im Hinblick auf die sich daran anschließende Tätigkeit des Deutens und/oder auf die daraus folgende Handlung des Gehorchens. Botschaft in diesem letzteren Sinne heißt soviel wie Befehl. Das Befolgen ist eine bestimmte praktische Form des Deutens auf der Grundlage der Mitteilung eines autoritativen Beschlusses, dessen Nichtbefolgung eine Verfehlung (amartano) bedeutet. Es kommt dabei alles darauf an, dass der Empfänger die Botschaft genau so deutet, sich also in-formieren läßt, wie es der Sender will. Da aber die Differenz zwischen Mitteilung und Information sich nicht aufheben läßt, erzeugt jede Botschaft Ungewißheit. 

Die Verwendung des Botschaftsbegriffs in einem politischen - wie am Beispiel von Herodots Beschreibung des persischen Relaispostensystems (agareion) ersichtlich (Herodot, Historien VIII, 98) - oder religiösen Kontext hebt ganz besonders die Heteronomie der Handlung hervor. Das gilt auch für die Dichtung, wie am Beispiel Pindars ersichtlich. Der Dichter ist, so wie Hermes, der Bote der Götter. Er wird von den Horen, den Göttinnen des Wachsens, Reifens und Blühens, nach Olympia gesandt, um Zeuge der Kämpfe und des Sieges zu werden. Auf seine "süße Botschaft" (angelian glykeian) freuen sich die Edlen (Olymp. IV, 5). Der Chorführer Aieneas soll "rechter Verkünder" (angelos orthos) der Wettkämpfe werden (Olymp. VI, 91). Angelia, die Göttin der Botschaft, Hermes' Tochter, bringt die Siegeskunde dem Vater und dem Oheim und mit ihr, so hofft der Dichter, Gedeihen für Stamm und Stadt des Siegers (Olymp. VIII, 81). Die Verkündung einer glücklichen Botschaft läßt, mit anderen Worten, andere mögliche Mitteilungen offen. 

Nicht jeder kann ein solcher Bote werden, sondern einzig der Dichter, der mit seinen Liedern eine Botschaft (angelian) entsendet, "Übertreffend ein mutig Roß an Schnelle, ein geflügelt Schiff", die die Stadt entflammt. Das Überbringen solcher Glücksbotschaften seitens des Dichters ist nur möglich, weil er den Garten der Göttinnen des Glücks (charites) "mit schicksalsberufener Hand" pflegt (Olymp. IX, 21 ff.) 

Pindars Botschaften sind Siegesbotschaften, die sich letztlich einer höheren Macht verdanken. Sie können nur dann richtig übermittelt werden, wenn derjenige, der sie mitteilt, sich genau den göttlichen Mächten fügt, die die Geschehnisse, wovon sie Zeugnis sind, mit verursacht haben. Menschliche Siegesbotschaften sind für Pindar letztlich göttliche Botschaften, die im Hinblick auf diese Herkunft ausdrücklich mitgeteilt werden. Auch Herakles ist nur ein Sieger "sofern es die Gottheit es so will" (kata daimon) (Olymp. IX, 28). Die Bewertung dieser angeletischen Handlung richtet sich nach der Fähigkeit, den Empfänger zu begeistern. Der Dichter fordert ihn auf, zu Danken und Preisen. So viel zur Pindarischen Botschaftstheorie. 

Zu Beginn des Artikels "Hermeneutik" im "Historischen Wörterbuch der Philosophie" schreibt Hans-Georg Gadamer: 

"Hermeneutik ist die Kunst des hermeneuein, d.h. des Verkündens, Dolmetschens, Erklärens und Auslegens, 'Hermes' hieß der Götterbote, der die Botschaften der Götter den Sterblichen ausrichtet. Sein Verkünden ist offenkundig kein bloßes Mitteilen, sondern Erklären von göttlichen Befehlen, und zwar so, daß er diese in sterblicher Sprache und Verständlichkeit übersetzt. Die Leistung der H. besteht grundsätzlich immer darin, einen Sinnzusammenhang aus einer anderen "Welt" in die eigene zu übertragen. Das gilt auch von der Grundbedeutung von hermeneia, die "Aussage von Gedanken" ist, wobei der Begriff der Aussage selber vieldeutig ist, Äußerung, Erklärung, Auslegung und Übersetzung umfassend." (Gadamer 1974, 1061-1062)

Es ist erstaunlich und bezeichnend zugleich, dass Gadamer in diesem begriffsgeschichtlichen Beitrag zwar auf hermeneuein als Verkünden, nicht aber auf angelia hinweist. Auslegung und Übersetzung setzen die Ankündigung oder Mitteilung des Auszulegenden voraus. Mit anderen Worten, die Hermeneutik bedarf der Angeletik. Die Philosophie in ihrem Sokratisch-Platonischen Anfang steht dem dichterischen Verkünden göttlicher Botschaften kritisch gegenüber. Das läßt sich deutlich am Beispiel des platonischen Dialogs "Ion", also jenem hermeneutischen Dialog par excellence, zeigen, in dem Sokrates die Künste göttlicher Dolmetscher, besonders der Homeriden, kritisiert. Diese haben ihr Wissen aufgrund göttlicher Eingebung (theia moira) und nicht durch Sachkenntnis (techne, episteme) (Ion 536c-d). Die Dichter sind "Dolmetscher der Götter" (hermenes ton theon) (Ion 534e) und die Rhapsoden wiederum Dolmetscher der Dichter. Um die besondere Art der dichterischen Vermittlerrolle hervorzuheben, bedient sich Platon mehrmals der Metapher von eisernen Ringen, die "unter dem Einfluß des Magneten die Kraft voneinander empfangen." (Ion 536e). Dichter und Sänger sind also in den Augen des Philosophen magnetisierte, d.h. unwissende Vermittler. Die philosophische Angeletik sokratisch-platonischer Prägung gründet nicht auf angelia, sondern auf dem (mündlichen) logos. Sie heißt Dialektik. 

Anstelle der vertikalen Botschaft tritt der philosophische logos und der dialektische Mitteilungsprozeß, d.h. das sachliche Fragen auf der Basis jener Botschaften, die uns die Sinne und allem voran die Vernunft (nous) mitteilen und die der Kritik unterworfen werden. Diese Sachen sind für Platon die Ideen (idea) und für Aristoteles die Formen (eidos, morphe) der Dinge. Der im semantischen Kontext von Mythos und Politik angesiedelte angelia-Begriff wird als terminus technicus durch den logos und die Ideen ersetzt. Der mythischen Botschaftstheorie folgt die philosophische. Der dichterische sowie politische Kontext des angelia-Begriffs bei Platon läßt sich an mehreren Stellen nachweisen. Am Anfang des 12. Buches der "Gesetze" heißt es z.B. 

"Wer sich fälschlich als Gesandter (presbeutes) oder Herold (kerux) des Staates bei einem anderen Staate ausgibt oder, wenn er wirklich mit der Gesandschaft betraut ist, die ihm übertragene Botschaft (presbeias) wissentlich fälscht (me apangelle) oder andererseits keinen Zweifel darüber läßt, dass er die von der anderen Seite, sei es Feind oder Freund, ihm übertragene Botschaft als Gesandter oder Herold gefälscht hat, der soll gerichtlich belangt werden als ein Frevler wider die heiligen Gesetze über Botschaften und Aufträge, die unter dem Schutze des Hermes und Zeus stehen (Hermou kai Dios angelias kai epitaxeis); und wird er schuldig befunden, so soll das Gericht die gebührende Strafe oder Buße bestimmen." (Nomoi 941a).

"Als Wächterin über alle solche Verfehlungen", schreibt Plato ebenfalls in den "Gesetzen" - und er meint an dieser Stelle die Verfehlungen bezüglich der Ehre, die man den Göttern, Heroen sowie den Eltern schuldig ist -, "ist Nemesis, die Botin der Dike (Dike Nemesis angelos)" (Nomoi 717d; vgl. Nomoi 758c). Im Dialog "Kratylos" deutet Sokrates die Herkunft des Namen Hermes als Dolmetscher (to hermenea), Bote (to angelon), Dieb (to klopikon) und Betrüger (to apatelon) in bezug auf die Rede (in logois). Hermes ist ein geschickter Handelsmann (to agorastikon), bei dem alles sich um die Macht der Rede (peri logou dynamin) dreht. Sein Name ist zusammengesetzt aus eirein, dem "Gebrauch der Rede", und emesato, "ausfindig machen". Auch der Name der Iris wird von eirein abgeleitet, "weil sie Botin (angelos) war" (Crat. 407e-408b). 

Am Schluß des Dialogs "Menexenos" - ein Dialog, in dem Platon politische Lobreden persifliert und somit nicht nur philosophische Zwecke beabsichtigt - bedankt sich Menexenos für die Sokratische Wiedergabe der Rede (logos) der Milesierin Aspasia, zeigt sich aber zugleich skeptisch. Sokrates bemerkt dazu ironisch, Menexenos solle ihm die Gründe seines Mißtrauens nicht verraten, damit er ihm andere "politische Reden" verkünden (apangello) könne (Men. 249e).

An anderen Stellen gebraucht Platon angello und angelia in einem alltäglichen Zusammenhang, ohne aber dass dieser Begriff zum Gegenstand philosophischer Reflexion oder sogar zum terminus technicus wird. Zu Beginn des "Gastmahls" kommt ein Sklave mit der Meldung (angellonta), dass Sokrates in der Vortür eines Nachbarhauses steht (Symp. 175a). Eutyphrons Vater schickt einen Boten (angelon), um die Auslegung des Richters in einem Mordfall zu erfahren (Euthyph. 4d). Kriton bringt Sokrates eine schlimme Nachricht (angelian chalepen), nämlich die seines bevorstehenden Todes (Crit. 43c). Am Schluß des "Phaidon" sagt Kriton mit Bezug auf die vorausgegangenen Ankündigungen des Dieners, der einen Auftrag (angellon) zu erfüllen hatte: 

"Auch weiß ich, dass andere erst lange nach geschehener Ankündigung (parangelthe) den Trank nahmen" (Phaed. 116e) 

Zu Beginn dieses Dialogs wünscht sich Exekrates einen genauen Bericht (saphes ti angeilai) über die Vorgänge in Zusammenhang mit dem Tod des Sokrates (Phaed. 57 b). 

Im vierten Buch der "Staates" "jagen" Sokrates und Glaukon nach dem Wesen der Gerechtigkeit. Als Sokrates meldet, er hätte "eine Spur des Wildes" entdeckt, antwortet Glaukon: "Gute Botschaft" (eu angelleis). Allerdings stellt sich sofort heraus, dass das Wild sich von Anfang an vor ihren Füßen herumtrieb! (Polit. 360a). Am Schluß dieses Dialogs heißt es, dass der Nutzer eines Gegenstandes der Erfahrenste sei und deshalb dem Hersteller darüber Auskunft geben soll (angelon gignesthai), was er richtig oder falsch macht:  

"Also der eine als Wissender gibt Auskunft (exangellei) über taugliche und untaugliche Flöten, der andere schenkt ihm Glauben und verfertigt sie danach?" (Polit. X 601d-e). 

Bei dieser Stelle steht angelia in einem prima facie paradoxen Zusammenhang mit dem Prozeß der Mitteilung von Fachwissen. Der Stelle liegt die Platonische Auffassung des Handwerkers als Nachahmer zugrunde. Der Verfertiger einer Nachahmung hat für Sokrates nur ein Scheinwissen über die Sache gegenüber dem, der diese unmittelbar gebraucht. So kommt es, dass das praktische Wissen des Verbrauchers höher eingestuft wird als das technische Herstellerwissen. Dementsprechend wird der Prozeß der Wissensmitteilung vom Verbraucher zum Hersteller höher eingestuft als umgekehrt. Ebenfalls im neutralen Sinne von Wissensmitteilung lautet folgende Stelle am Schluß des "Philebos": 

"Auf alle Weise also wirst du, Protarchos (den Abwesenden) durch Boten (angellon pempon), den Anwesenden durch eigenen Mund verkünden (phrazon), dass die Lust nicht das erste und auch nicht das zweite Besitztum sei" (Phil. 66a).

Dieser neutrale Gebrauch von angellein kehrt sozusagen das Verhältnis dichterischer Mitteilung, so wie sie im Dialog "Ion" gedeutet wurde, um.  

Mit der Philosophie findet ein Ortswechsel gegenüber den mythischen, politischen und dichterischen Botschaften statt: Nicht die Königspaläste und die Wettkämpfe, sondern die Agora und die Palästra sind die Orte, an denen logoi mitgeteilt und gedeutet werden. Die Philosophie stellt sich kritisch gegenüber dem mythisch belasteten angelia-Begriff und ersetzt ihn zumindest als terminus technicus durch den des dialektischen Sprechens (dialegesthai). Das logon didonai, d.h. das gemeinsame Suchen nach Gründen und Ursachen, bedeutet allem voran eine an den Gesprächspartner gerichtete sprachliche Handlungsaufforderung, den mitgeteilten logos selbst zu prüfen (krinein). Philosophische Botschaften sind, wie jede Botschaft, heteronom, aber nicht vertikal, sondern horizontal. 

Der Maßstab für den Erfolg einer philosophischen Sprechhandlung ist nicht der Nachweis der Befolgung einer Anweisung, sondern ob die Selbstprüfung tatsächlich erfolgt, was sich ggf. durch eine Gegenfrage erweist. In diesem Sinne fordert Sokrates Kratylos am Schluß des Dialogs auf, das, was er durch eigenes Nachdenken gefunden hat, ihm auch mitzuteilen (metadidonai) (Crat. 440d). Daher auch die aporetische Form philosophischer (Sokratischer) Dialoge. Dennoch entstehen auch beim philosophischen Mitteilungsmodus neue Machtstrukturen, z.B. in Form der Meister-Schüler-Beziehung sowie in bezug auf die Frage, inwiefern der philosophische logos letztlich unter der Macht des Göttlichen steht. Zu diesen Machtstrukturen gehört auch die unterschiedliche Auffassung über das angemessene Medium philosophischer Botschaften, sei es, wie bei Platon, zugunsten der Oralität oder, wie bei Aristoteles, in der Anerkennung der Schrift und des philosophischen Traktats als vollwertiges Medium.

Philosophische messages sind also, was ihre Form betrifft, keine imperativen, sondern indikativen oder optativen Botschaften. Sie beabsichtigen, den Empfänger zu überzeugen, nicht ihn zu Befolgung aufzufordern. Ihr Ziel ist primär dialogisch, d.h. auf die Erzeugung neuer Information orientiert und diskursiv, d.h. auf allgemeine Verbreitung ausgerichtet. Kurz, die philosophische Botschaftstheorie hat andere Koordinaten als die mythische und die dichterische. Das schließt nicht aus, dass philosophische Schriften, wie die platonischen Dialoge, auch zusätzliche Adressaten im Blick haben, so dass sie auch als politische oder dichterische Botschaften aufgefaßt werden können. Das macht nicht zuletzt die Komplexität und den besonderen Reiz z.B. der platonischen Dialoge aus.


4. VERKÜNDIGUNG UND MISSION

Mit dem Aufkommen des Christentums steht der philosophische logos gewissermaßen in der umgekehrten Situation im Hinblick auf das euangelion, die Frohe Botschaft. Versuchten die Philosophen die Macht der mythischen angelia durch die Botschaftstheorie des philosophischen logos wettzumachen, so geht es jetzt darum, die Frohe Botschaft nicht der Macht des philosophischen logos zu unterwerfen. Diese Spannung zwischen angelia und logos, das Verkünden der Frohen Botschaft und ihre rationale Deutung durch die Theologie, prägt das abendländische Selbstverständnis und hat auch dramatische Auswirkungen auf die missionarische Weitergabe dieser Botschaft.

Eine mythische Urszene unserer Kultur ist zweifellos die vom Evangelist Lukas beschriebenen Szene der Verkündigung Mariä durch den "Engel des Herren" (angelos kuriou) (Luk. 1, 11). Diese Szene korreliert wiederum mit der Szene am leeren Grab, wo Joseph von Arimathia und mehrere Frauen von "zwei Männern mit glänzenden Kleidern" die Nachricht über den auferstandenen Jesus hören und anschließend an die nicht anwesenden Jünger verkündigen (apengeilan) (Luk. 24, 9). Lukas berichtet schließlich, wie Jesus ihnen, den "Zeugen" (martyres), "die Verheißung seines Vaters" (ten epangelian tou patros mou) verspricht (Luk. 24, 49). Markus schreibt, dass sie die Frohe Botschaft (to euangelion) an "alle Kreatur" predigen (keruxate) sollen (Mark. 16, 15). Bei Matthäus lautet der Auftrag, sie sollen allen Völkern "lehren" (matheteusate) (Matth. 28, 19). Am eindrucksvollsten kommt aber das Verhältnis von logos undangelia im Johannesevangelium und in seinen Briefen zum Ausdruck:

"die Verkündigung (angelia), die wir von ihm gehört haben und euch verkündigen (anangelomen), dass Gott Licht ist" (I Joh. 1, 5).

sowie:

"Das ist die Botschaft (angelia), die ihr gehört habt von Anfang, dass wir uns untereinander lieben sollen" (I Joh. 3, 11)

Im "Theologischen Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament" schreibt Schniewind über angelia und verwandte Begriffe:

"Die Terminologie wird weder aus der Sprache der Philosophie noch der hohen Religion noch der Mystik gewonnen, vielmehr aus der Sprache des öffentlichen Lebens, der Kampfspiele und der Herrscher. (...) Ob die Sprache des NT aus dem Judentum oder dem Hellenismus stamme, ist hier falsch gefragt. Von Botschaft und Sendung weiß man beiderseits. Die Frage ist nur, wer der Sendende, wer der Bote ist, und was Sendung und Botschaft besagt. Das NT faßt alles im onoma Jesu zusammen." (Schniewind 1953, 57-58)

In Jesus fallen, mit anderen Worten, Bote und Botschaft zusammen. Zur Sprachgeschichte von angelia heißt es ferner bei Schniewind, dass das Wort sowohl die Handlung des Meldens als auch das Gemeldete bezeichnen kann und dass dieser doppelte Sinn sich bei euangelion findet. Während angelia zur Sprache der Dichtung und der Politik gehört, ist die Rolle des Boten (angelos) seit der homerischen Zeit, wie wir gezeigt haben, eine sakrale. Boten werden deshalb von den Göttern geschützt, weil Botschaften zu überbringen, "die einzige Möglichkeit des Verkehrs der Menschen untereinander ist" (Grundmann 1953, 72). Auf die theologische Engellehre, auf die Rolle der Propheten und der Erwartung eines kommenden Boten im Judentum sowie auf die Bedeutung von logos und kerigma im Neuen Testament (Coenen u.a. 1993) können wir hier nicht eingehen. Zu euangelizomai schreibt Friedrich:

"In sämtlichen semitischen Sprachen, im Akkadischen, im Äthiopischen wie im Arabischen ist im Stamm bsr die Bedeutung Freude enthalten. Schon darin zeigt sich die realistische Auffassung von "Wort" in den semitischen Sprachen, daß sie für etwas Erfreuliches melden einen besonderen Stamm haben, während unsere modernen Sprachen und das Latein darauf verzichten und das Griechische eine Mittelstellung einnimmt, indem es das Kompositum euaggelion, euaggelizesthai gebildet hat." (Friedrich 1953, 705)

Michel Serres hat eine eindrucksvolle aber zugleich apologetische Analogie zwischen unserer heutigen message society und der "Legende der Engel" vorgelegt (Serres 1993). Seine Darstellung verwischt m.E. den Unterschied zwischen Engellehre und Angeletik. Gleichwohl steht die Vorstellung von der Materie getrennter reiner Vernunftwesen, was die mittelalterliche Philosophie "getrennte Intelligenzen" (intelligentiae separatae) nannte, nicht weit von einigen Phantasien heutiger Künstliche-Intelligenz-Forscher (Capurro 1995).

Die Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin veranstalte 1994 eine Tagung mit dem Thema "Gespräch - Boten - Briefe. Körpergedächtnis und Schriftgedächtnis im Mittelalter", die als Beitrag zu einer Theorie der Botschaft im Kontext des Mittelalters sowie der frühen Neuzeit aufgefaßt werden könnte (Wenzel 1997). Ich fasse zunächst kurz einige Beiträge zusammen, bevor ich auf das Beispiel der Übertragung der christlichen Botschaft zur Zeit der spanischen Eroberung näher eingehe. Im Mittelpunkt steht die Problematik des Übergangs von einer face-to-face Kommunikation zu einer Kommunikation auf der Basis der persönlichen Repräsentanz, des Instituts des Boten oder Gesandten sowie im Medium des Briefes. Dadurch entstehen Probleme der Sicherung, des Transports sowie der Affektübertragung. In diesem Zusammenhang wäre es eine Untersuchung wert, die mittelalterliche Briefkultur etwa mit der Briefkultur in der Antike zu vergleichen (Capurro 1995, 99-102). Die Literalisierung des Gesprächs reduziert die Komplexität der leibhaftig übertragenen Botschaft, kann aber solche Verluste durch einen Zuwachs an Komplexität, an Speicherkapazität und -dauer kompensieren (Wenzel 1997, 14). 

Ähnliches läßt sich zum Beispiel über die Übertragung der Sokratischen Botschaft im Medium der Oralität durch die Dialoge Platons sagen. Die Frage ist dann, welches Medium aufgrund welcher Argumente die Dominanz besitzt, und welche Konsequenzen das jeweils für Mitteilung, Information und Verstehen hat. "Die wechselseitige Austauschbarkeit der mittelhochdeutschen Begriffe briefe und bote(schaft) verweist", so Wenzel, "auf einen gleitenden Übergang von der mündlich übertragenen zur schriftlich vorgetragenen Botschaft, die auf eine faszinierende Nähe des Boteninstituts zum Medium des Briefes hinweist." (Wenzel 1997, 13). Wenzel, Herausgeber des Tagungsbandes, faßt den für eine Theorie der Botschaft besonders relevanten Beitrag von Bernhard Siegert mit dem Titel "Vögel, Engel und Gesandte" (Siegert 1997) mit folgenden Worten zusammen:

"In der alteuropäischen Mediendiskussion stehen Specht und Elster als sprechende Botenvögel für eine Fernkommunikation, die der Funktion des Boten (nuntius) vergleichbar ist, der seinem Fürsten Körper und Stimme im Sinne einer repraesentatio soni leiht zunächst als physische Vergegenwärtigung (Dante), dann im Sinne der mechanischen Vertretung eines Abwesenden (Descartes). Die mediale Erweiterung des Herrscherkörpers (Kantorowicz) durch Bilder und Boten impliziert die diskursive Ohnmacht des Nachrichtenträgers (nuntius, legatus) als Gefäß einer fremden Stimme, es sei denn die Inkorporation des Wortes werde als Inkarnation Gottes verstanden, der sich als trinitarische Einheit präsentiert. Eine besondere Pointe dieses Beitrages liegt in dem Nachweis, daß die Engel als Botschafter des Himmels (gr. angeloi) etymologisch auf die Bediensteten des angareion, des persischen Relaispostensystems zurückverweisen und damit die Einrichtung der Post dem himmlischen Boten schon vorausgeht. Bezeichnenderweise wird Gabriel, der Engel der Verkündigung, der von Hieronymus als fortitudo Dei definiert ist, als Folge der Verschriftung und Versiegelung der himmlischen Botschaft im späten Mittelalter wieder zu einem Briefträger." (Wenzel 1997, 15-16)

Siegert verweist im Anschluß an Michel Foucault (1997, II, 579) auf die Entstehung des Prokurators im 12. Jahrhundert. Dessen Funktion ist nicht mehr, wie beim nuntius, die bloße Repräsentation, sondern die Wahrheitssuche und Wissensproduktion. Das erfordert ein neues Institut: Die ständige Gesandschaft, die Berichte oder Depeschen verfertigt.  

Wenzel thematisiert das Verhältnis zwischen körperlichen und nichtkörperlichen Nachrichtenträgern, zwischen Boten und Briefen. Die Botenfigur als Archetypus der Fernkommunikation zeigt verschiedene Ausprägungen, nämlich die des persönlichen Stellvertreters eines Auftraggebers (Gespräch), des Überbringers und Deuters einer Nachricht (Gespräch und Brief) sowie des bloßen Trägers (Brief) (Wenzel 1994a). In jeder dieser Ausprägungen gestaltet sich die Differenz zwischen Mitteilung und Information auf unterschiedliche Weise, je nachdem, ob die Mitteilung, wie bei der lebendigen Rede, eine Einheit mit der Information bildet, so dass der Empfänger buchstäblich keine Zeit hat, um Verdachtsmomente zu schöpfen, es sei denn, wie wir gleich zeigen werden, diese Verdachtsmomente liegen schon vor, so dass die Mitteilung sie auch ggf. bestätigt und letztlich zu ihrer Ablehnung führt. Der Bote ist das Medium. Zum Verhältnis zwischen Mitteilung und Information in bezug auf Oralität und Schrift schreibt Luhmann:

"Erst die Schrift erzwingt eine eindeutige Differenz von Mitteilung und Information, und der Buchdruck verstärkt dann nochmals den Verdacht, der sich aus der Sonderanfertigung der Mitteilung gibt: daß sie eigenen Motiven folgt und nicht nur Dienerin der Information ist. Erst Schrift und Buchdruck legen es nahe, Kommunikationsprozesse anzuschließen, die nicht auf die Einheit von Mitteilung und Information, sondern gerade auf ihre Differenz reagieren: Prozesse der Wahrheitskontrolle, Prozesse der Artikulation eines Verdachtes mit anschließender Universalisierung des Verdachts in psychoanalytischer und/oder ideologischer Richtung." (Luhmann 1987, 223-224)

Die Entkoppelung von Bote und Botschaft macht aus dem Boten zunächst einen Briefträger und letztlich einen transmitter und receiver, Teil eines elektrotechnischen Systems und, aus heutiger Sicht, eine mailbox in der weltweiten Vernetzung.

Wulf Oesterreicher stellt die Situation zu Beginn des 16. Jahrhunderts im "Kommunikationsraum Hispanoamerika" als gekennzeichnet durch den Ausschluß der Schriftkommunikation dar. Das bedeutet:

"- von den in der Trias "Gespräche - Boten - Briefe" angedeuteten Kommunikationsformen kommen für die Kommunikation mit Indios die Gesprächsform, der mündliche Bericht sowie die Verlautlichung von Schriftlichem durch Vorlesen oder Verlesen, also mit einem Medienwechsel, in Frage; genuine Schriftkommunikation mit medial schriftlicher Rezeption, also der Lektüre, ist zuerst einmal inexistent. 

- zusätzlich ist jedoch immer ein Sprachwechsel notwendig: es muß übersetzt, gedolmetscht werden. Dieser Sprachwechsel betrifft jede Art von hispano-indianischer Kommunikation. Übersetzer sind damit für die spanischen Konquistadoren von ungeheurer Bedeutung." (Oesterreicher 1997, 299)

Was geschah am 16. November 1532 in der nordperuanischen Stadt Cajamarca? Antwort: Ein Gespräch des Inka-Herrschers Atahualpa mit dem vom spanischen Conquistador Francisco Pizarro geschickten Dominikanerpater Fray Vicente de Valverde, ein Massaker an den Indios und die Gefangennahme Atahaulpas. Vorausgegangen waren Raubüberfälle der Spanier, worauf der Inka-Herrscher die Spanier zur Klärung der Vorfälle einlädt. Die Nacht vor dem Treffen verbringen die Soldaten in Angst und Schrecken vor einem Angriff. Pizarro plant als Ausweg einen Überraschungsangriff am nächsten Tag. Am späten Nachmittag des 16. November erscheint Atahualpa auf einer Sänfte getragen auf dem Hauptplatz von Cajamarca. Valverde, mit dem Kreuz in der einen und der Bibel in der anderen Hand und von einem Dolmetscher begleitet, läßt dem Inka-Herrscher sagen, dass er predigen wolle, was in diesem Buch steht. Als Atahualpa das Buch in die Hand nimmt, kann er zunächst die Schließe nicht öffnen und schlägt den zu Hilfe eilenden Valverde zurück. Er wundert sich, so ein Augenzeugenbericht, scheinbar mehr über die Schrift als über das, was geschrieben war. Mit vor Zorn gerötetem Gesicht wirft er das Buch in die Menge, besteht auf der Rückgabe des geraubten Goldes und droht mit dem Tod. Valverde antwortet, dass dies nicht Gott gefällig sei und dass in der Schrift stehe, dass wir uns gegenseitig lieben sollten. Atahualpa verlangt das Buch und wirft es erneut weit von sich. Valverde kehrt zu Pizarro zurück und fleht ihn an, die Indianer zu töten. Das Massaker der vermutlich um die 7000 unbewaffneten Indios dauert zwei Stunden.

Oesterreicher ist aufgrund eines Augenzeugenberichts der Meinung, dass es sich nicht (oder nicht nur) um einen Dialog gehandelt hat, sondern dass Valverde einen vorgefertigten und seit 1514 obligatorischen Text (requerimiento), der zur Konversion und Unterwerfung aufforderte, vorgelesen hat, dessen gleichzeitige Übersetzung seit 1526 gesetzlich vorgeschrieben dar. Es handelte sich um einen formalen Rechtsakt, der zugleich eine Belehrung in Sachen Christentum und die Ersatzform einer Kriegserklärung war. Oesterreichers Fazit lautet:

"Ganz unabhängig von den besprochenen tragischen Ereignissen in Cajamarca gilt: Die praktische Durchführung des requerimiento führte in der Regel zu 'gespenstischen' Szenarien. Dies haben schon zeitgenössische Juristen zugeben müssen. Häufig wurde schon gekämpft, bevor das requerimiento verlesen wurde. Oft war die Entfernung zu den indianischen Gruppen so groß, daß diese den Vortrag gar nicht hören konnten. Und im übrigen gilt ja: auch wenn sie den Vortrag hörten, verstanden sie natürlich nichts..." (Oesterreicher 1997, 310-311)

Für Bartolomé de las Casas war das requerimiento ein zynischer Akt, "ungerecht, ruchlos, skandalös, absurd und ohne Vernunft, eine Schande für den Glauben und die christliche Religion." (Oesterreicher 1997, 311). Diese Situation zeigt deutlich nicht nur die vertikale Struktur politischer und religiöser Botschaften, sondern auch ihren imperativen Charakter. Die Aufklärung wird die Vorherrschaft dieser Struktur auf den wissenschaftlichen Diskurs in Frage stellen. Die sich daraus ergebende Situation ist nicht gleich wohl, aber vergleichbar mit der Infragestellung der mythischen und politischen angelia durch den philosophischen logos in der Antike.
 

5. VON DER AUFKLÄRUNG ZUR MESSAGE SOCIETY

Die Neuzeit bringt das Aufkommen eines autonomen Subjekts sowie die Forderung eines zensurfreien Raums des wissenschaftlichen Mitteilens auf der Basis des gedruckten Wortes. Die technische Revolution des Buchdrucks schafft eine neue angeletische Situation. Für Immanuel Kant ist gerade die zensurfreie Mitteilung zwischen den "Gelehrten" mittels gedruckter Schriften das Medium, wodurch die Botschaft wissenschaftlicher Kritik sich verbreiten soll und die politischen Prozesse mittelbar beeinflußt werden können (dazu sowie zum Folgenden vgl. Capurro 1995, 110-112; Capurro 1996b). Kants Aufforderung, den Mut zu haben, uns des eigenen Verstandes zu bedienen, stellt die Machtverhältnisse des politischen und religiösen Sendungsbewußtseins zugunsten der autonomen Mitteilungsfreiheit in Frage. Der Anspruch auf die Kontrolle der Botschaftserzeugung und -verbreitung, sei es durch die Politik, die Kirche oder das Militär, soll im Falle wissenschaftlicher Botschaften eingeschränkt werden, und zwar so, dass beide Systeme koexistieren können.

In der Schrift "Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung?" (Kant 1910, AA VIII) schlägt Kant ein duales System vor. Auf der einen Seite sind wir als "Bürger" beim Gebrauch unseres Verstandes durch militärische, geistliche und politische Systeme eingeschränkt, sofern wir nämlich einen "bürgerlichen Posten" oder ein "Amt" bekleiden. Kant spricht dann vom "privaten", d.h. eingeschränkten Gebrauch unserer Vernunft. Auf der anderen Seite aber, als "Gelehrte", sprechen oder, genauer, schreiben wir "vor dem ganzen Publikum der Leserwelt" und dürfen dabei "in allen Stücken" von unserer Vernunft "öffentlichen Gebrauch" machen. Dieses duale System ist so konzipiert, dass der Privatgebrauch den öffentlichen Gebrauch zwar einschränken, aber nicht hindern darf. Denn die bürgerlichen Systeme sind nicht autark, sondern "Glied eines ganzen gemeinen Wesens", das wiederum von der "Weltbürgergesellschaft" umfaßt wird. Diese Weltbürgergesellschaft ist das Forum, vor dem wir als Gelehrte den Mut haben sollten, uns im eigenen Namen zu äußern. 

Kants Botschaftslehre stellt also ein System dar, in dem es politische und religiöse Botschaften auf der einen und wissenschaftliche Botschaften auf der anderen Seite gibt, mit ihren jeweiligen Mechanismen, Machtverhältnissen und Adressaten. Im Falle der wissenschaftlichen Botschaften sind das Medium die gedruckten "Schriften", die sich an die "Leserwelt" richten, und "durch keine Amtspflicht" eingeschränkt werden sollten. Die "Schriften" sind der öffentliche Raum der "Gelehrtenrepublik", wo die dogmatischen Grundsätze und die daraus hervorgehenden Botschaften der Politik und der Religion ihre theoretische Gültigkeit verlieren und einer Prüfung unterzogen werden. Kant nennt diese Konstruktion, eine "Reform der Denkungsart", die durch keine "Revolution" zustande gebracht werden kann, da diese 'nur' den "persönlichen Despotism" abschafft. In der Schrift "Was heißt: Sich im Denken orientieren?" (Kant 1910, AA VIII) betont Kant, daß die Gedankenfreiheit unlösbar mit der Freiheit "seine Gedanken öffentlich mitzutheilen" verbunden ist. Das "ganze Publikum der Leserwelt" reguliert sich selbst. Diese Gedankenfreiheit ist, so Kant, keine Frage der Toleranz, d.h. durch eine amtliche Botschaft verordnete oder erlaubte Gedankenfreiheit.  

Kant macht aber auf Paradoxien, die er am toleranten Verhalten seines aufgeklärten Königs beobachtet, aufmerksam: "räsoniert, soviel ihr wollt und worüber ihr wollt; nur gehorcht!" Mit anderen Worten, in Kants Botschaftstheorie klaffen Theorie und Praxis auseinander. Er fordert nicht "einen größeren Grad", sondern "einen Grad weniger" bürgerlicher Freiheit und bekämpft die politische mit einer philosophischen Paradoxie: Wenn die Gedankenfreiheit um den Preis des politischen Gehorsams erkauft werden muß, dann ist ihm lieber jene auch in politicis zu besitzen, auch wenn dabei die "Freiheit zu handeln" nicht unmittelbar "ausgewickelt" werden kann. Dadurch können nicht nur die Religion, die Künste und die Wissenschaften, sondern auch die "Gesetzgebung" Gegenstand der freien und öffentlichen Kritik werden. Der Preis dafür ist die Aufspaltung von Gedankenfreiheit auf der einen und Handlungsfreiheit auf der anderen Seite, die auf dem Umweg über die "Schriften" vermittelt werden sollen. 

Jürgen Habermas hat dieses Kantische Konstrukt "aus dem historischen Abstand von 200 Jahren" einer Kritik unterzogen. (Habermas 1995). In Kants dualem System soll letztlich die Moral die Fäden der Politik an sich ziehen und zwischen der Weltbürgergemeinschaft und der Staatsräson vermitteln. Dem kommt aber im Licht der Geschichte der letzten zweihundert Jahre eine Entwicklung entgegen. Kant rechnete, so Habermas, "natürlich noch mit der Transparenz einer überschaubaren, literarisch geprägten, Argumenten zugänglichen Öffentlichkeit, die vom Publikum einer vergleichsweise kleinen Schicht gebildeter Bürger getragen wird." Was er nicht voraussehen konnte, war, so Habermas, "den Strukturwandel dieser bürgerlichen Öffentlichkeit zu einer von elektronischen Massenmedien beherrschten, semantisch degenierten (sic), von Bildern und virtuellen Realitäten besetzten Öffentlichkeit." (Habermas 1995, 11). Er konnte also nicht mit der Informationsgesellschaft rechnen. 

Die globale elektronisch-vernetzte und multimediale Kommunikation ist aber weder Kants "Leserwelt" der Gelehrten noch Habermas' transparente Gesellschaft der rational face-to-face Argumentierenden. Es steht noch offen, ob sie die stratifizierten Grenzen der durch die Massenmedien geprägten Weltöffentlichkeit auflockern kann. Gianni Vattimo hat das Habermassche Ideal einer durchsichtigen Gesellschaft kritisiert, und statt dessen für eine "schwächere" Vernunft plädiert, die unterschiedliche Formen des kulturellen Mestizentums sowie von Heterotopien erlaubt, die sich im dezentralen Charakter des Internet abzeichnen (Vattimo 1989). 

Das 20. Jahrhundert kannte bis in die 90er Jahre nur Medien für die Individual- und die Massenkommunikation. Diese Trennung kommt in Flussers Unterscheidung zwischen diskursiven und dialogischen Medien deutlich zum Ausdruck (Flusser 1996). Flusser befürchtete, dass die Massenmedien, allem voran das Fernsehen, mit ihrer one-to-many-Struktur der Botschaftsverbreitung letztlich die dialogischen Medien beherrschen könnten. Er rechnete also nicht mit einem Medium, das die Möglichkeiten der Sendung many-to-many, many-to-one und one-to-many in sich vereinte, ohne der Vertikalität letztlich den Vorzug zu geben. Es war nicht von ungefähr, dass die Massenmedien, zumindest in Deutschland, zunächst allergisch auf das Internet reagierten und jetzt versuchen, so zu tun, als ob das Internet nur ein Kanal mehr wäre, um ihre Machtpositionen weiter zu verfestigen (Capurro 2001). Demgegenüber stimme ich mit Manfred Faßler überein, dass nach der Internet-Revolution die Massenmedien nicht mehr das sind, was sie waren, und es nie mehr sein werden (Faßler 2000). 

Hauptziele der massenmedialen Botschaftsverbreitung, der Fernseh- und Rundfunksendungen also waren und sind Nachrichten und Unterhaltung. Das hat u.a. auch zum infotainment geführt. Peter Sloterdijk hat darauf hingewiesen, dass wir in einer "Epoche der leeren Engel" oder in einem "mediatischen Nihilismus" leben, in der wir, bei einer Vervielfältigung der Übertragungsmedien, die zu vermittelnde Botschaft vergessen haben: "Das ist das eigentliche Dysangelion der Gegenwart" (Sloterdijk 1997, 75). Nietzsches Wort "Dysangelion" hebt, gegenüber Evangelium, die Eigenschaft der Leere jener Botschaften hervor, die durch die Massenmedien verbreitet werden. Bei Nietzsche ist dies der Gegensatz zwischen der einen lebendigen Botschaft und ihrer theoretischen Entleerung: 

"Das Wort schon "Christentum" ist ein Mißverständnis -, im Grunde gab es nur einen Christen, und der starb am Kreuz. Das "Evangelium" starb am Kreuz. Was von diesem Augenblick an "Evangelium" heißt, war bereits der Gegensatz dessen, was er gelebt: eine "schlimme Botschaft", ein Dysangelium. Es ist falsch bis zum Unsinn, wenn man in einem "Glauben", etwa im Glauben an die Erlösung durch Christus das Abzeichen des Christen sieht: bloß die christliche Praktik, ein Leben so wie der, der am Kreuze starb, es lebte, ist christlich..." (Nietzsche 1976, III, 646)

Sloterdijk hat Nietzsches "Verbesserung der guten Nachricht", sein fünftes "Evangelium", unter diesem Vorzeichen thematisiert (Sloterdijk 2001). Es ist die Frage, inwiefern das Internet einen gegenüber den dysangeletischen Massenmedien neuen angeletischen Raum schafft, der in der Lage ist, neue Botschaftssynergien zu erzeugen und uns erlaubt, die Vernetzung als Chance für unterschiedliche Formen der Lebensgestaltung wahrzunehmen (Capurro 1999). Denn wir sind selbst Medien und Boten zugleich. Wir lösen uns allmählich von den Oligopolen vertikaler one-to-many-Strukturen der Botschaftsverbreitung, indem wir sie in einem nur scheinbar anarchischen Netz von Boten und Botschaften auflösen. Dieses Netz verbindet und teilt auf neue Weise die Welt auf (digital divide). Die Herausforderungen dieser angeletischen Situation für das Leben ganzer Gesellschaften sind noch nicht übersehbar. Die message society, wie sie in diesem globalen Ausmaß nicht einmal die Aufklärung zu träumen wagte, ist gerade dabei, die Koordinaten für eine neue Botschaftskultur auszuloten. 

Der Sinn dieses Beitrags war, Ihnen, den Hörern und den Lesern, einige Gedanken über die Herkunft dieses heutigen Phänomens vor einem theoretischen Hintergrund darzulegen. Aristoteles empfiehlt am Schluß seiner "Rhetorik" eine asyndetische Formulierung am Ende einer Rede, damit es die Form eines Schlußsatzes bekomme, und nicht die eines normalen Satzes. Seiner Empfehlung schließe ich mich an: "Ich habe gesprochen, Ihr habt es gehört, Ihr kennt die Tatsachen, urteilt Ihr nun." ("eireka, akekoate, echete, krinate") (Rhet. 1420 a 8).


LITERATUR   

Aristoteles (1959): Ars Rhetorica. Ed. W.D. Ross. Oxford University Press.
Assmann, J. (2000). Religion und kulturelles Gedächtnis. München: Beck. 
Bateson, G. (1972). Steps to an Ecology of Mind. New York: Ballantine Books. 
Capurro, R. (1976). Information. Ein Beitrag zur etymologischen und ideengeschichtlichen Begründung des Informationsbegriffs. München u.a.: Saur. www.capurro.de/info.html 
- (1995): Leben im Informationszeitalter. Berlin: Springer.
 www.capurro.de/leben.html  
- (1996): On the Genealogy of Information. In K. Kornwachs, K. Jacoby Eds.: Information. New Questions to a Multidisciplinary Concept. Berlin: Akademie Verlag. S. 259-270. http://www.capurro.de/cottinf.htm
- (1996b): Informationsethik nach Kant und Habermas. In: A. Schramm, Hrsg.: Philosophie in Österreich 1996. Wien: Verlag Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, S. 307-310. www.capurro.de/graz.html  
- (1999): Vernetzung als Lebenskunst. In: P. Bittner, J. Woinowski Hrsg.: Mensch - Informatisierung - Gesellschaft. Münster: LIT Verlag, S. 1-19 www.capurro.de/fiff.htm  
- (2001) Strukturwandel der medialen Öffentlichkeit. In: Internet-Zeitschrift für Rechtsinformatik JurPC (im Erscheinen)
 www.capurro.de/zkmforum.htm 
Capurro, R. Hjørland, B. (2003). The Concept of Information. In: B. Cronin (Ed.), Annual Review of Information Science and Technology (ARIST), Medford, NJ: Information Today Inc., Vol. 37. 
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Faßler, M. (2000): Mediale Zukünfte. Auf der Schwelle zu einer neuen Epoche. In: medien praktisch 1/2000, S. 8-12. 
Flusser, V. (1996). Kommunikologie. Mannheim 1996. 
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Grimm, J., Grimm, W. (1999). Deutsches Wörterbuch (1854). Leipzig: dtv. 
Grundmann, W. (1953). Art. Angelos. In G. Kittel, Hrsg. Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Tetament. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, S.72-75. 
Habermas, J. (1995). Kants Idee des Ewigen Friedens. Aus dem historischen Abstand von 200 Jahren. In: Information Philosophie 5, S. 5-19. 
Herodot (1894). Historiarum libri IX. Leipzig: Teubner. 
Homer (1979). Odyssee. Vossische Übersetzung. Leipzig: Dürr. 
Hiebel, H. (1997). Kleine Medienchronik. München: Beck. 
Kant, I. (1910ff). Gesammelte Schriften. Hrsg. Preuss. Akademie der Wissenschaften. Berlin 
Luhmann, N. (1987). Soziale Systeme. Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp. 
McLuhan, M. (1964). Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man. New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Nietzsche, F. (1976). Werke. Frankfurt a.M.: Ullstein Verlag. 
Oesterreicher, W. (1997). Das Gespräch als Kriegserklärung. Pizarro, Atahualpa und das Gold von Peru. In H. Wenzel Hrsg.: Gespräche - Boten - Briefe. Körpergedächtnis und Schriftgedächtnis im Mittelalter. Berlin: Schmidt Verlag. 
Platon (1967). Opera. Ed. I. Burnet. Oxford University Press. 
Pindar (1967). Siegesgesänge und Fragmente. Hrsg. und übersetzt O. Werner. München: Heimeran. 
Schniewind, J. (1953). Art. Angelia u.a.. In G. Kittel, Hsg. Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, S. 56-71. 
Serres, M. (1993): La légende des anges. Paris 1993. 
Shannon, C.E. (1948). A Mathematical Theory of Communication. Bell System Technical Journal 27, 379-423, 623-656. 
Shannon, C.E., Weaver, W. (1972): The Mathematical Theory of Communication. Urbana: The University of Illinois Press, 1949, 5. Aufl. 
Siegert, B. (1994). Vögel, Engel und Gesandte. Alteuropas Übertragungsmedien. In H. Wenzel Hrsg.: Gespräche - Boten - Briefe. Körpergedächtnis und Schriftgedächtnis im Mittelalter. Berlin: Schmidt Verlag, 45-62. 
Sloterdijk, P. (1997): Kantilenen der Zeit. In: Lettre International, 36, p. 71-77. 
- (2001): Über die Verbesserung der guten Nachricht. Nietzsches fünftes "Evangelium". Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp.
Vattimo, G. (1989): La società trasparente. Milano 1989. 
Wenzel, H. (1997). Einleitung. In H. Wenzel Hrsg.: Gespräche - Boten - Briefe. Körpergedächtnis und Schriftgedächtnis im Mittelalter. Berlin: Schmidt Verlag, 9-21. 
Wenzel, H. (1997a). Boten und Briefe. Zum Verhältnis körperlicher und nichtkörperlicher Nachrichtenträger. In H. Wenzel Hrsg.: Gespräche - Boten - Briefe. Körpergedächtnis und Schriftgedächtnis im Mittelalter. Berlin: Schmidt Verlag, 86-105.



UWE WIRTH: DIE FRAGE NACH DEM MEDIUM ALS FRAGE NACH DER VERMITTLUNG



in: Was ist ein Medium, hg. von Stefan Münker, Alexander Roesler Frankfurt/M. 2008, S. 222 - 234.

»Medium«, so lesen wir im Vorwort des Kursbuchs Medienkultur, »heißt Mitte und Mittler, Vermittlung und Vermittler und appelliert an die Frage, wie die Rolle, die Tätigkeit und das Material dieses Dazwischen genauer beschaffen sei". [1] Damit ist die Frage »Was ist ein Medium?« offensichtlich an die Frage »Wie ist ein Medium?« gekoppelt. Was macht ein Medium in diesem Dazwischen? Wenn man der Ansicht zustimmt, dass es Medien in einem »substantiell und historisch stabilen Sinn« [2] nicht gibt, da »[w]eder materielle Träger noch Symbolsysteme oder Techniken der Distribution« [3] hinreichen, um den Begriff des Mediums zu explizieren, dann tritt an die Stelle einer substantiellen Antwort auf die Was-ist-ein-Medium-Frage eine Das-macht-das-Medium-These: die These nämlich, dass Medien das, was sie vermitteln, verarbeiten oder speichern, »unter Bedingungen stellen, die sie selbst schaffen und sind«. [4] Medien sind, mit anderen Worten, Rahmenbedingungen, die konstitutiv auf das, was sie vermitteln, einwirken. Diese eigentümliche Dynamik der medialen Rahmung fasst die Mediologie im Ausgang von Regis Debray als System Dispositiv - Träger - Prozeß [5] ein System, das die Verfahren der Übertragung determiniert; in die gleiche Richtung zielt Sybille Krämer, wenn sie feststellt, dass Medien »im Akt der Übertragung dasjenige, was sie übertragen, zugleich mitbedingen und prägen«. [6]
Bei Ausdrücken wie »Träger« oder »Übertragung« liegt es nahe, an den Briefträger zu denken (natürlich könnte man auch an eine Übertragung durch Tröpfcheninfektion denken), und so stellt sich die Frage: Wie bedingt und prägt der Briefträger den Akt der Übertragung eines Briefes? Aber vielleicht ist diese Frage bereits im Ansatz falsch gestellt - vielleicht sollte man besser von einem »postalischen Dispositiv" [7] sprechen, in dessen Rahmen der Brief als Medium und der Briefträger als Mediator eine je eigene Funktion der Vermittlung übernehmen. Dabei macht der Prozess der Übertragung eines Briefes nur dann Sinn, wenn ihm ein Prozess des Briefschreibens vorangegangen ist und wenn der Briefschreiber einen Briefempfänger adressiert. Der Briefträger bedingt den Akt der Übertragung dadurch, dass er ihn als ein Schriftstück, das bestimmte materiale Qualitäten besitzt, transportiert - aber er darf natürlich nicht den Brief öffnen und etwas dazuschreiben. Insofern prägt er nicht die Botschaft des Briefs. Vielmehr prägt er den Brief als Botschaft, die übertragen wird: Seine Übertragungsfunktion besteht darin, dass er direkt oder indirekt im Dienst des Senders steht - von dieser Art der Prägung zeugen Briefmarke und PoststempeL Eben das sind die dispositiven Rahmenbedingung der Übertragung von Briefen.
Wenn es nun aber stimmt, dass Medien im Akt der Übertragung dasjenige, was sie übertragen, zugleich mitbedingen und prägen, dann wäre es falsch, vom Brief als Medium zu sprechen, denn die mitbedingende, prägende Dynamik geht ja vom postalischen Dispositiv, also von den Rahmenbedingungen der Briefkommunikation aus. Nun könnte man natürlich einwenden, dass man Briefe überhaupt nur unter der Bedingung eines postalischen Dispositivs schreibt, dass also die Möglichkeit der Übertragung gewissermaßen in den Brief eingeschrieben ist, und insofern könnte man konzedieren, dass die Übertragung von brieflichen Nachrichten durch eine postalische Bewegung geprägt ist. 
Nun haben wir allerdings drei Möglichkeiten, den Begriff des Mediums anzuwenden, nämlich erstens der Brief als Medium: als symbolisch codierte Nachricht, die der Empfänger entschlüsseln kann: eine Nachricht, die verfasst wurde, weil Sender und Empfänger durch ein Dazwischen getrennt sind; 
zweitens der Briefträger als Medium: als Agent der Übertragung, der in dem Zwischenraum zwischen Sender und Empfänger eine Vermittlungsfunktion ausübt, indem er eine Übertragungsbewegung ausfuhrt; 
drittens das postalische Dispositiv als Medium, nämlich als ein fur Sender, Empfänger und Briefträger gemeinsames Wissen um die Rahmenbedingungen der Briefkommunikation, das sowohl den Prozess der Übertragung als auch den Prozess der Entstehung dessen, was übertragen wird, prägt.
Dabei muss man freilich unterscheiden zwischen dem bereits vor dem Beginn der Briefkommunikation vermittelten dispositiven Rahmenwissen einerseits und der bei jedem Vollzugsschritt der Briefkommunikation wirkenden dispositiven Rahmungskraft andererseits. Wenn der Briefempfänger die Sprache, in der der Brief verfasst ist, nicht kennt, dann scheitert die Briefkommunikation ebenso, wie wenn er die Handschrift nicht lesen kann - aber sie scheitert aus anderen Gründen. Wenn der Briefempfänger nicht weiß, dass man einen Brief öffnen und lesen muss, dann scheitert die Briefkommunikation ebenso, wie wenn er den Brief nicht öffnen kann, weil er keine Hände mehr hat - aber sie scheitert aus anderen Gründen. Man mag der Ansicht zustimmen, dass Schrift auch dann noch funktionieren muss, wenn Empfänger und Sender bereits gestorben sind [8] - der Brief funktioniert in diesem Fall jedoch nicht mehr als Medium eines »guten Gesprächs«, [9]  sondern nur mehr als Spur einer Übertragungsbewegung. In ganz besonderer Weise kommt es zu einer Störung im postalischen Dispositiv, wenn der Briefträger den Brief verliert oder wenn er streikt. Bei diesen »Unfällen« [10] oder Ausfällen [11]  scheitert die Übertragungsbewegung, die den Akt der Vermittlung im Dazwischen ausführen soll. 
Wenn ich es recht sehe, dann ist in den drei eingangs formulierten Statements zum Begriff des Mediums letztlich immer der dritte Aspekt gemeint, also das Medium als Dispositiv, das eine funktionale Rollenverteilung zwischen verschiedenen Agenten vornimmt, deren Handeln von der Zielvorstellung bestimmt wird, eine Botschaft zu übertragen und ein trennendes Dazwischen zu überwinden.
[...]
Nach Luhmann ist ein Medium »eine große Masse lose miteinander verbundener Elemente, die fur Form empfänglich sind«.[22] Das Medium ist dabei - ähnlich wie bei Heider - als Repertoire an physisch wahrnehmbaren Elementen zu fassen, nämlich als »mediales Substrat«, [23] das sich auf grund seiner »Besetzbarkeit« [24] als Zeichenträger auszeichnet - und durch eine formstiftende Konfiguration zum Zeichen wird. Das Medium wird also bei Luhrnann als Grund respektive als Grundlage einer zeichenkonstitutiven Konfiguration gefasst. McLuhan scheint das Verhältnis von Figur und Grund dagegen in erster Linie unter dem Gesichtspunkt der Aufinerksamkeitsökonomie zu betrachten, wenn er schreibt, alle »kulturellen Situationen« setzten sich »aus einem Bereich der Aufmerksamkeit (der Figur) und einem viel größeren Bereich, der der Aufmerksamkeit entgeht, zusammen (dem Grund)«.[25] Etwa wenn sich in einer Vorlesung die Aufmerksamkeit von dem, was . der Redner sagr, auf seine Gesten oder auf das Summen der Beleuchtungsanlage verschiebt. Hier ist die Figur nicht mehr nur ein konfiguriertes Zeichen, sondern ein Aufinerksamkeitsfokus, der einige Gegenstände der Wahrnehmung thematisch werden lässt und andere in den Hintergrund drängr. Das »unablässige Wechselspiel« zwischen Figur und Grund fuhn nicht nur dazu, dass sie sich »gegenseitig abschleifen«, sondern macht auch ein Dazwischen sichtbar: »Zwischen beiden - Figur und Grund - liegr ein Umriß, ein Grenzbereich oder ein Intervall, was beide gleichzeitig begrifflich zu bestimmen hilft.« [26] Wenn wir diesen Gedanken auf das Verhältnis von Vermittlung und Vermitteltem übertragen, dann müssten wir fragen: Wie können wir diesen »Grenzbereich« beschreiben? Was geschieht in diesem Bereich zwischen dem Medium als physikalischer Masse von lose gekoppelten, wahrnehmbaren Elementen und dem konfigurierten Medium als fester Kopplung? 
Ich möchte versuchen, diese Frage im Rekurs auf das Peircesche Zeichenmodell zu beantworten. Nach Peirce erhält das Zeichen seine Funktion als Repräsentamen dadurch, dass es, »outward or inward, mediating between an object and.an interpreting thought« ist. [27] Das Zeichen vermittelt zwischen einem Objekt und einem interpretierenden Gedanken, der seinerseits ebenfalls den Charakter eines Zeichens hat. Damit das interpretierende Zeichen als Interpretant fungieren kann, muss es durch ein vermittelndes Zeichen so determiniert worden sein, dass der Interpretant in »derselben triadischen Relation auf das Objekt« [28] steht wie das vermittelnde Zeichen. Der Interpretant gewinnt seine Erklärungskratt also dadurch, dass seine Beziehung zum Zeichen analog konfiguriert ist wie die Beziehung zwischen Zeichen und Objekt. 
[...]
Während die Beziehung zwischen Objekt und Zeichen ikonischen, indexikalischen oder symbolischen Charakter haben kann, kommen beim Zeichen als solchem drei weitere Aspekte ins Spiel, die Peirce als Typen, Token und Tone bezeichnet. Peirce erläutert den Unterschied mit Blick auf das Zählen von Wörtern in einem Manuskript. Da gibt es durchschnittlich 20 Mal den Ausdruck »der« auf einer Seite - das wären 20 Tokens, also Vorkommnisse des Worttyps »den<. Darüber hinaus weist jedes Zeichen aber auch noch einen »indefinite significant character« auf,31 etwa den schrillen Ton einer Stimme oder die Farbe der Tinte, mit der ein Wort geschrieben wurde. Dieser »tonale Aspekt« hat, wenn wir Peirce folgen, einen unbestimmten signifikanten Charakter, den das Zeichen-Token entweder in dem Moment annimmt, in dem es als Token eines Type verkörpert wird (Peirce spricht hier explizit von »embodied«); [32] es kann aber auch sein, dass das Token »unterwegs« zusätzliche tonale Aspekte hinzugewinnt - oder verliert. So kann die Tinte, in der ein Brief geschrieben wurde, mit den Jahren verblassen - oder das Papier, auf das der Brief geschrieben wurde, kann vergilben. Wenn ich nun aber einerseits von der Tinte und andererseits von dem vergilbten Papier spreche, dann besteht hier semiotisch und logisch betrachtet ein Unterschied: Die Tinte ist zwar der tonale Aspekt eines Zeichentokens, aber das Briefpapier ist nicht in gleicher Weise als Tone zu betrachten wie die Tinte: Es ist der Grund, auf dem die tonale Qualität eines Schritttokens zur Erscheinung kommt. Natürlich beeinflusst die Materialqualität des Papiers die Art, wie die tonale Qualität des Schrifttokens zur Erscheinung kommt - und insofern trägt die Papierqualität zur tonalen Qualität des Schritttokens bei. In einem anderen Verwendungszusammenhang kann nun freilich auch das Briefpapier zu einem Zeichen-Token, ja womöglich sogar zu einem Prototyp werden - und zwar aufgrund seiner tonalen Aspekte: etwa dann, wenn man ein Blatt handgeschöpftes Büttenpapier als Muster vorzeigt - oder mit der Post an eine Druckerei versendet.
Der Punkt, um den es mir hier geht, ist, dass Tones offensichtlich gerade wegen ihres unbestimmten signifikanten Charakters eine grundlegende Vermittlungsfunktion haben: Sie sind zum einen die Grundlage für die physikalische Konfiguration des Tokens: Tokens bestehen, mit anderen Worten, aus einem konfigurierten Bündel tonaler Qualitäten. Die Konfigurationsvorschrift ist der Type - befolgt man diese Vorschrift, dann stellt man eine feste Kopplung her, die dem Token als Bündel von Tones eine distirJcte Form gibt. Zum anderen stellen Tones aber auch einen Bezug zu anderen Objekten in der Welt her, weil sie »als Farbe, Ton, überhaupt als Sinnesqualität« [33] aufgefasst werden, die nicht nur das Zeichentoken konstituieren, sondern auch an anderen Dingen beobachtbar sind - ohne deswegen unbedingt schon Zeichencharakter zu haben. Das kann sich ändern, sobald sich die Aufmerksamkeit von einem Zeichentoken auf einem Blatt Papier - etwa dem Wort »der« - auf die materiale Qualität des beschriebenen Papiers verschiebt. Dann kann mit einem Mal der Umstand, dass das Wort »der« auf handgeschöpftes Büttenpapier geschrieben wurde, zu einem Signalhaften Anzeichen dafür werden, dass der Schreiber dem Empfänger besondere Wertschätzung angedeihen lässt, weil er ein besonders teures Papier gewählt hat. 
Meine Frage an die Peircesche Zeichentheorie und an die Heidersche Medientheorie wäre nun erstens, ob sich Tones im Sinne von Peirce als Sinnesqualitäten im Sinne Heiders auffassen lassen, die bei der Konfiguration von Zeichentokens einen physikalisch determinierten Grund zwischen Zeichen und Objekt herstellen - und insofern entscheidenden Anteil an allen Vorgängen der Vermittlung im Sinne Heiders haben. Dabei, so steht anzunehmen, interferieren die Aspekte des Zeichens als solchen (Tone, Token, Type) mit den ikonischen, indexikalischen und symbolischen Aspekten, die die Beziehung zwischen dem Objekt und dem Zeichen determinieren. Zweitens wäre zu fragen, ob und inwiefern die zu Tokens konfigurierten Tones parergonal die Bewegung im Rahmen eines Dispositivs mitbestimmen, also von einem bestimmten Außen her sozusagen im Inneren des Verfahrens mitwirken. 
Zu klären bliebe drittens, wie sich die physikalisch determinierte Vermittlung verändert, sobald das vermittelte Zeichen interpretiert, und das heißt, in ein anderes System von Zeichen übersetzt wird. Wie transformiert, mit anderen Worten, der interpretative Prozess der Mediation die physikalische Konfiguration des Mediums? Wenn man mit Peirce davon ausgeht, dass die Beziehung zwischen einem Zeichen und seinem Interpretanten die Beziehung zwischen Zeichen und Objekt übersetzt (also die Beziehung zwischen Objekt und Zeichen auf die Beziehung zwischen Zeichen und Interpretant übertragen wird), dann muss man davon ausgehen, dass die damit implizierte mediale oder gar intertnediale Modulation in besonderem Maße die tonalen Aspekte des vermittelten Zeichens betrifft. Genauer gesagt: Die mediale Modulation betrifft den zwischen Objekt und Zeichen gelegenen Raum der Vermittlung (Medium), der als gemeinsamer Grund durch ein tonales Dispositiv konf\,uuriert ist und im Vollzug seiner interpretativen Vermittlung (Mediation) eine rekonfigurierende Modulation erfährt.Vielleicht könnte man diesen Modulationsprozess im Anschluss an Ludwig Jäger als tonale Transkription bezeichnen, nämlich als Transktiption, bei der das Medium durchsichtig respektive transparent wird.[34]


1 Kursbuch Medienkultur. Die maßgeblichen Theorien von Brecht bis Baudrillard, hg. v. Claus Pias, Joseph Vogl, Lorenz Engell, Oliver Fahle und Britta Neitzel, Stuttgart 1999, S.9.
2 Ebd., S. 10 .
3 Ebd. 
4 Eb hier: S. 16.
5 Régis Debray; »Für eine Mediologie«, in: Pias/Vogl/Engell/Fahle/Neitzel (Hg.), Kursbuch Medienkultur, a. a. 0., S.67-75, hier: S. 68 f. 
6 Sybille Krämer, »Erfüllen Medien eine Konstitutionsleistung? Thesen über die Rolle medientheoretischer Erwägungen beim Philosophieren«, in: Stefan Münker, Alexander Roesler und Mike Sandbothe (Hg.), Medienphilosophie. Beiträge zur Klärung eines Begriffs, Frankfurt/M. 2003, S.78-90, hier: S. 85. 
7 VgL Natalie Binczek, »Medien- und Kommunikationstheorie. Neuere deutsche Literatur«, in: Claudia Benthien, (Hg.), Germanistik als Kulturwissenschaft. Einführung in neue Theoriekonzepte, Reinbek 2002, S. 152-174, hier: S. 165, sowie Bernhard Siegert, Relais. Geschicke der Literatur als Epoche der Post. 1751-1913, Berlin 1993, S·44 ff.
8 Jacques Derrida, »Signatur Ereignis Kontext«, in: Ders., Limited Inc., Wien 2001 S.15-45, hier: S.25. 

9 Christian Fürchtegott Gellert, Briefe, nebst einer praktischen Abhandlung von dem guten Geschmacke in Briefen (1751), in: Ders., Gesammelte Schriften. Kritische, kommentierte Ausgabe, Bd.4, Roman. Briefsteller, hg. von Bernd Witte, Berlin, New York 1989, S. III. 
10 V gl. Ludwig Jäger, »Störung und Transparenz. Skizze zur perforrnativen Logik des Medialen«, in: Sybille Krämer (Hg.), Performativität und Medialität, München 2004, S. 35-74, hier: S.42, sowie John L. Austin, Zur Theorie der Sprechakte, Stuttgart 1979, S.36. 
11 Vgl. hier auch: Werner Hamacher, »Affirmativ, Streik«, in: Christiaan L. Hart Nibbrig (Hg.), Was heißt »Darstellen«?, Frankfurt/M. 1994, S. 340-371.
22 Niklas Luhmann (1993), »Die Form der Schrift«, in: Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht und K Ludwig Pfeiffer (Hg.), Schrift, München 1993, S·349-366, hier: S. 355.
23 Niklas Luhmann, Die Wissenschaft der Gesellschaft, Frankfurt/M. 1994, S.188.
24 Ebd.
25 Marshall McLuhan, »Das globale Dorf", in: Medien verstehen. Der McLuhan-Reader, Mannheim 1997, S.225f. 

26 Ebd.
27 Charles Sanders Peirce, Collected Papers, hg. v. Charles Hartshorne und Paul Weiss, Bd.I-VI, Cambridge (Mass.) 1931-1935, Bd. VII und VIII. hg. v. Arthur W Burks, Carnbridge (Mass.) 1958. Zitiert wird nach Band u. Abschnitt: 1.480 .
28 
Charles Sanders Peirce, Phänomen und Logik der Zeichen, hg. v.· Helmut Pape, Frankfurt/M. 1983, S. 64 (Manuskript 478 aus dem Jahr 1903).
32 Peirce, Collected Papers, a.a.O., 4.537. 
33 Heider, Ding und Medium, a. a. 0., S. 106.
34 Vgl. Jäger, "Störung und Transparenz«, a.a.O., S. 60f.






SYBILLE KRÄMER: MEDIUM, BOTE, ÜBERTRAGUNG

 Kleine Metaphysik der Medialität

Frankfurt a.M. 2008, S. 110 ff.


Inhalt
I. Prolog
1. Übertragung und/oder Verständigung? Über das 'postalische' und das 'erotische' Prinzip von Kommunikation

II. Methodische Erwägungen
2. Ist eine Metaphysik der Medialität möglich?

III. Hinführungen
3. Walter Benjamin
4. Jean Luc Nancy
5. Michel Serres
6. Régis Debray
7. John Durham Peters

IV. Das Botenmodell
8. Wo stehen wir? Ein erstes Resümee
9. Der Bote als Topos

V. Übertragunsverhältnisse
10. Engel: Kommunikation durch Hybridisierung
11. Viren: Ansteckung durch Umschrift
12. Geld: die Übertragung von Eigentum durch Entsubstantialisierung
13. Übersetzung: Sprachübertragung als Komplementierung
14. Psychoanalylse: Heilung durch affektive Resonanz
15. Zeugenschaft: Zeugnisgeben durch Glaubwürdigkeit

VI. Was also bedeutet 'übertragen'?
16. Wahrnehmbarmachen
17. Spurenlesen

VII. Erprobung
18. Karten, Kartieren, Kartografie

VIII. Epilog
19. Weltbilddimensionen, Ambivalenzen, Ansclussmöglichkeiten
Literatur


I. Prolog

1. Übertragung und/oder Verständigung?  
Über das 'postalische' und das 'erotische' Prinzip von Kommunikation


[...] Während die Kommunikation-als-Verständigung als ein symmetrischer und reziproker Vorgang aufzufassen ist, verläuft die Kommunikation-als-Übertragung asymmetrisch und unidirektional. Die Übertragung ist gerade keine Wechselrede: Aussenddung, also Dissemination, und nicht Dialog ist das Ziel technischer Kommunikation  [6]. Wir können somit vom personalen Prinzip der Verständigung das postale Prinzip [7] der Übertragung deutlich unterscheiden.
Das postalische Prinzip entwirft Kommunikation als das als das Herstellen von Verbindungen zwischen räumlich entfernten körperlichen Instanzen. Das dialogische Prinzip hingegen modelliert Kommunikation als ein Zusammenfund eine Vereinheitlichung vormals divergierender Zustände von Individuen. Wir können daher auch sagen: Die personale Perspektive mit ihrem Telos, voneinander Geschiedenes zusammenfallen zu lassen, birgt eine latent erotische Dimension. [8] In ironischer Zuspitzung können wir auch von einem 'potalischen' und einem 'erotischen' Konzept der Kommunikation sprechen.

[6] Diese Überlegungen sind inspiriert von John Durham Peters Unterscheidung zwischen 'Dialog' und 'Dissemination' (1999, S. 33ff.)
[7] Der Begriff  'postalisches Prinzip' findet sich - an Derrida anknüpfend - erstamsl bei Chang 1996, S. 47: "[...] the dialectic mediation ... is itself governed by another more general principle [...] the postal principle." Für Derrida 1982, S. 82, wird die 'Post' zu einer Art absoluter Metapher, zur Inkarnation der Über-tragung, des meta-phorein und damit zum strukturellen Prinzip der Metaphorisierung selbst. Zur postalischen Adressierbarkeit als Subjektkonstitution vgl. auch Siegert 1993 sowie im Anschluss an Siegert: Winthrop-Young 2002.
[8] Wir sind uns darüber im Klaren, dass wir 'erotisch' hier in einem sehr elementaren und reflexiv anspruchslosen Sinne gebrauchen!

(S. 15)


IV. Das Botenmodell
9. Der Bote als Topos
[...]


I. Dimensionen des 'Botenmodells'

Was tut also der Bote? Er vermittelt zwischen heterogenen Wilten, indem er Botschaften überträgt. Dieser Sachverhalt ist denkbar schlicht: wir wollen ihn aufschlussreich machen, indem wir fünf Dimensionen am 'Botenmodell' unterscheiden: Distanz, Heteronomie, Drittheit, Materialität und schließlich Indifferenz.

(1) Distanz als heterogenität: Abständige Kommunikation. - Wo immer wir Kommunikation in der Perspektive des Botengängers beschreiben, geht es um eine Kommunikation, die geprägt und gezeichnet ist von Distanz. Diese Distanz ist keineswegs auf die räumliche Enternung zu beschränken, sondern umgreift auch die Verschiedenartigkeit, welche die miteinander Kommunizierenden in der Fülle ihrer unterschiedlichen Geschichten, singuläre Erfahrungen, abweichenden Meinungen, unterschiedlichen Wissensbestände und praktischen Orientierungen einander durchaus fremd und unverständlich sein lassen. Mitteilung - erinnern wir uns an Benjamin und Nancy - setzt die Teilung und Spaltung voraus. Wir sind im Miteinander zugleich immer auseinander und also Einzelne.[...]

(2) Heteronomie als Sprechen mit fremder Stimme. - Dies ist einer der irritierenden - und zugliech wesentlichen - Aspekte des Botenmodells: Der Bote ist heteronom, [5] hier verstanden im Unterschied zu 'autonom'. Er ist nicht selbstätig, er untersteht einem 'fremdem Gesetz' und handelt im Auftrag eines anderen: Er hat eine Mission. Der Bote ist 'von außen gesteuert'.
Wo immer Boten thematisch werden, stoßen wir auf die Unterscheidung zwischen vertikaler, sakraler sowie horizontaler, säkularer Botschaftsübermittlung Bleiben wir in der Vertikalen: Hermes überbringt die Botschaften der Götter den Sterblichen. Dieser Aufgabe kommt zugute, dass der Schutzgottheit der Straßen und des Handels ist, Gelehrsamkeit und List verknüpft und auch dem Diebstahl nicht abhold ist. So bewahrt er eine Nähe zum allzu Menschlichen, die nottut, da er die göttlichen Botschaften in das Register des den Menschen Zugänglichen zu übersetzen hat. [6] Die biblischen Worte 'angelos' (Bote) und 'angelia', Verkündigung und Bostchaft, entstammen, wie Julius Schiewind feststellte, nicht der Sprache der Religion, Mystik oder Philosophie, sondern der Sprache des öffentlichen Lebens.[7]. Dem korrepondiert - wie Bernhard Siegert zeigte [8] -, dass der Engel als Botschafter Gottes (angeloi) etymologisch sich ableitet von den Bediensteten des Äangareion', des persischen Relaispostsystems.[9] Die mythschen und religiösen Verbindungen von Gott und Mensch sind etymologsich gezeichnet von der Prosa eines postalischen Prinzips.
Zu den vertikalen Vermittlern zählen auch die Dichter und Rhapsoden, die als "Dolmetscher der Götter" oder, wie im Falle der Rhapsoden, als "Dolmetscher der Dichter" ihre Kunde üermitteln. Genau dies, von einem Wissen zu künden, das ihnen in göttlicher Eingebung zwar aufgegeben, nicht aber selbst erarbeitet oder auch nur zu verantworten ist, lässt der Dichter dann in der Perspektive des sokratischen Dialogs bei Platon absinken zu "unwissenden Vermittlern", [10], die zu kritisieren zur genuinen Augabe der Philosophie wird: Die Überwindung der angelia durch den logos wird zur Geburtstunde der am Wahrheitsdiskurs orienteirten Philosopohie. Und ih ihrem Horizont wird der Bote zum uneigentlichen Redenden. [...]

3) Drittheit als Keimzelle der Sozialität . - Der Bote sstiftete eine Relation. Indem er nicht nur gesandt, sondern auch auf jemanden hin gerichtet ist, dem er etwas zu 'entbieten' hat, ermöglicht der Bote eine soziale Beziehung zwischen denen, die voneinander entfernt sind. Nicht zufällig weist unser Begriff  'Relation' etymologsich zurück auf die Berichterstattung ('relation' lat. und mhdt. Bericht). Die Mittelstellung des boten zwishen Absender und Adressat konfiguriert eine elementare 'Kommunikationsgemeinschaft'', für die der Bote wesentlich ist, ohne dochals ihr Subjekt aufzutreten. Wir sind gewohsnt, intersubjektive Beziehungen in Strukturen des Dualen, somit als Dyade thematisch werden zu lassen: Sprecher und Hörer (Searle, Habermas), Sender und Empfänger (Shannon), ego und alter ego (Parsons, Luhmann), Produzent und Rezipient, Herr und Knecht (hegel), Ich und Du (Buber). Vom Standpunkt binär orientierter Intersubjektivitätstheorien mag das Auftreten eines Dritten als störend, parasitär , entfremdet erscheinen. Aber sind nicht aud "dydische Figuren latent trianguliert", fragt Joachim Fischer, so dass sich zu den Binarirät des Einen und des Anderen noch eine dritte Figur hizugesellt.?[15] Das System unserer Personalpronomen (ich, du, er/sie/es, sie) legt jedenfalls Zeugnis ab davon, wie tief in unseren alltäglichen Praktiken die 'Hereinnahme' des Dritten und seiner Perspektive eingelagert ist.[16] [...] In der Sozialität des Boten nistet von Anbeginn auch die Fragilität der boteninstitution, die ihn zur Kippfigur prädestiniert. [20] Gerade weil die Kommunizierenden füreinaner unterreichbar sind, wird die Frage von Belang, ob der Bote seinen heteronomen Status und die darin angelegte Neutralität wahrt oder ob er sicch doch als Souverän und Manipulator 'seiner' Nachrichten' geriert'', mithin weglässt, verzerrt oder erfindet. Denn als Figuration des Dritten ist das Mediium immer auch Unterbrechung von etwas und somit eine Bruchstelle. Es kann eben auch Zwist stiften, Streit aussähen, Intrigen einfädeln, gegeneinander ausspielen, verraten und aufhetzen. Vermittlung trägt also ein symbolisch-dialogisches Doppelgesicht: Sie kann als sym-bolischer Akt (zusammen-werfend), aber auch als dia-bolischer Eingriff (auseinander-dividierend) [21] auftreten.  Die diabolische Entgleishung ist der Dritten und Botenfunktion als Option stets eingeschrieben.

(4) Materialität als Verkörperung. - Die Aufgabe des Boten ist die Ent-fernung des Raumes durch seine eigene Bewegung; eine Bewegung deren Bedeutung nicht darin besteht, hervorzubringen, sondern Korrespondenzen herzustellen. Auch hier erinner die Wortgeschichte daran, das 'korrespondieren' im Sinne von 'sich entsprechen' und 'übereinstimmen' auf 'Korrespondenz' als Berichterstattung und Briefwechsel verweist. Die Beweglichkeit des Boten steht in eigentümlichen Spannungsverhältnis zur erwarteten Identität und Stabilität des ihm Aufgetragenen. Der Bote hat die Botschafat nicht nur zu überbringen, sondern sie dabei zugleich zu bewahren im störungsanfälligen Verlauf der von ihm durchmessenen Raum-Zeitlichkeit. Die Mobilität der Nachricht, die sich im Boten verköprtert, komm der Nachricht allein in der Äußerlichkeit ihres materialen Trägers zu, während ihr Gehalt möglichst immobil zu halten ist. Ist das die Geburt der Trennung von Signifikant und Signifikat aus dem Geiste des Botenganges? Was immer eine Botschaft ist: Sie muss jedenfalls aus der Situation ihrer Genese ablösbar und also transportierbar sein. Sprachliche Aussagen gerinnen zur physiognomischen Textur; Sinn materialisiert sich in der Sinnlichkeit eines Körperhaften. Dem Boten wird die Rede zu etwas 'Äußerlichem'. In ihm kristallisiert sich die Aussage zum Aufgesagten, zur 'imitatio soni'.
Die Botschaft gehört einem Materialitätskontinuum an, zu dessen physischen Bestand auch der Bote in seiner Körperlichkeit zählt. Seiner Mimesis, seinem 'Körpergedächtnis', [22] ist die Botschaft einverleibt und anvertraut. Inkorporation und Exkorporation keruzen sich also im Boten. So war zur Sicherung der Botschaft nicht nur deren authentische Reproduktion, sondern auch die Beglaubigung des Botenkörpers durch 'wahrzeichen'[23] üblich. Um noch einmal auf die Verkörperungdes Auftraggebers zurückzukommen: Der Nuntius [24] galt als "der über seine Grenzen hinaus verschobene Körper des Fürsten": Er repräsentiert mit dem Vortragen seiner Botschaft zugleich auch ein In-Erscheinung-Treten seines Auftraggebers:[25] Eine Art von profaner Epiphanie. Und es wurdert nicht - Horst Wenzel macht darauf aufmerksam [26] -, dass die Immunität des boten stets gefährdet ist: nicht selten wurde der Bote - je nach Art 'seiner' Botschaft - belohnt oder bestraft.
Als Teil eines Materialitätskontinuums bewwegt der Bote sich also im Zwischenraum des "Sinnaufschubs".[27] Der sinnliche Außenraum des Sinns ist seine Operationsbasis. Im Boten gewinnt das Phänomen der Abspaltung von Sinn und Sinnlichkeit, von Text und Textur, von Form und Gehalt eine handgreifliche Gestalt.

(5) Indifferenz als Selbstneutralisierung. - Wo Botschaften gesendet werden, geht es meist um Mitteilungen, die von Wichtigkeit sind. Botschaften berühren, sie überraschen, sie bringen ihren Empfängern Glück oder Unblück. Doch der Bote verhält sich indifferent gegegenüber dem Gehalt seiner Botschaft. Er wahrt eine Gleichtülgkeit gegenüber dem, was er sagt. Denn schließlich ist er ein Zeichen-Träger genau dadurch, dass er selbst von der Zeichenbedeutung abzusehen und diese zu dispensieren vermag. Sein Signifikantengedächtnis kann so stark sein, weil er das Signifikat vergessen darf.
Der Bote nimmt die Mitte ein, und das heißt: Er ist nicht Partei. Die Neutralität der Mitte ist die Wurzel des Mittleramtes.[28] Diese indifferente Position wird sinnfällig in der Tendenz des Boten zurückzutreten, sich zurückzunehmen zugunsten dessen, was er zu übertragen und zu sagen hat. Dei Verkörperung einer fremden Stimme ist nur möglich durch das Aufgeben der eigenen Stimme, durch jene Form der Selbst-losigkeit, die der Funktionslogik des Boten eingeschrieben ist - und übrigens auch das Ethos seines Amtes ausmacht: Fremdenvergegenwärtigung durch Selbstneutralisierung. Im Boten kann das Differente, das Überraschende der Botschaft Gestalt gewinnen auf dem Hintergrund seiner eigenen Indifferenz. Erinnern wir uns: Sowohl das Verschwinden des Mediums in der syllogistischen Schlussfigur wie auch das Motiv des sterbenden Boten verweisen etymologisch auf diese Selbst-rücknahme, die in der Medialität des Botenamtes angelegt ist. Sie bildet übrigens auch die Voraussetzung für jene magische Realpräsenz des abwesenden Auftraggebers, die im Boten ebenfalls wirksam werden kann.
Ist eigens zu betonen, dass auch diese 'symbolische Zurücknahme" des Mediums seine 'diabolische Umkehrung' kennt?

Es sind also fünf Attribute, die uns am Botenmodell wichtig sind: (1) Der Bote verbindet heterogene Welten, zwischen denen er etwas 'in Fluss bringt'. (2) Er ist nicht selbstbestimmt, vielmehr heteronom, spricht also mit fremder Stimme. (3) Er verkörpert die Figur eines Dritten und bildet somit eine Keimzelle der Enstehung von Sozialität. 4) Er ist eingebettet in ein Materialitätskontinum operierend im Zwischenraum des Sinnaufschkrufs, und zehrt damit von der Trennung zwischen Text und TExtur, Sinn und Form. (5) Er ist eine sich selbst neutralisierende Instanz, die dadurch etwas anderes vorstellig macht, dass sie sich selbst zurücknimmt.

Damit gewinnt das Botenmoddel eine Signatur - denken wir nur an die Aspekte, die mit der Fremdbestimmtheit, dem Sinnaufschub und der Selbstneutralisierung  zu tun haben - die es als Kontrastfolie, wenn nicht als 'Gegenmodell' dessen erscheinen lässt, was wir gemeinhim unter 'Kommunisieren' verstehen. Es lässt sich kaum verleugnen: Der 'gute' Bote ist diskursiv ohnmächtig. [29] Versuchen wir diesen irritierenden Aspekt ein Stück weit zu verfolgen."

2. Zur diskursiven Ohnmacht des Boten

Nahezu alle Facetten, die wir der Rede des Boten Abgewinnen, fügen sich zusammen zu einer Auffassung des Sprechens, die quer steht zu dem, was im philosophischen Diskurs 'Kommunikation' und 'Sprachlichkeit' bedeuten. Philosophisch betrachtet verkörpert der Bote eine anstößige Figur: Er spricht nicht im eigenen, sondern in fremden Namen. Er denkt und meint nicht, was er sagt. Er darf, was er sagt, nicht selbst produzieren; er muss es noch nicht einmal verstehen. Der Bote steht nicht in der Veantwortung für den Inhalt dessen, was ihm zu sagen aufgetragen ist. [...]
Die Anfänge der klassischen Philosophie in Griechenland gehen einher mit der Ersetzung des Begrifffes 'angelia' (Botschaft) durch die Begriffe 'logos', 'idea', 'nous'.[30} Die Herabsetzung des Dichters und des Rhapsoden in Platons Ion erfolgt im Namen der Diskreditierung desjenigen, der 'nur' als Bote auftritt. Denn die Dichter gelten als Dolmetscher der Götter, [31] die Rhapsonden wiederum als Dolmetscher der Dichter. Die Art von Zusammenhang, die dichterische Vermittlung schafft, versinnbildlicht Platon durch den Einfluss des Magneten, dessen Kraft die magnetisierten eisernen Ringe zusammenhält. Wo göttliche Botschaften verkündet werden, da bleiben ihre Vermittler unselbständig und unwissend. Daher kann die Philosophie nur in Kritik und Überwindung des Botenmodells der Kommunikation zu der ihr eigenen Form einer auf Denkautonomie und Wissen gegründeten Rede finden.


5. Diese Heteronomie des Boten hat Capurro 2003 zu einer Gelenkstelle in seiner Theorie der Botschaft gemacht.
6. Auf diese 'Übersetzungstätigkeit' des Hermes verweist explizit: Gadamer 1974, S. 1062.
7.Schniewind 1953, S. 57f
8. Siegert 1997.
9. Dazu: Herodot 1971, Kap. 98, 8. Buch
10. Platon 1990, Bd. I, Ion 530f.
15. Fischer 2004, S. 80
16. Elias 1978, zit. bei Fischer 2006, S. 151: Fischer zeigt, wie in dem System der Personalpronomen 'Ich, Du, Es, Er bzw. Sie, Wir, Ihr, Sie' die ausdifferenzierte Stelle eines personalen Dritten gegeben ist, und macht daraus ein Argument für die systematische Berücksichtigung des Dritten in der Sozialtheorie (ibid. S. 152).
20. Fischer 2004, S. 35
21. Block 2000.
22.Wenzel 19997, S. 86ff.
23.Wenzel 1997, S. 98.
24. Siegert 1997, S. 49.
25. Siegert 1997, S. 50.
26. Ibid., S. 97.
27. 'Sinnaufschub' ist ein Begriff, den Tholen 2002, S. 8, gebraucht.
28. "Der Botschafter muß gewissermaßen zu einem Neutrum werden, als wäre er nur ein reiner Kanal" (Sloterdijk 1999, S. 676)
29. Diese Aussage bezieht sich selbstverständlich auf die 'Reinform' unseres Modells; sie bildet kein Urteil über die empirisch-historischen Gestalten der Übermittler. Und zugleich ist klar, dass die 'diskursive Ohnmacht' des boten die Voraussetzung bildet für die in ihm verkörperte 'Telekommunikation der Macht'.
30. Darauf verweist: Capurro 2003, 105 ff.
31. Platon 1990, Bd. 1, Ion 534c.

Literatur

Capurro, Rafael (2003). "Theorie der Botschaft", in: ders. Ethik im Netz, Stuttgart: Steiner, S. 105-122.
Fischer, Joachim (2000). "Der Dritte. Zur Anthropologie der Intersubjektivität", in: wihr / ihr / sie. Identität und Alterität in Theorie und Methode, hg. v. Wolfgang Eßbach, Würzburg, Ergon, S. 103-138.
Gadamer, Hans-Georg (1974). "Hermeneutik", in Historisches Wörterubuch der Philosophie, hg. v. Joachim Ritter, Karlfried Gründer und Gottfried Gabriel, Bd. 3, Darmstadt: Wiss. Buchgesellschaft, S. 1061-1073.
Herodot: Historien. Deutsche Gesamtausgabe, übers. v. August Horneffer, hg. v. Hans W. Haussig, Stuttgart: Kröner.
Platon (1990) Werke, hg. v. Gunther Eigler, bearb. v. Heinz Hofmann, 8 Bde., Darmstadt: Wiss. Buchgesellschaft.
Schniewiend, Julius (1953). "Angelia", in: Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament, hg. von Georg Kittel und Gerhard Friedrich, Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, S. 56-71.
Siegert, Bernhard (1997). "Vögel, Engel und Gesandte. Alteuropas Übertragngsmedien", in Gespräche - Boten - Briefe. Körpergedachtnis und Schriftgedächtnis im Mittelalter, hg. v. Horst Wenzel, Berlin: Schmidt Verlag, S. 45-62.
Sloterdijk, Peter (1999). Sphären II - Globen, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.
Tholen, Georg Christoph (2002). Die Zäsur der Medien. Kulturphilosophische Konturen, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
Wenzel, Horst (Hg.) (1997). Gespräche - Boten - Briefe. Körpergedachtnis und Schriftgedächtnis im Mittelalter, hg. v. Horst Wenzel, Berlin: Schmidt.




FRIEDRICH A. KITTLER: DIE WAHRHEIT DER TECHNISCHEN WELT

Essays zur Genealogie der Gegenwart

Herausgegeben und mit einem Nachwort von Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht

Frankfurt a.M.  2013

INHALT

I. Emergenz einer historischen Sensibilität

Der Dichter, die Mutter, das Kind. Zur romantischen Erfindung der Sexualität
Nietzsche (1844-1900)
Lullaby of Birdland
Der Gott der Ohren
Flechsig/Schreber/Freud. Ein Nachrichtennetzwerk der Jahrhundertwende

II. Kulturgeschichte als Mediengeschichte

Romantik - Psychoanalyse - Film: Eine Doppelgängergeschichte
Medien und Drogen in Pynchons Zweiten Weltkrieg
"Heinrich von Ofterdingen" als Nachrichtenfluß
Weltatem. Über Wagners Medientechnologie
Die Stadt ist ein Medium
Rock Musik - ein Mißbrauch von Heeresgerät
Signal-Rausch-Abstand
Die künstliche Intelligenz des Weltkriegs: Alan Turing
Unconditional Surrender
Protected Mode
Es gibt keine Software
Il fiore delle truppe scelte

III. Griechenland als seinsgeschichtlicher Ursprung

Eros und Aphrodite
Homeros und die Schrift
Das Alphabet der Griechen. Zur Archäologie die Schrift
Im Kielwasser der Odyssee
Martin Heidegger, Medien und die Götter Griechenlands. Ent-fernen heißt die Götter nähern
Pathos und Ethos. Eine aristotelische Betrachtung

Nachwort: Mediengeschichte als Wahrheitsereignis. Zur Singularität von Friedrich A. Kittlers Werk



FRIEDRICH A. KITTLER: MARTIN HEIDEGGER, MEDIEN UND DIE GÖTTER GRIECHENLANDS

ENT-FERNEN HEISST GÖTTER NÄHERN

 Essays zur Genealogie der Gegenwart
Herausgegeben und mit einem Nachwort von Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht
Frankfurt a.M.  2013

Um eine Ontologie der Ferne auch nur von weitem anzudenken, scheint es tunlich, praktisch und verzweifelt zu sein, zuerst und zunächst an die fernen, ja immer ferneren Ursprünge unserer Kultur zu gemahnen. [...]

Das Auge sieht das Bild eines Dinges nicht etwa, weil sich einige seiner winzig kleinen, also unsichtbaren Atome von ihm lösen würden und durch die Leere zu mir flögen. Nein, widerspricht Aristoteles' kleine Schrift "Über die Sinne" den Vorsokratikern Leukippos und Demokritos. Zwischen – auf griechisch to metaxý –, auch unter dem Namen Luft bekannt. Zwischen Netzhaut und Iris – auf griechisch koré oder Mädchen – gibt es ein weiteres Medium, auch als Wasser bekannt. Nur weil also zwei Elemente im griechischen Wortsinn das Ding am einen Ende, das Sehbild am anderen Ende einer Distanz gleichwohl zum Kontinuum, also zu lauter unendlich kleinen Nähen verhalten, können wir – dem Arztsohn Aristoteles zufolge – sehen.  Und nur wil zwischen Kithara und Trommelfell, aber auch zwischen Trommelfell und Innenohr Luft ist, können wir hören. Woran Sie Heideggers kleinen Schritt über Aristoteles hinaus schon erkennen: In Sein und Zeit sind Auge und Ohr nicht mehr von physikalischen Medien wie Luft und Wasser umgeben, sondern mit technischen Medien wie Brille und Telephon aufgerüstet. Die Ferne – wie schon Nietzsches Wüste – ist gewachsen.

Doch es kommt noch besser oder schlimmer.

Das Ent-fernen ist zunächst umsichtige Näherung, in die Nähe bringen als beschaffen, bereitstellen, zur Hand haben. Aber auch bestimmte Arten des rein erkennenden Entdeckens von Seienden haben den Charakter der Näherung. Im Dasein liegt eine wesenhafte Tendenz auf Nähe. Alle Arten der Steigerung der Geschwindigkeit, die wir heute mehr oder minder gezwungen mitmachen, drängen auf Überwindung der Entferntheit. Mit dem 'Rundfunk' zum Beispiel vollzieht das Dasein heute eine in ihrem Daseinssinn noch nicht übersehbare Entfernung der 'Welt' auf dem Wege einer Erweiterung und Zerstörung der alltäglichen Umwelt. [6]

Sein und Zeit, in erste Auflage 1927 erschienen, erweist sich einmal mehr auf dem technischen Stand der Dinge: Nur vier Jahre zuvor, im Oktober 1923, hat Deutschland ein ziviles Kultur- und Unterhaltungsradio bekommen, das die Reichspost aus Gründen der Sprachreinheit aber lieber zu Rundfunk verdeutschte. Seitdem, aber auch erst seitdem leben wir Europäer "mehr oder minder gezwungen" mit einem technischen Medium, das uns als bloße Hörer definiert. Denn im Ersten Weltkrieg, an dem Heidegger zuletzt noch teilnahm, gab es schlichtweg keine Broadcast-Radiostationen mit einer Sendeantenne  und Tausenden von Empfängern, sondern ausschließlich drahtlose Telephonie, militärischen Wechselsprechfunk. Der chemisch reine Konsum, wie Sein und Zeit ihn allem Zeug nachsagt, war also kein "Daseinssinn", sondern Medienpolitik eines Staates, der Radikaldemokratie zu verhindern suchte. Und dennoch sieht Heidegger – viel klarer als in denselben Jahren Bert Brecht – den Unterschied zwischen Rundfunk und Telephon. Das Radio ist nicht nur darum keine alltagspraktische extension of man wie Brille oder Telephon, weil es uns nicht unauffällig nahe rückt, sondern vor allem darum, weil es "das Dasein heute" in seiner geschichtlichen Stellung angeht und verändert. Auch wenn Heidegger wie üblich von der causa efficiens, also den Ratio-Ingenieuren und Erfindern, schweigt, schreibt er seiner Gegenwart "eine Steigerung der Geschwindigkeit" zu, die wir mühelos als physikalische Beschleunigung entziffern können. Bleibt nur die Frage, ob die zweite Abteilung des Weges, also der Distanz, noch als "wesenhafte Tendenz" im "Dasein" selbst beschreibbar ist. Eine erste Antwort Heideggers auf diese Frage gibt ein Vortrag von 1938, "Die Zeit des Weltbildes" überschrieben.

Für diesen Kampf der Weltanschauungen und gemäß dem Sinne dieses Kampfes setzt der Mensch die uneingeschränkte Gewalt der Berechnung, der Planung und der Züchtung aller Dinge ins Spiel. Die Wissenschaft als Forschung ist eine unentbehrliche Form dieses Sicheinrichtens in der Welt, eine der Bahnen, auf denen die Neuzeit mit einer den Beteiligten unbekannten Beschwindigkeit ihrer Wesenserfüllung zurast. Mit diesem Kampf der Weltanschauungen tritt die Neuzeit erst in den entscheidenden und vermutlich dauerfähigsten Abschnitt ihrer Geschichte.

Ein Zeichen für diesen Vorgang ist, daß überall und in den verschiedensten Gestalten und Verkleidungen das Riesenhafte zur Erscheinung kommt. Dabei meldet sich das Riesige zugleich in der Richtung des immer Kleineren. Denken wir an die Zahlen der Atomphysik. Das Riesige drängt sich in einer Form vor, die es scheinbar gerade verschwinden läßt: in der Vernichtung der großen Entfernungen durch das Flugzeug, im beliebigen durch einen Handgriff herzustellenden Vor-stellen fremder und abgelegenen Welten in ihrer Alltäglichkeit durch den Rundfunk. [7]

Kurz vor diesen Sätzen über Flugzeug und Radio hat Heidegger gespottet, die Griechen in Olympia, anders als die Deutschen bei der Olympiade von 1936, hätten "niemals Erlebnisse" gehabt. Trotzdem fällt ihm nicht ein, die Fernsehübertragungen dieser Spiele zu den technischen Medien des Weltbildzeitalters zu rechnen. Wie in Sein und Zeit bleibt das ältere Radio sein Beispiel für etwas Riesenhaftes, das zugleich immer kleiner oder –  in heutigen Worten – miniaturisierter zu werden droht. Nur daß der Rundfunkempfang "fremder und abgelegener Welten" nicht mehr dem Dasein als Tendenz des Ent-fernens zugerechnet wird, sondern der einer historischen Epoche: der Neuzeit. Heideggers Kehre ist die Einsicht, daß alle Spielarten der Transzendentalphilosophie, ob  nun vom Subjekt oder vom Dasein aus, an der Faktizität hochtechnischer Medien scheitern. Die Neuzeit erweist sich vielmehr als ein Geschick oder Schicksal, das aus seiner äußersten Ferne das Allernächste bestimmt, jenen Handgriff zum Abstimmkondensator nämlich, der damals, unter Bedingungen des Analogradios, bei Millionen von Hörern deren cartesische Vorstellungen oder repraesentationes herstellen konnte, bevor, keine vierzehn Monate später, dann doch der Ernstfall eintrat: jener Kampf der Weltanschauungen, den wir genauer Zweiten Weltkrieg nenne. "Nicht das Anwesen waltet, sondern der Angriff herrscht." [8]

Die Wehrmacht konnte 1939 nur deshalb zum Blitzkrieg antreten, weil sie als erste Armee auf Erden ihre Panzerdivisionen und Bomberstaffeln bereits systematisch auf Funksteuerung umgestellt hatte. jeder Panzer hatte UKW-Empfang, jeder Panzerkommandant auch UKW-Sender und jeder Pilot, schon um mit Sein und Zeit nach rechts und links orientiert zu werden, Kopfhörer auf den beiden Ohren. Selbstredend holten sämtliche Gegner diesen Vorsprung so schnell wie möglich, nämlich in zwei, drei Jahren auf, was den Blitzkrieg in die furchtbarste  Schlächterei aller Zeiten verkehrte. Fünfzig Millionen Tote für drei, vier "Weltanschauungen". Aber kriegsentscheidend, zumindest auf dem europäischen und atlantischen Kriegsschauplatz, war etwas anderes. Um den maschinell verschlüsselten Funkverkehr der deutschen Wehrmacht und Kriegsmarine zu knacken, entwickelte der britische Geheimdienst Ende 1943 erste digitale Maschinen, die wir heute Computer nennen würden. Was immer eine Maschine verschlüsselt, kann eine andere entschlüsseln, hatte Alan Turing geschrieben, als er seine abstrakte Papiermaschine als Prinzipschaltung aller möglichen Digitalcomputer angab. Mit Heidegger gesprochen, fand also eine medientechnische Eskalation. vom Telegraphenkabel des amerikanischen Bürgerkriegs zu seiner siegreichen Widerlegung, dem drahtlosen Funk des Ersten Weltkriegs, vom Geheimfunk der Wehrmacht zu seiner kriegsentscheidenden Widerlegung, dem Computernetz von heute. Krieg ist insofern der Vater aller Dinge, als sich im Kampf zwischen Fernmedien Sieger und Besiegte scheiden, Technik selbst, mit anderen Worten, macht (mit Heidegger) die Seinsgeschichte.

Der Computer ist entstanden, um Geheimfunksysteme zu schlagen. Und die Neuzeit samt ihren analogen Bildern, Tönen und Vorstellungen, wie "Die Zeit des Weltbildes" sie auf die drei Jahrhunderte zwischen Descartes und 1938 datiert, ging tatsächlich zu Ende. Was unbedarfte Denker, dazu noch im Auftrag der kanadischen Regierung, leichthin Postmoderne tauften, ist seinsgeschichtlich etwas völlig Neues: Das Ge-stell. Kein Subjekt stellt sich mehr vor, daß es sich Dinge vorstellt, sondern eine digitale Schaltung, die wir auch Computer nennen würfen, speichert, rechnet, überträgt Information. Wohlgemerkt nicht zwischen zwei Subjekten, nicht als weitere extension of man, sondern von Maschine zu Maschine. [9]

Das hat Heidegger, der entlassene Freiburger Philosophieprofessor, spätestens 1964 erkannt, als er einen seiner seltenen Fernvorträge hielt oder vielmehr von Jean Beaufret vorlesen ließ. In Paris, am Sitz der UNESCO, hörten die Delegierten in eleganten Französisch , daß alle Philosophielehrstühle sinnlos geworden, ihre Inhaber also auf der Stelle zu entlassen. Vermutlich ist es daher nur die Tätigkeit ehrwürdiger Institutionen, die uns hier und heute versammelt. Der Grund, den Heidegger nannte, war einfach: Die Philosophie ist heute zu Ende, weil sie sich in den einzelnen Wissenschaften vollendet, damit aber auch aufgelöst oder abgeschafft hat. Das sei zwar schon einmal in der Seinsgeschichte geschehen, nämlich im hellenistisch späten Griechenland, allerdings noch nie so abgründig und endgültig wie heute. Im Denken nach Aristoteles trat nur die Einheit von physisund logos auseinander in die Wissenschaften der Physik und der Logik (um die unsägliche spätgriechisch-römische Ethik ganz zu schweigen). Heute hingegen, schreibt Heidegger, ist anstelle einer Logik, die Philosophen erforschten und lehrten, eine Logistik getreten, die ihrerseits mit der Kybernetik zusammenfällt, anders gesagt, mit Norbert Wieners mathematischer Theorie rückgekoppelter Schaltkreise, ob sie nun Organismen oder Maschinen steuern. Mithin gibt es auch keine Kausalität mehr, in der eine Ursache einer Wirkung zeitlich vorausgeht, sondern nurmehr ein herausforderndes Stellen, [10] das der Physik ihren kantischen Begriff von Gegenständen entwendet und sie auf mathematische Entwürfe reduziert. Der Entwurf dieser Entwürfe aber nennt Heidegger, als hätte er von Turings universaler Maschine, die alle anderen Maschinen sein kann, auf Umwegen gehört: die "Rechenmaschine". Kybernetik, Logik und Informationsverarbeitung sind, mit anderen Worten, keine menschenbetriebenen Wissenschaften mehr wie im späten Griechenland, sondern als Hochtechnologien implementiert Sie laufen (wen man überhaupt noch so sagen darf) als Dinge unter Dingen. Deshalb ist das Ge-stell nicht nur die Gefahr, sondern (mit Hölderlins Wort) auch schon die nahende Rettung. Denn Rechenmaschinen, vulgo Computer, untergraben den Unterschied  selber, der seit Aristoteles Scheidung von logos und physis die Metaphysik überhaupt erst begründet hat. Sie sind beides, Logik und Physik ineins. Das Ge-stell, anders als alle gewesenen Epochen der Metaphysik, vereignet wie einst in der Erfahrung, aber nicht im Denken der frühen Griechen, nur eben auf seine dunkle, drohende Weise wieder Denken und Sein.

Zu dieser einmaligen Lage, deren Neuheit gegenüber der Neuzeit Heidegger erst nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg aufgegangen ist, gehört es vor allem daß sie aus der Nähe Europas in die Ferne des Globus ausstrahlt. So überraschend es klingen mag, Heidegger kam schon 1964 zu einem Begriff  der Globalisierung: "Das Ende der Philosophie zeit sich als der Triumph der steuerbaren  Einrichtung einer wissenschaftlich-technischen Welt und der dieser Welt gemäßen Gesellschaftsordnung. Ende der Philosophie heißt: Beginn der im abendländisch-europäischen Denken gegründeten Weltzivilisation." [11]

Mir scheint, für eine Ontologie der Ferne ist dieser, auf die Computertechnik gegründete Begriff von Globalisierung weittragender und maßgeblicher als alle Versuche, sie von traditionellen Massenmedien wie Radio, Film und Fernsehen herzuleiten, wie das bis heute in der Mediengeschichte üblich ist, aber auch Heidegger selbst noch 1950 im "Ding"-Aufsatz versucht hat. [12] Damit freilich stellt das Ende der Philosophie zugleich dem Denken eine unerhörte Aufgabe. Es ruft nach einem Denken, das die Bahnen der Technik in ihrer Gänze durchmißt: von ihrem Anfang, nämlich dem griechischen Begriff techne, bis hin zu ihrer Vollendung im modernen Computersystem, wie es nach Heidegger Wirtschaft und Industrie, Wissenschaft und Politik "in Betrieb" setzt (und dringend um Kriegstechnologie zu ergänzen wäre).

Neu gegenüber dieser Diagnose von 1957 ist heute, 2007, wohl nur, daß "die Rechenmaschine" längst aus ihrer Beschränkung auf röhrenbestückte Mainframes ausgebrochen ist und in Gestalt weltweit untereinander vernetzter PCs so alltäglich wie allnächtlich herrscht. Dennoch: die technische Möglichkeitsbedingung solcher Globalisierung liegt schon im Begriff des Riesigen beschlossen, zu dessen unheimlichen Seiten Heidegger ja auch das Winzige gezählt hat. Ohne die Fortschreitende Miniaturisierung unserer Computerarchitekturen, zunächst auf der Basis von Transistoren und schließlich von millionenfach integrierten FlipFlops, wäre an den Siegeszug von Laptops und Handies nie zu denken gewesen. Auf eine Weise, die schwer zu entwirren ist, verschränken sich das Fernste und das Nächste: auf der einen Seite ein digitaler Informationsfluß, der schon bis an die Ränder unseres Planetensystems reicht, auf der anderen ein Computerdesign, das die Abstände zwischen Schaltungen und Leiterbahnen heutzutage in Nanometern miß´t, also tendenziell gegen Null bringt. Damit aber verkehrt sich das Verhältnis von Ferne und Nähe: Die fernen Planeten sind unseren Augen, mit Sein und Zeit gesprochen, näher oder entborgener als die Schaltungen auf unseren Schreibtischen und in unseren Taschen.

Das, scheint mir, ist der Punkt, wo wir Heideggers eigene Seinsgeschichte verlassen müssen, um seine Fragen von heute her aufs neue zu stellen. Die implementierte Einheit physis und logos erfordert es, das Verhältnis von Denken und Rechnen seit ihrer griechischen Stiftung anders zu denken. Es stimmt einfach nicht, daß das Denken erst dann ein Rechnen geworden wäre, als es mit Platon und Metaphysik überging. Ganz im Gegenteil: Sokrates zeichnete es aus, daß er im Unterschied zu den Vorsokratikern nichts von Mathematik und nichts von Musik verstand. Ganz im Gegenteil soll Aristoteles an ebendem Tag, als Platon der Akademie einen Mathematiker zu seinem Nachfolger bestimmte, den Musenhein am Nordrand Athens fluchtartig verlassen haben. Jedenfalls schreibt die Metaphysik ganz ausdrücklich, daß Mathematik eine andere und wesentlich niedrigere  Wissenschaft als Ontologie ist: Sie handele nicht vom Seienden als solchem, das jeweils ein Beisammenanwesen von Form und Stoff ist, sondern als Geometrie von bloßen stofflosen Formen, als Arithmetik von ebensolchen Zahlen.

Ebendiese aristotelische Definition trifft nun aber für die anfängliche Mathematik der Griechen schlichtweg nicht zu. Sie ist eine Arithmetik der logoi und das heißt Verhältnissen zwischen ganzen Zahlen, der immer zugleich eine Geometrie entspricht, sei es als Diagramm aus Rechensteinen, sei es als Saitenstimmung einer griechischen Kithara. Die anfängliche Mathematik war also ebenso implementiert wie im modernen Computer. Und nur weil Heidegger die Pythagoreer – anders als sein Freiburger Mitstreiter Johannes Lohmann – offenbar  nie gelesen hat, konnte er zwar die Schaltungstechnik von Hochspannungsnetzen als Weisen des "herausfordernden Entbergen" denken, nicht aber die digitalen Mikrochips.[13]

Denn die gesamte pythagoreische Mathematik beruht auf einem einzigen Satz, dem ersten allgemeinen Gesetz überhaupt, das schon als solches die griechische Mathematik vom Zahlenrechnen ihrer ägyptischen und babylonischen Vorgänger unterschied: Alle Zahlen außer der Eins, heißt es bei Philolaos von Kroton, sind entweder gerade oder ungerade. Mit anderen Worten: die griechische Arithmethik, in radikalen Unterschied zur neuzeitlichen, schließt die reellen Zahlen aus, um sie nur als geometrische Strecken oder Flächen zuzulassen. Zwischen zwei natürlichen Zahlen liegt mithin grundsätzlich (wie es bei Aristoteles heißen wird) ein Intervall, eine Distanz, während der Körper der reellen Zahlen bekanntlich dicht und kompakt ist (ein Kontinuum hätte Aristoteles gesagt).

Es war nun 1936 der grundlegende Gedanke von Turings Dissertation, aus dem Körper der reellen Zahlen eine Untermenge abzuscheiden und näher zu untersuchen. Er nannte diese Untermenge die berechenbaren Zahlen (computable real numbers) und wies nach, daß sie im Sinn von Georg Cantors Mengenlehre gleich mächtig wie die Menge der natürlichen Zahlen sind. Wir könnten auch viel schlichter sagen: computable real numberslassen sich mit endlich vielen Zeichen eines Alphabets beschreiben. Daran und nur darin iegt es, daß 1943 aus dem Rechnen von Menschen das von Maschinen hat werden können. Denn das Reelle, weil sein Körper überabzählbar ist, bleibt weiterhin als Unmögliches, wie Lacan gesagt hätte, außerhalb aller Berechenbarkeit oder – auf Englisch – computability. Jeder digitale Computer fällt mithin Jahrtausende hinter die neuzeitliche Analysis zurück, um erneut eine strikt pythagoreische Mathematik zu implementieren. es ist daher zwar nicht zwingend, aber schon schaltungstechnisch doch sehr naheliegend, auch wieder auf die pythagoreische Zweiteilung aller Zahlen in gerade und ungerade zurückzugreifen: Alle Zustände einer digitalen Maschine lassen sich als entweder offener oder geschlossener Schalter implementieren, also mit den – von Leibniz einst eingeführten – binären Zahlen Eins und Null. Anders wäre der physis kein logos einzuschreiben, wie das elektronenlithographisch millionenfach pro Tag geschieht, nämlich bei der Herstellung digitaler Wafer im staubfreien Reinsträumen, deren Bau allein Milliarden von Dollars oder Euros verschlingt. Anders wäre die Computertechnik nicht dieser Verbund von Hard- und Software, Physik und Logik, der uns die fernen entflohenen Götter ersetzt. Zeus, wie Sie wissen, war zugleich der ungeheure Himmelsglanz über Griechenland und "der Blitz, der alles steuert". [34] Nur Götter und Computer sind imstande, den blauen Himmel oder aber die Gewitter, die als Wetter morgen aufziehen werden, schon heut vorauszusagen.

Ob Heidegger diese Identität von Sein und Denken, wie er sie mit Parmenides beschwor, gefallen hätte, steht dahin. Den Siegeszug der Miniaturisierung und des Personal Computer konnte er im Todesjahr 1976 noch nicht absehen. Aber wir wissen, daß ihm die hochtechnische Gegenwart näher stand, als das umlaufende böswillige Gerücht besagt.

In Freiburg-Zähringen, Rötebuckweg 47, gab es  selbstredend kein Fernsehen, aber bei den Nachbarn, deren Sohn ich gut kannte. Im Hochsommer 1972, während der Fußballweltmeisterschaft in München, tauchte Heidegger regelmäßig bei ihnen auf,  um am Bildschirm den Spielen der deutschen Nationalmannschaft zu folgen. Einige Wochen später fuhr er mit dem Zug nach Heidelberg, um an einer Sitzung der dortigen Akademie der Wissenschaften teilzunehmen. Auf der Rückfahrt sah ihm im Abteil Erster Klasse ein Unbekannter gegenüber, der sich als Intendanz des Freiburger Stadttheaters entpuppte:

– "Warum gehen Sie denn nie ins Theater?" lautete nach kurzer Weile die berechtigte Frage desIntendanten.
– "Ganz einfach, sagte Heidegger, "er wolle Helden und Götter spielen sehen, keine modernen Schauspieler."
– "Götter?! die gibt es heutzutage doch gar nicht mehr!"
– "Doch, doch, Herr Sowieso, im Fernsehen zum Beispiel"
– "Das müssen sie mir aber erklären, Herr Professor!"
– "Ja, gern: Haben Sie jemals Beckenbauer Fußball spielen gesehen? Ere gewinnt mit seiner Mannschaft den Weltmeistertitel und wird trotzdem niemals verletzt. So jemand nenne ich einen Gott." [15]

Schöne Ontologie der Ferne: Wenn Heidegger fernsah, sah er in Beckenbauers Nähe oder Ferne – wer kann das schon entscheiden? – die Götter Griechenlands erscheinen. Dieser Fernsinn ist es, scheint mir, den wir in aller Liebe von Heidegger erfahren und erlernen können.

6 SZ, § 23, S. 105.
7 "Die Zeit des Weltbildes", in: Holzwege, S. 75-113, hier S. 94 f.
8 Ebd. S. 108.
9 "Die Frage nach der Technik", in Vorträge und Aufsätze, S. 5-36, hier S. 20.
10 Ebd. S. 21.
11 "Das Ende der Philosophie und die Aufgabe des Denkens", in Zur Sache des Denkens, Tübingen 169, S. 61-80, hier S. 65.
12 "Das Ding", in Vorträge und Aufsätze, S. 165-187.
13 "Die Frage nach der Technik", in: Vorträge und Aufsätze, S. 17
14 Vgl. Martin Heidegger / Eugen Fink: Heraklit. Seminar Wintersemester 1966/1967. Frankfurt/M. 1970, Kapitel I-III.
15 Vgl. Heinrich Wiegand Petzet,  Auf einen Stern zugehen. Begegnungen und Gespräche mit Martin Heidegger 1929-1976. Frankfurt/M. 1983, S. 219f. Über die griechischen Göt als Sportler vgl. Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht, Lob des Sports, Frankfurt/M. 2005.

(S. 377-390) [meine Hervorhebungen, RC]




RAFAEL CAPURRO: EINFÜHRUNG IN DIE DIGITALE ONTOLOGIE


Dieser Aufsatz ist die gekürzte und veränderte Fassung eines Email-Dialogs mit Michael Eldred im Jahre 1999 (Siehe hier). Erschienen in: Gerhard Banse, Armin Grunwald (Hrsg.): Technik und Kultur. Bedingungs- und Beeinflussungsverhältnisse. Karlsruher Institut für Technologie (KIT) 2010, S. 217-228.

1. Einführung

Wir leben in digitalen Kulturen. Die digitale Technik prägt bis in den Alltag hinein unsere Lebensweise, die Art und Weise wie wir wissenschaftlich lehren und forschen, unsere Politik und Ökonomie, unser Recht- und Verwaltungssystem usw. Zwar ist das Verhältnis von Technik und Kultur in der Menschheitsgeschichte immer eng gewesen, aber das besondere unserer heutigen Situation besteht m.E. darin, dass dies global, beinah gleichzeitig und auf der Basis digitaler Technik geschieht, die sich auch in vergleichsweise extrem kurzer Zeit entwickelt hat. Die digitalen Kulturen sind Teil einer globalen Kultur, die aber nicht notwendigerweise kulturelle Unterschiede einebnet. Sie bedeutet auch nicht, dass alle Menschen im gleichen Ausmaß und auf gleicher Weise von ihr bestimmt werden. Das Schlagwort von der "digitalen Spaltung" (digital divide) zeigt diesen Unterschied an, auch wenn zum Beispiel die Frage des Zugangs zum Internet die Differenzen zwischen den von der digitalen Technik geprägten Informationsgesellschaften vereinfacht darstellt. Aber nicht etwa das World Wide Web, sondern generell die Digitalisierbarkeit aller Phänomene macht das besondere der heutigen digitalen Kulturen aus. Wir sehen, verstehen, konstruieren und manipulieren alle Phänomene im Horizont des Digitalen. Wenn diese Wahrnehmung unseres Zeitgeistes stimmt, dann können wir vom Digitalen als von einem den Wirklichkeitsbegriff lokal und global auf unterschiedlicher Weise bestimmenden Horizont sprechen. Mit dem Wirklichkeitsbegriff befassen sich in der Philosophie bekanntlich Ontologie, Metaphysik und Erkenntnistheorie.

    Ich unterscheide in diesem Zusammenhang, Martin Heidegger folgend, zwischen Ontologie (oder „Fundamentalontologie“) im Sinne der Seinsverfassung des Menschen, und Metaphysik oder Lehre vom Seienden, die aber, so Heidegger in Anschluss an Immanuel Kant, die Bedingungen ihrer Möglichkeit in der menschlichen Erkenntnis (Kant) bzw. im menschlichen Dasein nicht kritisch reflektiert (vgl. Heidegger 1991). Wenn Metaphysik auf der Endlichkeit menschlicher Erkenntnis bzw. menschlichen Existierens basiert, dann ist die Objektivität „symbolischer Formen“, im Sinne des Kulturphilosophen Ernst Cassirer, der sich in der berühmten „Davoser Disputation“ mit Martin Heidegger auseinandersetzte, in eben dieser endlichen Seinsverfassung begründet (vgl. Cassirer 1994; Heidegger 1991). Kultur und Technik, symbolische und "poietische" Formungen, sind als ontische oder kategoriale Phänomene zu verstehen. „Jedes neue Werkzeug, das der Mensch findet, bedeutet demgemäß einen neuen Schritt, nicht nur zur Formung der Außenwelt, sondern zur Formierung seines Selbstbewusstseins.“ (Cassirer 1994, Bd. 2: 258). Kultur und Technik beruhen, so meine These, auf einer nicht endgültig fixierbaren Seinsdeutung, wobei man wiederum menschliches Seinsverständnis als Kultur im ontologischen Sinne bezeichnen kann.

    "Was ist das Seiende?", diese Grundfrage der Metaphysik, lässt sich aus der Sicht eines endlichen Erkennens nicht ein für allemal beantworten. Metaphysik bedeutet ein solcher Versuch, das Sein des Seienden "essentialistisch" zu fixieren. Auf unsere gegenwärtige Problematik einer digitalen Kultur bezogen: Eine digitale Ontologie ist eine mögliche Bestimmung des Seins des Seienden, welches sich auf die Digitalisierbarkeit bezieht. Eine digitale Ontologie ist aber stets in Gefahr, zu einer digitalen Metaphysik in dem Augenblick zu mutieren, in dem sie sich als die wahre Antwort auf die Seinsfrage missversteht. Die digitale Ontologie ist ein mögliches Seinsverständnis menschlicher endlicher Erkenntnis. Alle Regionen oder Sphären des Seienden erscheinen oder werden aufgefasst als digital-seiend. Wir sprechen von e-Commerce, e-Economy, von virtuellen Gemeinschaften und virtuellen Hochschulen, von digitalen Bibliotheken, usw.

Ich bezeichne unsere gegenwärtig vorherrschende Seinsdeutung in Abwandlung des Satzes von George Berkeley „Das Sein der Dinge ist ihr Wahrgenommensein“ (Their esse is percipi) (Berkeley 1965: 62) mit dem Satz esse est computari. Das bedeutet also keineswegs, alles sei bloß virtuell oder die Dinge bestünden, "essentialistisch" gedacht, aus bits, sondern es bedeutet, dass wir meinen, etwas in seinem Sein erklärt und verstanden zu haben, wenn wir es auf der Basis von Zahlen und Punkten im elektromagnetischen Medium erfassen. Es wäre auch möglich, diesen Satz so zu formulieren: esse est informari, wobei der Informationsprozess im Sinne eines im elektromagnetischen Medium stattfindenden Formungsprozesses zu verstehen ist. Die globale digitale Vernetzung ist die Art und Weise, wie wir heute jene Totalität erfahren und gestalten, die die Metaphysik das Seiende im Ganzen nannte. Der Ursprung dieses digitalen Weltentwurfs liegt, so meiner These, in der griechischen Metaphysik. Im Rahmen dieser Einführung ist es nicht möglich, die weitere Entwicklung, etwa über Raimundus Lullus, Blaise Pascal, René Descartes, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, die britischen Empiristen, die Erfindung des Computers usw., nachzuzeichnen.

2. Der griechische Ursprung

Wir sollten zunächst bedenken, inwiefern die Kategorie des Signals zum Seienden selbst im metaphysischen Sinne gehört oder ob sie aus einem Handelnden – einem Göttlichen oder einem Menschlichen oder einem sonst Existierenden – zu verstehen ist. Mir scheint, dass die antike Philosophie eher den ersten Sinn betont, während der zweite seit der Neuzeit aufgrund der Trennung von Subjekt und Objekt vorherrschend wird. Das moderne Verstehenvon 0 und 1 hat auch eine andere Bewandtnis im Rahmen einer Theorie der Signalübertragung als zum Beispiel im Rahmen einer kabbalistischen Überlegung über die Bedeutung dieser Zeichen. Letzteres würden wir dann eher als Symbol kennzeichnen. In der Neuzeit wird die Unterscheidung zwischen Signal und Symbol teilweise eingeebnet. Genau genommen werden aber keine Reihen von Nullen und Einsen gesendet, sondern elektromagnetische Strömungen, die wir dann als 1 und 0 interpretieren. Der Code 0/1 ist also unser Anteil am ontologischen Entwurf. Dieser Code bedeutet nicht, dass allen Phänomenen eine zweiwertige Logik zugrunde gelegt wird. Zahlen werden bekanntlich im Computer binär dargestellt und dienen der Berechnung der fuzzy logic, oder der Erfassung quantenmechanischer Phänomene nicht weniger als der Codierung natürlicher Sprache. Ob die Quantenmechanik – in deren Rahmen bereits eine „Quantentheorie der Information“ entwickelt wurde (vgl. Lyre 1998) – auf dem Weg über den Quantencomputer zu einer Quantenkultur oder gar zu einer Quantenontologie im Sinne einer grundlegenden menschlichen Einstellung zum Sein mit allen ontischen Konsequenzen führen kann oder wird, ist eine offene Frage.

    Wir nehmen die Signalübertragung als ein Ganzes wahr. Das Gehirn braucht dazu Zeit. Aber phänomenal gesehen entsteht der Eindruck der Ganzheit. Die Tätigkeit des Gehirns ist auf Ganzheit hin ausgerichtet. Hier ist eine metaphysische Kategorie (to holon) impliziert. Es ist eine beliebte Metapher, die gegliederte Auflösung in 0/1 im digitalen Bereich mit der Auflösung im neuronalen Netz unseres Gehirns zu vergleichen. Wir müssten dabei eine metaphysische Unterscheidung (diairesis) vornehmen. Zahl und logos hängen in der Sprache der Metaphysik (Platon) so zusammen, dass die Zahl einen höheren Seinswert (Freisein vom materiellen Substrat) hat als der logos. Insofern erfasst die Zahl das eidos der Dinge, während der logos die Möglichkeit hat, näher am Wahrnehmbaren zu sein.

    Als Ausgangspunkt dieser Einführung in die digitale Ontologie dient uns folgende Passage aus Heideggers Sophistes-Vorlesung vom Wintersemester 1924/25:

„Dabei ist zu beachten, dass für Aristoteles die primäre Bestimmung der Zahl, sofern sie auf die monás als die arché zurückgeht, einen noch viel ursprünglicheren Zusammenhang mit der Konstitution des Seienden selbst hat, sofern zur Seinsbestimmung jedes Seienden ebenso gehört, dass es ‚ist’, wie dass es ‚eines’ ist; jedes on ist ein hen. Damit bekommt der artithmós im weitesten Sinne – der arithmós steht hier für das hen – für die Struktur des Seienden überhaupt eine grundsätzlichere Bedeutung als ontologische Bestimmung. Zugleich tritt er in einen Zusammenhang mit dem lógos, sofern das Seiende in seinen letzten Bestimmungen nur zugänglich wird in einem ausgezeichneten lógos, in der nóesis, während die geometrischen Strukturen allein in der aisthesis gesehen werden. Die aisthesis  ist das, wo das geometrische Betrachten halt machen muss (stesetai), einen Stand hat. In der Arithmetik dagegen ist der lógos, das noein, am Werk, das von jeder thesis, von jeder anschaulichen Dimension und Orientierung, absieht“ (Heidegger 1992: 117).

  Das Trennen (chorizein), so Heidegger, ist der „Grundakt der Mathematik“ für Aristoteles (Trennen, aber kein Getrenntes – vgl. Heidegger 1992: 100). Die mathematiká sind ein Herausgenommenes aus den natürlichen Dingen (physei onta). Der Mathematiker bringt etwas von seinem Platz (chora) weg. Es gibt für Aristoteles keinen himmlischen Ort (topos ouranós) für die Zahlen. Der Unterschied zwischen Geometrie und Arithmetik besteht zunächst darin, dass die monas nicht gesetzt wird (ousia áthetos), der Punkt (stigme) aber doch. Die monas ist das, was schlechthin bleibt. Punkte muss man setzen. Orte gehören zum Seienden. Jedes Seiende hat seinen Ort: das Feuer oben (ano), die Erde unten (kato) etc. Diese Bestimmungen gelten für Aristoteles teilweise absolut, dann aber auch für uns (pros hemas), d. h. je nachdem, wo wir uns befinden. Der Ort ist schwer zu fassen. Erst z. B. beim Bewegenden, d. h. beim Ortswechsel, werden wir uns des Ortes bewusster. Der Ort ist die Grenze des periechon, also dessen, was einen Körper umgrenzt, was an seine Grenzen stößt. Die Welt ist für Aristoteles absolut orientiert, es gibt ausgezeichnete Orte (ein absolutes Oben etc.). Heideggers Fazit lautet: Der Ort hat eine dynamis, er ist die „Möglichkeit der rechten Hingehörigkeit eines Seienden“, er gehört zum Seienden als sein „Anwesendseinkönnen“, sein „Dortseinkönnen“. Es ist, wenn es da ist (vgl. Heidegger 1992: 109).

       Heidegger erörtert anschließend die Genesis von Geometrie und Arithmetik im Ausgang vom topos. Wenn man vom topos absieht und nur die möglichen Lagen und Orientierungsmomente behält, dann sind wir bei der Geometrie. Das Geometrische ist nicht mehr an seinem Ort. Die pérata sind nicht mehr als die Grenzen des physischen Körpers verstanden, sondern sie erhalten durch die thesis eine eigentümliche Eigenständigkeit. Es ist aber nicht so, dass die höheren Gebilde aus solchen Grenzen (Punkte usw.) einfach zusammengesetzt sind. Linien entstehen nicht aus Punkten, Körper nicht aus Flächen, denn zwischen zwei Punkten gibt es immer eine Linie (grammé). Aristoteles und Platon sind hier „in der schärfsten Opposition“: „Zwar sind die Punkte die archai des Geometrischen, aber doch nicht so, dass aus ihrer Summierung die höheren geometrischen Gebilde aufgebaut werden könnten“ (Heidegger 1992: 111). Eine „bestimmte Zusammenhangsart“ ist darüber hinaus erforderlich. Ähnlich im Bereich des Arithmetischen ist die monás noch keine Zahl. Die erste Zahl ist die zwei. Weil die monás im Unterschied zu den Elementen der Geometrie keine thesis in sich trägt, ist die Zusammenhangsart eines arithmetischen Ganzen anders als bei Punkten. Beide Formen von Mannigfaltigkeit (Faltung) sind verschieden oder, wie wir auch sagen könnten: Beide Formen der Vernetzung sind verschieden. Zahlen sind anders vernetzt als Punkte usw.

       Wie aber? Es gibt mehrere Formen, wie Dinge miteinander (vernetzt) sind – Heidegger bezieht sich dabei auf Aristoteles’ Physik V, 3 –, nämlich:

  • hama: zugleich; wenn Dinge an einem Ort sind;
  • choris: getrennt; was an einem anderen Ort ist;
  • haptesthai: sich berühren (an einem Ort);
  • metaxy: dazwischen (oder das Medium: wie z. B. der Fluss, in dem sich ein Schiff bewegt);
  • epheches: das Darauffolgende; da gibt es zwischen dem, was vorher ist, und dem, was folgt, kein Zwischen vom selben genus (Seinsabkunft) wie das Vernetzte. So stehen die Häuser einer Straße in einer Reihe, aber in einem Medium, was kein Haus ist. Das ist die Art der Vernetzung der monades, wobei bei ihnen nichts dazwischen steht. Sie berühren sich aber nicht wie bei der syneches;
  • echomenon: was sich hält, ein Nacheinander, was sich zusammenhält und sich berührt, die Enden stoßen zusammen an einem Ort (wie etwa bei Kabel und Steckdose);
  • syneches  continuum: hier gibt es kein Zwischen; es ist ein echomenon, aber ohne Zwischen, also ein ursprüngliches echomenon (Beispiel: Die Grenzen des einen Hauses sind identisch mit denen der anderen); das ist die Vernetzungsart der Punkte, die eine Linie bilden.

Jedes Seiende (on) ist ein hen. In der Geometrie ist die Wahrnehmung (aisthesis) am Werk, während in der Arithmetik der logos von jeder Setzung (thesis) und jeder Anschauung absieht. Die Dinge, sofern sie eins sind, gehören zusammen oder sind vernetzt in der Weise der epheches, d. h., sie müssen sich nicht berühren und es muss nicht immer etwas dazwischen sein (vgl. Heidegger 1992: 113-116).

    So, wie die Griechen die Zahlen aus dem Zusammenhang mit den natürlich Seienden (physis) lösten, so lösen wir sie heute aus ihrem gedanklichenZusammenhang mit dem menschlichen Geist (nous) und dem menschlichen Leib und verlagern sie nicht mehr in einen theo-logischen, sondern in einen techno-logischen Ort. Was zunächst aber rätselhaft erscheint, ist die Möglichkeit eines Zugangs zum Sein ohne den logos. Ich denke an Gadamers Satz: Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache“. Er schreibt anschließend: „Das hermeneutische Phänomen wirft hier gleichsam seine eigene Universalität auf die Seinsverfassung des Verstandenen zurück, indem es dieselbe in einem universellen Sinne als Sprache bestimmt und seinen eigenen Bezug auf das Seiende als Interpretation. So reden wir ja nicht nur von einer Sprache der Kunst, sondern auch von einer Sprache der Natur, ja überhaupt, von einer Sprache, die die Dinge führen“ (Gadamer 1975: 450).

    Sofern wir es sind, die das Sein auslegen, ist immer die Zeit im Spiel, denn wir sind zeitlich (vgl. Heidegger 1992: 632). Offenbar stellt Heidegger hier die Möglichkeit, das Sein des Daseins vom Sein der Welt auszulegen oder umgekehrt, zur Entscheidung und entscheidet sich für das Gegenteil. Der Grund? Weil das Zeitlichsein des Daseins eine eigene (eigentliche) Zeitlichkeit besitzt, die nicht identisch ist mit der Zeitlichkeit der Welt (und somit mit den Seinskategorien der Welt). „Der nächste Sinn von Sein“ ist nämlich der Sinn vom Sein (der Welt) als das Gegenwärtige (vgl. Heidegger 1992: 633). Für uns ist aber Vergangenheit und Zukunft eine Weise zu sein, die dem Sein der Welt in seinem Begegnen nicht entsprechen. Welt ist nur da in der Weise der Anwesenheit. „Das Sein der Welt ist Anwesenheit“ (Heidegger 1992: 633). Die Aneignung des Seienden in logischen und digitalen Zusammenhängen wird der Interpretation des Seins des Daseins nicht gerecht. Umgekehrt aber gilt, dass durch die zureichende Interpretation des Seins des Daseins „der nächste Sinn von Sein“, die Anwesenheit nämlich, die auch das Sein der logischen und digitalen Zusammenhänge ausmacht, positiv aufgeklärt werden kann. Es ist schon etwas merkwürdig, dass Aristoteles von Herauslösen spricht, wo man in der Regel meint, der Denker der Loslösung (horismos) sei ja Platon.

    Ich fasse zusammen. Punkte haben einen Ort und dadurch lassen sie sich voneinander differenzieren. Zahlen sind zwar ortlos, aber in sich selbst differenziert. Beide, sowohl Punkte als auch Zahlen, werden aus dem natürlich Seienden (physis) herausgelöst, also sie bestehen zunächst nicht für sich wie Platon meint. Das digital Seiende, oder das Seiende, sofern es digital ist, oder die aus dem natürlich Seienden heraus gelöste Zahl-Struktur, löst das Seiende zugleich aus seinem natürlichen Ort heraus. Das digitalisierte Seiende oder das Seiende in seinem Digitalisiert-sein ist ortlos, weil sie als Zahl aufgefasst werden. Das ist die Bedingung der Möglichkeit für die Einrichtung einer Technik, die genau den Gesichtspunkt des Ortes weg lässt, im Gegensatz etwa zu einer Bibliothek, die auf die Materie (hyle) der Bücher baut. Zugleich aber schafft die Schrift auch eine Ortlosigkeit, denn Bücher können woanders sein, als dort, wo sie hergestellt wurden. Die Ortlosigkeit des logos ist eine merkwürdige Eigenschaft, die vielleicht den Unterschied zwischen Platon/Sokrates und den Sophisten ausmacht. Denn Platon legt immer großen Wert auf die situationelle Gebundenheit des Logos gegenüber der Schrift, wie er dies im Phaidros in Zusammenhang mit dem Mythos der Erfindung der Schrift darlegt. Die Sophisten scheinen den logos von der strengen dialektischen Situation zu lösen, um die so losgelösten Erkenntnisse überall zu vermarkten. Der sophistische mündliche logos wäre also, von Platon aus gesehen, nicht weniger losgelöst als der schriftlich fixierte logos. Aristoteles knüpft an die Einsicht der Sophisten an, ohne aber deren Praxis zu teilen.
    
    Mit Bezug auf die Ortlosigkeit des logos lösen die techné und die poiesis das natürlich Seiende mit seiner hyle aus seinem angestammten Ort heraus. Die Frage ist aber, ob durch die Vernetzung den Zahlen doch ein wechselbarer Ort zugewiesen wird: Sie sind immer irgendwo, aber nicht ausschließlich an einem Ort. Sie sind also an der technischen Schnittstelle zwischen hyle, Punkt und logos angesiedelt. Wie steht es aber mit der von Heidegger hervorgehobenen Unterscheidung zwischen monas und hen? Wenn das hen zu dem natürlich Seienden gehört, dann sind das ens et unum convertuntur der Scholastik (griechisch: on kai hen) sowie das „Ein und Alles“ (hen kai pan) von hier aus zu verstehen. So wie sich also das Seiende gegen das Nicht-Seiende abhebt, so hebt sich die monas gegen die 0 ab. Zunächst haben wir also die natürliche Welt und dann durch Herauslösung das Ort- und Weltlose (atopos). Wir haben also folgende Abstufung der Abstraktion oder der Herauslösung aus dem natürlich Seienden:

  • das natürlich Seiende (physei onta): bestimmt durch Einheit, Ort und Setzung (hen, topos, thetos);
  • der Punkt (stigme): bestimmt durch Ortlosigkeit und Setzung (atopos, thetos) und Berührung (syneches, continuum);
  • die Einheit (monas): bestimmt durch Ortlosigkeit und Ungesetztheit (atopos, athetos).

Diese Herauslösung ist heute gekoppelt mit der technischen Einprägung oder Herstellung von Zahl und Punkt im elektromagnetischen Medium. Die Frage, die wir uns angesichts der Entwicklung von der Formung durch den Schöpfer über den Golem bis hin zum Computer stellen, ist dann die unseres möglichen Aufenthaltes in der so erschlossenen Welt.

    Die Griechen – weniger pauschal: Platon und Aristoteles – orientierten sich am logos und entwickelten demnach eine Ontologie. Der Logos behält die Kontrolle auf verschiedenen Stufen, letztlich auch als Logos, der den Ursprung der monas, d. h. das hen erkennt. Heidegger geht auf die Diskussion des on als hen (Parmenides) ein. Der Satz „Alles, was ist, ist Eins“ (hen on to pan) stellt eine verwickelte Geschichte über die Deckung oder Nicht-Deckung dieser Begriffe mit der wohlgerundeten Kugel des Parmenides dar. Ein wichtiger Unterschied ist der zwischen der Einheit im Sinne der Ganzheit von Teilen und der Einheit, die dieser Ganzheit vorausgeht (vgl. Heidegger 1992: 457). Griechisch ausgedrückt: hen  als pathos epitois meresi oder syneches ek pollon meron on und hen alethos, das letztlich aufgedeckte Eins. Das hat zur Folge, dass das on als ein hen (alethos) nicht gleich dem holon als Ganzheit von Teilen ist. Wenn das holon aus dem on als solchem herausfällt, dann fallen auch genesisund ousia heraus, weil das Werden in einem gewordenen Ganzen im Sinne eines fertigen, ganzen Seienden sich vollendet. Wenn es aber kein Werden und kein Sein gibt, dann ist das on nicht. Der Satz des Parmenides führt also, wie Heidegger Platons Überlegungen nachzeichnet, in einen Selbstwiderspruch.

     Da Platon im Horizont des hen argumentiert und dem me on eine entsprechende Stelle im Ganzen zuweist, wäre die Frage, wie das me on im Horizont des Digitalen zu denken ist: Was ist eine digitale Spur? Sie verweist auf das Gewesene (me on) des Digitalen. Es scheint mir so zu sein, dass wir in einer digitalen Ontologie mit einem umgekehrten Parmenides zu tun haben: Während bei Parmenides das holon – also die Ganzheit im Sinne von Ganzheit von Teilen – aus dem on herausfällt, und es somit keine genesis und keine ousia gibt, so fällt bei der digitalen Ganzheit das hen aus dem on heraus, so dass wir nur genesis und ousia, aber nicht „Sein“ und „Totalität“ (pan) haben. Die Frage ist dann, ob in der digitalen Ontologie lediglich die monas und nicht das hengesehen werden kann.

3. Digitale Ontologie

Durch die Computertechnik und die Vernetzung haben wir eine andere Möglichkeit für die Ortlosigkeit der Zahlen geschaffen: Sie sind zwar ortlos, aber sie können an allen möglichen Orten sein, oder besser gesagt, sie sind zunächst technisch an einem Ort, aber an diesen Ort nicht von Natur aus gebunden, also zugleich ortsgebunden und ortlos. Wenn jetzt nicht nur Raum und Zeit, sondern sogar ein elektromagnetisches Medium hinzukommt, dann haben wir es wohl hier mit der Konstitution des „digital Seienden“ zu tun. Und wie steht es mit der Frage nach der Vernetzung? Mir scheint, dass wir heute den Begriff der Vernetzung sehr inflationär gebrauchen. Welches neue Phänomen wird dadurch konstituiert?

    Die digitale Welt ist eine Welt und doch keine, sie ist lokal und doch global und umgekehrt. So hat der Mensch nicht nur die Möglichkeit zuweilen beim Immerseienden zu verweilen, sondern auch bei einer Art von Seiendem, das von der techné monas hervorgebracht wird. Was passiert, wenn wir den logos mit der Welt der technisierten Arithmetik verbinden? Dass der logos sich vom natürlich Seienden und somit von der Stimme (phone) trennen lässt, zeigt die Auseinandersetzung von Sokrates/Platon mit den Sophisten und Platons Kratylosin der physei-thesei-Debatte.

    Wir sprechen in der Informationswissenschaft von information retrieval, d. h. vom Abruf von Information (vgl. Capurro 1986). Wie unterscheiden sich der logische und der mathematische Abruf des Seienden? Um was für einen Vorgang handelt es sich hier? Dass die natürlichen Dinge sich uns „zusprechen“, mag einsichtig sein, aber wie können uns Dinge ansprechen, die wir erst konstruieren müssen? Für Platon lag hier ein höherer Zuspruch wohl vor, dem wir entsprechen, wenn wir die Ideen nachahmen. Die Platonische Lösung dessen, was wir Kreativität nennen, sind die Ideen als Vorbilder für die künstliche Herstellung vom Seiendem. Für Aristoteles bleibt das natürlich Seiende das Leitende, wovon sich die logoi abheben. Zahl und logos lassen Seiendes anders sein als es von sich aus, d. h. natürlich ist, und sie lassen auch deshalb Seiendes anders werden, d. h. Seiendes vom logos oder von der Zahl her entstehen, techné on, onto- und monado- oder arithmo-logisch. Die Verbindung ergibt das onto-arithmo-logisch Seiende. Dadurch wird nicht nur das natürlich Seiende (physei onta) anders vergegenwärtigt, sondern es wird Seiendes in seinem Sein anders vernommen. Mit anderen Worten, die onto-arithmo-logische Technik lässt Seiendes anders sein als eben die physis und die bisher bekannten Formen der Herauslösung (Punkt, Zahl). Wie ist also das onto-arithmo-techno-logische Seiende zusammen? Indem es zugleich an einem Ort, aber nicht an ihm gebunden ist.

    Das elektromagnetische Medium ist eine Prägemasse. To ekmageion ist die Masse, worin man etwas abdrückt, Wachs, Gips, und to ekmagma ist das Aus- oder Abgedruckte in Wachs, Gips, daher ein getreues Abbild, Ebenbild. Dieses Wort entspricht dem Lateinischen informatio (vgl. Capurro 1978). Mageia bedeutet Zauberei. Das ekmageion kommt bei Platon in der berühmten Stelle über das Aufnehmende (chora) im "Timaios", in der es um das Aufnehmende für alles Seiende, um die „Amme des Werdens“ (Timaios 52b), die selber „von allen Sichtbarkeiten (eidon) frei sei“ und „alle Herkünfte (gene) in sich aufnehmen, empfangen soll“ (Timaios 50e). Platon behauptet, „dasjenige aber, das weder auf Erden noch irgendwo am Himmel sei, das sei nicht“ (Timaios 52b). Übersetzt heißt dies, dass jedes Seiende eines Mediums bedarf. Das elektromagnetische Medium ist eine Prägemasse, die das digital Seiende aufzunehmen vermag. Das digital Seiende kann sich aber auch frei durch dieses Medium bewegen und Platz darin einnehmen. Insofern ist das elektromagnetische Medium wie die chora ein Raum zum Aufnehmen von digital, d. h. arithmologisch zergliedertem Seienden. Bereits in der Verschriftlichung des logos findet eine Herauslösung des Mitgeteilten aus dem Zusammenhang und somit aus dem Ort statt, was Platon in seiner Schriftkritik klar erkennt. Aber schon der gesprochene logos ist eine Herauslösung aus der Seele des Sprechenden, wodurch dann die Praxis der Sophisten möglich wird, sofern diese die logoi, losgelöst vom Ziel der Wahrheitssuche, für beliebige Zwecke verwenden.

    Die Ontologie orientiert sich am logos oder am on legomenon, d.h. am Seienden, wie es vorliegt als das Worüber eines Sagens. Hier liegt ein Unterschied zu uns: Wir orientieren uns an der monas oder an den mathematikaaber nicht schlechthin, sondern sofern diese – die monades oder Einheiten – techno-logisch digital eingebunden sind. Die Bezeichnung digitale Ontologie ist, von hier aus gesehen, ein Oxymoron. Eher könnten wir von digitaler Ontoarithmetik sprechen.

       Für Aristoteles wird das hypokeimenon als das schon Vorliegende im Hinblick auf das legein, also als etwas, was vor dem Sprechen schon da ist, verstanden. Wie aber, wenn der Grundcharakter des Seins nicht aus dem logos, sondern aus dem arithmos gewonnen wird? Und wie, wenn dieser arithmostechno-logisch aufgefasst wird? Welches ist dann die formale Bestimmung von etwas, was überhaupt ist? Was liegt vor dem Zählen? Was macht das Zählen möglich? Die monas, die ja ungesetzt (athetos) ist. Aristoteles schreibt, dass das hen das Prinzip für etwas ist, was wir dann unter dem Gesichtspunkt des Zählens (arithmos) auffassen können (vgl. Metapysik, V, 1016b18ff.). Das hen ist aber ein Metaprädikat, denn, was wir jeweils als hen betrachten, ist je nach Seiendem unterschieden. Wenn das, was wir zählen, von der Art des Unteilbaren (adiaireton) und Ungesetzten (atheton) ist, dann ist die Einheit, die monas, etwas Unteilbares. Eine Linie ist dann in eine Richtung teilbar etc. Aristoteles trifft hier eine weitere Unterscheidung: Das hen-sein lässt sich der Zahl nach oder dem eidos oder der Analogie nach unterscheiden:

  • das hen, der Zahl nach hat mit der hyle, zu tun;
  • dem eidos nach mit dem logos, oder dem schema tes kategorias;
  • der Analogie nach, wie das Verhältnis des Einen zum Anderen.

Aristoteles schreibt, dass das Verhältnis dieser drei Ebenen so ist, dass die erste Ebene, die der Zahl, die grundlegende ist. Was also der Zahl nach eins ist, hat auch ein Eidos (aber nicht umgekehrt). Die monas ist also eine Form (unter anderen) von Einheit hen. Aristoteles sagt wenig später, dass die Einheit in der Zahl Ursprung und Maßstab ist (en tou arithmou arche kai metron). Gemeint ist wohl, dass das hen als monas oder besser gesagt, dass das hen, arché der monasist und dass die monas wiederum Ursprung des Zählens (arithmos) ist.

    Kehren wir aber zu Heidegger zurück. Was ist ontologisch entscheidend: die monas oder das hen? Jedes on ist zwar ein hen, aber das hen-sein des Seienden ist ja nicht einerlei und nicht mit der monas und dem artihmos gleich. Dennoch ist das hen der Zahl nach grundlegend für das Einssein von Eidos und Analogie. Die Zahl (arithmos) liegt dem logos voraus, denn sie ist nicht gesetzt, athetos). Heidegger schreibt, dass deshalb die Zahl für Platon grundlegender ist als der logos im Hinblick auf die ontologische Besinnung, weil sie weniger braucht als der Punkt, wobei aber das hen „nicht mehr selbst Zahl ist“ (Heidegger 1992: 121). Er schreibt mit Bezug auf die Zahl: „Dasselbe ist durchgeführt am Beispiel des logos“ (Heidegger 1992: 120). Zahlen und Silben sind eigenständig. Es gibt keine Silbe überhaupt, während ein Punkt wie alle Punkte ist.

    Die Zahlen sind, wenn sie an der technischen Schnittstelle zwischen Materie (hyle), Punkt und logos angesiedelt werden, nicht schlechthin ortlos, aber auch nicht an einen Ort gebunden. Das ist erstaunlicherweise auch eine Form von Im-Ort-Sein, die Thomas von Aquin den (von der Materie) „getrennten Intelligenzen“ (intelligentiae separatae) zuweist. Die oft als lächerlich empfundenen scholastischen Überlegungen zur Seinsweise der intelligentiae separatae, also dessen, was theologisch "Engel" genannt wird, könnten ein sehr interessantes Gedankenexperiment in Zusammenhang mit der Seinsweise digitaler Virtualität ausgelegt werden (vgl. Capurro 1993). Es waren die arabischen Philosophen des Mittelalters, die in Anschluss an die antike Kosmologie diesen Begriff prägten. Die „getrennten Intelligenzen“ sollten zum Beispiel dazu dienen, die Sterne und Planeten ewig zu bewegen. Sie waren also als motores gedacht. Die himmlische Mechanik wurde in der Neuzeit durch natürliche Kräfte ersetzt, woraus sich dann auch eine sehr praktische Industrie der Maschinenherstellung entwickeln konnte.

    Am Ende dieser Entwicklung werden die Maschinen wieder abstrakt und wir kommen zurück zu einer Art von „Intelligenz“, die sich durch ihre Virtualität auszeichnet, die aber nicht von einem göttlichen, sondern von einem menschlichen Erbauer hergestellt wird. Die reine universelle Zahlenmaschine vermischt sich aber im Laufe des 20. Jh.s mit dem logos. Um aber dem universellen Charakter der Zahlen und Punkte zu entsprechen, muss der logoskünstlich berechenbar werden. Gehört zu diesem logos eine besondere Form von Verstehen? Ergibt sich daraus nicht so etwas wie eine digitale Hermeneutik? (vgl. Capurro 2008) Kommen wir dem Sein dadurch, paradoxerweise, (anders) näher als durch die natürliche Sprache? Ist das „aisthetische Sichzeigen“ nicht bereits ebenfalls eine Loslösung des Seienden zum „Anderen“ hin? Denn nach Aristoteles bildet sich „in der Seele“ ein Bild (phantasmata) der sichtbaren Dinge, was aber nicht wie eine Verdoppelung der Dinge im Bewußtsein zu interpretieren ist, sondern eher so, dass die Wahrnehmung auf die Dinge je mit dem jeweiligen Sinnesorgan zugeht und dabei das „Eigene“ – Aristoteles nennt es idia  – „wahr-nimmt“. So nimmt das Ohr zum Beispiel sein „Eigenes“, also die Laute wahr.

    Ist es aber nicht so, dass die metaphysische Vorstellung vom Ort des logos in der Seele (psyche) und vom Ort des Denkens als einem Dialog der Seele mit sich selbst (Platon) die eigentliche Herauslösung des logos aus dem existentiellen Zwischen bedeutet, was Heidegger mit dem Vorrang der Rede und mit ihr des „hermeneutischen Als“ vor dem „apophantischen Als“ bezeugt (vgl. Heidegger 1976: 158)? Gilt die Unwahrheit bzw. Verstellung nur für den logos oder auch für die Zahlen? Wo liegt der Unterschied in der Art der Entbergung zwischen den Zahlen und dem logos? Wie gehören diese beiden Formen der Entbergung zusammen? Gibt es nur diese zwei oder auch andere? Und wenn nicht, warum nur diese zwei?

4. Ausblick

Für uns ist nicht die sophia als Wissenschaft vom hen, sondern die Wissenschaft und Technik von der monas und dem arithmos grundlegend. Wenn wir also den arithmos als grundlegend für die Struktur für alles Seiende nehmen, dann bedeutet dies, dass wir uns zwar in den Fußstapfen der griechischen Ontologie bewegen, aber ohne das hen und die sophia. Das bedeutet auch, dass wir dem Gegenwärtigen den Primat auch bei der Auslegung des Daseins geben. Heute besitzen wir eine ausgebildete Mathematik und Logik aber keine Ontologie im Sinne einer Wissenschaft vom Einen. Geblieben ist lediglich das Eine als logische Kategorie. Eine Wissenschaft vom „Einzigen“ scheint heute nur im Bereich der Religion, öfter in dem der Esoterik, möglich. Zugleich aber entwickelt sich eine digitale Ontologie, deren Herrschaft, in Gestalt einer digitalen Metaphysik, mir nicht kleiner erscheint als die des Materialismus im vorigen Jahrhundert.

    Die digitale Ontologie bedenkt ein Code und ein Medium, nämlich die digitale Weltvernetzung, in dem unser Sein sich der Weise eines vielfältigen Rufens und Angerufenwerdens abspielt, wo also die Grenzen zwischen der one-to-many-Struktur der Massenmedien und der one-to-one-Struktur der Individualmedien beim Telefon im Hegelschen Sinne „aufgehoben“ werden. Wenn wir uns des griechischen Wortes für message, nämlich angelia, erinnern, dann können wir sagen, dass wir eine neue angeletische Situation vor uns haben, deren Fundament gegenwärtig die digitale Ontologie darstellt. Ich nenne die Wissenschaft, die sich mit dem Phänomen (dem Code) Bote/Botschaft befasst, Angeletik (vgl. Capurro 2003). Die Hermeneutik, als Theorie des Verstehens von Botschaften, setzt stillschweigend dieses Phänomen voraus.

Die digitale Sicht des Seienden im Ganzen (holon), dass wir also alles, was ist, nur dann in seinem Sein zulassen, wenn wir es im Horizont des Digitalen verstehen, macht die Kernthese der digitalen Ontologie aus. Sofern sie sich darüber im Klaren ist und diesen Seinsentwurf nicht für den einzig gültigen hält, mutiert sie nicht zur digitalen Metaphysik (vgl. Capurro 2006).

 
Literatur

Berkeley, George (1965): A treatise concerning the principles of human knowledge (part I) [1710]. In: Berkeley: Philosophical Writings. Ed. by Desmond M. Clarke. London, pp. 42-128.
Capurro, Rafael (1978): Information. Ein Beitrag zur etymologischen und ideengeschichtlichen    Begründung des Informationsbegriffs. München. 
Capurro, Rafael (1986): Hermeneutik der Fachinformation. Freiburg/München
Capurro, Rafael (1993): Ein Grinsen ohne Katze. Von der Vergleichbarkeit zwischen „künstlicher Intelligenz“ und „getrennten Intelligenzen“. In: Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung, Januar/März, S. 93-102. 
Capurro, Rafael (1999): Beiträge zu einer digitalen Ontologie.
Capurro, Rafael (2003): Theorie der Botschaft. In: Capurro, Rafael: Ethik im Netz. 
Stuttgart, S. 105-122.
Capurro, Rafael (2006): Towards an ontological foundation of information ethics. In: Ethics and Information Technology, vol. 8, no. 4, pp. 175-186.
Capurro, Rafael (2008): Interpreting the digital human. In: Buchanan, Elizabeth; Hansen, Carolyn (eds.): Proceedings. Thinking critically: Alternative methods and perspectives in library and information studies. Wisconsin-Milwaukee (University, Center for Information Policy Research, School of Information Studies), pp. 190-220. 
Cassirer, Ernst (1994): Philosophie der symbolischen Formen [1923]. 10. Aufl. Darmstadt. 3 Bde.
Eldred, Michael (1999): Entwurf einer digitalen Ontologie. 
Eldred, Michael (2008): Social ontology. Recasting political philosophy through a phenomenology of whoness. 
Heusenstamm
Gadamer, Hans-Georg (1975): Wahrheit und Methode [1960]. 4. Aufl. Tübingen.
Heidegger, Martin (1976): Sein und Zeit [1927]. 15. Aufl. Tübingen
Heidegger, Martin (1991): Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik [1929]. 5. vermehrte Aufl. Frankfurt  am Main
Heidegger, Martin (1992): Platon: Sophistes [1924/25]. In: Heidegger, Martin: Gesamtausgabe. Bd. 19. Frankfurt am Main
Lyre, Holger (1998): Quantentheorie der Information. Wien.





HANNAH ARENDT: ELEMENTE UND URSPRÜNGE TOTALER HERRSCHAFT.
Antisemitismus, Imperialismus, totale Herrschaft.
Piper, München Zürich 2000 (7. Aufl.), S. 726-731
.


III. Totale Herrschaft

11 Die totalitäre Bewegung

Totalitäre Propaganda


Auf die Mob- und Eliteelemente der Gesellschaft üben die totalitären Bewegungen eine Anziehungskraft aus, die von Propaganda nahezu unabhängig ist und vor allem jener Trieb- und Schwungkraft ihre Wirkung verdankt, die zu versprechen scheint, alles Bestehende in einem Sturm von Umwälzungen und Terror hinwegzufegen. Die Massen hingegen können nur durch Propaganda gewonnen werden. Totalitäre Bewegungen, sofern sie sich unter normalen Bedingungen von Meinungsfreiheit und verfassungsmäßiger Regierung entwickeln, appellieren an das gleiche Publikum, dem Informationsquellen noch in unbeschränktem Maße zur Verfügung stehen und das durch Gewaltakte nur in sehr begrenztem Maße terrorisiert werden kann.

Daß Propaganda und Terror sich ergänzen wie zwei Seiten der gleichen Medaille, ist zwar von Kritikern wie Anhängern totalitärer Systeme behauptet worden, ist aber nur begrenzt richtig. [1] Totalitäre Regierungen pflegen die Propaganda der Bewegungen durch Indoktrination zu ersetzen, und ihr Terror richtet sich sehr bald (sobald nämlich die Anfangsstadien einer organisierten Opposition überwunden sind) nicht so sehr gegen die Gegner, die man durch Propaganda nicht hat überzeugen können, als gegen jedermann. Sobald totalitäre Diktaturen fest im Sattel sitzen, benutzen sie Terror, um ihre ideologischen Doktrinen und dies aus ihnen folgenden praktischen Lügen mit Gewalt in die Wirklichkeit umzusetzen: Terror wird zu der spezifischen totalen Regierungsform.

So setzte sich die bolschewistische Regirung in Rußland die ideologische Forderung, daß es in einem sozialistischen Lande keine Arbeitslosigkeit geben dürfe, aber nicht so, daß sie propagandistisch-schwindelhaft in einem Moment offenbarer Arbeitslosigkeit behauptete, es gäbe keine Erwerbslosen, sondern indem sie ohne alle Propaganda erst einmal die Arbeitslosenunterstüzung  abschaffte. [2] Die Lüge wurde Wahrheit: Es gab keine Arbeitslosen mehr in Rußland, nur noch Bettler und asoziale Elemente, und der alte sozialistische Grundsatz "Wer nicht arbeitet, soll auch nicht essen" war auf eine zwar unerwartete, dafür aber um so radikalerer Weise verwirklicht worden. Oder. Als Stalin die Geschichte der russischen Revolution umzuschreiben beschloß, bestand seine "Propaganda" der neuen Fassung lediglich darin, zusammen mit der alten Aauflage und den zu ihr gehörenden Dokumenten die alten Autoren und ihre Leser zu vernichten. Als im Jahr 1938 die neue Geschichte der Kommunistischen Partei Rußlands erschien, war die Publikation selbst das Zeichen, daß die Generalreinigung der Partei, die eine ganze Generation der russischen Intelligenz dezimiert hatte, zu Ende war. In beiden Fällen diente Terror dazu, eine Doktrin zu verwirklichen, nicht sie zu propagieren.

Das Naziregime verhielt sich in diesen Fragen ganz ähnlich. Solange es sich noch darum handelte, die Bevölkerung der besetzten Ostgebiete für die Besatzungsmacht zu gewinnen, entfalteten die Nazis eine recht erhebliche antisemitischen Propagandatätigkeit welche auf Terror schon darum verzichten konnte, weil sie die Stimmung der Bevölkerung, vor allem Polens, ganz und gar entgegenkam. Terror wurde erst angewandt, als es sich kurze Zeit darauf, darum handelte, die Rassenlehre, derzufolge die östlichen Völker als Untermenschen keine Intelligenz haten, in die Wirklichkeit umzusetzen und die politische Intelligenz auszurotten, von der damals Widerstand noch nicht einmal zu befürchten stand. Genauso zhielte die sogenannte "Heuaktion", die wegen der Kriegsereignisse nur ansatzweise zur Durchführung kam und in der alle blonden und blauäugigen Kinder aus Polen nach Deutschland entführt werden sollten, nicht darauf ab, die Bevölkerung in Schrecken zu setzen, sondern das germanische "Blut zu retten", das heißt die Rassengrundsätze zu verwirklichen. [3]

Insofern totalitäre Bewegungen in einer Welt existieren, die selbst nicht totalitär ist, sind sie auch gezwungen, das zu machen, was wir gewöhnlich unter Propaganda verstehen. Als solche richtet sie sich immer an ein Außen, sei es an die nichttotalitären Schichten des Volkes, sei es an das nichttotalitäre Ausland. Das Außen, an das die totalitäre Propaganda sich wendet, dann außerordentlilch verschieden sein; es kann auch noch nach der Machtergreifung in den Schichten des eigenen Volkes bestehen, die man nur gleichschalten kann, aber nicht verläßlich indoktrinieren konnte. In dieser Hinsicht sind die Reden,  die Hitler seinen Generälen während  des Krieges hielt, Musterstücke der Propaganda, vor allem durch die faustdicken Lügen kenntlich, mit denen der Führer seine Tischgesellschaft unterhielt und für sich zu gewinnen suchte. [4] Das Außen kann auch durch die Sympathisierenden-Gruppen repräsentiert werden, denen man die eigentlichen Ziele der Bewegung noch nicht mitteilen kann; es kommt schließlich auch oft vor, daß selbst die Parteimitglieder von dem innersten Führerkreis oder den Mitgliedern der Eliteformationen als ein solches Außen betrachtet werden, das noch der Propaganda bedarf, weil es noch nicht zuverläßig beherrscht werden kann. Um die Bedeutung dieser Propaganda und ihrer Lügen nicht zu überschätzen, muß man sich die an sich viel zahlreicheren Fälle vor Augen halten, in denen Hitler an Aufrichtigkeit und brutaler Eindeutigkeit in der Definition der eigentlichen Ziele nicht das geringste zu wünschen übrigließ, die aber dann von einem auf diese Konsequenz nicht vorbereiteten Publikum einfach nicht zur Kenntnis genommen wurden. [5] Im wesentlichen aber strebt die totale Herrschaft danach, Propagandamethoden nur noch in ihrer Außenpolitik zu verwenden oder die Filialen der Bewegung im Ausland mit geeigneter Propaganda zu versorgen. Kommt die Indoktrination des bereits total beherrschten Landes mit der Propagandalinie für das Ausland in Konflikt (was in Rußland geschah, nicht als Stalin seinen Pakt mit Hitler schloß, wohl aber, als er gezwungenermaßen ein Bündnis mit der demokratischen Welt eingehen mußte), so wird die Propaganda innerhalb der eigenen Bewegung ausdrücklich als "zeitweiliges taktisches Manöver" erklärt. [6] Die Unterscheidung zwischen ideologischer Doktrin, die innerhalb der Bewegung der Propaganda nicht mehr bedarf, und reiner Propaganda für die Außenwelt ist soweit wie möglich bereits ausgebildet, bevor die Bewegungen an die Macht kommen. Das Verhältnis zwischen Propaganda und Indoktronation hängt von der Größe und Stärke der Bewegung einerseits, von dem Druck, den die Außenwelt auf sie ausübt, andererseits ab. Je kleiner die Bewegung ist, desto mehr Energie wird sie noch auf Propaganda verwenden; je größer der Druck der Außenwelt auf totalitäre Regierungen ist, ein Druck, der selbst hinter einem "Eisernen Vorhang" niemals ganz ignoriert werden kann, desto aktiver wird die totalitäre Propaganda nach außen und im Ausland werden. Wesentlich ist, daß die Notwendigkeiten der Propaganda immer von der Außenwelt diktiert werden und daß die Bewegungen von sich aus nicht eigentlich propagieren, sondern indoktrinieren. So wächst mit Terror notwendig gekoppelte Indoktrination, je stärker die Bewegungen werden oder je sicherer die totalitären Regierungen sich fühlen.

Propaganda ist in der Tat ein unabdingbarer Bestandteil "psychologischer Kriegsführung". Terror ist mehr. Terror bleibt grundsätzlich die Herrschaftsform totalitärer Regierungen, wenn seine psychologischen Ziele längst erreicht sind; das wirkliche Grauen setzt erst ein, wenn Terror eine vollkommen unterworfene Bevölkerung beherrscht. Wo immer Terror seine Perfektion erreicht hat, wie in den Konzentrationslagern, verschwindet Propaganda völlig; sie war in den Konzentrationslagern sogar ausdrücklich verboten. [7] Propaganda ist mit anderen Worten nur ein Instrument, wenn auch vielleicht das wichtigste, im Verkehr mit der Außenwelt; Terror dagegen ist das wahre Wesen totaler Herrschaft. Terror hat in totalitär regierten Ländern so wenig mit der Existenz von Gegnern des Regimes zu tun, wie die Gesetze in konstitutionell regierten Ländern von denjenigen abhängen, die sie brechen.

-------------------

[1] So etwa auch in E. Kohn-Bramstedt, Dictatorship and political Police, London, 1945. S. 164ff. Die hier gegebene Erklärung ist die übliche: Terror ohne Propaganda hätte keine genügende psychologische Wirkung, während Propaganda ohne Terror ihre volle Wirksamkeit nicht entfalten könne (S. 175). Was in diesen und ähnlichen Formulierungen, die sich meist im Kreise drehen, übersehen wird, ist, daß nicht nur politische Propaganda, sondern die moderne Massenreklame bereits ein Element der Drohung in sich enthält; daß andererseits Terror auch ohne alle Propaganda voll wirksam ist, wenn man sich auf politischen Terror der üblichen Tyrannen beschränkt. Nur wenn Terror nicht von außen, sondern auch gleichsam von innen zwingen will, wenn also das politische Regime mehr will als Macht, bedarf der Terror der Propaganda. In diesem Sinne meint der Nazi-Autor Eugen Hadamovsky, Propaganda und nationale Macht, 1933, S. 22: "Propaganda und Gewalt sind niemals Gegenpole. Die Gewaltanwendung kann ein Teil der Propaganda sein."

[2] Siehe Anton Ciliga, The Russian Enigma, London 1940, S. 109.

[3] Die "Heuaktion" begann mit einem Erlaß Himmlers "betreffend der Deutschstämmigen in Polen" vom 16. Februar 1942, demzufolge Kinder in Familien zu überführen seien, "die bereit sind, die Kinder ohne Vorbehalt, aus Liebe zu dem in dem in den Kindern vorhandenen guten Blut" aufzunehmen. (Nürnberger Dokument R 135, dessen Fotokopie ich im Centre de Documentation Juive, Paris, insehen durfte) Im Juni 1944 scheint dann die neunte Armee 40000 bis 50000 solcher Kinder wirklilch geraubt und nach Deutschland gebracht zu haben. Der Bericht, den ein gewisser Brandenburg darüber an den Generalstab der Wehrmacht nach Berlin schickt, erwähnt ähnliche Pläne für die Ukraine. (Dokument PS 031. Der Text ist abgedruckt bei T. Poliakov, Bréviaire de la Haine, S. 317) - Himmler selbst hat sich mehrmals zu diesem Plan geäußert, siehe Nazi conspiracy and Aggression, Band 3, S. 640, wo Auszüge der Rede von Himmler vom März 1942 in Krakau veröffentlicht sind, und Kohn-Bramstedt, op.cit., S. 244, der über eine Rede in Bad Schachen vom Jahre 1943 berichtet. - Wie die Auswahl dieser Kinder vonstatten ging, können wir aus Attesten ersehen, die von der Abteilung II Med. in Minsk am 10. August 1942 ausgestellt wurden: "Die rassische Untersuchung der Natalie Harpf, geb 14.8.1922, ergab ein normal entwickeltes Mädchen von vorwiegend ostbaltischem Typ mit nordischem Einschlag." - "Die Untersuchung des Arnold Cornies, geb. 19.2.1930, ergab einen normal aufgewachsenen 12jährigen Jungen von vorwiegend ostischem Typ mit nordischem Einschlag." Gez. N. Wc. (Dies Dokument im Archiv des Yiddish Scientific Institute, New York, No. Occ E 3a-17). Für die Vernichtung der polnischen Intelligenz, die nach Hitlers Meinung "ruhig ausgemerzt" werden konnte, siehe Poliakov, op.cit. S. 321 und Dokument NO 2472.

[4] Siehe Hitlers Tischgespräche, in denen er noch im Sommer 1942 davon spricht, "auch den letzten Juden aus Europa (herauszuwerfen)" (S. 113) und sie in Sibirien oder Afrika (S. 311) oder Madagaskar anzusiedeln, während er bereits die "Endlösung" spätestens kurz vor Beginn des russischen Feldzuges, wahrscheinlich schon 1940 beschlossen und im Herbst 1941 den Befehl für die Errichtung von Gasöfen gegeben hatte. (Siehe Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Band 2, S. 265 ff.; Band 3, S. 783 ff. Dokument PS 1104; Band 5, S. 322ff. Dokument PS 2605.) Himmler wußte bereits im Frühling 1941, daß "die Juden bis Kriegsende bis auf den letzten Menschen ausgerottet werden (müssen). Das ist der eindeutige Wunsch und Befehl des Führers." (Dossier Kersten im Centre de Documentation Juive.).

[5] Sehr interessant in dieser Hinsicht ist ein Bericht von einer Diskussion im Führerhauptquartier vom 16. Juli 1940, bei der Rosenberg, Lammers, Keitel und Hitler anwesend waren und während deren Hitler mit folgenden "grundsätzlichen Feststellungen" begann: Wesentlich sei es nun, daß wir unsere Zielsetzug nicht vor der ganzen Welt bekanntgäben; ... Es soll also nicht erkennbar sein, daß sich (mit den Verordnungen für Ruhe und Ordnung in den besetzten Gebieten) eine endgültige Regelung anbahne. "Alle notwendigen Maßnahmen - Erschießen, Aussiedeln - tun wir trotzdem und können wir trotzdem tun." Daran knüpft sich eine Diskussion der Anwesenden, die auf Hitlers Worte überhaupt nicht Bezug nimmt und an der Hitler sich nicht mehr beteiligt. Er war ganz offenbar nicht "verstanden" worden. (Dokument L 221 in Centre de Documentation Juive.)

[6] Daß Stalin volles Vertrauen in Hitler hatte, kann kaum noch bezweifelt werden. Siehe Isaac Deutschers Stalin-Biographie, S. 454ff., und die Anmerkung auf S. 458. Krawtschenko, I Chose Freedom (New York, 1946), schildert, wie das Bündnis mit Hitler auch ideologisch ernst genommen wurde, während die demokratische und nationalistische Propaganda während des Krieges dann niemals bis in die höheren Funktionärschichten der Partei drang,wo all dies nur als Propaganda gewertet wurde.

[7] Und zwar von Himmler selbst. Siehe Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Band 4, S. 616ff.





     

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